

THE UNGUARDED FRONTIER

*A History of American-Canadian
Relations*

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To

NORMAN A. M. MACKENZIE

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CHAPTER I

The Face of the Continent

NO ONE WHO LOOKS with any care at the map of North America is likely to feel that its political divisions explain themselves automatically. Even the secondary boundaries which mark the borders of states and provinces exhibit more than one puzzling feature. They are a reflection of the complex interplay of history and politics and diplomacy—a complexity whose results are still more evident in the line which divides the two nations who share the North American continent.

For it is hard to find a justification in either geography or logic for the boundary between Canada and the United States. Only in the area of the Great Lakes is there something resembling a natural line of demarcation. The rest of this tremendous frontier has been determined piecemeal, and a wide variety of factors contributed to its determination. There was nothing inevitable about the Ashburton award or the Oregon boundary or the forty-ninth parallel in general. Nothing on the physical face of the continent explains why the division lies where it does—or, indeed, why there is a division at all.

Yet the really remarkable fact may be not that there are two separate nations in North America but that there are only two and no more. In the origin and growth of the countries which have become the United States and Canada many nations participated. There was nothing inherent in the conditions of this

continent which prevented them from establishing a number of separate and even hostile states. The obstacles which kept France from planting a powerful colony in the Mississippi Valley, for example, lay not in the Mississippi Valley but in France itself. The future of America has more than once been affected by the shifting situation in Europe. It is a complex balance of political and economic forces that has produced the present situation of a great and unified state occupying most of the Temperate Zone, with a smaller but determinedly independent nation maintaining itself on the habitable northern fringe of the continent.

Here is a case in which politics and economics appear to have combined to modify the initial dictates of geography. For, like all continents, the continent of North America has a basic geographic unity. But, also like other continents, the communities which inhabit it are subject to sectional strains, and the lines of sectionalism are not always identical with the apparent geographical divisions. Nonetheless, geography sometimes has a hand in determining them and in imposing certain economic conditions which have their manifestations in political results. The struggle for the possession of the Ohio Valley, the maneuvers for control of the Mississippi which so unexpectedly led to the Louisiana Purchase and the acquisition of nearly half a continent, the issues which led to armed conflict between the Northern and Southern states—all these reflect the pull between sectionalism and unity which has been a constant feature of American history. Yet it is only in the division between Canada and the United States that sectionalism has effectively triumphed—and even then its triumph has been subject to important qualifications. No division that was based on irreconcilable diversity, however paradoxical it may sound, could have survived for well over a century without a single serious threat of conflict from either side.

The diversity, in fact, is based on a wide measure of community. Its basis is cultural as well as geographic. Through the history and the framework of the two nations there run common threads which are fundamental and lasting. They do not always manifest themselves in the same fashion in either case. They

sometimes take odd twists as they cross and recross the political boundary, and the patterns they produce may occasionally be different north and south of the border. The result has not always been harmonious. Yet the basic factors remain, and they have exercised a steady and a cumulative influence on the relations of Canada and the United States.

These relations have passed through more than one phase of friction and even of outright hostility. It would indeed have been remarkable if the two countries had escaped completely the accustomed consequences of a common frontier. Neighborhood among nations is far from implying amity, particularly in the case of a small state planted on the borders of a great power. And in the case of the United States and Canada there have been positive factors calculated to create difficulties between them. There have been grudges and ambitions. Memories of old grievances, traditions hallowed by past history, economic aspirations, and nationalist enthusiasms have all in their time aroused flares of antagonism on either side. The very causes which made them two separate nations have operated with continued strength to maintain and affirm that separation—at times, indeed, to maintain it in an atmosphere of distrust and even alarm.

Yet such an atmosphere is far from being the real characteristic of the feelings between the two countries. If the factors which make for antagonism have been real, the factors which dictate a serious effort at harmony and co-operation have been far more powerful and persistent. At the root of the relations between Canada and the United States has been a firm desire to share the North American continent in amity and without strife. For well over a century the process has gone on of working out a basis upon which this result could be achieved. It has not always been a conscious process. But even when its development has been left to the somewhat precarious operation of the unguided course of natural events, these, too, have on the whole contributed to that fortunate result which has been increasingly the desire of both sides.

For whatever antagonisms have occasionally developed, they have never reached the point where they threatened to become irreconcilable. Not since the early days of their history has either

nation offered a major threat to the vital interests of the other. The comparative weakness of Canada, the forbearance—at times half unconscious—of the United States have made it possible to bridge the occasional periods of crisis and to go forward toward an increasing friendship and mutual respect based on a growing recognition of mutual dependence.

Canada, indeed, has never, throughout her history, been strong enough to offer a serious threat to her southern neighbor. There was a time, in the days of New France, when there were vain dreams of wiping out the English settlements. But although frontier raids could endanger the safety of outlying communities, there was never any real prospect that the strong and stable colonies along the Atlantic coast could actually be destroyed. The real threat was not to their present existence, but to their future prospects. New France, too weak to conquer them, could still hope to confine them to the area east of the Appalachians. It was this design which led to the struggle for the Mississippi Valley and ultimately to the end of New France.

Even this, it is true, did not finally settle the question. Imperial possession of the coveted area did not, it appeared, imply unquestioned access to it by the various colonies. As their suspicions grew of a design to exclude them, so did their hostility to Britain. The American Revolution and the War of 1812 were both, in certain of their aspects, the American response to the suspicion that England was bent on denying those opportunities for expansion on which their future depended; and Canada, in both cases, was directly involved in the issues at stake.

The War of 1812 ended the threat, but the suspicions died hard. In fact, those Canadian interests which had sought to retain a foothold south of the Great Lakes were now reconciled perforce to the narrower limits of the present boundary, and Britain henceforth showed a growing determination to avoid any action on the American continent which might provoke the United States to war. But the belief remained rooted in large sections of American opinion not so much that Canada herself entertained hostile designs as that Britain was prepared when occasion served to use Canada as the spearhead of aggression against the United States. Not even the long story of British

concessions for the sake of American friendship served completely to banish this legend. It was only when Canada not only achieved full control of her own destinies but succeeded at length in convincing her neighbors that this independent control was a reality that the ancient distrust ceased to find expression in anything more than an occasional campaign utterance by the unscrupulous imposing on the ignorant.

But if Canada was the victim of these suspicions against another, she responded with suspicions on her own account. The conviction that the United States cherished a deep-seated ambition to annex Canada—a belief not without its usefulness in Canadian election campaigns—was for long entertained by large sections of the Canadian people. It must be said that they could bring some evidence to back it up. The frank avowal of annexationist ambitions by American political leaders, however rhetorical they may have been in actuality, were frequent enough to keep the fear alive, and the actual attempts by extremist groups to bring it about seemed warnings to Canada to be constantly on guard. The very fact that her defensive resources were so limited added to her tendency to see active hostility where there was at most a large measure of irresponsibility.

By the United States as a whole, however, Canada's existence as a foreign country was in general viewed with an indifference at times amounting to benevolence. If Canada could have been absorbed without serious effort, the event might have been accepted and even welcomed by Americans. When a controversy arose in which it appeared that important issues were at stake, Washington occasionally took a stand whose firmness was little short of highhanded. But of any serious attempt against the existence of the smaller country there was less and less indication as 1812 receded into the distance.

The fact is that, unflattering though it may be to both sides, Canada has offered little real temptation to American aggression. She has been confined to the occupation of a marginal fringe of the habitable territory of this continent. The lands for which the United States might have been tempted to fight she mostly secured when the boundary was first determined. The further adjustments which she occasionally demanded, in the

areas of Maine and Oregon and Alaska, she secured by vigorous diplomatic action, backed by menaces where necessary. The riches of what remained were not substantial enough to arouse the covetousness of the nation at large, though they did occasionally attract the cupidity of small groups within it. The expansionist energies of the United States were directed toward the more glittering prizes of Texas and California. They were not greatly attracted by the Ontario peninsula or the Canadian prairies, let alone by the Laurentian Shield. It was in this practical lack of incentive rather than any considerations of principle or sentiment that Canada's real security lay. This was not the highest ground, but it may possibly have been the safest. Both Spain and Mexico might testify that reliance on the high ideals of a neighbor is not always the most certain path to national security.

The nature of the motives, however, does not in the least minimize the importance of the results. The peace which was the outcome of these mundane considerations provided an opportunity for the development of far broader and even loftier elements in the relations of the two countries. It gave the time that was necessary to overcome the tenacious legacy of distrust inherited from earlier struggles. It led to a more sober examination of the positions of the two countries and the circumstances which explained them. It made possible a new and a steadily growing understanding which brought an increasing awareness of the extent of their mutual interests and the closeness of their kinship. The two nations became conscious that they shared not only the same habitation, but a similar heritage, and from these twin roots sprang a similarity of standards and outlook which, on almost all issues of major importance, ranged them together in thought as well as in action.

II

In that combination of heredity and environment which has produced a characteristically North American civilization, the hereditary factor is almost purely European. No other external currents joined with those from Europe to produce a new

amalgam. No indigenous culture existed which was strong enough to affect in any profound degree the social and cultural outlook of the European settlers. The modifying influences to which they were subjected were products of geography and climate and economic conditions, not of contacts with the native races. The Indians left few serious imprints on the aggressive newcomers or the society which they established on this continent. The growth of that society in the early days was to some extent conditioned by Indian hostility. The specialized skill of the aboriginal tribes made some contribution to certain aspects of its economy. But from the beginning they were regarded as a primitive element to be exploited or exterminated, not as a coherent society whose characteristics were perpetuated in the one which replaced them.

Initially, indeed, the settlements in America were a projection of Europe overseas. That was not always what the settlers intended. In their own minds many of them had renounced Europe and all its abuses. They were escaping from religious repression or economic frustration to a new land where they hoped to build a world of freedom. Nonetheless, the very urge that sent them out, the aspirations that drew them across the Atlantic were products of European thought and conditions and could have been produced nowhere else. The pioneers could no more renounce their background than they could shed their skins.

Not only that. The contact between Europe and America which the first settlers established was not broken after their arrival. The New World was bound to the Old by ties of increasing strength. The needs and habits and living standards of the colonists meant a demand for a wide variety of articles which only Europe could supply. The colonies could not in the early stages produce the garments and utensils and weapons which the settlers felt were essential. They were not ready to adopt the primitive ways of the American Indian as a permanent mode of life. They were incapable of creating other modes which would free them from outside needs and still satisfy their desires. The prospects of comfort and wealth depended on access to European supplies and European markets, and the economic ties multiplied as the colonies grew.

Along with these went cultural and political ties. The colonies looked to the mother country for guidance and for defense. They got, whether they wanted them or not, laws to regulate their lives and officials to administer the laws. Their intellectual life was fed from the older culture, from the churches and universities and printing presses whose products, from fashions to theology, provided the new communities with things they desired but could not yet produce to their full satisfaction. America was in the direct current of the stream of western civilization which had now spread to the shores of the new continent.

It also inherited at the outset the feuds and divisions of the Old World. Englishmen and Frenchmen and Spaniards brought their prejudices with them, often in a particularly strong version. The political and racial conflicts, the bitter religious antagonisms which characterized the Europe of the seventeenth century were reflected in the communities which stemmed from the various countries overseas. At the outset, at least, the prospects of continental unity in North America were definitely prejudiced by the variety of national stocks which set out to plant their own particular communities on its shores.

These initial conflicts did not immediately disappear under the influence of a new environment. They did, however, undergo a significant transformation. As the various settlements increased in size and strength, the antagonisms which emerged between them became less the result of inherited conflicts than the outcome of indigenous causes. The economic and strategic interests of these communities themselves led to clashes which had little to do with their European background. The European connection continued to play a significant part as the rival colonies looked to their respective home governments for support to their ambitions in America. But it was the American situation which became basic by the eighteenth century; and if the European connection should be broken, or if the local causes of antagonism should disappear, the very fact of a common European background might become a unifying factor in spite of the more superficial fact of racial divergence.

For although America was a projection of Europe, it was not a duplication. Its heredity was substantially affected by its new

environment. And in that environment may be found the explanation not only of the differences between Europe and America, but of certain of the characteristics which distinguish Canada from the United States.

The pioneers who laid the foundations of settlement on the American continent were in a large number of cases the victims of maladjustments. This characteristic was perhaps less general in the case of New France, where immigration was small in any case and where much of it represented a docile response to government urging. Yet even here a part of the incentive was supplied by the hope of escaping from cramped conditions at home to the wider opportunities of a new land. In the English colonies that hope was positive and even passionate. Here came those who were at odds with the religious or economic or social restrictions of the old country and who hoped to escape the bonds or overcome the barriers which at home they had found irksome and in some cases intolerable.

Thus the early colonies drew off a considerable number of those who rebelled against external restraints of one sort or another. Their desire to be free to go their own ways has been elevated by certain later writers into a sort of universal abstraction called the American Dream. Like most dreams, it has a somewhat limited relation to the harsher reality. There may have been those who from the beginning hoped to create a land in which all without distinction would enjoy personal liberty and equality of opportunity. But there were also those whose loud insistence on freedom for themselves was accompanied by an equally loud demand for conformity on the part of others; and the very real progress of political liberty, even in colonial times, did not conceal the early growth of inequalities and abuses in other spheres. Indeed, more than one sincere advocate of equality and toleration was promptly dealt with as a subversive character by the alarmed leaders of his community.

An idealist, in fact, might well regard the American continent as a land of missed opportunities. It is not beyond imagination that in this new land a society might have been created which, building on the best qualities of European civilization, would at the same time have eliminated the abuses and oppressions which

the pioneers had sought to escape. The failure was partly due to the incompleteness of their emancipation. They had reached the stage of rejecting certain obsolete traditions or certain aspects of privilege in social and religious and economic matters. But there were others which they were not prepared to abandon and which were productive of bitter and still-unsolved conflicts. And the very fact that the spirit of individualism was so strong among the early settlers was in some respects an obstacle to the creation of that more restrained and balanced society which alone could have assured the good of all its members.

Moreover, the founders were conditioned by actual and immediate necessities. Their first problem was to find a basis of subsistence. When that had been solved their natural desire was to discover a way to prosperity and wealth. They set out to exploit the resources which the new continent offered to them. It was implicit in their outlook that they should claim full right for individual enterprise to pursue this goal, unchecked by anything except existing property rights, and even to pursue it with a reckless wastefulness whose seriousness was for long concealed by the vastness of the untouched resources which the continent still contained. But this meant adapting the structure and development of the new society to the conditions which the continent imposed; and, shaped by this necessity, the new society was to develop still further the characteristics which distinguished it from that of Europe.

One of the inexorable conditions thus imposed was the continuance of a pioneering element. From the time when the first settlers landed the urge to reach out beyond the bounds of existing settlement to new and untapped areas was powerful and uninterrupted. There never was a line within which it could be felt that there was enough potential wealth for the whole existing population, let alone for the newcomers—by birth or immigration—who constantly added to their number. The restless and the ambitious, the optimistic and the inefficient were constantly being crowded out and forced to accept the hardships of a pioneer existence as the alternative to the frustration which confronted them in their native community.

This was true even when it was a question not of clearing

new lands, but of exploiting existing natural resources. The Hudson's Bay Company, settling down to the fur trade in a remote and unfrequented area, for a long time avoided any serious necessity of expansion. Once its first bases were firmly established, it simply waited for the Indians to bring the furs to them. But as the beaver diminished and competition increased, the company was ultimately forced to gird its reluctant loins and move into the interior, following and eventually extending the trails to new empire which had been blazed by its rivals. The traders of New France felt the necessity almost from the beginning, and as they thrust farther and farther westward to the Mississippi and the Saskatchewan a slender trickle of settlement began to follow in their wake. And the English settlements to the south, beset by a land hunger that was almost insatiable, had no choice but to keep the line of settlement moving ever westward until no more land remained.

It was this process of carving ever newer areas from the wilderness, this steady advance of the agrarian frontier, that was one of the most profound influences in shaping the American way of life. The other pioneering activities were of secondary importance in comparison. Not only the fur trade, but mining and lumbering and cattle raising offered certain outlets to those who felt cramped in the settled communities. But these were too limited to have any profound effect on the general social structure. It was the availability of cheap and ultimately of free land that created the vast army of migrants which for two centuries provided a fluid element in American society—an element which had no real counterpart in modern Europe.

Now one of the significant things about the agrarian frontier is that it was continental in both its scope and its influence. The existence of a political dividing line had almost no modifying effect. There were times when political events such as the American Revolution or restrictive regulations such as those in Canada after 1814 might divert a few secondary currents for a brief period. But these were the exceptions. For most of its course the tide flowed on along its natural channels. The American migration overlapped into Acadia and Ontario and the Canadian west. The Canadian exodus joined the current to Minnesota and

the Dakotas, and French as well as English-speaking Canadians went to swell the stream. On both sides of the line men who saw a dwindling of opportunities in their own community moved farther on where lands were cheap and taxes low; and, compared with these advantages, the question of what government controlled the lands and levied the taxes was to most of them of secondary importance.

Naturally the outlook of these frontier communities was affected by the conditions they had to meet. The pioneer was an individualist. He was also an equalitarian. He had confidence in his own ability to take care of himself and an abiding faith that he was as good as anyone else, or even a little better. He was strongly insistent on his own personal freedom and equally strongly opposed to special privilege and oligarchic rule. The frontier was inevitably a school of democracy and of social and economic equality.

This fact affected the whole community. As the frontier settlements were absorbed into the general body, to be succeeded by new settlements still farther on, their characteristics had a leavening effect on the whole lump. Whether they were in Ohio or Ontario, Minnesota or Manitoba, the effect was basically the same. It was not so much the addition of a new outlook as the preservation and strengthening of that original spirit of individualism which might otherwise have been weakened in the older communities. They kept alive an advancing democracy against the growing conservatism of the new propertied classes. The frontier, whether in Canada or the United States, fostered an attachment to the democratic ideal which was the outcome not of abstract speculation, but of practical conditions.

Moreover, they introduced into the older communities an element of flexibility which was also a democratic force. Even if the frontier communities had not themselves been absorbed into the mass of the nation, the very fact that there was a frontier would have had a significant effect. Its presence hindered, if it did not wholly prevent, the growth of a static and rigidly stratified society. There was a period, for instance, when the best lands in Ontario had been largely occupied and the vacant lands in the Canadian west were hardly accessible for practical pur-

poses. But the opportunities which were lacking in Canada were available in the United States, and Canadians who sought new openings moved freely to the American West. On both sides of the line the citizen who was dissatisfied with his existing fortunes could find somewhere else to make a fresh start. It might, of course, turn out that he was flying to other and unknown ills which were still more difficult to endure. But even if his choice was made under illusions, he had a choice. He need not feel that he was fixed in a mold from which there was no escape.

The frontier was thus a force which made a vital contribution to the underlying unity of the North American continent. It is no paradox to say that it also helped to rouse sectional conflicts, for there was a constant interplay of these two aspects, and diversity of interests only partly offset a basic similarity of outlook. In particular it had a profound effect not only on the formal relations but, to a far greater extent, on the basic national viewpoints of Canada and the United States. It was not merely that the two peoples were constantly mingling in one single movement of expansion. Their mutual contributions to each other's growth were of the utmost value to both sides. But still more important was the effect of this common factor in forming common habits of thought and action on both sides of the line. The powerful force of westward expansion largely ignored the political frontier as a barrier to population movements, and the result was to reduce very greatly the significance of the boundary as a cultural dividing line.

III

Nonetheless, the political boundary was not entirely without influence. It did mark off two nations which, in spite of these basic similarities, exhibited very real differences as well. And while certain of these would have existed in any case, their effect has been increased in a number of instances, not only by the existence of a line of demarcation, but by the fact that this line lies where it does.

It has first of all accentuated the importance of geography. If the boundary has had little influence on the movement of

population, it has had a very real effect on the movement of goods. It has drawn a line between the resources of the two nations and between domestic and foreign markets. It has forced the Canadian economy to adapt itself to the limitations of the political structure, and the necessity has created for Canada special problems somewhat different in nature from those confronting the United States.

Perhaps the outstanding factor is the scarcity of cultivable land. It is scattered in comparatively small and isolated pockets along the southern fringe of the Dominion. The most substantial area is the northern wedge of the continental plain which embraces a large part of the prairie provinces, and even this is afflicted by the precarious hazards of climate and rainfall. In central Canada the St. Lawrence Valley and the Ontario peninsula present a rich but very limited area which at present contains 60 per cent of the population of the Dominion. On the east and west coasts, in the Maritime Provinces and British Columbia, the farm lands are scattered through a few fertile valleys beyond which there is little temptation for settlement to extend. For all the vastness of its empty spaces, there are few agricultural areas in Canada which are still open to occupation.

Thus Canada has presented a very limited field for population or expansion. Besides that, the actual process of expansion has been seriously hampered by the physical barriers between these isolated areas. There has been no continuous and advancing frontier in Canada as there was in the United States. On the borders of each area the pioneer has come up against formidable natural obstacles, and the cost of overcoming these obstacles has been very great in money and time and energy.

For if nature interposed the Appalachian barrier between the American coastal plain and the great fertile stretches of the interior, her aspect in Canada has been still more forbidding. Not only does the Appalachian system extend into the Maritime Provinces and eastern Quebec; it swings seaward and at the same time sinks toward the ocean. What formed the coastal plain farther south disappears beneath the Atlantic to form the continental shelf, and there remain only the tops of sunken mountains with occasional pockets of arable land cupped in their

depressions. Quite apart from the Shickshock ridges which separate New Brunswick from Quebec, the lower elevations also impose the barrier of a wilderness in which a light soil will support the forest growth but holds little promise for the land-seeking pioneer.

Thus the communities on the Atlantic coast are separated from those of central Canada by something more than mere distance. In the same way Ontario and Quebec are physically isolated from the prairie provinces. The grim mass of the Laurentian Shield interposes its vast bulk between the two sections, and a thousand miles of rocky wilderness lay between the settlements of early Ontario and the broad acres of the Canadian west.

The Laurentian Shield has shaped the whole course of Canadian development. This tremendous area of glacial rock extends from Labrador to the Mackenzie and from the Great Lakes to the Arctic. Its two and a half million square miles comprise two thirds of the whole area of the Dominion. With the exception of a very few pockets, such as the clay belt of northern Ontario, it is uncompromisingly unsuited for cultivation. Its rocky outcroppings, covered with forests in the south and with muskeg in the north, hold no lure to settlement except under the most specialized conditions. Its forests are an important element in the Canadian economy. An increasing wealth of minerals is slowly being wrung from its stubborn crust. But neither of these industries is intensive enough to attract large numbers of settlers. The lack of either coal or high-grade iron ore has prevented it from becoming a populous manufacturing area, quite apart from other disadvantages, and even the development of its resources in water power has so far done little to change that situation.

Thus there was no possibility of a steady and progressive expansion from Ontario toward the west. The settlement of the prairies waited until the tide of American expansion flowed in from the south and the Canadian railways, driving through the uninhabited lands north of the Great Lakes, gave direct access from the more distant areas of Canada itself. And as the Shield hemmed the prairies in on their eastern flank, so the Rockies

confined them on the west, filling the rest of the land to the very shores of the Pacific and cutting off the settlers in the coastal valleys from the rest of the Dominion.

Here are four sections whose effective integration has presented a formidable problem. With few natural links binding them together, they have at the same time found their natural orientation hampered by the political boundary. Without that boundary the Maritime Provinces might have been more integrally connected with New England and British Columbia with the rest of the Pacific coast. Even as it is, they have had to make some efforts to minimize the economic effects of political separation. But they have also been driven to look in other directions for economic salvation, and their tendency has been to look seaward rather than to the interior. The connection of both extremities with the central portions of the Dominion has been limited and somewhat uneasy, and even this has been achieved only by a major effort to overcome the disadvantages of geography.

Between the prairies and central Canada the connection, though still far from close, has something more of a natural basis. The prairies represent the last remnant of the economic system of the St. Lawrence—that structure which, in the early days, it was hoped would make the whole hinterland of the continent a tributary dependency of Montreal.

Of the four great water inlets to the interior of the continent from the Atlantic side, the St. Lawrence in the early stages enjoyed an unquestioned supremacy. Hudson Bay was an area for only specialized enterprise. The Mississippi was only later used as a route for penetration; indeed, the first approaches were by way of its upper reaches and were calculated to bring it into subjection to the St. Lawrence system. The Hudson-Mohawk route, which later emerged as a triumphant rival, only attained that position with the spread of western settlement and the construction of the Erie Canal. It was the route of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes that led to the wealth of the interior and that tapped a vast area from the Arkansas to the Saskatchewan.

As a result the dependence of central Canada was from the

first less on settlement than on commerce. Even after political separation there were constant attempts to continue the commercial control of the American hinterland. There was little prospect of sudden wealth in the resources that were left to Canada after 1783. But if she could continue as the intermediary between the products of this continent and the markets of Europe, the future was bright. Even without any extensive settlement in Canada she could take tribute from the flow of products down the St. Lawrence, and the more rapid was American expansion, the more would Canada benefit from it.

That dream never fully materialized. It was not the St. Lawrence but the Erie Canal that became the chief artery of western commerce, to be supplemented later by American railways. How far the political boundary contributed to this result was a matter of speculation. But Canada was, in any case, thrown back within that boundary and forced to seek in her own resources the foundations of her prosperity.

That did not remove the importance of the commercial aspect. To profit from her natural products, Canada still had to be an exporting and trading nation. The products were too limited in number to make her self-sufficient; they must be sent abroad in quantities in order to provide the imports which an American standard of living demanded and which Canada could not herself produce. But to exploit these natural products on such a scale—and even to add the products of agriculture and manufacture—involved a tremendous outlay of money and energy. The problem of transportation alone was a formidable one. Railways could make possible the development of the West, the opening up of mining areas, the supplementing of water transport when the Northern winter closed it for months on end. They had to be built through areas from which they would draw no traffic and at the expense of a small population which many of these enterprises would do little to help expand. For a century and more the limitations of geography have lain heavily on the Canadian economy.

They have also had a real effect upon the racial situation. The fact that Canada's population is primarily drawn from two racial stocks need not by itself have presented a major problem.

But the confines of the political boundary helped to prevent a type of expansion which might have produced a practical amalgam in the natural course of events. In the United States the frontier, notwithstanding the persistence of economic sectionalism, did tend to create a measure of uniformity in type and outlook among the pioneers, however diverse their origins. But in Canada the frontier was neither extensive enough nor continuous enough to have the same effect. It failed to unify the two races, and at the same time the available area of expansion was not great enough for either one of them to attain such an overwhelming numerical superiority that the other would be reduced to a hopeless minority. The geographical factor helped to keep the two races in relative balance. It also had a certain influence on the emergence of a body of special privileges on both sides, as political evolution was affected by the limitations which geography seemed to impose on the prospects of future development. The result of this historical process and its political implications was to create a situation in Canada which has no parallel in the United States.

It has also been a factor in the continued separation of the two countries. The maintenance of that individual character and those characteristic institutions which has been possible for a strong French community within Canada would be much more difficult within the wider bounds of a continental union. The French leaders have consistently recognized that their racial and cultural position would be much more precarious if they were reduced to a small minority through the annexation of Canada to the United States. If Canada had offered scope for an indefinite expansion of population, the French position might have been undermined even there. But the existing boundary strictly limited such prospects. Expansion soon approached its practicable limits, and the influx of immigration ebbed as opportunities dwindled. With the achievement of a relative population stability the French were enabled by their superior birth rate to hold and even to improve their ground. They have, it is true, shared the economic disadvantages resulting from these geographical limitations—disadvantages which have been illustrated by the drift of French as well as English-speaking Cana-

dians to the United States. But in the eyes of the French leaders this is a phenomenon to be combated, not to be accepted as foreshadowing an inevitable destiny. The preservation of their peculiar institutions is more important than the lure of wider economic opportunity; and since the choice has to be made, the choice has been in favor of a narrower political community in which French separatism has proved its ability to survive. Lord Elgin had perhaps better grounds than he realized for suggesting that the last hand which would wave the British flag on American soil might be that of a French Canadian.

For Canada's geographical position and limitations have played no small part in her insistence on maintaining her political connection with Great Britain. She has, in fact, been constantly subject to two powerful and at times conflicting attractions. The physical fact that she is located on the American continent has made her relations with the United States of prime importance, and this has been reinforced by cultural influences and economic needs. But economic factors have also operated to strengthen her imperial ties, and the very fact of her propinquity to the United States has seemed at times to make her reliance on Britain a necessity. To balance that there have been risks as well as advantages. Her position as the nearest British territory occasionally exposed her to vicarious visitations of American wrath against Great Britain. But that has not diminished the importance in Canadian policy of the belief that the British connection was an essential safeguard against absorption by the United States.

A determined resistance to such absorption has been an almost unbroken theme in the history of the relations of the two nations. The roots of this separatism trace back to historical causes, arising to no small extent out of geographical factors and their economic implications. These factors have continued to operate in favor of separatism on the part of Canada. But they have been accompanied, and occasionally almost balanced, by other factors which exercise a continual pull in the direction of a continental unity. For the United States there has been no dilemma. The advantages of continental unity have seldom been seriously questioned, and the belief that such a unity was dictated by

manifest destiny has led on more than one occasion to strenuous efforts to bring it to pass. For Canada, however, the dictates of destiny have appeared less plain. There was loss as well as gain to be faced, and in the shifting balance between these conflicting considerations and in the attempt of Canada to effect a compromise between them may be found one of the keys to the historical relations between Canada and the United States.

CHAPTER II

The Struggle for Empire

THE EARLY STRUGGLE for the control of North America was the result of a complex of factors, any one of which might by itself have led to a serious clash. Differences in race and religion, the struggles in Europe which had their repercussions in the colonies, above all a growing economic rivalry with its extensive geographic implications—all of these had their part in bringing about armed hostilities. But important as each was in itself, it was not inevitable that any single one should have made the quarrel so deep-rooted as to be irreconcilable. It was only when they came to operate simultaneously that the issue could be settled only by conquest.

Here was a case in which the forces of sectionalism were paramount. In the quarrels in which the newly freed American states indulged after the Revolution—quarrels which led some of them to the verge of actual hostilities—there were, nonetheless, forces of unity available. There were important groups whose interests were general rather than local, and these eventually took the situation in hand and created a unified nation under the Constitution of 1787. But there was no such body of general interest at work to reconcile New France and the thirteen colonies. Instead, there were forces which—particularly on the French side—dictated a determined effort to crush the neighboring settlements who seemed a threat not only to present security, but still more to future prospects.

In the development of this situation diversity of race was an obvious starting point. If New France and New England had been of the same stock they might have been slower to attack each other. Possibly they might never have fought at all. But if diversity of race removed certain barriers to conflict it did not provoke the strife. It merely made it easier for strife to break out when other factors began to operate.

To some extent the same is true of the diversity of religion. Yet this, too, facilitated antagonism and even helped to provoke it. The provocation came particularly from the French side. New England had a real hostility to Papists and a real dislike of the nearness of a French Catholic state. But however much this feeling might be vented on Acadia, it would hardly have aroused in New England the zeal and energy needed for the formidable task of conquering Quebec. It would have called for substantial help from the other colonies or from the mother country, and neither was likely to undertake the effort on the ground of religion alone. There was little enthusiasm for a crusade of this nature even in New York and Pennsylvania, let alone in the remoter colonies to the south.

New France, however, was imbued with a very real zeal against the heretics. Religion was a fundamental element in the colony from its beginning. The Jesuits, who were in the forefront of the missionary effort, were particularly concerned. Their desire to convert the Indians to the Catholic faith was hardly greater than their fear that the Indians might become the victims of heresy. It is no exaggeration to say that the Jesuits preferred the savages to remain in pagan innocence (which still offered an open field for their efforts) rather than see them fall into the snare of Puritan theology. Given such views, the Church was bound to welcome any prospect of driving the English from the continent, and its servants among the Indians on more than one occasion used their influence to send the savages out on the warpath. The religio-nationalist combination was incomparably stronger in New France than in any of the English colonies.

It was, however, the economic factor which provided the chief spur. It was linked closely with geography. It became inextricably involved in the political aspect. But it remained the funda-

mental issue which, arising on this continent, paved the way for the ultimate struggle for control.

It arose from the very nature of the French colony. The choice of Canada as the theater of France's chief colonial effort in America was in some respects accidental. The first conscious attempts had been made in less inhospitable zones. But motives and resources had both been inadequate for the success of the Huguenot efforts in Brazil and Florida. A stronger economic incentive was needed. That was provided by the fur trade, and the desire of French private interests to develop the fur trade led to the colonization of Canada.

Out of the necessities of the fur trade grew a program of steadily widening expansion. As its demand depleted the nearest regions it reached out to tap continually greater areas. The very survival of the colony depended on the success of this process of finding new sources of supply and almost equally on the eliminating or forestalling of competition in the chief fur areas. And as the trade advanced religion and politics marched in its wake. The Church sought to hold the newly discovered tribes within the sphere of its own activity. Clergy and traders, as their range extended, relied more and more on the state for aid and protection. And in the minds of both traders and government officials there gradually arose a vision of a great continental empire which would minister not only to commerce and religion but to the glory and prosperity of France.

This was a project which was enthusiastically supported by such rulers as Talon and Frontenac. It was an integral part of the imperial vision of La Salle and of the professed objectives of La Vérendrye, however much the hope of private profit may also have influenced their schemes. It led them down the Mississippi and westward to the Saskatchewan. It stimulated the effort to colonize Louisiana and the founding of New Orleans. By the early part of the eighteenth century France was well on the way to fastening her control on the strategic line which bisects the continent from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico.

If that had been all the clash might still have been delayed. It would have come eventually, but only when two different types of expansion actually came to grips. But, in fact, the issue

was joined long before this happened. It was joined not so much directly by the two sides as through their respective instruments, but once this had happened the principals were not slow in becoming directly involved.

The key to this situation lay with the Indians. However little the native tribes may have affected the culture of the colonies, they were a vital element in certain aspects of the early economy. This was of course particularly true of the fur trade. The *coureur de bois* played an important role, but he was more often a trader than a trapper. It was on the trapper that the fur trade was built, and that meant the Indian. There was no place in the fur trade—or indeed in Canadian tradition in general—for the maxim that the only good Indian is a dead Indian. To the trader of New France or Hudson Bay it must have seemed at times that the Indians were too few rather than too numerous. An Indian who was any good to the trader was not only alive and active but powerfully imbued with the acquisitive instinct.

But although the French depended so completely on the Indians they could not hold them all in impartial friendship. The Indians themselves were at odds for the control of the position of middleman in the fur trade between the Europeans and the western tribes. In this struggle the French, perhaps inevitably, were forced into the position of partisans. When Champlain joined a war party against the Iroquois the choice was made, with profound consequences for New France. Faced with this alliance, the Iroquois sought European allies of their own. They resorted to Albany, first to the Dutch and then to the English, for the weapons and supplies which they needed to redress the odds. In return they not only brought their own furs to the English but sought to intercept the flow to Montreal and divert it southward, to their own profit as intermediaries, and at the height of their power they even threatened to wipe out Montreal itself.

This was the situation with which New France had to deal. By firmness and energy they might have crushed the Iroquois had these been isolated. But behind them stood the English, and by 1684 the English had secured a definite treaty with the Six Nations which placed them under the protection of the British

Crown. An attack on them was no longer merely a punitive expedition; it was an international affair, and if Canada hoped to eliminate her savage enemies she was almost forced to eliminate the English as well.

This was the project upon which Frontenac, in his last period as governor of New France, proceeded to embark. His plan called for a double attack on the colony of New York by an expedition from Canada down the Hudson and a French naval attack on New York itself. The plan collapsed—as later and similar plans were to do—when the naval help failed to materialize. But the series of raids which was launched against the frontiers of the English colonies gave notice that a quarrel, indigenous to this continent, had entered a new phase in which the mother countries of the belligerents would be more and more involved.

It is a matter for speculation what the outcome would have been if the relations of the mother countries had been different. As it was, they had already entered upon a struggle in Europe which was to have direct repercussions in America. If Britain and France had been allied or even actively friendly they might have restrained their American colonies from hostilities, though the restraint would have had to be exercised in a positive and decisive manner. But by 1689 they had entered upon that prolonged though spasmodic conflict which was to end only in 1815. A new age of world commerce had now dawned. The old commercial rivals of Britain—Spain and Holland—had sunk to second place. But the France of Louis XIV, threatening to secure the mastery of the continent and to master the Low Countries as well, had now emerged as a rival for commercial and maritime supremacy. Here was a combination of threats which touched the most vital springs of British policy, and Britain was compelled, almost by her very nature, to fight rather than see them become a reality.

The scope of the struggle that was now joined spread eventually halfway around the globe. In the course of her military effort in Europe, England discovered in Marlborough her one soldier of genius between Henry V and Wellington. But it was not only on the battlefields of Flanders or the Danube that her

forces were engaged. In this struggle for national power the imperial resources of both belligerents were also at stake. Slow though they were to recognize it, the destruction of the enemy's commerce implied a full-scale attack on the colonies which were growing as bases of commercial and national strength. The vital importance of sea power emerged with increasing clarity, and behind the struggle for mastery of the seas there lay the fight for overseas empire. When that became clear America was at last seen to have a definite place in the balance of power.

By 1701, with the outbreak of the war of the Spanish succession (Queen Anne's War), the struggle in America had been joined on two fronts and was soon to spread to a third, the most vital of all. The fight for Hudson Bay was secondary in scale and in significance. It was decided at the Peace of Utrecht, and that decision was never seriously challenged. But the fight for Acadia, though also small in scale, held a greater importance. It represented the real beginning of serious conflict—a conflict which was to spread to the Ohio Valley and to reach a climax on the Plains of Abraham.

II

If Acadia had stood alone it could never have presented a serious threat to its neighbors in New England. A bare handful of settlers, deserted by France and left to exist as best they could in the face of periodic depredations by such freebooters as Argall and Kirke, even their survival was a marvel of stubborn tenacity. But they numbered only 1,773 in 1714 against a New England population of 110,000. On the face of it, Boston had little to fear from Port Royal.

There were, nonetheless, potential elements in Acadia's position which kept alive the concern of New England. Quite apart from the possibility that French settlement might extend into Maine and forestall English occupation of the northern coastal area—a possibility which on the whole was pretty remote—the possession by the French of such a strategic base in the north Atlantic could not be viewed with complete indifference. It lay on the flank of the commercial and fishing routes which

were of growing importance to New England. It might be developed into a base from which the French competition with New England fisheries, already strong in the area extending to the Grand Banks, could operate with increasing effectiveness. The possibility of developing a trade with the West Indies naturally appealed to Acadia and perturbed New England interests, even though little was done to make it a reality. The significance of Acadia as a naval base in time of war was foreshadowed by the operation of privateers from Port Royal, to the detriment of New England commerce. On all these counts it was desirable that a potentially hostile community—hostile not only in race, but in religion—should be eliminated before it was in a position to offer a serious threat.

For such a danger to become actual, Acadia would have to receive outside support, and particularly support from France. There were few signs before 1713 that France had any real interest in developing Acadia as a base for aggression in America. But as aggression developed from New France, and as Paris lent a favorable ear to Frontenac's designs against the English colonies, the prospect that Acadia would be used as an outpost for attack drew steadily nearer. The English colonies on their part recognized that the root of the danger lay for the moment at Quebec. But Quebec was difficult of access, whereas Acadia was vulnerable and near at hand. It was thus, naturally, a first object of attack, both to clear away this French flank position and to inflict vicarious retribution for the sins of New France. The expeditions of 1690 and 1710 both failed to effect their ultimate object of capturing Quebec, but both resulted in the capture of Port Royal. The first capture was nullified by the return of Acadia to France in 1697. But the second helped to bring a greater attention to colonial interests on the part of European diplomacy, and by the Treaty of Utrecht Acadia was ceded to England in 1713.

The result, however, was not the end of conflict in this area. The peace merely inaugurated a new stage which called forth more serious efforts from both sides. It was made possible by the limitations on the cessions which the French had made. They were not removed completely from their foothold on the north

Atlantic coast, and the loss which they had accepted merely stirred them to new interest in the possible advantages of what remained.

There was first of all the controversy over the boundaries. Acadia had been ceded conformable to its ancient limits. But there was no agreement as to what these limits were, and the efforts of the boundary commission failed to result in an acceptable decision. By energetic action the French were able to confine their rivals to the peninsula of Nova Scotia and to plan a more effective occupation of the mainland beyond the isthmus. Their resources were inadequate to the latter project, but the fact that they made such an effort, and particularly the eventual establishment of a military outpost at Fort Beauséjour, gave indications that the French intended not only to preserve all they could, but to recover the remainder at the first opportunity.

The establishment of Louisburg was still more striking evidence of France's new interest in this hitherto-neglected region. Whatever had been ceded on the mainland, the Isle Royale—the present Cape Breton—remained an undoubted French possession. Here was a site for a base which would be more convenient as well as more formidable than the former one at Port Royal. It would support and protect the French Atlantic fisheries. It would serve as a bulwark of Canada by commanding the entrance to the St. Lawrence. It would, it was hoped, serve as a pivot for the development of the West Indian trade. It offered a refuge and a port of supply on the route between France and Canada which would serve both merchant vessels and warships, and in time of war it would dominate the north Atlantic, menace the commerce of New England, and threaten the sea communications between England and the colonies.

Finally there was a new attitude toward the Acadians. Hitherto neither France nor Canada had paid them much attention. But as the struggle was joined in the interior the advantages of Acadia as an outpost on the Atlantic flank became too important to neglect. The Acadians, having been surrendered to English rule, were now being urged to refuse submission to their new masters. Physical as well as moral pressure was brought to bear. Priests kept before them the danger that they would be deprived

of their religion, and Indian raids on Acadian settlements pointed the danger of any defection in patriotism. Most of the Acadians only wanted to be let alone, as they had been for over a century. But they had inadvertently attained the position of useful pawns in the imperial ambitions of both France and Canada, and both were determined to use them as a spearhead, regardless of the effect upon the Acadians themselves.

This new effort to consolidate and retrieve the French position provoked a hardening of the attitude of New England in reply. It found its embodiment in William Shirley, who became governor of Massachusetts in 1741. Like Frontenac a half century before, Shirley had reached the firm conclusion that the continent was not big enough for the two nations to share in peace and harmony. Already, with only the bare fringes of America touched by settlement, France and England had reached a stage where their interests in the New World were irreconcilably at odds. Only the destruction of French power could make the English colonies secure, and to this central object Shirley henceforth devoted all the energy and resources at his command.

The stronghold of French power on this continent was the St. Lawrence, and the conquest of Canada proper was Shirley's ultimate objective. But the conquest of Acadia occupied much of his attention, not only in order that a menace might be removed, but that a definite asset might be gained. He believed it to be the most important of all England's possessions in America from the imperial point of view. Consequently, not only must the French be dislodged from their remaining footholds; the Acadian population, nominally under English rule, must be subjected in fact as well as in form. The conquest of Louisburg and the Anglicizing of the Acadians became the twin aspects of his policy, and both were powerfully supported by New England sentiment.

The strength of this sentiment was proved by the first capture of Louisburg in 1745. It was a New England enterprise, both in its inception and in its military execution. A naval squadron from Britain provided the sea power necessary to its success. But the troops were New England levies who set off with a sublime self-confidence to storm the most modern fortifications that existed on the American continent.

The confidence of the rank and file was based to no small extent upon ignorance. But Shirley, the moving spirit of the expedition, had a very shrewd knowledge of the defects of the French establishment. Louisburg had inexperienced officers, a mutinous garrison, a shortage of provisions, and an armament that was incomplete and ill arranged. Only these defects plus a lack of either competence or energy on the part of the defenders enabled the expedition to succeed. "If any one circumstance had taken a wrong turn on our side," wrote a New England commentator, "or if any one circumstance had not taken a wrong turn on the French side, the expedition must have miscarried." But the energy and enthusiasm of the attackers made up for any technical defects in organization and equipment, and after a six weeks' siege the New England forces were in possession of the stronghold.

In the outcome it seemed a futile effort. Plans to follow it with an attack on Canada were never implemented, and when peace was signed in 1748 the colonies discovered that Louisburg had been restored to France. But even though this gave the French an opportunity to remedy the defects which led to its fall, the episode was not without its significance. It marked a further stage in the hardening of resolution on both sides, and one result was the situation which led to the expulsion of the Acadians.

The Treaty of Utrecht had apparently provided a clear-cut choice for the population of Acadia. Those who so desired were to be free to emigrate within a year; those who remained were to become subjects of Great Britain, but to enjoy the free exercise of their religion. The French authorities, desirous of strengthening the islands of Cape Breton and St. Jean as prospective footholds for a recovery of their Atlantic position, threw their influence on the side of emigration. A majority of the Acadians initially declared their desire to move. But some of them lost their enthusiasm for the prospect of leaving their comfortable homesteads to embark on a pioneer existence in areas that seemed on inspection to be none too hospitable. The English authorities, on their part, viewed the prospect with the utmost apprehension. Quite apart from their reluctance to facilitate

anything which would strengthen the French colonies, they had no desire to see the new colony suddenly depopulated. When, therefore, the Acadians requested permission to move the English put obstacles in their way. The ships which the French were to have sent to transport the settlers never arrived. The English refused to provide transportation. The boats which the Acadians constructed were seized by the authorities. When the year stipulated by the treaty had elapsed the bulk of the Acadians were still within the province.

Then a new issue arose. The death of Queen Anne and the accession of George I led to a demand that the inhabitants take an oath to the new sovereign. The Acadians refused. They had no intention of causing trouble, but neither had they any desire to bring trouble on themselves. Eventually they agreed to a compromise. They would take the desired oath, but only on condition that they be exempted from bearing arms. This was an exemption which the English were unprepared to allow, yet they found no means of enforcing the unqualified oath without driving the Acadians from the colony. This they were reluctant to do, and each new effort during the subsequent forty years only convinced the Acadians that their refusal could be maintained without serious consequences.

After 1748, however, the situation was more difficult, and the Acadians found themselves in a most unhappy position. The French activities on the borders of the province took on a new vigor. Forts were built to command the isthmus of Chignecto, particularly Fort Beauséjour on the western side. Increased pressure was brought on the Acadians to continue true to their French allegiance. Rumors of English designs against their religion were backed by the activities of a priest called Le Loutre, who stirred up the Indians against the English and threatened spiritual doom to the inhabitants who submitted to English rule. French activities were taking on an uncompromising character which must soon force a definite test of authority in Acadia.

The attitude of the English authorities also began to stiffen. Although Louisburg had been returned, partly to secure the return of Madras to England, it was now recognized as a serious potential menace so long as it remained in French hands. To

counteract the danger it was decided to establish Halifax as a military and naval base in 1749 and to try to settle the colony with a reliable Protestant population to offset the dubious neutrality of the Acadians. At the same time efforts were renewed to remove the ambiguities in the Acadian position, and the prospect that this might drive them from the colony became less alarming as immigration from England and Europe promised a settled population to replace the French inhabitants as a source of labor and food supplies.

Even then the English attitude crystallized only slowly. Efforts by Cornwallis to enforce the unqualified oath in 1749 met with no more success than those of his predecessors. Appeals to England for guidance brought little light from the indecisive Newcastle ministry. "The more we consider this point," wrote the Board of Trade to Governor Lawrence in 1754, "the more nice and difficult it appears to us; for, as on the one hand great caution ought to be used to avoid giving any alarm and creating such a diffidence in their minds as might induce them to quit the province, so on the other hand we should be equally cautious of creating an improper and false confidence in them, that, by a perseverance in refusing to take the oath of allegiance, they may gradually work out in their own way a right to their lands and to the benefit and protection of the law, which they are not entitled to but on that condition." Clearly the home authorities were bent on avoiding decision and leaving the risks and the responsibilities to the man on the spot.

There were, however, more clear-cut influences at work. New England sentiment, as expressed by Shirley, was now calling for an end to uncertainties and a definite policy which would assure the tranquillity of Acadia. Steps should be taken to remove the influence of the French and their missionaries. The most active intransigents among the Acadians should be not expelled to join the French, but deported for safekeeping to the other English colonies. A coherent policy directed toward the conversion and the Anglicizing of the Acadians should be embarked upon, so that by the next generation they might "in a great measure become true Protestant subjects."

This was a long-range scheme too broad for the existing ad-

ministration. Nonetheless, the idea of reaching a definite and final solution made an increasing appeal to the simple military mind of Governor Lawrence. He had no particular desire to take drastic steps and no real expectation that they would be necessary. But by 1755 he had come to a point where he was at least ready to expel some of the Acadians in order to convince the others of his determination.

There were increasing motives for prompt action. As France grew steadily more aggressive it was clear that war was not far off and that French pressure might make the Acadians an active danger. When in June 1755 a successful attack was directed against Fort Beauséjour—three hundred Acadians were found there in arms. They were leniently treated, since it was recognized that they had acted under coercion, but the fact that the reluctant inhabitants could thus be coerced was added proof of the dangers of the situation. The arrival soon afterward of news of Braddock's defeat was certain to hearten the French and stiffen the attitude of the Acadians, and news that Louisburg had been reinforced gave further cause for alarm. With armed conflict approaching, the authorities in Nova Scotia were in no position to see the province endangered by a fifth column among the population.

The decision was precipitated by a petition from the inhabitants of Minas asking for a return of their boats and arms which had been sequestered as a preliminary to the expedition against Beauséjour. The tone of the petition gave offense to the council. The deputation was reprimanded and ordered to take the required oath. The demand met with the traditional refusal. Deputies from the other settlements on a similar mission were equally stubborn in their attitude. The council, which ordered the imprisonment of the Minas deputies for their recalcitrance, now felt that the time had come to deal with the broad general problem once and for all.

"I am determined," wrote Lawrence, "to bring the inhabitants to a compliance, or rid the province of such perfidious subjects." In this determination the council backed him up. Of its five members, three were New Englanders who now pressed for measures to assure the security on which New England insisted.

The oath was to be imposed on the population, and if nothing else would serve, those who refused were to be deported to the English colonies.

There were now miscalculations on both sides. Lawrence felt that the real need was to convince the Acadians that he was in earnest, if necessary by drastic measures. Once that was done he still believed that the inhabitants would submit. But the Acadians refused to be convinced. They were conscious that they desired only peace and quiet and had no hostile intentions toward the authorities. They had successfully evaded repeated orders to take the oath during the past forty years, and they believed that their resistance could be maintained. Their mistake resulted in the tragedy of a people.

In August 1755 the authorities struck with brutal abruptness. The danger of popular resistance and the desire to prevent desertions to the French dictated efforts at speed and surprise. At Fort Cumberland Colonel Monckton summoned the inhabitants to the fort, informed them that their lands were forfeited and they were prisoners, and held them for the ships which would take them into exile two months later. To force the surrender of the fugitives who had sought refuge in the woods, he sent expeditions to destroy the villages and the crops throughout the district. At Annapolis the first effort to seize the inhabitants found only deserted settlements. But by September the people had returned to their homes and occupations, and a fresh effort in November resulted in their seizure and transportation. Meanwhile, military parties scoured the countryside, not without meeting occasional resistance, and rounded up stragglers to swell the total.

The most difficult situation of all was at Grand Pré. Here Colonel Winslow found himself with a small body of troops and none-too-adequate provisions, facing a situation in which resistance by the population would place him at a hopeless disadvantage. On September 5, without previous explanation, he summoned the inhabitants to the church, informed them of the fate that was in store for them, and held them under guard. The five transports which were on hand were inadequate for the transportation of several hundred prisoners, and the other ships

that had been promised were slow in coming. In an effort to reduce the risks which this situation still created Winslow ordered fifty of the young men aboard each of the transports, marching them under guard along the road to the shore amid the lamentation of the women and children from whom they were being separated. At last, on September 28, more ships arrived, and part of the population was embarked. There were efforts to avoid the separation of families, but the authorities were now driven by a sense of urgency, and the haste and confusion which resulted, combined with the shortage of accommodation, helped to thwart whatever good intentions they may have entertained. Even as it was, a substantial number of the inhabitants still remained, and it was not until December that this particular task was completed. Indeed, there were further deportations still to be carried out, and their extension to the islands of Cape Breton and St. Jean after the capture of these places prolonged the process over a period of some seven years.

In all, it is estimated that from six to ten thousand persons were thus exiled from the land of their birth. They were distributed in the first instance among the various English colonies. But some continued a voluntary progress to the French colony of Louisiana, and others eventually made their way back to the land from which they had been forcibly torn away.

Tragic as the event was, it was not without its justification. Much of the worst tragedy lay in the methods by which it was carried out, and even here some excuses could be found. From the point of view of the broad conflict which was now in progress, the deportation represented for the English the essential consolidation of a position which the ambiguous attitude of the Acadians had hitherto rendered insecure. The first step had been taken in assuring the Atlantic flank with the removal of the Acadians and the capture of Beauséjour. The next would follow with the second and final capture of Louisbourg. But important as these operations were, they were subsidiary to the main struggle. For this Canada was still central, and Canada's expansion had now brought the conflict to a focus in the Ohio Valley.

III

The prospect that the French might expel the English from America, so hopefully entertained by Frontenac, dwindled as the eighteenth century advanced. Although the French continued their incursions against the frontier settlements they failed to come to grips decisively with the English colonies. These might be slow to defend their outposts effectively, but it became apparent that their potential forces of resistance were too great for the French, in any but the most exceptional circumstances, to overcome them by conquest.

But if the English could not actually be expelled there was still a chance that their expansion might be limited. While their settlements were still hemmed in between the Atlantic and the Appalachians the French had pushed into the interior. They had planted their posts along the Great Lakes and down the Mississippi. Between that river and the mountain barrier lay a vast stretch of land which neither side had as yet effectively occupied. If the French could forestall their rivals by entrenching themselves firmly in this area the Appalachians might become the final boundary of English settlement, and the whole immense interior of the continent would become the imperial domain of New France.

This was the project inaugurated by the expedition of Céloron de Blainville to the Ohio in 1749. In the course of the next five years a series of forts stretching from Lake Erie to the forks of the Ohio was set up to make French control effective. In spite of her numerical weakness and lack of resources New France still felt strong enough to challenge the English in the interior. "Although they were sensible that the English could raise two men for their one," a French officer told Washington, "yet they knew that their motions were too slow and dilatory to prevent any undertaking of theirs."

Unfortunately for French calculations their advance came at a time when a new incentive for expansion beyond the mountains had arisen in the English colonies. To add to the gravity of the situation, the English motives were quite different from those which animated the French. The resulting conflict was

not merely a competition for new lands, serious enough as that was. It was a clash of two different economies, two concepts of expansion which were completely incompatible with each other; and these were characteristic of the difference in outlook and development between the French and English establishments in America.

Both the limited nature of English expansion up to this point and the new stage that was now in prospect were accounted for by the concentration on land settlement as the essential basis of the colonies. New France, dependent on the fur trade for its very existence, had been forced to extend its activities in an ever-widening range. But the fur trade meant comparatively little to the colonies to the south. Commerce and lumber, fishing and shipbuilding and distilling were all more important activities. A number of merchants and traders might be interested in the fur trade, but it did not bulk large enough to have any serious effect on public policy. When so many colonial legislatures were lethargic about providing protection even for their own frontier settlements, it was hardly to be expected that they would make any great effort on behalf of the few individuals who ventured into the wilderness beyond.

By 1750, however, it was not the fur trader alone who was interested. The tide of settlement had reached the mountains and was ready to flow across them to the fertile lands beyond. And this brought into play the dominant force in the colonial structure. The constant hunger for new land kept pace with the growth of colonial population. As the coastal plain filled up the pressure that resulted meant that new settlement was pushed steadily westward. The tide had been dammed momentarily by the Appalachian barrier. But already the routes through the barrier were being discovered, and soon the pioneer settlers would be carving new homes out of the forests of Ohio and Kentucky and Tennessee.

Such an advance spelled the doom of the fur trade. As the forests receded, so did the beaver areas. It was the aim of New France to keep the forest areas intact in order to protect the great staple around which the whole life of the colony was built. It was no less the aim of those essential allies in the fur

trade, the Indians. The Indian had no idea of accepting the advance of settlement and adapting himself to it. He saw a fatal threat to the only way of life that he knew; and even the Iroquois, so long the allies of the English, began to waver in the face of this new development.

There is, however, some doubt whether this new pioneer wave would in itself have brought an immediate acceptance of the French challenge. It was still in its early stages, and the individuals who composed it were not yet numerous and powerful enough to have swayed public policy. But shrewd men in high places had already foreseen the development and laid their plans to profit by it. Land speculators in the colonies, allied with similar gentlemen in England, had become keenly interested in the Ohio area. By 1748 a group organized as the Ohio Company had secured a grant of half a million acres, and other and still more ambitious schemes rapidly followed. The grantees now saw the French intrusion threatening to blight their hopes of fortune from land sales and were suitably vehement in their denunciation of this invasion of British soil.

It was fitting that the man who took up their cause with promptness and vigor should be a governor of Virginia. The claims of Virginia to the interior of the continent were not the less extensive for being somewhat vague. The boundaries of the colony were to run "from sea to sea, west and northwest"; and though this might cause some difficulty for geographers it satisfied Virginians (though by no means their neighbors in other colonies) of their rightful title to the greater part of the continent. Governor Dinwiddie in particular was quite clear about Virginia's ownership of the lands upon which the French had so rudely intruded. His firmness was not diminished by the fact that he was deeply interested in the Ohio Company and had extensive personal holdings in addition. He sent George Washington, first to protest, and, when that failed, to expel the French; and when the latter expedition ended unhappily with Washington's surrender at Fort Necessity, the governor turned for aid to Britain.

The struggle between France and Britain had now reached a point where its imperial nature was emerging with increasing

clarity. In spite of Shirley's activity the Newcastle regime had failed to make any serious effort in America during the war of the Austrian succession (King George's War) and had bought peace at the price of the return of Louisburg. But the events of the war itself had forced the imperial issue upon the attention of even the Old Whigs, and the founding of Halifax in 1749 was a symbol of the dawning importance of American affairs in the eyes of the home government. The Albany Congress of 1754, with its vain effort to provide for more effective colonial co-operation, had the effect both of engaging the interest of Britain and of impressing upon her the need for more positive action. Thus when hostilities broke out in America, in spite of the precarious continuance of peace in Europe, there was a greater readiness to connect this with the general struggle. The fact that France had sent reinforcements to Quebec under the leadership of Dieskau was added proof that the colonies were part of the general theater of conflict and that the strength of the enemy might be affected by what happened across the Atlantic.

Britain's answer was the dispatch of two regiments under Braddock to Virginia. It is not certain that at that stage the government had made up its mind to attempt the conquest of Canada—indeed, a government headed by Newcastle rarely made up its mind to anything. Shirley did get the adoption of a scheme whereby, while Braddock proceeded against Fort Duquesne, Johnson should lead an expedition against Crown Point while he himself attacked Niagara. But these were still only the outposts of New France, and the general sentiment seemed to be concerned chiefly with pushing the French back within their own boundaries, not with crushing them decisively.

Even this hope was remote from the reality of what happened. The whole plan failed ignominiously. But the collapse of the efforts against Crown Point and Niagara was overshadowed by the disaster which overtook Braddock's expedition. This had an impact out of all proportion to its scale as a military engagement. A British and colonial force of less than 1,400, struggling through a primitive forest to attack a rude outpost, was met and defeated by some 200 French regulars and militia aided by several hundred Indians. Nonetheless, this was the most serious military

effort that Britain had yet made in America, and the fact that it was crushed so decisively was a shock which awakened both the colonies and the home government to a realization of how serious was the task that confronted them. When the effort was resumed its objective would be nothing less than the crushing of French power in North America.

This was made definite with the accession of Pitt to power. That arrogant and incalculable man, with his crushing power of oratory and his dogmatism on general principles concealing his lack of constructive views on most specific issues, was, for all his defects, a model among English war ministers and a paragon among eighteenth-century politicians. It is doubtful whether he had any real vision of the continental future of the colonies and certain that he had no practical solution for the imperial problem that was now emerging. But he had a clear appreciation of the nature of the struggle with France and a faculty for grasping the essentials of imperial strategy. It was his deliberate decision to conquer France in America (and, by subsidies to Frederick the Great, to conquer America in Germany) which infused new coherence into the English effort, and it was his insistence on capable leaders backed by adequate resources that provided the means by which victory was made possible.

The American campaign involved a major effort on the part of both Britain and the colonies. Hitherto, except for Kirke's expedition in 1629, Canada proper had been immune from English attack. This compact and distant settlement could only be assailed by a force more substantial than any the colonies had been able to raise or Britain had been ready to provide. Its centralized regime, in spite of its many disadvantages, gave coherence and direction to its military efforts. The military talents of Montcalm lent added vigor to that direction. Hampered though he was by the jealousy of the governor Vaudreuil and the peculations of the intendant Bigot and his predatory associates, Montcalm was able in the early stages to carry the war to the larger but slow-moving enemy. Before the final decision Britain and the colonies between them had gathered an available force of some 50,000 men—not far short of the total population of Canada itself.

Even then military strength was only part of the story. If the French and English colonies had been left to fight it out among themselves it is doubtful whether either side could at this stage have achieved decisive victory. Both depended on the home government for the reinforcements which would determine the balance, and this brought in the factor of sea power. It was the ability of the British fleet to prevent the arrival of French aid while assuring the transport of British troops which was ultimately decisive, and even then the aid of powerful British squadrons was an essential factor in the capture of both Louisburg and Quebec.

The defensive outposts of New France stretched in a long sweep from Michilimackinac to Fort Duquesne. Behind them three points guarded the main strategic approaches to the colony. The upper St. Lawrence was protected by Fort Frontenac. The line of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu was covered by Crown Point and Ticonderoga. Louisburg covered the entrance to the Gulf. There was some tendency on the part of Britain to strike first at such outposts as Niagara and Fort Duquesne, but ultimately a converging attack on the main positions decided the fate of Canada.

There was, however, a period of ineffective fumbling before Pitt gained full control and his work began to show its effect. The outbreak of war in Europe in 1756 made official the state of hostilities which already existed in America, and it was the French who first profited. While the British under Loudon muddled about with preparations for an attack on Ticonderoga, Montcalm struck at the westward flank with the capture and destruction of Oswego. Next year, when Loudon shifted his main strength from the center for an attack on Louisburg—which he never carried out—Montcalm struck again with the capture of Fort William Henry. The British had not only failed to make any progress—they had lost the advance posts which defended the center and the west.

The following year, 1758, marked the turning of the tide. Amherst, the new commander, with Wolfe as a brilliant second, attacked Louisburg with a force of 12,000 men supported by forty ships. That amphibious power which was Britain's greatest

strength was at last brought effectively into play to crush the defenses of Canada's eastern flank. At the same time a subsidiary and almost unplanned operation cleared the way in the west. The main objective here had been Fort Duquesne. But Bradstreet secured permission to lead an expedition to the capture of Fort Frontenac. With the fall of that position, Duquesne itself was doomed, and even the defenses of the center were placed in jeopardy. Although Montcalm inflicted a disastrous repulse on the forces attacking Ticonderoga the opening of the St. Lawrence at both ends made it unwise to risk further forces in this advanced position. In 1759 the French drew back to defend their main positions at Montreal and Quebec.

Quebec was now the key to the struggle. Even if Montreal should fall there remained the possibility that this strong natural citadel could maintain itself until France could slip reinforcements through the British fleet. But the capture of Quebec would seal the St. Lawrence and decide the fate of Montreal. Once more it was an amphibious operation. The British fleet not only closed the river but covered the arrival of the British troops and played a vital part in their subsequent operations; and as the siege wore on and the prospect loomed that the fleet might have to leave before winter closed the river, it was hauntingly clear to Wolfe that this eventuality would end any hope of taking Quebec by assault.

It was on Wolfe's force alone that this task rested in 1759. Once again a triple attack was planned, with Niagara and Ticonderoga the other two objectives. But while their capture would clear the way for a final crushing stroke from both ends of the St. Lawrence and from Lake Champlain, the actual course of the operations gave no prospect that this could be delivered until the following year. Niagara was easily captured, but the force which took it was too weak to turn and threaten Montreal. Amherst with 13,000 men, on the other hand, moved on Ticonderoga with overwhelming strength. The garrison of 3,000 which Montcalm had left in the fort was meant to fight merely a rear-guard action. As soon as Amherst settled down to the siege the garrison blew up the fort and retreated to the Ile aux Noix at the north of Lake Champlain, ready to fight a

delaying action down the Richelieu route. The French defenses were thus broken in the center, but Amherst's deliberate preparations, including the construction of gunboats to gain command of the lake, took most of the summer and prevented him from following up his initial success. He brought no real pressure on the main body of the French defenders, and Montcalm was able to keep the bulk of his troops concentrated for the defense of Quebec.

Montcalm had his own difficulties. The bulk of his army of 17,000 was composed of militia, ill armed and poor in quality. Vaudreuil, the governor, whose jealousy had hampered Montcalm from the outset, continued to interfere with his plans throughout the siege. Nonetheless, he had good prospects of success. He occupied one of the strongest natural positions on the continent. He had guarded the approaches from down-river by stationing his most reliable troops in the six miles of entrenchments known as the Beauport lines, stretching to the Montmorency River which covered their flank. Above the citadel the high cliffs were patrolled by a mobile force on the watch for any surprise landing. As Wolfe complained, the enemy had "shut himself up in inaccessible entrenchments so that I can't get at him without spilling a torrent of blood."

The formidable nature of the problem was revealed as the summer wore on. Wolfe's first move was to occupy the Ile d'Orléans on June 27. The French withdrawal from Levis and abandonment of the south bank of the river allowed him to seize a point directly opposite Quebec from which his artillery could bombard the town. Another force was landed near the mouth of the Montmorency across the river from the French defenses. Even these steps, however, failed to solve the problem. A direct assault on Quebec from Levis seemed hopeless. A number of ships succeeded in passing the fortress to the river above, but a mobile force under Bougainville at Pointe aux Trembles strengthened the defenders in that area. With less than 9,000 men at his disposal—barely half the defending force—Wolfe faced the problem of finding a vulnerable spot; yet even the crossing of the Montmorency with its deep gorge seemed an impossible task. Out of many hazardous choices he decided at

the end of July to attempt this last operation, covering it with a frontal attack on the Beauport lines from the river. The attack miscarried, and Wolfe returned to the restless task of probing for a weak point in the lines of the defenders.

By the beginning of September it was touch and go. The fleet would soon be obliged to sail, and without the support of the fleet Wolfe saw no prospect of success. In desperation he contemplated a new effort against the Beauport lines. His brigadiers offered the alternative proposal of an assault some miles above Quebec. Wolfe accepted, risky though the plan was, and began concentrating his dwindling forces by evacuating the Montmorency camp. But before the plan was put into operation another if almost equally hazardous chance presented itself. This was to launch a surprise attack on the cove called the Anse au Foulon, just above Quebec, from which a path led to the heights outside the fortifications. If Montcalm's apprehension about the danger at either end of his extended lines could be kept alive an assault on the center might succeed before he could concentrate his strength.

The plans which Wolfe so carefully laid for this gamble were aided by circumstances. Montcalm was worried about the Anse au Foulon. He actually ordered a battalion to strengthen the defenses in that area, but Vaudreuil countermanded the order, and the post was left in the care of a weak guard under an inefficient commander. Moreover, the French were expecting a convoy of provision boats on the night chosen for the attack. They did not know that this, too, had been canceled, and Wolfe's advance guard could pass as the expected boats to get within striking distance.

Wolfe capitalized on all these factors. He kept alive a pretended threat against the Beauport lines. He set the fleet in motion to draw Bougainville's strong patrol force away from the city. Then with perfect timing, in the darkness of the night of September 12, he launched a shock detachment to seize the path from the Anse au Foulon and hold the heights for the main body which followed across the river. By sunrise next day he had 5,000 men in battle array on the Plains of Abraham.

"There they are," exclaimed Montcalm, "where they have no

right to be!" At once he summoned reinforcements from the Beauport lines. But Vaudreuil interfered to prevent their departure, and Montcalm felt that he could not afford to wait for them or for Bougainville. His supplies were running low, and if Wolfe were allowed to entrench himself Quebec might well be starved out. At nine in the morning he left the shelter of his fortifications and advanced to give battle in the open. It was a final move which played into Wolfe's hands. His thin line, two ranks deep, held its fire as the French came on. The Canadian militia, lying down after each shot to reload, somewhat disorganized the French advance. Then at forty yards the British line blazed with a shattering volley, followed immediately by another, and charged home with the bayonet. The militia broke; the French regulars were swept aside, and the doom of Quebec was sealed. Wolfe was dead in the hour of victory, but so was Montcalm in defeat, and Vaudreuil was not the man for a desperate effort to retrieve the situation. On September 18 the citadel formally surrendered to the British.

That was not quite the end. There was still a French army in Canada, ably commanded by Levis. At the end of April it advanced against Quebec, and Murray, the commander, somewhat rashly moved out to the attack. He was thrown back with the loss of a third of his force, and for a little the fate of Quebec seemed again in doubt. But the garrison rallied to a stubborn defense, and Levis lacked the siege equipment necessary for a quick success. When on May 9 the first British ship arrived up the river the prospect of British supplies and reinforcements ended any prospect of success that Levis might have had. He drew back for a final defense of Montreal, on which the forces of Murray and Amherst now closed in. On September 8 the city was delivered by Vaudreuil, and with it the whole of Canada. France had been eliminated as a power in America, and her expulsion offered for the first time the prospect of the virtual unity of the continent under British control.

CHAPTER III

The Sundering of Empire

AMONG THE MANY FACTORS brought to light by the situation which resulted from the conquest of Canada not the least significant was the continued weakness of the forces making for the unity of the American continent. Even among the older colonies the spirit of sectionalism was still predominant. The Albany Congress of 1754 was a striking revelation of how little the colonies felt they had in common and how reluctant they were to subordinate their local interests to the needs of a wider community. The removal of the French danger increased that indifference by eliminating one motive for a united effort in defense. It brought no desire to find a basis which would harmonize the policies of the former English colonies with the needs of the new acquisitions or the interests of the empire as a whole. If there was any unifying force it was to be found for the moment not in America but in London.

For the British government, in contrast to the colonies, was becoming more and more impressed with the need for uniformity and coherence in imperial affairs. It now possessed a continental domain stretching from Hudson Bay to Florida. It had to consider the most effective way of maintaining and defending its possessions. It had to decide how the resources of America might best be developed in the interests of Britain. It had to face the question of the future development of the colonies themselves—

a question which involved problems of trade and land settlement, of government and defense. Lacking any spontaneous answer from the colonies themselves, the British government set out to evolve an answer of its own. The ultimate result was to bring a measure of colonial unity, not in co-operation, but in resistance—an outcome which involved the disruption of empire and the renewed partition of the continent of North America.

This division of the continent was not purely the result of the policies evolved at Westminster. It represented also a continued division of interests between Canada and the future United States. Yet without the imperial disruption that division need not have been so serious. The imperial quarrel accentuated the elements of dissension and placed Canada in a serious dilemma. Specific American problems became involved and entangled with general imperial policy, and while there were certain Canadian interests which were in conflict with American ambitions, there were also British policies which were not motivated from Canada yet which drew upon Canada the hostility of her neighbors to the south. It was a situation which was more than once repeated in the century that followed.

The problem was complicated by the fact that Britain herself was now passing through a transition period which was to bring a change in interests and which meanwhile brought about a certain confusion of outlook. The old mercantile system which insisted that colonies must serve the interests of the mother country was still in effect. But the balance of those interests was being affected by the progress of the industrial revolution which by 1760 was well under way. Commerce and shipping were still of prime importance, but commerce was on the way to becoming far more a handmaid of export industry than it had been in the past. Ultimately the Navigation Acts which had been the protection of commerce were to become restrictions whose removal industry would successfully demand. That stage had not yet been reached, but the interest in encouraging the growth of colonial markets had been quickened to a new pitch and was to play its part in the formulation of a new imperial policy.

Its influence can be seen in Britain's retention of Canada. Among the older school of mercantilists there was considerable

opposition to this decision. They poured scorn on what they regarded as a barren acquisition and pointed in contrast to the superior advantages of the sugar island of Guadeloupe. Here was a possession which would offer no threat of competition with English products. It would supply a valuable commodity to Britain and provide in return a market for British manufactures. Its annual exports of £600,000 in sugar and cotton were contrasted with the meager £14,000 in furs which Canada sent out in 1761. If Canada should develop into a larger and more prosperous colony it would be sure to compete with various British natural products and ultimately would embark on industrial competition as well. Far better to let the French bear the worry and expense—especially as the renewal of the French danger on the borders of the other colonies might be a positive advantage by forcing their continued dependence on the motherland.

Against this was a newer group whose eyes were fixed on the prospect of a steadily expanding market on the continent of America. The possibility that Americans might develop their own industries was minimized by this school. So long as plentiful land was available the energies of the colonists would be absorbed by agricultural expansion; and the more they expanded, the more need they would have for British manufactured goods. Perhaps these views might not have prevailed had they not been supported by the British sugar interests who did not want competitors on new and fertile lands admitted to their protected markets within the empire. But in addition to these two forces was the desire, embodied by Pitt and shared by his successors, to eliminate France from her military base on the American continent, and this combination of motives prevailed in the treaty of 1763.

That, however, was only a preliminary. Already there was looming the question of how the empire was to be made an effective unity. The coming of peace confronted the imperial authorities with the need to decide on the future, not only of the new colonies, but of the older ones as well. New and old mercantilists might differ about the ultimate aims of colonial policy, but they could agree that the previous lack of any

coherent policy was something to be remedied at once. But this agreement was not extensive enough to result in a clear decision as to what should actually be done, and the result was a wavering and piecemeal effort whose outcome was the American Revolution.

Nonetheless, the initial steps by Britain revealed the salient points in the imperial problem and indicated the general approach toward their solution. The regulation of trade was perhaps the question which touched British interests most closely. A realization of how loosely the Navigation Acts had been enforced brought an effort to make imperial control a reality, and though the Sugar Act of 1764 reduced the duties on foreign sugar it promised to collect them much more effectively than in the past. The traders in the colonies who had prospered by habitual evasion of such restrictions, the distillers who were dependent on cheap foreign supplies of molasses were at once alarmed, and a powerful colonial interest was aroused against the new policy.

Defense was another matter which engaged the serious attention of the British authorities. For the moment the colonies had been freed from the French menace. But there was no guarantee that France might not attempt, when occasion served, to recover her lost possessions, and Spain, holding the land beyond the Mississippi and controlling its outlet at New Orleans, was a remoter but still a possible threat. More immediate was the danger from the Indians. The unwillingness or inability of the colonies to adopt concerted measures of frontier defense had been glaringly evident in the past. The formidable outbreak under the leadership of Pontiac, coupled with the dubious attitude of the Iroquois, showed that the problem was one of real gravity. The need for a series of garrison posts to guard the frontier seemed clear in the light of such events.

But while arranging for protection against the Indians it also seemed desirable to remove the causes of Indian hostility. Among these the chief was the invasion, by fraud or force, of the lands which the Indians claimed as their own. Even a system of private purchase was open to serious abuses, and not all colonies were concerned to see that full title was secured before land grants

were made. This pressure of advancing settlement on the hunting grounds of the tribes was productive of constant friction which periodically led to bloodshed.

As a consequence the British government decided to take over the management of Indian relations and to work out an orderly system of settlement which would avoid the danger of conflict. Pontiac's conspiracy hastened the adoption of a policy under which, it was hoped, the Indians would feel more secure in their rights. By the Proclamation of 1763 a line was drawn along the headwaters of the rivers east of the Appalachians beyond which no settlement was to be made without the direct sanction of the home government. Initially this was meant to be only temporary. It neither invalidated the territorial claims of the individual colonies nor set up a permanent barrier to westward expansion. Its intention was to provide a breathing spell during which the government could secure by treaty the surrender of the necessary lands. When that had been done settlement could progress peacefully to the new boundary, and meanwhile the newly acquired colonies, including Nova Scotia, were expected to provide a fully adequate outlet for any pioneers who felt impelled to seek a new frontier.

Not all the colonists, unfortunately, were willing to look forward with patience to the operation of this long-term policy. Speculators who held land in the existing colonies might be well content with the government's plan. But others, such as the backers of the Ohio Company, found their hopes seriously deferred; and still others, engaged in new and ever more grandiose schemes for colonies as far west as Illinois, were ready to deal with the Indians in their own fashion and to call on the government for protection when they inevitably got into trouble. Behind them were the individual pioneers, less interested in Nova Scotia and Florida than in the lands of Ohio and Tennessee. And as successive British ministries hardened in their opposition to western settlement the suspicion arose that the line was intended to be permanent, after all, and that Britain was deliberately confining the colonies to the seaboard in order that they might be easier to control.

All these problems were directly connected with the question

of taxation. Between the mountains and the Mississippi Britain now had an imperial domain which she intended to defend and to develop. Both defense and administration involved considerable expense for no immediate return. When returns should at last materialize it would be the colonies who would benefit in the first instance. Britain's own advantage, however real, would be later and indirect. To the mother country, already burdened by an unprecedented debt as the result of her triumphant imperial campaigns, it seemed only right that the colonies should bear at least part of the expense. When the colonies showed no eagerness to assume the burden Britain set out to impose it upon them. The Sugar Act, in this aspect, was frankly intended to raise a revenue from the colonies. With the inauguration of direct taxation by the Stamp Act of 1765 a conflict was begun which led in the end to armed rebellion.

Taxation, however, was the occasion rather than the actual cause of the quarrel. However wide the groups which it touched, its effect would hardly have been so ruinous as the colonial outcry seemed to suggest. By the time it dwindled to a tax on tea its importance was symbolic rather than practical. But it was a simple and concrete issue which everyone could understand and over which it was not difficult to rouse a real resentment. And that resentment extended far beyond the specific question of taxation to embrace ultimately the whole question of imperial control.

There was, in fact, an American nationalism already in existence which was unprepared to make any substantial concessions for the sake of retaining the imperial connection. A steady growth of stability and prosperity had brought with it an increased sense of self-sufficiency. There was no longer a recognition of England as a source of economic benefits. There was a readiness, now that France was no longer in control of Canada, to dismiss the necessity of any further military aid from Britain. There was no appreciation of the actual imperial problem and no desire to contribute to its solution. In actual fact, imperial control was not without its benefits. It provided a co-ordinating influence which was lacking in America itself. It offered a means of attaining uniformity and harmony on

such matters as trade and land policy and intercolonial relations generally. It dealt with problems which the colonies were not yet prepared to tackle and which, in the days after the achievement of independence, nearly wrecked the newborn nation. But these were not obvious matters which were directly felt by the individual. He saw few direct benefits arising from British rule, and he was conscious of positive disadvantages as British policy developed. Traders hampered by the Navigation Acts, merchants placed at a disadvantage by the new tea monopoly, planters heavily in debt to London, frontiersmen who were barred from new lands and who connected British control with their grievances against the colonial oligarchy were all ready to resist any strengthening of authority. It was a conflict between legality on one side and interest on the other, which ultimately roused tempers to a point where no reconciliation was possible.

But America was not at one in that resistance. Nova Scotia and Quebec both held aloof. It was not simply that they were comparatively new colonies, though the stage of their development did have something to do with it. They, too, and particularly Quebec, had grievances against Britain. But their grievances were not identical with those of the colonies to the south, and their sense of benefits was far more immediate. Once more events revealed a divergence of interests between the Northern and Southern halves of the continent, which found expression in completely different courses when the imperial crisis arose.

II

The province of Quebec presented a special problem which, perhaps only half-intentionally, was initially lumped in with the whole general question of American policy. For the first time Britain found herself in possession of an overseas colony which contained a substantial and well-established population of another European race. Some 65,000 Canadians could not be treated in quite the same fashion as a handful of Dutch in New Netherlands or a few thousand Acadians in Nova Scotia. Nonetheless, the western policy of the British government helped to determine the first arrangements with respect to Canada. Settlers

were to be shut out from the west and attracted elsewhere. But experience with Nova Scotia had shown that even an established colony, in order to attract settlers, must offer them not only available lands, but an acceptable government. They must be assured of the civil and political liberties to which they were accustomed. Hence the promise that settlers in the newly conquered colonies would enjoy the benefits of English law and would be granted a representative assembly as soon as circumstances allowed. In that promise the new province of Quebec was included by the Proclamation of 1763.

That promise was made, not for the benefit of the existing French settlers, but of the new English and American ones who were anticipated by implication. Unhappily other factors prevented the expectation from being realized. For one thing, there were the boundaries. Just as the Proclamation line barred the older colonies from the west, so the boundaries of Quebec were intended to confine it within narrow limits. Within those limits there were still lands available for settlement. But they were in the districts where a French population was already settled, and they were by no means easy of access from the older colonies. A southern border which ran along the forty-fifth parallel to the St. Lawrence, in the vicinity of the present city of Cornwall, and thence west to Lake Nipissing excluded practically the whole of modern Ontario. There was little natural access from the west, and access through the Gulf of St. Lawrence was a long way round. Even if those western areas which had been controlled by the French had been left to the province it would have been some time before settlement reached them, but they would ultimately have been in the direct path of the western migration. As it was, the boundaries almost precluded that influx of English settlement which was assumed as the very foundation of the political provisions.

In consequence the system envisaged by the Proclamation was never fully applied. Both Governor Murray and his successor, Carleton, sought to modify it for the benefit of the conquered population. They objected strongly to the overthrow of the existing legal system. They refused to institute an assembly from which the French, being Catholics, would thereby be excluded.

They insisted on allowing the French to sit on juries in civil as well as criminal suits, since to do otherwise would make "two hundred Protestants perpetual judges of the lives and property" of the whole French population. Race and religion were solid facts with which the conquerors had to deal; and, failing an overwhelming influx of English Protestants, they could only be dealt with successfully by respecting the established customs of the community.

Unfortunately, in thus attempting to solve one set of difficulties, the authorities raised others that were almost equally troublesome. If the new arrivals from Britain and the southern colonies had been land seekers and pioneers they would almost certainly have been submerged in the existing population. But the bulk of them were merchants and traders, and though they totaled only a few hundred they carried a weight of influence that was out of all proportion to their numbers. They stepped right into the center of the commercial life of Canada. The French merchants had now been cut off from their European connections. They lacked both credit and markets, and their own scanty capital had been hard hit by the inflation which preceded the fall of New France. The newcomers, with their connections in Britain and in the older colonies, took over almost without effort. They were the contractors who provisioned the army. They secured control of the wholesale trade. Above all, they took over the fur trade in the area of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, linking their resources in capital with French experience and personnel; and this great staple enterprise, with its center at Montreal, fell entire into British hands.

Such men could not be entirely ignored by the government. However few they might be, they occupied positions of the first importance in the life of the colony. They provided the resources and the enterprise upon which its prosperity depended. They had influential connections in London through which they could reach the ear of the home government. Into that ear they were soon pouring complaints which were loud and unrestrained. They had gone to Canada trusting in the promises of the Proclamation. They had undertaken risks and commitments in the belief that they would enjoy the full advantage of English

laws. Now they saw their expectations balked and their rights denied, and they proceeded to clamor for redress.

Here was a situation which, productive as it was of internal grievances, might seem to offer common ground between the Canadian merchants—many of whom had come from the older colonies—and their neighbors to the south. In both cases there was resistance by interested parties in the colonies to the policies which were being pursued by the authorities. But, in fact, there was a significant difference. The measures to which the older colonies objected were part of a broad imperial policy which represented the deliberate decision of the home government. But these particular measures made little impression on Canada. What the Canadian merchants wanted was the actual implementing of an imperial policy which was being warped by the local government, and during the years when the Americans were beginning to question the imperial authority as such the Canadians were still looking hopefully to London for redress.

Similarly, although both parties were dissatisfied with the western policy inaugurated by the Proclamation of 1763, the grounds of their discontent were divergent and even antagonistic. The Canadians had no reason to oppose the principle of a western reserve which would protect the interests of the Indians. Canada had few pioneers who could not be satisfied within its own borders, and if any merchants were attracted to land speculation on the side their urge could be easily satisfied by the acquisition of one of the existing seigneuries. For the most part, the business leaders welcomed a policy which, by keeping the West for the Indians, would also preserve it for the fur trade. But they wanted it to be a fur trade whose center of control would be Montreal. They had little liking for a policy whose regulations hampered their own access to the area south of the lakes and gave them no special advantage over their competitors from Albany and Philadelphia. It was not only that the handling of the western situation by the imperial authorities was uncertain and unsatisfactory, though this was a real cause of discontent. Beyond this was the desire to secure a definite advantage by annexing the West to Canada. The merchants who took over the French fur trade wanted to control the complete system,

and that meant a perpetuation of the rivalry which in no small measure had led to the armed struggle which resulted in the conquest of Canada.

In 1774 they were granted their desire. The Quebec Act of that year extended the boundary to the Ohio, taking in the whole territory between the western boundary of Pennsylvania and the Mississippi. But this advantageous reversal of the arrangements of 1763 with respect to the West was balanced by a reversal of the political arrangements which the English minority regarded as an outright betrayal. Under the influence of Carleton the home government accepted the thesis that British settlers would always prefer "the more cheerful climates, and more fruitful soil of His Majesty's Southern provinces . . . so that, barring Catastrophe shocking to think of, this Country must, to the end of time, be peopled by the Canadian race." The corollary was that an authoritarian government and the preservation of French civil law were the most suitable bases for such a community. The denial of the promises of 1763 was now made definite and permanent, and the English minority saw itself submerged in an essentially French state.

Here again the action of the imperial authorities seemed calculated to throw the Canadian merchants into the arms of the Continental Congress. The Quebec Act was one of a series of sparks dropped into an explosive situation. The Boston Tea Party had been followed by the Intolerable Acts with their severe measures against Massachusetts. The Quebec Act, coinciding with these in time, seemed homogeneous with them in intent. The British government regarded it as a generous and benevolent measure which, securing the tithe to the Catholic Church and the existing system of tenure to the seigneurs, would rally the natural leaders of the Canadians to the support of British rule. But the alarmed colonies saw in the establishment of Catholicism and the denial of representative institutions an intent to create a hostile military despotism which might keep them in awe; and the extension of the boundaries of Quebec seemed not only a further proof of this but a final confirmation of Britain's intention to build a wall of circumvallation around the coastal colonies.

The colonies reacted promptly. In an address to the British people they protested against the iniquitous nature of the government's concessions to the French. But they also launched an address to the French informing them of how iniquitous was the British government's denial of British institutions. And when Lexington was followed by Bunker Hill and outright war loomed as inevitable the Continental Congress sent a delegation to persuade Canada to join as a fourteenth colony in resistance to the mother country.

III

It was not only the old province of Quebec that was affected by the American crisis. Less regarded, but perhaps no less disturbed, was the older colony of Nova Scotia; and these two provinces, in spite of differences in composition and situation, illustrated each in its own way the operation of those factors in the Canadian background which made for continued loyalty to Britain and for separation from revolutionary America.

The grievances of Nova Scotia were different in kind and in scale from those which agitated the English minority in Quebec. For one thing, the racial problem was practically non-existent. The expulsion of the Acadians had cleared the way, and Nova Scotia, in contrast to Quebec, had enjoyed a substantial influx of new settlers. It had also, since 1758, enjoyed representative institutions, granted with the same object of inducing settlement as motivated the Proclamation promises five years later. And when an injudicious governor attempted an excessive use of his authority, representations to the home government secured his recall. The ideal of London as a protector against local despotism was realized more successfully by Nova Scotia than by Quebec, and still more than by the colonies farther south.

At the same time there was a close connection with New England and a very considerable sympathy with colonial resistance. A large part of the population of Nova Scotia represented a pioneering element which had moved northward from the New England colonies. They shared the independence of outlook and the dislike of outside authority which characterized

their kinsfolk and led them ultimately to revolution. This affinity was further strengthened by a close commercial connection and a measure of similarity in economic activities. There was nothing to wonder at in the fact that a certain agitation developed in Nova Scotia over the Stamp Act or that the merchants had some reason to fear that the Boston Tea Party might be repeated in Halifax.

Yet there were factors on the other side which restrained Nova Scotia from actual resistance. For one thing, the benefits from British rule were more tangible and immediate than they were in the older colonies. Boston might resent the presence of British troops, but they were a godsend to Halifax. They consumed supplies; they provided badly needed cash; their removal, in fact, threatened one source of Nova Scotia's prosperity. The approach of war gave new promise of prosperous times—particularly since the provisioning of the British forces could be supplemented by an active if somewhat hazardous trade with their enemies at Boston. But even in more tranquil times Britain was a source of funds for public works and the support of the government and a market for fish and naval stores; and the economic benefits to be drawn from this connection far outweighed any burden resulting from the imperial power of taxation.

On the other hand, it might have been hard for Nova Scotians to join the Revolution even if they had wanted to. They were scattered in small communities, with scanty communications and with little active leadership. A small and dispersed population lay under the shadow of the military and naval base of Halifax. John Adams might sneer at them as "a set of fugitives and vagabonds who are also kept in fear by a fleet and an army." But with such scanty resources the people of Nova Scotia were in no position to challenge the British forces as were the people of Massachusetts. The issues of the Revolution would have to touch them far more vitally to move them to so desperate an enterprise.

One thing that might have moved them, however, would have been a British attempt to force them into the army. If the Nova Scotians had no desire to fight against Britain they were equally

reluctant to fight against the Revolution. A recruiting drive failed dismally, and when the government, in fear of invasion, called out a part of the militia the suspicion that this was for service in the more general theater of hostilities called forth immediate protests. "We were almost all of us born in New England," said the petition from Yarmouth. "We have fathers, brothers, and sisters in that country." Like the Acadians before them, the Yankees of Nova Scotia were stubborn in their insistence on neutrality.

Unlike the Acadians, they were able to maintain that position. The essential reason is that the Americans, unlike the French, made no attempt to force their kinsmen into a position of belligerency. One or two enthusiasts suggested an attack on Nova Scotia, but Washington was cool to the idea. His professed reason was that the principles of the Revolution called not for conquest, but only for defensive action. A more concrete motive was the actual difficulty of the enterprise. Not only would it draw off men and supplies which were desperately needed elsewhere. It would also call for sea power, and this was something which the Americans did not at first possess. When the entry of France provided a naval force there was no temptation to use it in this way. The last thing the Americans wanted was a new French conquest of the northern Atlantic coast which might leave that power once more in possession when the war came to an end.

So Nova Scotia was left relatively undisturbed. A few unofficial attempts at invasion were made. An attack on Fort Cumberland which was to be combined with a rising within the province fizzled out after an *opéra-bouffe* siege of three weeks. There were sea raids on the coastal settlements and privateering against Nova Scotian commerce and fisheries. There were also American privateers who used Nova Scotian harbors and British countermeasures which destroyed American bases at Machias and the mouth of the Penobscot. But these were side issues, and although Halifax was a base of central importance for British operations Nova Scotia itself hardly entered seriously into the main course of the struggle.

For Canada proper the problem was more complex. Here, too, a desire for neutrality was strongly in evidence. But its

realization was much more difficult, and if in the last resort the province chose to adhere to the British connection it was perhaps less from enthusiasm for the British cause than from a reluctance to face the full consequences of union with the United States.

In Quebec, as in Nova Scotia, there was a definite body of sympathizers with the American cause. Funds and provisions were sent to Boston in 1774, and propaganda on behalf of the Revolution was actively spread by some of the merchants in Montreal. But the grievances of the Canadian merchants were by no means identical with those of the revolted colonies. The Stamp Act left them practically unmoved. There was no grievance over tea. The Navigation Acts in general were a boon rather than a burden. The situation in the West had been adjusted to their satisfaction. There was no serious resentment against British taxing power or against the imperial authority in general. And when the merchants reflected that co-operation with the American colonies involved acceptance of the non-importation agreements they were given definite pause. Their whole system rested on a close and active commercial connection with the mother country. They needed British credits and British markets, and if these were cut off Canada's independent economy would founder before American competition.

Thus, in spite of their resentment against the Quebec Act, the mercantile group as a whole refused to cast in their lot with the Revolution. On the American side hope was placed less in the English minority than in the French population. The appeal which Congress issued was specifically directed to the habitant, calling upon him to join with the apostles of liberty to gain the blessings of freedom which the British government, by its creation of an arbitrary system of government, had deliberately denied to the Canadians alone of all the subjects of the Crown.

It was not a particularly well-grounded appeal. Though the habitant had his grievances they were not those suggested by the American appeal. His interest in representative institutions and the freedom of the press was decidedly slender, and his faith in the American colonists—those traditional enemies for a century past—was not of the highest. But if his resentments

were different they were nonetheless real, and there were definite signs that he was ready to accept the Americans for the sake of deliverance from British rule.

This was the outcome of certain miscalculations in the framing of the Quebec Act. Carleton had real ground for his belief that a contented clergy would do much to keep the mass of the population acquiescent if not actually enthusiastic. In his reliance on the influence of the seigneurs, however, he was on shakier ground. The ratification of the feudal system of tenures made no appeal to the tenants, particularly in those cases where it conferred upon their overlord rights which hitherto had been more theoretical than actual. The entrusting of military commands to these same overlords aroused a well-founded distrust in the breasts of those who were called upon to serve in the ranks. The calling out of the militia caused widespread discontent. Carleton had expected to be able to raise 18,000 troops for the defense of Canada. But in the event only a few hundred volunteered, and almost as many joined the American invaders. The influence of the Church probably prevented more extensive desertions. The vast body of Canadians stood aloof and waited to throw in their lot with the winning side—or, alternatively, the side which was most lavish of payments in hard cash.

With all this, however, it was soon apparent that there was no hope of the fourteenth colony adhering formally to the Revolutionary cause. The realization aroused grave concern among the American leaders. It left Canada as a possible base for military operations directed by an experienced and energetic governor, and in particular it threatened that important strategic feature, the line of the Hudson. If Canada could not be secured by persuasion it seemed eminently desirable to secure the rear of the Revolution by prompt military action. Thus in 1775, even before independence was definitely declared, Congress launched an invasion of Canada—an enterprise on whose success, according to Washington, the salvation of the Revolutionary cause in a great measure depended.

But the Revolution simply could not spare the necessary means for this success. Washington was striving desperately to whip together an army under the very eyes of the supine Howe in

Boston, and only a small and ill-equipped force could be spared against Canada. Even so, its initial success was not negligible. The first assault smashed in the weak Canadian defenses and drove what remained of the garrison within the one remaining stronghold of Quebec. For a full year the Americans held the sole effective authority throughout the greater part of Canada.

The central part of the plan was an advance by the traditional invasion route of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu. Carleton, whose most cherished idea was the development of Canada as a great military base, had been pressing for reinforcements to the colony and for steps to strengthen the defensive outposts at Crown Point and Ticonderoga. But nothing had been done up to the spring of 1775, and the forts remained little more than munitions depots with slender garrisons of some forty men each. To the revolutionists, desperately in need of supplies now that hostilities had broken out, the stores of powder at Ticonderoga offered a temptation to immediate action. Benedict Arnold, raising a group of followers in Connecticut, set off to effect their capture. The shrewd Ethan Allen had already been struck by the same idea. Arnold joined forces with him, and when Allen appeared before the fort and roared his peremptory demands for surrender (whether "in the name of the Great Jehovah and the Continental Congress" or with some less exalted invocation) the small force at Ticonderoga yielded, and that at Crown Point followed its example.

The capture of these forts cleared the way for an advance into Canada. The forces of Allen and Arnold, however, were too weak to attempt the enterprise by themselves. But Congress had decided on an effort at conquest and had placed the enterprise in the hands of General Schuyler. With his retirement as a result of ill-health, the command devolved on Montgomery, who in September moved down the Richelieu toward his ultimate objective of Montreal.

It was not altogether easy going. At St. Johns his progress was impeded by a fort whose garrison of 700 held out for six weeks against the assault of 4,000. But by that time their ammunition was running low, and the Americans had been en-

couraged and strengthened by the capture of a post at Chambly with its stores of food and gunpowder intact. On November 2, with no hope of relief in sight, St. Johns surrendered to the invaders.

The way was now clear to Montreal. Not only was that town practically unfortified, the forces for an adequate attempt at defense were not available. Carleton's regular force had been depleted by the sending of two battalions to reinforce Gage at Boston. His confident reliance on the Canadians had been shattered by reality. At one time he had believed that nothing but the forming of a Canadian regiment was necessary to complete their happiness. But soon he was writing: "I think there is nothing to fear from them while we are in a state of prosperity, and nothing to hope for while in distress."

As the Americans approached, therefore, Carleton abandoned Montreal and fell back on Quebec. He was fortunate to reach his destination. The Americans had set up batteries at Sorel which commanded the river, and although Carleton and a few companions managed to slip past in disguise, his ships and stores were captured by the invaders. Most of the regular troops who had remained in the colony had been taken at St. Johns, and it was a distinctly improvised garrison of 1,200 which he had at his disposal to hold his last remaining foothold in Canada.

Montgomery, who entered Montreal on November 13, had intended to pass the winter there. But all his plans were changed by the news that Arnold had reached Quebec almost at the same moment that Carleton arrived within its walls. Arnold's idea had been to strike a surprise blow which might catch the citadel off guard. He started up the Kennebec late in September with a force numbering in the vicinity of 1,100. It was a desperate enterprise through wild and difficult country. Part of his force eventually turned back sooner than face further hardships. The rest struggled across the height of land past Lake Megantic to the Chaudière. Their bateaux had been smashed in the rapids, their provisions swept away, and the men reduced to a starving condition. It was only the friendly reception of the French Canadians at the first settlement they reached that saved them from perishing in the wilderness. It was a weakened

force of less than 700 that crossed the river above Quebec and occupied Pointe aux Trembles on November 14.

Montgomery's arrival brought the force up to some 2,000 but still left the enterprise in a precarious state. The besiegers had only a small amount of light artillery and had little hope of breaching the strong fortifications. Yet it was important to make every effort to subdue Quebec before British reinforcements should arrive in the spring. On the last day of the year an attempt was made at a surprise assault under cover of a blinding snowstorm. But the garrison had got wind of the project and had laid its plans. When the two forces stormed into the lower town, one at either end, they were met with stiff resistance. Montgomery was killed, and his men were driven back; Arnold was wounded, and a large part of his unsupported force was cut off and captured. It was a repulse with heavy losses which virtually ended the prospect of taking Quebec.

The effort was not, however, abandoned. Reinforcements were rushed north, and the American commissioners in Montreal, including Benjamin Franklin and Charles Carroll, worked strenuously with the aid of their French printing press to win over the habitant. But the American forces were ravaged by small-pox and restless as their term of enlistment drew to a close, and the habitant was growing sullen under the slights to his religion offered by the invaders and the compulsory labor they imposed when the French refused to accept paper money. With the arrival of British ships in May bringing reinforcements and supplies, the siege of Quebec was lifted and the recovery of Canada was made possible.

Indeed, there may even have been a chance of altering the course of the Revolution. Carleton, whose growing forces by autumn numbered 10,000, was soon able to place the invaders in a precarious position. Their attempt to make a stand at Sorel and even to recover Three Rivers gave him a chance to cut off their retreat. But he allowed it to slip from him by his dilatory advance, and that in turn prejudiced his further operations. His continued delay allowed the Americans to gather their boats for the defense of Lake Champlain, and Arnold whipped up a force, which he described as "the refuse of every

regiment . . . the sick, the lame, and the lazy," to make a stand at Valcour Island. It was October before Carleton had built the necessary boats to proceed down the lake, and Arnold imposed a further delay in a three-day action before he was forced to retreat. The events left Crown Point to be taken by Carleton but helped to preserve Ticonderoga. Carleton decided that it was too strong to be taken by immediate assault and that the season was too late for a siege. He retired to Canada, leaving Ticonderoga in American hands.

This action, and the criticism which resulted in England, led to Carleton's being deprived of his military command in favor of Burgoyne. It also made Burgoyne's task distinctly more difficult. Carleton had consistently desired to use Canada as a base to strike at the Revolution, and now that a substantial force of regular troops was available it was possible to make the attempt. But the fact that the Americans still held the fortified outpost at the end of Lake Champlain had a profound influence on the operations. Instead of being able to make their preparations at leisure behind its protection the British were obliged to inaugurate a campaign which called for the mastery of Lake Champlain and the transporting of an army to the siege and capture of Ticonderoga before they could launch an attack on the line of the Hudson. It was the delay imposed by these conditions which led Burgoyne into increasing difficulties and allowed the Americans to gather the overwhelming forces which crushed the invasion at Saratoga.

Meanwhile, however, Carleton's expulsion of the Americans had ended the immediate threat to Canada, and it was not again renewed in the course of the Revolution. The entry of France into the war did indeed offer the occasion for a new attempt. Lafayette wanted to lead an expedition, and the eloquent appeal which was issued to the Canadians reminding them of their French birthright fell on fertile ground. But Washington vetoed the proposal. Even British rule in Canada was preferable, in his eyes, to a conquest which might restore the colony to the power of France. As this fear ebbed Washington changed his mind and was prepared to consider a new invasion. This time the French imposed a veto. They had no desire to see the

United States become all-powerful on the continent. They preferred a British state on the northern border which might keep the new nation dependent on France for support. From the outset each of these allies played its own game at the expense of the other, and for once Canada profited by dissensions among her enemies.

At the same time the defeat of Burgoyne ended all attempts to use Canada as a base for a full-scale military attack. There were secondary expeditions across the border with the objects of supporting the Loyalist elements in the back country and striking at the granary of the Revolution in western Pennsylvania and New York. The Tories of Butler and Sir John John Johnson, the Iroquois who followed Joseph Brant, struck from Niagara toward the Mohawk Valley and ravaged the northern frontier in the same way that the French and their Indian allies had done in previous times. But in spite of the marauding raids which swept from Lake Champlain to Detroit such activities had little effect on the main course of the war. Ultimately hostilities shifted to the south, and whatever alarms might be kept alive along the border, neither Canada nor the United States renewed the efforts which had seemed so critical for each of them in the early years of the struggle.

Thus the war ended with Canada and Nova Scotia still in British possession. But the resulting situation meant much more than simply the partition of the continent. The terms of peace had a profound effect on the whole structure of Canada, and that structure was further affected in a most vital fashion by the new population movement which followed the Revolution and in which the most striking element was the migration of the United Empire Loyalists.

CHAPTER IV

The Partition of the Continent

IF THERE is one thing written plainly across the face of the treaty of 1783 which ended the Revolutionary War it is the ineffectiveness of Canadian influences in the negotiations at Versailles. The whole future of Canada, both in its political evolution and in its economic development, was involved in the decisions arrived at by the negotiators. Yet the fundamental interest which Canadians had in the peace terms was either misunderstood or ignored. The first consideration which governed the British plenipotentiaries was naturally the interest of Britain as the government at Westminster conceived it. As part of that interest they had to consider the position of what was left of Britain's empire in America. But they were apparently willing to believe not only that the territorial extent which should be given to this imperial remnant was a matter of secondary importance, but that Britain's view of what constituted her imperial interest would turn out to be identical with the best interests of Canada as well. In the end it may have been for the best that certain Canadian desires were not realized. But that was an accidental outcome which was by no means the result of a special wisdom on the part of the imperial authorities, and there were other calculations which were not only falsified by the events that followed, but which led to a later attempt to undo certain features of the treaty as the consequences were more clearly revealed.

To the two communities which were henceforth to divide the North American continent the nature of the dividing line was of fundamental importance. In the peace negotiations, however, there were times when it was completely overshadowed by other issues which were of far less permanent significance. Questions concerning the recovery of private debts, the security of Loyalist property in the older colonies, and the rights of Americans in the Atlantic fisheries were the subjects of prolonged arguments and at times of a more stubborn insistence on one side or the other than was the question of the boundary line.

The first two points had little direct bearing on the relations between Canada and the new American Republic. The creditors whose claims had so promptly and enthusiastically been canceled by American debtors were most of them resident in Great Britain rather than in Canada. The ineffective clauses on behalf of the Loyalists which Congress agreed it would "earnestly recommend" to the several states affected numerous individuals in Canada; but while an attitude of generosity in place of the vindictiveness actually shown by the state governments might have led some of these individuals to return to their former homes, it is doubtful whether the great mass of the Loyalist migration would have been seriously affected. The fisheries question, however, had a more practical meaning for the Maritime Provinces and was to enter more than once into future controversies between the United States and Canada.

The north Atlantic fisheries were a matter of the most vital interest to the New England states. Hitherto they had enjoyed full right of access along with other British subjects. Now the achievement of independence had brought the loss of such rights, unless specifically safeguarded in the treaty. Even if American fishermen could still repair without molestation to the Grand Banks—and they do not seem to have been any too certain of that—that represented only a part of what they felt it was essential to retain. They wanted to continue fishing in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. They wanted places on British soil where they would be allowed to land for the purpose of drying fish. Not least important, they wanted full access to the inshore fisheries along the coast of British North America; and Franklin and

Adams, especially the latter, fought vigorously and successfully for all these points.

In this they had one great asset—the practical difficulty of keeping the American fishermen out of their accustomed haunts. Any interference on the Banks would produce constant clashes and keep alive a steady hostility which Britain was anxious to banish for the future. But even an effort to exclude the Americans from the creeks and bays of Nova Scotia might easily lead to trouble. In a dissertation to the peace conference on the habits of fish Adams related how they swarmed inshore during the month of April but moved to deep water when warmer weather approached. “Neither French nor English,” he pointed out, “could go from Europe and arrive early enough for the first fare; that our vessels could, being so much nearer—an advantage which God and nature had put into our hands.” It might have appeared that a similar advantage had been conferred under similar authority on the fishermen of Nova Scotia, who had some claim to be considered. But they were as yet too few to weigh seriously in diplomacy or to justify the retention of so important a monopoly to them alone. There was some safeguard in the provision that Americans landing to dry their fish must do so on uninhabited shores, but apart from this they were at full liberty to fish in British waters as well as on the high seas.

When such concessions, in a matter which was a definite English interest, were made for the sake of harmony it was hardly likely that any high emotions would be aroused over the division of the wilderness that separated Nova Scotia from New England. Indeed, the chief fear on both sides seems to have been that they might not be able to resist the more extreme claims of their opponents, and when each showed a disposition to compromise each accepted the prospect with alacrity.

The United States set out by aiming at the St. John River as the boundary, but with no very firm hope of getting it. Indeed, British raids had pushed back any effective American control beyond the Penobscot, and there was even some apprehension on the part of certain leaders that they might have to accept a line as far west as the Kennebec. But when the American delegation put forward the St. Croix as a compromise

Britain accepted without cavil. This had been the limit of the jurisdiction of Nova Scotia as defined in 1763, and there was little disposition to press for a wider extension. The commissioners, it is true, were none too clear on where the boundary would run. It was to follow the St. Croix to its source and thence along a line due north to the highlands, dividing the rivers which emptied into the St. Lawrence from those which fell into the Atlantic. The negotiators did not themselves know which highlands these were or where the source of the St. Croix might be; indeed, they were even mistaken in their belief that they knew where the St. Croix was itself. But such determinations, they rightly felt, could be left to a joint commission. It was something to have agreed so amicably upon a basic definition, and they could have no inkling at this stage of the confusion that would be caused and the emotions that would ultimately be aroused by their apparently simple and straightforward words.

The rest of the boundary east of the St. Lawrence aroused no difficulty. The line of the eastern highlands and the forty-fifth parallel had been consecrated by the two previous delimitations of Quebec in 1763 and 1774 and was accepted without serious question by either side. From the St. Lawrence westward, however, more serious questions arose; and here, more than in any other area, the decisions taken would be of the most vital interest to the whole future prospects of Canada.

They were only slightly less fundamental to the United States. Although negotiations on the boundary were at times overshadowed by other controversies they held long-term implications whose importance far exceeded that of any other issue, excepting only the basic question of recognition by Britain of the independence of the former colonies. In the question of the ownership of the "back country" lay the issue which had already been agitating Americans for a generation or more—the opening of western lands to the tide of settlement which was pushing west from the Atlantic seaboard. They had taken up the challenge of the French in the Ohio Valley and had seen the threat defeated by the conquest of Canada. They had struggled against the policy of exclusion under the Proclamation of 1763, which seemed to deny the colonists the fruits of victory. They had re-

acted vigorously against the Quebec Act with its extensive boundaries, which seemed to confirm that exclusion. Yet even when victory had again been won there was still no certainty that the West would be surrendered to the United States. The war had not brought it into their possession. The expedition of George Rogers Clark had done no more than gain a precarious foothold on the fringes of this domain. The remainder was still under British occupation, and apart from a renewal of the war, which no one contemplated, the surrender of this vast territory could only be gained by a skill and persuasiveness in negotiation which would induce Britain to surrender the empire of the interior.

Considering the importance of the stakes, the attitude of the negotiators on both sides showed a degree of moderation which at times seemed almost indifference. Even the Americans, keen as was their desire for the whole of the West to the Mississippi, were prepared if necessary to accept a great deal less. But the British authorities viewed the matter with an attitude that was almost philanthropic, and it was on their readiness to yield rather than on the vigor of American insistence that the final decision rested.

Franklin, like the shrewd bargainer that he was, began by putting forward the most extreme American claims. In his proposals of 1782 he suggested the cession of the whole of Canada. It would, he said persuasively, be a solid pledge of peace by removing any possible British threat from the northern frontier of the Republic. But this was not something which Britain was prepared to accept out of hand; nor were the Americans inclined to waste much energy in attempting to secure it. Having made his gesture as an experimental opening, Franklin fell back on more serious proposals which might seem moderate by comparison.

The new suggestion was a return to the southern boundary of Quebec as established in 1763. The Proclamation, while it forbade American settlement west of the mountains, had in no way altered the territorial claims of the older colonies. But it had set definite bounds to the province of Quebec which cut it off from the interior. Partly that was intended to avoid even an

implicit recognition that the old French claim to the interior had been valid; partly, too, it was an aspect of the whole policy of limiting present settlement while a positive imperial system was developed for the interior. The Quebec Act had reversed that policy as far as Quebec was concerned. But the Quebec Act, in this as in other features, was anathema to the older colonies; and when in 1779 Congress drew up preliminary instructions for a peace commission, one of its demands was for the boundary as defined in 1763.

This was a proposal which held serious possibilities. The line thus described ran from the point at which the forty-fifth parallel meets the St. Lawrence, in the vicinity of the present city of Cornwall, to the south end of Lake Nipissing. It cut off practically the whole of the modern province of Ontario, and its adoption would have confined Canada to the scantily settled area, predominantly French in population, which existed at the time of the conquest. Nonetheless, the British government was at this stage inclined to accept the demand, and the Cabinet, in August 1782, decided to make peace on the terms suggested. It was only a delay in closing the bargain, largely occasioned by American insistence on the definite recognition of independence as an essential preliminary to the negotiations, that gave Britain a chance to reconsider her position in the light of intervening developments. One of those developments was the successful defense of Gibraltar, which helped to revive Britain's waning prestige and to improve her bargaining position. When negotiations were resumed in October not only had the American prospect of securing the Nipissing line passed away, but Britain, in her turn, was emboldened to put forth a counterclaim for the whole of the interior as far as the Ohio.

It was now the turn of the Americans to have to face the prospect of surrender if the British demand was pressed with any real determination. The possibility was all the graver because of the attitude of the allies of the United States. Although the peace delegation had been instructed to act throughout in the closest concert with France, it had become abundantly clear that no real aid on essential points could be expected from Versailles. On the contrary, France's influence was persistently directed to

keeping American ambitions within strict bounds, and to aid her in this effort she soon enlisted the willing co-operation of Spain.

The efforts of France to advance her own interests at American expense were particularly evident over the fisheries. It was no longer possible for her to hope to attain her extreme objective of expelling England from Newfoundland, but at least she could try to exclude the American element that had formerly been part of British competition and perhaps gain something for herself in the process. To hints of this kind, however, the British government remained cool. They would too obviously lead to an embroilment with America which would benefit France without giving England any advantage that was worth such consequences, and England preferred to seek a reconciliation with America by means of generous concessions.

When it came to the boundary, the interest of France was less direct. No matter what settlement was reached, France could expect no territory for herself. Nonetheless, there were indirect advantages which might be gained by restricting the acquisitions of America. Spain could be gratified and drawn closer, while at the same time the United States, confined to a small area and checked by the neighborhood of two great powers, could be kept in continued dependence upon France for her security.

For support in this the French ministry could look to a Spain whose interests were more immediately concerned. Her entry into the war had been motivated primarily by a desire to recover Gibraltar. But she also had her eye on the Floridas and the Mississippi Valley, and now that Gibraltar was no longer in prospect the desire to strengthen her position in America increased in importance. She had even balked at committing herself to a recognition of American independence in her original treaty with France. It was no longer possible to deny such recognition, but at least she could aim not only at the recovery of the Floridas, but at the extension of Louisiana to the east of the Mississippi. At the beginning of August the American negotiators were faced with a Spanish proposal to divide the territory along a line running roughly from the western end of Lake Erie south to the boundary of Florida.

This was alarming enough. But the French attitude which was

revealed in the discussions which followed the Spanish proposal was still more perturbing. Any willingness which France had hitherto shown to support American claims to the Mississippi boundary seemed now to have evaporated. She was willing to propose a compromise line for the division of the Southwest. But she coupled this with a suggestion that the whole area should form an Indian buffer state under the protection of the respective claimants, and she made it plain that she was now inclined to support Britain's claim to all the country north of the Ohio.

Against this possible combination of doubtful friends and former enemies the United States had little chance of prevailing. The one thing that saved the situation was the failure of such a combination to materialize effectively. The evident divergence between France and the United States had indeed been one factor which encouraged Britain to claim the Ohio boundary. But although success was now within her grasp if she chose to press her advantage, other considerations intervened. The very calculations which had motivated the policy of France were also present in British minds. The Franco-American rift might give England a chance to gain her territorial desires, but that very success might throw the United States back into the arms of her former ally. It was more desirable to detach the United States from France than it was to gain the Ohio Valley.

Consequently, when the Americans put forward a compromise proposal, they found the British benevolently disposed to listen. If England would accept a solution based on the Mississippi boundary neither France nor Spain would be disposed to dispute it further. And by receding from their more extreme ambitions to the north of the Great Lakes the Americans might gain not only the Mississippi, but the Ohio country as well. As a basis for this, they offered two alternative suggestions. One was the extension of the forty-fifth parallel westward to the Mississippi. The other was a line following the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes to the northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods, and thence in a straight line westward to the Mississippi. Because the latter proposal seemed to offer a line which was clearer and more convenient it seemed preferable to the British.

Without a qualm the claim to the Ohio was abandoned, and—with both sides ignorant of the fact that the proposed extension would miss the Mississippi by a considerable distance—an agreement was reached which established the present boundary between Ontario and the United States.

It was an agreement which, however acceptable to the actual negotiators, was anything but gratifying to the minor party whose interests were vitally affected by the decision. Canadians, and particularly the Canadian merchants, heard with extreme alarm of the proposal to divide the area whose unity was essential to the fur trade as it then existed. That trade was built around the exploitation of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. The chief posts—Niagara, Detroit, Michilimackinac—were on the American side of the proposed line. The tribes who gathered the furs and the routes by which these were brought to the trading posts would now be under American control. The old French commercial empire, briefly restored by the boundaries of the Quebec Act, was once more to be partitioned to the disadvantage of the Canadian economy in the interests of British power politics.

To the indignant protests of the Canadian traders, however, the British government had an answer. It was not so much ownership of the territory as access to its resources that was important to Canada, and it was fully expected that provision for such access would be made. This, in fact, had been one of the great inducements by which the Americans had persuaded the British to accept the dividing line. Let us, they said in effect, deprive that line of any practical meaning. Let us arrange a territorial surrender which will involve no economic sacrifice. Give us the land, and we will allow you full physical and commercial access which will mean the uninterrupted domination by British interests of the trade and resources of the interior.

It was a specious proposal, though perhaps not deliberately so. The opening of the ceded area to American settlement was bound to spell the doom of the fur trade. A British monopoly of trade with the new areas of settlement was something which could only be maintained by guarantees far stronger than any treaty could provide. As events were to show, the pressure of

American interests would soon be strong enough to defy or nullify such economic concessions. But in the event, and through no fault of the Americans, the concessions never appeared in the treaty. Having been influenced by the prospect of getting them, the British government decided on second thoughts to postpone their realization. For the American proposals of mutual freedom of trade involved not only Canada, but Britain as well. The modification of the Navigation Acts which would thus be made necessary was not something to be hastily undertaken in the face of powerful British mercantile interests. So a combination of British economic and political considerations dictated a postponing to a later date of a separate commercial treaty in which the proposals would be embodied. Such a treaty was never concluded. The political division inexorably became an economic partition, with effects on the Canadian economy so profound as to be almost revolutionary.

Yet it is one of history's milder ironies that the new boundary, half accidental in its creation and bedeviled almost at once by a change of mind on the part of its creators, may well have been the only one behind which Canada could have grown to independent national stature. Certainly the Nipissing line as proposed by the Americans could have offered no such prospect. Even if the truncated province of Quebec had received the Loyalist influx which actually began the settlement of Ontario, there would have been little of that subsequent American immigration which contributed so much to its first growth, and probably equally little attraction to the later immigration from the British Isles. Deprived of the Ontario peninsula, not only would the agricultural growth of early Canada have been stifled, but the readjustment of its commercial life on the basis of new staples, painful as it was at best, might have been made impossible. And even if the reduced community could have withstood the pressure or the attraction of a flourishing American community west of the Ottawa it would almost certainly have continued too weak to compete effectively for the retention of the prairie West when the time came to forestall the American advance on that region by an effective Canadian occupation.

The dangers inherent in the superficially attractive idea of a

Canadian boundary on the Ohio were different but, in the long run, possibly just as fatal. This was an area destined for settlement. But Canada could not have sent settlers in sufficient force to occupy and hold it against American pressure. There would have been a losing struggle to keep it for the Indians and the fur trade, and it could not have been held for long. It would have become a Canadian Texas, and there is no certainty that when the American expansionists reached out to grasp it for the Union they would not have reached much farther than the boundary of the Great Lakes.

Even the proposal of the forty-fifth parallel held its dangers. It would have given Canada a western area which would have relieved some serious problems of commercial geography. The mineral wealth of the Lake Superior region might have made a profound difference to her industrial development. The extension of this line after the Louisiana Purchase would have generously increased her area of habitable arable land. But the division would have cut across the Ontario peninsula, and it is again a question—granting that a war such as that of 1812 would have come in any case—whether such a line could have been maintained. If the more favorable western boundary could have been combined with the line of the lakes, that area might perhaps have been held, with tremendous results for Canada's future. But this was not a compromise envisaged at the time, and although there were later efforts to obtain something like it the opportunity had passed when, in the face of the Franco-Spanish intrigue, the United States persuaded Britain to surrender the West in the vain hope of healing the wounds of the Revolution. Those wounds were still to be irritated by continued friction, and to that unhappy result Canadian as well as British influences were to make their contribution.

II

This renewed division of the continent was one of the obvious results of the American Revolution. Once again North America was partitioned among three different sovereignties—although now, as previously, Spain was to prove of minor account in the

evolving destiny of America. The United States now, like the thirteen colonies a quarter century before, saw on her northern border an alien and possibly hostile state under the dominion of a European power. But this was by no means simply a return to the situation which existed before 1763. The fact that Britain had replaced France was a very real difference, and one which was anything but a disadvantage to the United States. Far more significant, however, was the change which the Revolution brought to Canada itself. It meant a substantial increase in population, a profound alteration in the balance between English and French, a shift in the old economic basis to which the new boundary had already dealt a serious blow. And it meant, too, an increase in the distinctively American influences which were to contribute to the shaping of Canada and to her future relations with the new Republic.

The Loyalist migration was the outcome of the profound rift which the Revolution had created in the population of the older colonies. Resistance to authority was a hazardous business. Those who embarked on it might be staking their property and even their heads. Their best prospect of success lay in solidarity. All who threatened that solidarity were in consequence enemies who endangered the whole venture. The Tories were not merely political opponents in the ordinary sense. They were allies of the enemy, ready to denounce the abettors of violence and to deliver them to the utmost rigors of the law. They were still more active enemies when the conflict came to open war and the Tories took up arms in support of the imperial connection. In view of the resulting civil strife within the colonies the vindictiveness of the victorious Radicals is in no way surprising. It is perhaps more remarkable that the spirit of revenge was kept within such moderate bounds.

It was active enough, however, to make the position of the Loyalists impossible. From the very beginning of the controversy they were exposed to physical danger. Even when their lives were not menaced their persons were frequently assaulted and their property damaged or destroyed. The outbreak of war increased their insecurity. Most of them were safe only under the shelter of the British forces of occupation, and against such

refugees the new state governments directed various penal measures, including the confiscation of property. The end of the Revolution brought little relaxation of this attitude. In spite of the promise of the treaty and the attitude of Congress the confiscatory measures continued, and most Loyalists found it impossible to return even temporarily to their former homes or to secure a return of their possessions.

Thus, quite apart from the desire of many of them to remain under the British flag, they were driven forth by a practical necessity which offered no alternative. All through the Revolution there was a northward drift in the direction of a friendlier soil which was still firmly under British control. As one town after another on the American seaboard was abandoned by the British, Loyalist refugees left with the troops. By the end of the war New York had become the chief place of refuge, and the evacuation of those who had gathered there was one of the chief tasks which confronted Carleton on the conclusion of peace. Even after the war the movement continued as those who had hoped to make their peace with the victorious Revolution found themselves exposed instead to the continued spirit of persecution and revenge. Tens of thousands were thus uprooted from their homes in the older colonies and forced to embark on a new life under pioneer conditions, and in the process they laid new foundations for Britain's second empire in America.

The first and the most profound effect was on Nova Scotia. This seaboard colony, relatively close to the American ports in which the Loyalists sought refuge, was a natural place of resort, all the more so because the naval and military base at Halifax represented a familiar destination to the authorities in charge of the evacuations. Here was a colony with an established and stable government and with plenty of vacant land available. Advance parties of Loyalists had already investigated certain areas that were suitable for settlement. The local government was prepared to lend its aid, though its administrative resources were soon overwhelmed by the vastness of the task with which it found itself confronted. The new immigrants were not always suited by age or training to the rigors of a pioneer existence. Many were former officials or merchants or professional men,

used to wealth and comfort and position, and their change in fortunes was brutally abrupt. But although some found the new conditions impossible to endure the majority weathered their trials. A migration which may have totaled 40,000 souls doubled the original population of Nova Scotia and laid the foundations for the new province of New Brunswick.

This was an increase which, in the normal course of events, the seaboard provinces would have had little reason to expect. The northward thrust of population from New England which began in 1760 had already shown signs of ebbing by 1768. The opportunities of Nova Scotia seemed all too scanty. The lure of western lands, made more accessible by the Treaty of Stanwix with the Indians, turned land-hungry faces in that direction. After the first influx a backwash set in which threatened to draw off some of the more restless pioneers. To this current the Revolution and the Loyalist immigration offered an abrupt check; and out of the political upheaval came a new movement along lines already marked out—a movement of involuntary pioneers to carry on and extend a process which, under other circumstances, would have developed much more slowly if it had not actually come to a halt.*

The influx into the present province of Ontario, on the other hand, represented the advance guard of a natural movement which was now getting under way. Here the Loyalist migration itself had a pioneer character far more marked than that to Nova Scotia. Its personnel was to a very considerable extent drawn from the frontier settlements of the older colonies. The farmers who moved from the Mohawk Valley or the back country of Pennsylvania experienced no such violent uprooting as was the lot of many of the exiles from the seaboard area. They might need help to tide over the first difficult winter, but

*It is only fair to say that a somewhat different view has the support of eminent authority. "It is a mistake to think that the American Revolution brought about the occupation of the northeastern region. Actually its preliminaries and its course interrupted or hampered it for about fifteen years. What the Revolution did was to exercise a selective process upon a logical movement of North American population." M. L. Hansen and J. B. Brebner, *The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples* (New Haven, 1940), 56.

they represented the very element that was already pushing the American frontier of settlement west of the Alleghenies. And behind them came others of the same kidney who found in Ontario rather than in Ohio the best prospect of satisfying their desire for new land.

For although the Republic now had title to the West there were still obstacles in the way of the individual settler. For one thing, the Indian danger had not yet been removed. Sullivan's campaign of 1779 had cleared the Mohawk Valley, but farther west the hostility of the tribes hung restless and menacing until Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers paved the way for the Treaty of Greenville in 1795. In the Mohawk Valley itself speculative grants hampered the process of settlement, and a satisfactory land system was slow in coming for the old Northwest. It was not until 1787 that the first sales were made under the ordinance adopted two years previously, and even then the terms were too high for many individuals. Squatters could and did move into the new territories in defiance of all these deterrents, but the settler who wanted security and a clear title did not always find it easy to satisfy his desires.

In such conditions Ontario offered certain real attractions. It lay directly on the flank of the new westward migration. Its Indians had amicably surrendered their lands to settlement. Its authorities offered virgin land with remarkable generosity. In theory the grants were a reward for loyalty during the Revolution. But in practice there was a tendency to feel that any American who showed a preference for British rule, even though that sentiment might be a sudden new discovery on his part, was well worth encouraging to the extent of fifty or a hundred acres. Gratiified recipients wrote back to friends and relatives in the old colonies, and they in turn crossed the border to take advantage of His Majesty's generosity. True, they also had to take an oath of loyalty to their benefactor. But that offered little difficulty when a free farm was in question, and objections to the tyranny of George III dwindled in importance before such a tangible advantage.

But although the immediate interest of the new pioneers was economic there were political effects which it was impossible to

disregard. Previous experience in both Quebec and Nova Scotia had shown that Americans, when they moved to new areas, did not willingly abandon the institutions to which they were accustomed. Even the conservative Loyalist elements who settled in the Maritime Provinces, however averse they might be to complete democracy, would not long have been content without some form of representative government. The problem did not arise there, for Nova Scotia already had its assembly, and New Brunswick was granted one on its creation. But in Canada the authoritarian government created by the Quebec Act was still in force, and it was little likely to content the frontier element which was now introduced into that province.

The whole foundation of the Quebec Act was by this time in ruins. The dream of attaching the enthusiastic loyalty of the habitant by contenting the aristocracy and the Church had proven false. The hope of holding the older colonies in subjection by reviving a military threat in the North had completely failed. The need to provide a strong and effective government for the West had vanished now that the West was lost. Most important of all, it could no longer be assumed that Canada would remain French to the end of time. The development envisaged by the Proclamation of 1763 had been abandoned when the expected settlement failed to materialize. The Quebec Act had replaced it on the assumption that no substantial settlement would take place. Now that settlement was under way, and a new reversal of policy was the almost inevitable consequence.

Other considerations added weight to this conclusion. The necessity of providing a local revenue for provincial needs made it almost unavoidable that the inhabitants should be invited to tax themselves through their representatives. The clamor of the mercantile minority for the fulfillment of the promises of 1763 rose with new vigor as they saw their position strengthened by an influx of English-speaking settlers. With the full maintenance of feudal tenures and French commercial law becoming virtually impossible, the objection to an assembly with powers of local legislation was also weakened. Not least in significance, the very existence of the United States made changes inevitable. Even a

French province might ultimately grow restive if its own system of government remained in direct contrast to the freer institutions of the neighboring republic. A population which was British in origin was certain to demand a similar political freedom.

There was one feature of the American development, however, which there was no attempt to emulate. That was the achievement of federal unity under the Constitution of 1787. Even in the United States such an achievement had not been easy. The lack of coherence in the days before the Revolution had been flagrantly in evidence. The necessities of the Revolution had done something to overcome it, but the weakness of the Articles of Confederation and the internal discords after 1783 showed how potent was the surviving spirit of localism. There were, however, other and growing forces to counteract the tendency to disruption. There were groups whose interests could not be fully served and whose opportunities could not be properly realized through the medium of local politics. Mercantile and trading interests were hampered by the lack of a uniform commercial system. Investors were alarmed at the decline of public credit. Owners of western lands saw their prospects endangered by interstate controversies. Aspiring manufacturers sought a national market behind a national tariff. These were the powerful forces of unity which overcame the widespread opposition to an effective central government and made the new nation a political reality.

There were no such forces at work in British North America. One voice indeed was raised in favor of effective federation. William Smith, the chief justice, was a Loyalist who had held the same office in New York. He was convinced that the unchecked growth of local legislatures was the real reason for the loss of America. The remedy would have been "the erection of a power upon the continent itself, to control all its little republics, and create a partner in the legislation of the empire." The chance had been missed in the older colonies, but it was presented again in what was left of the American empire, and Smith pleaded with the home government not to miss it a second time.

His plea found little support in either London or Canada. Only the mercantile group in Quebec was interested in a measure of unity, and even that was limited. They wanted to keep Canada as a single province. But neither the French nor the Loyalists showed any particular enthusiasm for such a project, and neither these groups nor the merchants themselves had any interest in unity with the Maritime Provinces. That indifference was fully reciprocated. The Maritimes, indeed, accepted with complacency their division into four separate units in 1784. They were hardly likely to press with any vigor for union with far-off Quebec. Canada's stage of development was still too elementary, and her geographical difficulties were too great, for any truly national forces to have arisen strong enough to overcome the localism which was implicit in the racial and geographical situation.

The attitude of the British government was more positive in opposition to any such idea. Britain might be ready to agree that the legislatures had become too strong in the older colonies, but she failed to see how that would be remedied by the creation of a still stronger body. The lesson which she drew from the Revolution was rather the danger of allowing any such development. Even if it could not be prevented indefinitely—even if in the natural course of things the colonies would ultimately reach a stage of maturity which would result in their dropping away from the mother country—at least something could be done to postpone the inevitable separation. The colonies could be drawn more closely in the early stages by a more effective assertion of imperial authority, and the application of the principle of “divide and rule” would help to keep them in continued dependence on the mother country.

So, following the division of the Maritime Provinces, there came a division of Quebec into Upper and Lower Canada. The step was not without its valid reasons. The greater part of the Loyalists had been settled beyond the effective bounds of the old province. A line could easily be drawn to separate in a general way the two racial communities. The threat of serious racial conflict might thus be largely removed. The French could retain their religious privileges and their laws and their system

of property without interfering with the interests of the new settlers. These, on their part, could enjoy the full benefits of English law and English land tenure and an established Protestant church without alarming their French neighbors. In the end it was not quite so simple as that, but very few people could have been expected to see the full complications which ensued.

In another and less obvious way the system established in Canada by the Act of 1791 differed from the political framework that existed in the United States. The colonies which threw off the authority of the Crown fell back upon popular sovereignty as the basis of government. They might still be shy about adopting a full democratic franchise, but whatever the modifications in practice, they had no choice but to rest the authority of the state on the active consent of the people at large. But it was just such a trend which Britain—and in this she had the support of many Loyalists—was anxious to prevent in the colonies which remained. Elective assemblies were unavoidable, and the basis of the franchise was comparatively generous. But the power of the assemblies was kept within strict bounds. They were checked by an appointed upper house. Official appointments and executive policy were largely outside their control. Even their power over finance was by no means absolute. And for the further strengthening of authority, definite provision was made for the support of a Protestant clergy under government patronage and control—a feature whose absence from many of the older colonies was deplored as depriving the government of one of its most effective and most natural supports.

Unfortunately, however admirable all this was in intention, it still left potent elements dissatisfied. To the merchants a disastrous peace in 1783 was now crowned by a disastrous constitution in 1791. The new international boundary cut across their natural trade area. The new interprovincial boundary divided them politically from their compatriots in Ontario and left them a hopeless minority in a French community. They had gained the Assembly for which they had clamored so long, but they had no hope of controlling it. They were trying to adjust their interests to the situation created by the new settlements in Ontario, but they were unable to control public policy in

either province or to link the two provinces as an effective commercial unity. They were not excluded economically from either Ontario or the American West. But the double division which had resulted from the Revolution nonetheless hampered their present activities and rendered uncertain their future prospects. For the next generation a part of their efforts was bent toward reversing this situation. They hoped to restore the unity of the St. Lawrence system, and for this purpose they sought not only the reunion of Canada, but, what was far more ambitious, the retention or recovery of the American West.

CHAPTER V

The Treaty and the West

THE BURST of generosity which had led Britain to sign away her claims to the West represented an impulse that was comparatively short-lived. It had ebbed perceptibly when the time came to make the surrender effective. Considerations which had been ignored during the negotiations, calculations whose inaccuracy was revealed after fuller reflection, worked to bring about a change of mind in London. Repentance was made all the easier by the change of ministry which brought the younger Pitt into power in place of the Fox-North coalition. This ministry, no longer confronted with the necessity and the responsibility of making peace, could contemplate with some freedom a modification of the peace made by their now-discredited predecessors. Canadian representations which had been brushed aside in the face of earlier exigencies could now be recognized not merely as having some validity from the point of view of local conditions, but also as being in harmony with broader imperial interests. As a result, although the boundary was defined in 1783, it was not established for another decade and more; and the controversy over the West developed to a point where the parties concerned were brought within a hairs breadth of a renewal of armed hostilities.

It centered around the question of the western posts. At Detroit and Michilimackinac, Niagara and Oswego, Oswegat-

chie and Dutchman's Point, Britain held bases which gave her strategic control of the Great Lakes and the line of the Richelieu River. They were also the points from which British control was made effective throughout the American Northwest. In spite of George Rogers Clark that control remained virtually unshaken. It was Britain and not the United States who remained in effective occupation of this area at the conclusion of the peace, and the principal centers from which that control was exercised were now on American soil.

The prospect of an early evacuation of the posts roused serious misgivings in a number of quarters. In the early stages there were probably few people, either in Canada or in London, who believed that the decision once taken could actually be reversed. But there were many who felt it vital that its execution should be delayed, and as the delay was prolonged hope rose that a modification of the treaty might be effected which would remedy some of the shortcomings which were now being revealed. A number of diverse motives—commercial, strategic, political—began to work toward an identical end, impelled by tangible and immediate considerations to which the prospect of evacuation gave rise.

The interest which was most obviously affected was that of the fur trade. Already there were signs that its center of gravity was beginning to shift north of the lakes, but the transition was slow, and two thirds of the trade, according to the fur traders, lay south of the new boundary line. Not all of this, of course, would be lost as a result of the treaty; indeed, some of the leading Canadian firms seem to have been optimistic about their ability to continue in successful competition with their American rivals. But at best the treaty introduced an element of uncertainty, for the passing of the trading posts under American control might result in regulations which would hamper the Canadians in their use of these as bases. It seemed wisest, in any case, to clear up such commercial debts—out of an estimated total of £300,000 in the whole of the interior—as were due from the American side of the line; and the merchants pleaded that the evacuation of the posts be delayed at least two years to allow this operation to be completed.

Beyond this lay a broader question in which British as well as Canadian interests were involved. The idea of continued commercial access to the American West had been implicit in the negotiations which led to the final treaty. The Canadian merchants were naturally the most directly concerned, for the problem of transportation routes as well as of markets was involved, and they had tried without success to get the desired guarantees written into the treaty itself. For Britain the matter was less vital. It could indeed be argued that no matter who controlled the trade of the West, Britain would profit, since she alone could supply the manufactures on which the trade depended. But there would, nonetheless, be additional assurance of this if the trade could be kept in British hands. The incentive was not great enough to lead to the comprehensive trade treaty which the peace negotiations had envisaged. But if while maintaining the protection of the mercantile system for her own benefit Britain could, through her possession of the western posts, continue to enjoy an American market, she would possess not only an immediate advantage, but a useful bargaining position when it came to negotiating a wider agreement.

But trade was not the only consideration and perhaps not even the paramount one. The treaty raised political and strategic questions of the most serious sort for Canada, and they could not be completely ignored by the imperial authorities. For it was not only Canadian interests which these authorities had tended to overlook during the negotiations for peace. Equally ignored, and perhaps far less excusably, were the interests of the Indians; and the Indian question now thrust itself forward to create a serious dilemma for the British government and to exacerbate its relations with the United States.

During the Revolutionary War the Indians of the Northwest had inevitably been partisans of the British cause, with the Iroquois particularly active in the struggle. It was not merely loyalty to an accustomed authority which decided their choice. Their interests drew them to the side which held the St. Lawrence and which stood for the continuance of the fur trade. Any remaining hope they may have had of curbing the encroachment of American settlement on their hunting grounds lay in the pro-

tection of British imperial authority, of which the Proclamation Line was a tangible example. Even so their confidence was none too great. The influence of Sir William Johnson, reinforced by the prestige of Joseph Brant, played a considerable part in bringing the Six Nations to a definite decision. But in any case they could expect little advantage from an American victory. If their hunting grounds were to be saved that salvation would come from Britain and from Canada.

The defeat of Britain was a blow to these hopes. The peace treaty seemed to shatter them completely. Their lands were surrendered to the sovereignty of the United States with no effort to safeguard the rights of ownership which the Indians claimed and which Britain had previously recognized. It was an oversight which looked suspiciously like betrayal. The attempt of the British authorities, when they realized the situation, to convince the Indians that only such rights as Britain had previously enjoyed were now transferred to the Americans and that the Indian rights remained unaffected was too hollow to be accepted. The Americans themselves were firm in rejecting such a view. The Indians were enemies who had made war on the United States. Britain's recognition of territorial sovereignty deprived Britain's savage allies of any legal claim to ownership. Wisdom might dictate a policy of purchase rather than outright seizure. But whatever the policy, the United States was determined to open the hunting grounds to settlement. American soldiers had been promised western grants. American investors in public securities looked to revenue from land sales to provide security for their investment. The West was henceforth to be opened to the ax and the plow of the pioneer, and the tribes must make what terms they could with their new masters.

This was a prospect which held serious possibilities of trouble, and the Canadian authorities immediately took alarm. Their own relations with the Indians were completely harmonious. Lands had been set aside in Ontario for the refugee Iroquois warriors, and neither the Iroquois nor the local Missisaugas offered any objection to the opening of the remaining area of the peninsula to settlement. But the hunting grounds south of the lakes were a different matter. The policy of the American

government foreshadowed a serious clash, and that clash might have unfavorable repercussions on Canada. At best it would seriously hamper the fur trade; at worst it might turn the Indians against the Canadians as parties to the British betrayal.

This was the feature of the treaty which gave Governor Haldimand the greatest concern. This was his initial motive in advocating a retention of the posts until the danger had passed. "Nothing," he assured the home government, "shall be neglected on my part which can contribute to give them satisfaction, or to reconcile them with the subjects of the United States of North America, tho' I must acknowledge that I foresee great difficulties. Actions not words can make impression upon them." Pleading his lack of instructions, he evaded making any arrangements with Von Steuben when the latter was sent by Washington to discuss the surrender of the posts, and in this he had the approval of London. The first step toward an evasion of the obligations of the treaty had thus been taken, and as the policy developed it gradually lost its character of a temporary step to avert a serious crisis and began to aim at more permanent results which would lead to a modification of the treaty itself.

The way for this development was opened first by the phrasing of the treaty provisions, and second by the actions of American authorities. In providing for the surrender of the posts the treaty set no specific time limit. It merely called for evacuation "with all convenient speed," and there was nothing to prevent Britain herself from being the judge of that convenience. It was thus possible to resist American efforts to get definite arrangements for the transfer of the posts at a definite date and to take advantage of successive events to strengthen the British case for postponement.

For the Americans, on their part, were somewhat cavalier in their treatment of their treaty obligations. The clause which promised that British creditors would meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of just debts was, to say the least, imperfectly observed. The clauses which sought to protect the persons and property of the Loyalists were even more flagrantly contravened. It is true that the negotiators refused to make this a direct responsibility of the weak federal government, and the

treaty merely promised an earnest recommendation by Congress to the individual states. But in recognizing these states as individual sovereigns, the British government had at least a moral right to assume that it was negotiating with their accredited envoys. The fact that the states not only refused to reverse previous confiscations, but continued to pass further laws against the Loyalists, offered at least a technical grievance to justify British non-observance of the treaty.

There were other calculations which arose out of these and similar circumstances. The inability of Congress to control the states was only one illustration of the serious weakness of the new Republic. Other events revealed an internal condition which might ultimately end in disruption. The new settlements in the Southwest were beginning to flirt with the Spanish power which controlled their commercial outlet at New Orleans. In the North Vermont had declared itself an independent republic and was seeking a trade outlet by way of the Richelieu. There were even strong hints dropped by Ethan Allen that a favorable attitude would bring the return of Vermont to the bosom of the mother country. It seems more than dubious whether there was any real possibility of such an outcome and not too certain that the British authorities took it really seriously. But the possibility was at least worth encouraging, and so long as such weaknesses continued there was good motive for Britain to defer a final surrender of the West and to be in a position to retain it if the Republic should, after all, fall to pieces.

Even short of this, there might be advantages to be won. In the light of American weakness Britain began to realize the strength of her own bargaining position. To the possession of the posts was added the dependence of the United States on British markets and British supplies. In return for the commercial agreement which was being persistently sought by America substantial concessions might be asked. With the posts as a further lever it might even be possible to secure a revision of the treaty in Britain's favor. The idea developed of persuading the United States to relinquish part of what she had been promised by the treaty in order to secure delivery of the remainder.

The central feature in this plan was the creation of an Indian

buffer state. Haldimand, trying to find a way of averting the dangers implicit in the surrender of the West, had evolved this solution as early as 1784. The most likely means of preventing quarrels between Canada and the United States, he suggested, would be to recognize the country west of the Stanwix treaty line as belonging entirely to the Indians and to forbid the citizens of either country from settling there, while leaving them impartial freedom of trade.

This would be a happy solution from the point of view of both Britain and Canada. It would be a triumphant vindication of Britain's claim that she had really kept faith with the Indians in spite of all appearances to the contrary. It would mean for Canada the retention of her vital interest in the West. The apparent equality of treatment as between Canadians and Americans was, in fact, completely deceptive. The prohibition of settlement, while it would be a major blow to American hopes, would be of no disadvantage to Canada. On the contrary, by preserving the Indians and their hunting grounds, it would preserve the fur trade as well. And in spite of the suggestion of equal freedom of access, the trade would, in fact, be retained by Canada. The developments during the decade following 1763 had clearly revealed the advantage which Montreal enjoyed over any competition from the south. With the creation of the buffer state Britain need have no scruples about surrendering her posts on American soil. The Indian tribes would still look to her for continued support against American encroachments, and the advantages of the Indian trade would inevitably accrue to Montreal.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the project was soon adopted as a definite objective of British policy. By 1791 Haldimand's successor, Dorchester (the former Sir Guy Carleton), expanded the idea to take in the whole area bordering the Great Lakes and extending as far east as Lake Champlain. As tension grew between the tribes and the American government Dorchester also evolved the idea of acting as mediator and so arranging a compromise which would effectively implement this project while satisfying and attaching the western tribes. In this scheme he now had the backing of the home government, and

Hammond, the first British Ambassador to the United States, arrived with instructions to lend it his support.

But 1791, as Hammond soon discovered, was already too late. The new government created by the Constitution of 1787 had begun to function, and the effect was to strengthen the hands of the United States and to weaken Britain's tactical advantages. The central government could act effectively for the whole Union in foreign affairs. Within the limits assigned to it, it could pass measures to override the opposition or the delinquencies of the individual states. Treaties were part of the supreme law of the land, and the federal government was at last in a position to enforce them. Federal courts were open to aggrieved foreign citizens, and British creditors could sue for their debts and Loyalists seek recovery of their property with some hope of success. The excuses put forward for the retention of the posts were losing their validity as adequate judicial remedies became available.

At the same time the new powers of action by the United States government made the retention of the posts much more risky. In the days before 1789, when Congress hardly dared call out its own troops for fear that their demands for back pay would lead them to attack Congress rather than the enemy, the possibility of expelling the British by force was distinctly remote. Now the new government was in a better position to raise an effective force to deal with the situation in the Northwest. They were still reluctant to take any steps which might lead to hostilities, but there was no assurance that such forbearance would endure indefinitely. The Nootka Sound crisis in 1790 emphasized the dangers inherent in this unsettled situation. Britain, facing a war with Spain over a conflict of claims in America, had also to face the possibility that the Americans would join with Spanish forces from Louisiana. As it turned out, there was no imminent danger of this—indeed, the American government was chiefly concerned over the possibility that Britain might ask for the passage of troops across American soil to attack the territories of Spain. But the possibility had been there even if it had not been taken up, and a later crisis might find the United States far less restrained.

In the meantime there was danger enough in the possibilities

aroused by American efforts to bring the Indians to terms. Congress had begun by attempting to negotiate treaties of cession with the individual tribes. But although a number were actually concluded they could not be enforced. In spite of the efforts of American diplomacy to keep them divided the tribes were working toward the creation of a solid front against the advance of the white settlers. They had evolved the theory that all the land belonged to all the Indians and that no single tribe—much less any individual or group—had a right to alienate any of it. The treaties were repudiated, and the United States found it impossible to secure an acceptable general settlement.

This situation could not endure indefinitely. The restless and menacing attitude of the Indians and the threat which they represented to the frontier settlements made it increasingly imperative that a decision should be reached. If the Indians would not accept a peaceful agreement they must be reduced to submission by arms. In 1790 a force under General Harmar was sent as a demonstration into the western country. The Indians were not impressed. Launching a surprise attack, they cut off some of the force and threw the rest into disorderly retreat. A more serious expedition next year under General St. Clair fared even worse. Falling into an ambush as he advanced north from Cincinnati, he suffered a disastrous defeat in which the bulk of his force was wiped out by the savages and all his artillery was lost to the enemy.

These events increased the stubbornness of both sides. Already in 1791 the tribes in council had agreed on a definite boundary line as a basis of peace. This line, running from the Ohio north along the Muskingum to the Cuyahoga portage and thence east to Venango, would mean the retention of the bulk of the present state of Ohio. But the defeat of St. Clair raised the ambitions of the Indians. Although the Iroquois were now anxious for peace and had taken up a position of intermediaries between the western tribes and the United States government, they failed to keep the aspirations of their brethren within bounds. A new council in September 1792 agreed to meet with American commissioners next year at Sandusky. But they now demanded the Ohio boundary, and the Iroquois, unable to get more moderate

terms, felt obliged to maintain an appearance of solidarity in the hope that this demand might ultimately be modified.

The Americans, on their part, were determined to make an end to the situation on the Northwest frontier. The defeats of Harmar and St. Clair had led to an outburst of anger, and a good part of that anger was directed against Great Britain. Agents of the Indian Department were accused of stirring up the tribes, and periodic assurances to the Indians of British good faith and support were made more heinous by the fact that the Indians secured their weapons and supplies from the British posts. The tentative suggestions of British mediation were strongly resented. The "spontaneous" invitation from the Maumee council of 1792 to Simcoe, the governor of Upper Canada, to be present at the Sandusky conference was firmly vetoed by the United States, and his role was reduced to that of entertaining and safeguarding the commissioners. Even that he did too well. They were held up at Niagara while Brant called the tribes to a new council at the falls of the Maumee and tried to get them to accept more moderate terms. The commissioners felt that the perfidious Britons were keeping them from the meeting in order to make preparations for its certain failure. And when it did fail, as a result of the insistence by the Indians that they would treat on no other terms than the Ohio boundary, the disappointed commissioners saw in the outcome one more instance of a successful British intrigue to retain control of the West through the Indian tribes.

It was not quite so simple as that. The British were still hopeful that an Indian buffer state could be realized, and they made every effort in the meantime to preserve the good will of the Indians. Yet they were, in fact, still in the throes of a dilemma into which they had been plunged when they failed to secure adequate provision for the tribes in the peace treaty. The interests and the security of Canada made it impossible to ignore the possible Indian reaction. It was felt necessary to convince them that Britain was still their staunch supporter. But it was hard to do this without implying a readiness to lend armed assistance in case of an Indian war with the United States, and this the British were by no means ready to promise. They

would defend Canada against attack. They wanted to prevent depredations by aggrieved Indians and to be assured of Indian benevolence in case of an American invasion. The retention of the posts was a means to both these ends. But the British in the last resort had no intention of plunging into war for the sake of retaining the posts or of upholding the rights of the tribes. Unfortunately they were now in a position where an Indian war might involve them in spite of themselves. The fur trade was being hurt by the American expeditions. The posts were being brought uncomfortably close to the scene of the hostilities. The very fact that the two previous defeats were bound to bring a more serious and decisive American effort added to the danger. Wayne was already preparing for such an effort, and it might be a decidedly ticklish job to subdue the Indians without clashing with the British as well.

By this time an even more serious danger was looming in another quarter. The controversy on maritime rights which was to drag on for twenty years had now broken out as Britain found herself once more involved in war with France. It was a disillusioning development. The outbreak of the French Revolution had seemed to paralyze the ancient enemy. Spain's backdown over the Nootka Sound issue when France refused to support her had revealed the breakdown of the Family Compact which had united the Bourbon rulers of both countries. Pitt was optimistic about the chances of prolonged peace for England. But Jacobin nationalism soon began to appear as aggressive as Bourbon dynasticism. By January 1793 the two countries had entered on a war that was to last, with slight intermissions, for twenty years.

The British navy at once went into action against French commerce and French colonies, and both these activities almost at once intruded on American interests. Questions of blockade and of contraband arose to plague relations with England. The blockade of the French West Indies was especially aggravating, more particularly since France had thrown open this important trade to neutrals on the declaration of war. It was a bid by the weaker sea power to enlist the interest and support of neutral commercial states. But Britain had met a previous action of this

kind by promulgating the Rule of 1756, which asserted that trade which was closed in time of peace could not be opened in time of war. The seizures of American ships which resulted aroused widespread resentment, and when on top of this there arose the controversy over impressment of sailors from American merchant vessels, all the issues were present which ultimately led to war in 1812.

Among the opponents of the Administration there was a violent outcry against these English outrages on the high seas. The Jeffersonian Republicans, already stirred by the activities of the French Ambassador Genêt to a high pitch of sympathy with their former ally, clamored for retaliation against Britain. Madison introduced a series of resolutions providing for discrimination against English shipping. An embargo for one month was adopted in March 1794 and was renewed in April. It seemed certain that unless something could be done to ease the tension more drastic measures would be forced on the government, and war itself might not be far off.

This was the background for the dramatic climax which was now reached in the western dispute. As early as April 1792 steps had been taken to wipe out the effects of St. Clair's defeat by the preparation of a new expedition under the command of Major General Wayne. His title of "Mad Anthony" had some foundation in the arbitrary and capricious conduct which marked his career as commanding officer. Washington described him as "open to flattery, vain, easily imposed upon, and liable to be drawn into scraps. Whether sober, or a little addicted to the bottle, I know not." This last was a charitable judgment born of deliberate blindness, but Washington added the hope that "time, reflection, good advice, and, above all, a due sense of the importance of the trust which is committed to him will correct his foibles, or cast a shade over them."

In military matters at least Wayne's madness had a method which was in refreshing contrast to the near imbecility of some of his predecessors. The British Minister considered him "the most active, vigilant, and enterprising officer in the American service." His hope for a spring campaign during 1793 was frustrated by the continued negotiations with the Indians, and

the desire of the Administration to avoid hostilities delayed him for another year and a half. But the time was anything but wasted. Wayne spent it in hammering out an efficient force from the dubious material which he found when he took command. He had to deal with soldiers who disliked drilling and officers who resented discipline and a supply service which sent him such things as horseshoes under the label "musket balls." His remedial methods aroused wide resentment, some of it legitimate. But when he took the field he at least had with him an army which could march and shoot.

His method of advance was based on a determination to avoid any such disaster as that which had overtaken St. Clair. Although during the greater part of 1793 he was restrained by the prospect of continued negotiations from moving his main force beyond Cincinnati, he spent the summer in strengthening the forts which stretched northward toward the Indian country. Hampered by a growing feud with his immediate subordinate, General James Wilkinson, whose intrigues with the contractors amounted to deliberate sabotage, Wayne succeeded in opening roads and collecting supplies in preparation for a further advance. When negotiations broke down in the autumn and the Indians embarked on marauding activities, he moved his force along this route to a new and still more advanced base at Greenville. In December he pushed a small body still farther forward to the scene of St. Clair's defeat, on which he built an outpost which he named Fort Recovery. He had planted himself well within Indian territory in preparation for a decisive campaign in the following year.

There was a real alarm in certain quarters in Canada lest this should be a prelude to an attack on Detroit, and perhaps even an invasion. The possibility was discounted by many informed persons, who were convinced that the American government had no desire to see the Indian war develop into a conflict with Britain. But the governor general failed to share that conviction, and early in 1794 he was guilty of two completely irresponsible actions which came close to making a clash unavoidable.

Dorchester in his declining years was now in a state of pessi-

mism and disillusionment. His plan for a loyal and disciplined French Canada had fallen in ruins. His hope of a triumphant military career from Canada as a base had met with frustration during the Revolution. His outlook on the immediate future was gloomy. Having failed to save the other American colonies by his Canadian policy, he was now doubtful whether Canada could be preserved against the aggressive designs which he attributed to the United States. He was also involved in dissensions with the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, Sir John Simcoe. This energetic and ambitious official was even more convinced than Dorchester of the sinister designs being entertained by the Americans and the inevitability of a new struggle. He felt himself ordained for the role of the military savior of Upper Canada. He resented his subordination to Dorchester. He engaged in persistent efforts to secure for himself an independent authority, not only in civil affairs, but in military matters as well. Dorchester, obsessed by a sense of imminent danger, was further discouraged by the feeling that his resources and his instruments at hand were inadequate to meet it when it came.

These feelings found vent in an outburst in February 1794. Haranguing a group of Indian delegates, he expressed his belief that war would come within the year and that in that case a line must be drawn by the warriors. "You are witness," he told them, "that on our part we have acted in the most peaceable manner and borne the language and conduct of the people of the United States with patience, but I believe our patience is almost exhausted." It was a pronouncement which was at once disavowed by his superiors in London as soon as it reached their ears, but in the existing state of communications it took several months for that disavowal to arrive in America, and meanwhile Dorchester's speech had been circulated to the tribes and had inevitably come to the knowledge of Americans as well. They could hardly want more complete proof of their suspicions that the British authorities were actively urging the Indians to war.

A week later Dorchester took a still more reckless and challenging step. Up the Maumee, some fifteen miles in from Lake Erie, was a post which had previously been occupied by the

British and used as a center for Indian trade. It had lately been abandoned, but it offered a point which would add to the protection of Detroit by guarding the approaches to the lake. On February 17 Dorchester ordered Simcoe to send troops to reoccupy it, and a month later Simcoe arrived in Detroit to direct the operation in person. He had no illusions about its significance. "There appears to me," he wrote, "to be little doubt but that the possession of these posts will be construed into hostility." It was, in fact, an aggressive move into American territory which, as it turned out, would plant a British force almost in the midst of the forthcoming battle.

It was not until late August that the decisive engagement took place. In the meantime there had been some wavering among the Indians. They had failed to organize an effective confederacy, and a number of the chiefs were inclined to accept the American offers of peace. Little Turtle, the war chief of the Miamis, was particularly impressed with the contrast between Wayne's efficiency and the slacker methods which had enabled the Indians to defeat Harmar and St. Clair. "The Americans," he warned his brethren, "are now led by a chief who never sleeps; night and day are alike to him. Notwithstanding the watchfulness of our young men, we have never been able to surprise him." The lesson was reinforced by the failure of an attack on Fort Recovery which seriously weakened the available strength of the Indians. But the decision was still for war, and when Wayne struck directly overland to the Maumee, Little Turtle gathered his forces at Fallen Timbers to oppose further progress.

This helped still further to compromise the position of the new British garrison at Fort Miami. The Indian position was uncomfortably close to the fort itself. They had not only received supplies from there but also the unauthorized help of a small body of militia who had been unable to refrain from joining the fight once it had started. Unaware of this compromising development, the commander of the fort, Major Campbell, listened with tense anxiety on August 20 to the firing which told him that the battle had broken out. Within forty

minutes it was all over. Wayne's precautions had prevented a successful ambush, and a bayonet charge shattered the Indian ranks and sent them in headlong flight. Campbell kept the gates of the fort resolutely closed against the fugitives who streamed past, and at the close of the day he set down in writing his relief that the battle had been far enough away from the post to prevent the garrison from becoming involved.

But the danger was not to pass without further moments of tension. Wayne would have been anything but averse to following up his triumph with the expulsion of the British. He had been authorized to dislodge them if his operations against the Indians should make it necessary, though with the caution that he should attempt nothing unless success were absolutely assured. Campbell's refusal to admit any Indian refugees gave Wayne no excuse to attack the fort under the guise of pursuing the enemy, but he remained in the vicinity for a full week and conducted himself in a way which suggested that he hoped to provoke the British to aggressive action. He occupied the heights near the fort and burned the cornfields around it. To Campbell's inquiry as to how he was to view so close an approach, Wayne replied in effect that Campbell's position hardly entitled him to an answer and that he could think himself lucky that the pursuit of the Indians had not carried the victors to the fort itself. Campbell replied, praising his own forbearance. Wayne called the presence of the garrison a hostile act and demanded that they retire. Campbell asserted that he would defend his position according to orders and that the question of his right to be where he was could best be left to the diplomats. Wayne was content to leave it there. His real task had been accomplished, and he could withdraw with the added satisfaction of having given the British an unmistakable piece of his mind.

The two countries had been trigger close to war, and war might still have come if a decisive step had not already been taken in Philadelphia. It arose not from events in the West but from the tension over the situation at sea. The alarmed Federalists saw a looming prospect that at the very least their commerce would be wrecked by the retaliatory measures that were threatened in Congress, and at the worst the country would

be ruined by a new war with Britain which the young nation could hardly hope to wage successfully. The news of Dorchester's speech added to their alarm and to the rage of their opponents. The further news of the British occupation of Fort Miami at this stage might have been the last straw. But before it could arrive the Federalist leaders had decided on one last desperate effort at a settlement with Britain, and on April 18 the Senate confirmed the appointment of John Jay as special envoy to London.

His mission was concerned with two sets of grievances. There were the old ones arising out of the non-observance of the treaty and the new ones arising as a result of the war at sea. In the former, which included questions about the recovery of debts and the treatment of the Loyalists, the problem of the West was far the most serious element. The latter involved not only the controversy over neutral rights but the still unsettled problem of a trade treaty which would place the commercial relations of the two countries at last on a satisfactory footing.

The first set presented little difficulty. Already the problem of debts and allied subjects was being eased by the normal operation of the courts. In an effort to liquidate it speedily and finally provision was made for two commissions to meet in London and Philadelphia to decide on the claims of the citizens of either country. In the final event both these commissions broke down, but that merely resulted in the governments taking up matters directly and reaching a compromise settlement.

The question of the western posts was also speedily settled. The possibility of an Indian buffer state was shattered, for the moment at least, by Wayne's victory; and in the following year the Treaty of Greenville would secure the surrender of most of the lands south of Lake Erie. Under these circumstances the retention of the posts was a danger and an irritant, and Britain was reconciled to their surrender. It was merely a question of securing an adequate interval for the withdrawal of the garrisons and traders, and when the American envoy agreed to June 1, 1796, as a final date there was no further obstacle to agreement on this long-vexed issue.

This still did not mean, however, that the frontier was wholly

stabilized. It was now clear that a westward line from the Lake of the Woods would not meet the Mississippi, and Britain had already begun to think of a substantial revision in that area. The idea that free navigation of the Mississippi, as agreed on in 1783, was meaningless without physical access was easily expanded to a claim that such access should be to the navigable part of the river below the Falls of St. Anthony. But a surrender of territory so extensive was firmly repudiated on the part of the United States. Britain had lost her chance when she chose the line of the lakes instead of the forty-fifth parallel, and her relinquishment of the posts deprived her of the bargaining weapon which she had formerly tried to use as an instrument for securing the desired readjustment.

The decision on the boundary, therefore, was postponed for the moment. Meanwhile, a joint survey was to be undertaken to provide accurate information on where the source of the Mississippi lay, and so to give a more definite basis for later negotiations. At the same time the principle of arbitration was applied to another and still indefinite part of the boundary in the provision for a commission to determine the location of the St. Croix and to describe its course from source to mouth. This latter commission partly fulfilled its mandate, but the Mississippi survey was never undertaken in the form proposed, and the purchase of Louisiana by the United States soon introduced one more complicating factor which postponed still further a definition of the western boundary.

One concession, however, was secured in the interests of Canada. The guarantee of free access to the western fur trade, which had been omitted from the treaty of 1783, was now written into Jay's Treaty. The citizens of both countries—and, almost as important, the Indians on both sides of the line—were “freely to pass and repass by land or inland navigation . . . and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each other”; and the duties levied by either side were to be no higher than duties on similar goods imported from Europe. Though this was not free trade in the sense of a complete absence of tariffs, it seemed at least a guarantee against discrimination; and, coupled with

an assured use of the portages, it appeared to remove many of the uncertainties and difficulties which had hitherto confronted the Canadian fur traders. For although the advantages were reciprocal in form, it was actually the Canadians who would draw the chief if not the sole profit from them. Perhaps for that very reason there was little practical check on the scruples of the Americans when it served their purposes to violate these assurances in various ways; and thus, in spite of the diplomats, the boundary as a line of economic partition steadily gained in reality as the United States consolidated its hold on the West.

On the other set of questions—those connected with the maritime and commercial situation—Jay's success was far more limited. Although he did secure a trade agreement, its provisions were not wholly satisfactory, and the provisions with respect to American trade with the West Indies were so hedged about with restrictions that the Senate struck them out before approving the rest of the treaty. On such questions as impressment and contraband and blockade he could get no concessions except on matters of procedure. It was this failure, overshadowing the very real achievement of the treaty in other respects, which produced an outcry that was aggravated by Jay's personal unpopularity and nearly resulted in wrecking the whole treaty.

Yet while the settlement of the western controversy represented a major achievement on the part of the United States, it was still neither permanent nor final. So long as settlement continued to push westward, the Indian problem was bound to remain alive. In spite of successive surrenders of territory, each of which was solemnly accepted as the last, the tribes were constantly being faced with new demands which made them restless and dangerous. And so long as Canada's interest in the West was linked to the fur trade rather than to settlement, the interests of the traders and of the Indians would remain in harmony, and the tribes would look to British power as their only hope for friendship and protection. In American eyes this would be translated into a persistent British intrigue to stir up the tribes against the United States, and the British on the St. Lawrence would appear to be what the French had been before them—the instigators who launched against the American frontier the

torch of savage warfare. And when the unresolved quarrel over maritime rights flared once more to a warlike pitch the western question would also re-emerge, and old grudges would rise to precipitate a new war in which Canada's continued independence was once again at stake.

CHAPTER VI

The Conflict Renewed

THE OUTBREAK of the French Revolution and the resulting war in Europe, in which Britain was involved by the beginning of 1793, confronted the two nations of North America with the realization that a major conflict in the Old World was bound to have serious repercussions on the fortunes of the New. For the first time, but by no means for the last, this inexorable fact was forced upon the attention of peoples who were reluctant to accept it. It is true that during the colonial period, and during the American Revolution as well, events in Europe had exercised a profound influence over developments in America. But there was now a difference in circumstances and in outlook which completely altered the significance of the new conflict for both Canada and the United States. In previous conflicts between France and England the colonies had tended to seize the opportunity to press their own quarrels on the American continent and to clamor for aid from the mother countries to help them attain their objectives. Now there was no such impulse. Not only the United States, but Canada as well, had every reason to hope that the conflict would leave them untouched. They had no desire to take an active part in the quarrels of Europe and many grounds for alarm at the prospect that these quarrels would actively extend to America.

The war led to the formulation of an American policy which,

implicit ever since the achievement of independence, now became definite and ultimately traditional. Washington's proclamation of April 1793 calling for a friendly and impartial attitude toward both sides in the European war (the word neutrality, for various reasons, was carefully avoided) was based on an almost instinctive conception of the national interest of the American Republic. Participation in the ordinary vicissitudes of European affairs offered no advantage to the United States. Even though the nation had Spain on one border and Britain on another, the actual danger of attack from either direction was too rare to be a constant and determining element in national policy. American self-sufficiency dictated American aloofness from external entanglements—all the more so since the suspected jealousies of the old monarchies for the new and more virtuous republic (and the intrigues of France even when she was allied with the United States gave tangible evidence of this) made it wise to keep such nations at arm's length. America's true interest was to remain at peace, to develop her prosperity and her national strength, and to use that strength not in remote struggles over the balance of power, but in defense of her own vital interests when they should be threatened from outside. In Washington's Farewell Address, in Jefferson's first inaugural address, these views were emphasized and elaborated into a political dogma which was ultimately to get its title as the Monroe Doctrine.

But although it was a simple matter to formulate such a policy, it was less easy to implement it. American interests could not be rigidly separated from those of the belligerents. Even when they did not conflict on the continent itself, it was soon clear that they came into serious collision at sea. The interests of the United States demanded that the oceans remain free to neutral commerce. The interests of the belligerents demanded that the resources of the enemy should be weakened in every possible way. This involved something more than a clash of armies or of naval forces, or even attacks on enemy commerce. It meant depriving the adversary of his essential resources. If he drew needed supplies from overseas, if the wealth which made him able to support the struggle was based on foreign commerce,

it was not enough simply to destroy his own shipping. The neutrals who fed him with supplies or who carried his foreign trade were also aiding him in his war effort. What seemed to the United States to be legitimate commerce might thus become for France or Britain a threat to their own prospects of victory, to which the only possible reply was direct and effective interference with American trade.

It was not easy for the United States to find effective means of retaliation. In the last resort there was always the possibility of war in defense of neutral rights, but it was a costly and a repellent method which would only be adopted with the utmost reluctance. There was the possibility of economic retaliation, but neither belligerent was so dependent on the United States as to be ready to abandon the weapons of blockade and seizure for the sake of continued American trade, and it was American traders who chiefly suffered under the embargo and non-intercourse. And if war should turn out to be the only recourse there was the further complication of deciding against whom it should be waged. The United States could hardly contemplate fighting both sides simultaneously, yet their offenses were such that it was hard to choose between them. Until 1795 Britain was on the whole the chief offender. But France's anger at the conclusion of Jay's Treaty led her to launch an aggressive attack on American shipping, and American retaliation led to a state of undeclared war from 1798 until the peace of Amiens gave a temporary breathing space to belligerents and neutrals alike.

The spell was broken one year later, in 1803. In the interval Napoleon's acquisition of Louisiana had awakened acute alarm in America and had almost thrown the Republic into the arms of Britain. But the unexpected acquisition of that territory relieved the fears of the United States and left her free to pursue the controversy with both sides when the struggle revived the conflict at sea.

This time the situation was still more difficult. Napoleon was carried forward to new aggressions which brought almost the whole of Europe under his domination. By 1807 Britain was alone in the struggle against the new despotism. Inevitably the struggle for control of the seas took on a new intensity. Napoleon,

his hope of effective maritime operations shattered by Trafalgar, fell back on the Continental System, whose decrees made any neutral ship trading with Britain subject to seizure by France. On the high seas only an occasional French privateer was in a position to make such decrees effective. But France controlled the coast of continental Europe, and American ships which touched at European ports were periodically seized on the ground that they had been engaged in the forbidden trade with perfidious Albion.

Britain replied by tightening her grip on her maritime weapons. Unable to strike at the enemy by land, she drew closer the circle of the blockade. All the familiar topics of controversy with the United States—the distinction between an actual and a paper blockade, the relation of free ships and enemy goods, the right to trade with enemy colonies as against the Rule of 1756—revived with added acerbity now that Britain's ascendancy at sea made her the chief offender in these matters. In addition, the question of impressments became still more acute. No concession which would weaken the hard-pressed British navy could be contemplated, yet the method of carrying on what Castlereagh described as the "ancient and accustomed practice of impressing British seamen from the merchant ships of a foreign state" gave serious and legitimate offense to the national pride of all Americans. When in June 1807 it resulted in the attack by the *Leopard* on the American frigate *Chesapeake* war was in sight. And it soon became apparent that if war should come the most immediate victim would be Canada.

For Canada, indeed, the situation created by the European war was in certain respects far more delicate than it was initially for the United States. The latter could at least contemplate remaining aloof from the main conflict and could count on its own strength to meet a direct threat or to secure redress for a violation of its rights. Canada could do neither of these things. Although she was not in a position to offer any substantial aid to Britain, the existence of the British connection exposed her to possible attack, no matter how inoffensive her own policy might be. Moreover, there was no assurance that Britain, fully involved as she was in the European struggle, could

offer any help in time of trouble. In a quarrel in which she became automatically involved in the wake of British policy Canada might find that she stood unprotected except for her own limited resources.

The prospect which first presented itself in such a situation was a French effort to recover Canada, or at least to detach her from the empire. The French envoys in Washington—Genêt and his successors—intrigued vaguely for some such action, and at one stage the ambiguous activities of Ira Allen of Vermont suggested either that he had lent himself to these plans or that he had borrowed them for undisclosed purposes of his own. But these maneuvers never resulted in any serious external threat, and the possibilities of raising internal dissensions proved disappointing to the agents of the French republic. The idea of reunion with the mother country no longer stirred any great enthusiasm among Canadians of French origin. Quite apart from the growing dislike of Jacobinism, with its repudiation of tradition and authority and its hostile treatment of the Church, there was an incipient nationalism now becoming evident along the St. Lawrence. The *Canadien* looked upon Canada itself as his homeland. He had his political grievances under English rule, but his remedy was not the substitution of French domination, but a greater measure of Canadian autonomy. His aims were the achievement of political ascendancy in Canada, not the disruption of either Canada or the empire.

The growing friction between Britain and the United States, however, created a more serious situation. France was too far away to threaten a direct attack in the face of the British navy. The United States lay across a long and exposed frontier confronting a Canada with one tenth its population and with few military resources of its own. Here was a vivid illustration of the dilemma arising from the fact that Canada combined a physical position on the American continent with a political connection with Britain. In such circumstances only a continued friendship between Britain and the United States could assure Canada of full security. A breach between those two countries would at once jeopardize her position and even her existence.

To aggravate the prospect there were lingering difficulties between the United States and Canada herself. The troublesome western situation, although it had passed for the moment into the background, had not been eliminated by Jay's Treaty. On the American side a succession of obstacles, incompatible with the terms of the treaty, was being placed in the way of Canadian trade with the West. On the Canadian side there was still a connection with the Indians through the fur trade upon which the Americans looked with continued dislike. There was, in fact, little effort by the Canadian authorities to improve that connection or to use it to the disadvantage of the United States. But as the advance of settlement continued its pressure on the Indians, and as these showed a sullen resentment over the results, it was natural that the contrast between this attitude and Indian friendship with the British to the north should awaken in many Americans an uneasiness which easily passed into suspicion whenever a crisis threatened.

The way in which the western situation was entangled with the broader diplomatic developments was illustrated by the aftermath of the *Chesapeake* affair. As war loomed, and with it the prospect of an American invasion, the Canadian authorities at once became concerned about the situation on the western frontier. It was feared that in case of a conflict the Indians would not be content to stay aloof. There was little positive desire to let them loose against the Americans, but there was a very urgent hope that they could be prevented from attacking Canada, and a sudden new interest in the Indians and their friendship was the result. This effort to attach the tribes to the British side lasted only during the period of the actual war scare, but it was nonetheless revealing as a significant element in the general situation and one little calculated to reassure the Americans about the benevolence of their neighbors to the north.

The American frontier settlements, indeed, felt that they were facing a situation of the utmost gravity. A new group of treaties in 1804 and 1805 had deepened the alarm of the western Indians at the way their effete brethren in Indiana were bartering away the remaining hunting grounds. They looked for leadership around which they could rally and found it initially

in a one-eyed Shawnee who came to be known as the Prophet and who gathered around him a group of warriors to whom he preached the doctrine of solidarity in the face of white encroachments. A still more important figure soon emerged in the person of his brother Tecumseh. This impressive figure saw the need for Indian unity and used all his considerable gifts of diplomacy to bring the tribes together into a single confederation. At the same time he strove to prevent a clash with the Americans until unity had been completed and to assure the American authorities of the peaceful intentions of the Indians so long as they were not further molested. By 1808 Tecumseh and his brother had established themselves at Prophet's Town in northwest Indiana and around them had collected a group of warriors to whom the Prophet was extolling the virtues of temperance and husbandry as methods of keeping out of trouble.

These indications of pacific dispositions failed to reassure the frontier. The prospect that the Indians might become more successful in retaining their hunting grounds to the exclusion of settlement was bad enough. The growing number of Indian warriors who gathered under Tecumseh's leadership was still more alarming. Whatever their pretensions, there was no assurance that they would not weary of the arts of peace and let loose a new wave of savage warfare against the frontier. The situation grew still tenser after further cessions in September 1809 cut into the hunting grounds of the Wabash Valley to the extent of three million acres. Tribes that had hitherto been wavering now joined the confederation. More Indians gathered at Prophet's Town. Tecumseh refused to recognize the validity of the cessions or to accept the treaty payment and extended his diplomatic efforts to the southern tribes. The situation had reached a point where a clash could not long be delayed.

The West now clamored for action which would break up the Indian threat while there was still time. Five hundred regular troops were sent to Indiana, together with somewhat ambiguous instructions from the Secretary of War. The governor of the territory, William Henry Harrison, was none too clear about what these meant or about what he himself desired. But he had justification for feeling that the responsibility for decision

had been thrown on him, and he embarked on the raising of a local militia as a first step toward satisfying the rising public temper. When in the summer of 1811 Tecumseh departed on a mission to the southern Indians, the opportunity to strike during his absence seemed too good to be missed.

It was a somewhat wavering blow which Harrison proceeded to deliver. Although he marched an expedition of over a thousand men up the Wabash to the vicinity of Prophet's Town, he showed a remarkable uncertainty about what to do when he got them there. The Indians saved him the necessity for decision. On the morning of November 7 they launched an attack which was only beaten off after the loss of nearly one quarter of Harrison's force. His resulting position was so precarious after this two-hour skirmish that he did not even dare to send out scouts for twenty-four hours. After waiting for a day in the utmost apprehension a force ventured to approach Prophet's Town. They found that the Indians had deserted it, leaving everything behind. Seizing this respite, but still haunted by the prospect of a new attack, the battered expedition gathered its stores and wounded together and hastened back to the safety of Vincennes.

It was welcomed with paeans of victory. Those who had been engaged in the battle might be publicly critical of Harrison's leadership, and the authorities at Washington might refrain from any evidences of jubilation. But the West saw this dubious success in a larger light as a triumph which had saved the frontier from the menace which hung over it. The Prophet's influence collapsed. Tecumseh's league disintegrated. Indian hostility was not at an end, but the prospect of its effective organization had been shattered. To the West, in its enthusiasm and relief, Harrison was the hero of Tippecanoe—the creek along which the clash had taken place.

This feeling was accompanied by a rising anger against the British. The West was now firmly convinced that their influence was at the bottom of the whole Indian trouble. Harrison's dispatches were full of reports of British intrigues and expressed the reiterated conviction that "the tendency of the British measures is hostility to us." Actually there had been a real attempt to restrain the tribes, for the British officials fully recognized the

explosive possibilities inherent in an Indian outbreak. Canada, weak as she was in the military sense, and with an almost defenseless western border, had nothing to gain and everything to lose by provoking hostilities in which she might become involved. But the old dilemma which had emerged after the treaty of 1783 had not yet been solved. While the British might preach peace to the Indians, they were unwilling to abandon them entirely. They continued their presents of supplies. They remained the normal source of arms and munitions. They wanted to continue the relation which was the basis of the fur trade, and they wanted still more to prevent a breach which might turn the resentment of the savages against Canada. Inevitably it was felt by many of the Indians that the Canadians could be counted on for support in case of need, and by many Americans that nothing but the expulsion of British power from Canada would end the Indian threat.

It was in the midst of such an atmosphere that the Twelfth Congress was elected in November 1810. Seventy new members made their appearance in the House of Representatives, and their vigorous expansionist sentiments were typified by the election of Henry Clay as Speaker. The members from the frontier districts of the older states, the representatives of the newer states of the West, the Southern members resentful of both hard times and commercial domination showed a rising belligerence of temper. The Northwest with its desire for Canada was joined by the Southwest with its desire for Florida and its somewhat curious belief that a war with Britain was the way to get territories from Spain. The commercial section which was most affected by maritime grievances, but which firmly believed that war would complete the ruin which the embargo had begun, was overwhelmed by the agrarian West and South. "When a man rises in this House," commented Stow of New York, "you may almost tell how ardent he will be by knowing how far distant he lives from the sea."

But while the western issue thus acted as a precipitant, it was, nonetheless, the maritime controversy which remained the dominant element in the situation. Britain still refused any effective remedy for American grievances. Napoleon made a shallow

pretense of ending French offenses, and President, Congress, and nation accepted the myth that the Berlin and Milan decrees had been revoked. In the face of growing pressure for war with Britain, Madison delayed action in the hope that Britain might now be brought to see reason. But although some concessions were offered, they did not touch the essential issues; and when Britain at last agreed to a conditional repeal of her Orders-in-Council, her action was too belated and probably too limited even if it had been taken earlier. On June 1, 1812, Madison addressed a message to Congress which summarized Britain's offenses and left it to the legislators to decide on appropriate action. On June 18 Congress decided for war.

II

To the two countries principally involved the War of 1812 left a legacy of bitterness which was out of all proportion to the scale of the conflict or the sacrifices imposed on either side. In England itself memories of this episode are merged or even lost in the recollection of the far greater struggle with Napoleon to which the American war was incidental in a distinctly minor way. But it was the one direct clash between Canada and the United States, and both countries gave it a place in their traditions which kept alive a rankling sense of grievance and hampered the full restoration of confidence and friendship.

Much of this feeling stems from the firm belief of each side that it fought against an unwarranted aggression. In the eyes of most Americans Canada was simply the nearest and most vulnerable place in which to hit the power of Great Britain. There may have been a positive desire in some quarters to acquire Canadian lands, but that was a minor element. For the nation at large this was a defensive war to end the outrages which had been suffered at British hands on the frontier and on the high seas. For Canada, on the other hand, this was at best a wanton attempt at conquest by a more powerful nation against a country which firmly believed that it was innocent of any offense.

It was a bitterness unsoftened by any real sense of pride.

Canadians have indeed found cause for a legitimate satisfaction in the maintenance of their independence in the face of so formidable a danger. Yet even this is modified by a certain negative aspect attached to their achievement, and perhaps by an inner consciousness that Canadian valor was powerfully assisted by American mismanagement. On the side of the United States such inspiration as is drawn from the war is based rather on the fact that the nation actually challenged Great Britain than on the outcome of that challenge. Few Americans are so moved by patriotism as to feel that a national emergency would be served by invoking the Spirit of 1812. It would be only too apt to materialize in the discouraging guise of General James Wilkinson.

For this was a war without victories. It was full of defeats, but that is not quite the same thing. Whatever satisfaction may attach to Queenston Heights and Chateaugay, to Moraviantown and the battle of Lake Erie, the glory is subdued at its brightest; and the outcome of the war itself gave little sense of triumph to either side. Canadians could feel that their essential objective was won in the maintenance of their independence. But there was none of that sense of a clear-cut and decisive victory which so often makes possible a healing generosity by the victor and an abandonment of resentment by the defeated. In the eyes of the average man matters remained much as they had been before the war, and he saw little reason to feel that they would have been much different if the war had never been fought. All that either side could say was that the other had been taught a lesson, and even this rested more on faith than on any positive evidence.

It was also, by and large, a war without heroes. There were isolated instances of fine leadership and of heroic conduct, but hardly a figure emerged on either side to capture the imagination and embody the pride of either nation in its own martial achievements. General Brock performed a notable service for Canada in the first phase of the crisis. But his career was unhappily brief, and his personality remains shadowy and indistinct in popular tradition. On the American side the war placed Andrew Jackson on a sudden pinnacle of national reputation.

But Jackson's connection with the main war was almost fortuitous. Quite apart from the accident that the battle of New Orleans was fought after peace had been signed, Jackson's main activities were against the Indians and the Spaniards. It was the chance presented by a side issue which, in the last days of the conflict, gave to the United States a victory and a leader as a consolation for the lack of either on the northern border.

The Northern operations, in fact, were bedeviled from the start by a combination of military inefficiency and political disunity. Even the ultimate purpose of the operations was something on which there was no agreement. It might almost be said that the operations in the North represented two different wars, while a third and almost completely separate one was spasmodically in progress in the South. On the one hand were those who desired to bring Britain to terms at sea. On the other were those who wanted to expel her from the American continent. In view of the weakness of United States sea power, with its dozen or so frigates and cruisers and its almost useless collection of tiny gunboats—the "mosquito fleet" of Jefferson's administration—there was no prospect of challenging the British navy. Those who fought for a free sea had no choice but to join with those who sought a free frontier and to attack Canada as the best means of bringing Britain to terms. But in contrast to the western desire for Canada for its own sake, the objective of this group was merely strategic and diplomatic. Monroe expressed their view when he talked of invading Canada "not as an object of the war, but as a means to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion."

Behind this divergence of objectives lay a deeper sectional cleavage. Maritime New England in particular viewed the war with the utmost hostility. Governors refused to call out the militia. Investors refused to subscribe to war loans, preferring to invest in British securities. Merchants and shipowners traded actively and lucratively with Halifax, and across the borders of New York and Vermont went droves of cattle to provision the Canadian forces. New England's attitude not only prevented any invasion of New Brunswick or Nova Scotia; it

weakened the whole American war effort and even developed into an active threat of secession by the time the war came to an end. As for the South and Southwest, their anger might be directed against Britain, but their cupidity was attracted by Florida, and they were less interested in supporting the invasion of Canada than in securing the Spanish colonies on their own southern border.

The resulting confusion of counsel was reflected in the war preparations. To an army with a nominal strength of 10,000 the Executive proposed to add another 10,000 on short-term service. Congress preferred to call for 25,000 enlisted for five years (an impossibly long period) and to place a heavy reliance on the state militias—forces which usually turned out to be either unavailable or useless. On the financial side there was a dislike of the idea of war taxes and a preference for loans which the public failed to subscribe. "With a view to enabling the executive to step at once into Canada," wrote Madison with some bitterness, "they have provided, after two months' delay, for a regular force, requiring twelve to raise it, on terms not likely to raise it at all."

Even with all these handicaps, however, American strength was on paper overwhelming. Against the 4,500 regular British troops in Canada, supplemented by the small bodies of local militia, an American invasion should indeed have been, in Jefferson's confident words, "a mere matter of marching." But even this needed at a minimum men who would march, and it was greatly desirable to have generals who would lead them. In both these respects the American military effort was to reveal a rather marked deficiency.

The initial plan was to make Montreal the major objective. The main army would attack by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu, supported by another force proceeding down the St. Lawrence from Sackett's Harbor. At the same time the defenders would be pinned down at other points along the frontier by attacks from Niagara and Detroit. It was a sound plan, based on the same fundamental strategy as that which had led to the British conquest of Canada from the French. One important element was missing—an expedition against Quebec—but that

was not fatal, for control of Montreal would cut off the western area and leave the bulk of Canada at the mercy of the invaders. And in contrast to the earlier invasion during the Revolution, the Americans could throw their full weight into the attack, undistracted by graver operations nearer at hand.

The plan was initially hampered by one important defect. That was the lack of a main force to carry out the attack on Montreal. General Dearborn, arriving at Albany to take command over a month after the outbreak of war, found some 1,200 men without equipment or organization, and both volunteers and militia were slow in appearing. The chief force on the frontier consisted of 2,000 regulars in the West under General Hull. In theory this might have been brought East for a concentrated attack on the central objective. In practice there were grave obstacles to such a course. As Madison pointed out, it would have left the western frontier open to attacks from both Canadians and Indians. But the West expected the offending British centers to be wiped out at once, and the ardor of the western militia gave delusive promise of a force adequate to the task. In consequence, the actual preparations which were under way when war broke out were concerned with the plan for invading Canada from Detroit.

The enterprise was placed under the command of William Hull, the governor of Michigan. He was one of the group of Revolutionary officers who were now, in their advancing years, placed in charge of the armies of the United States. It was only after considerable pressure that he reluctantly accepted the appointment. He revealed a sound appreciation of the difficulties he must confront and of the general nature of the steps necessary to overcome them. But he was not sufficiently sure of his military competence to insist on these necessities; and when it came to the actual conduct of the operations, his defects of experience and character were to prove serious handicaps in a situation which called for abilities of the very first order.

At the beginning of June Hull set out from Dayton through the two hundred miles of forest which separated him from Detroit. The lack of roads and the distance of Detroit from any effective base were factors about which he was already con-

cerned. He had warned the War Department that the safety of this position would depend on naval control of Lake Erie, and the wisdom of this view was underlined by his initial misadventure. The news that war had actually broken out reached him when he was near the Maumee. In order to press on to his goal he decided to send his baggage by water, and when this was loaded on a schooner his official papers were also put on board. They were promptly captured by the British, who thus received their first information about the size of Hull's force and the detailed nature of his plans.

On July 5 Hull arrived at Detroit, and on the twelfth he crossed the river into Canada. In spite of the fact that the British had command of the lake Hull apparently counted on two things to aid him. The first was the American sympathies of the population of Upper Canada, to whom he addressed a stirring proclamation. "You will be emancipated," he informed them, "from tyranny and oppression and restored to the dignified station of freemen. . . . The United States offer you peace, liberty, and security—your choice lies between these and war, slavery or destruction."

There was some foundation for these hopes. Upper Canada was largely peopled by American immigrants who were reluctant to take up arms against the invaders. Brock found the militia in many cases unwilling to march and the Assembly unprepared to adopt coercive measures. Five hundred militia in the western district, he reported, had promptly deserted when the invasion began. But only a small number went over actively to the enemy. The population in general waited to see how the tide would run, and Brock's vigorous actions soon ended the prospect that the province would go over to the Americans.

Hull's second hope was also disappointed. He had insisted that his operations must be supported by a simultaneous attack on the Niagara frontier, otherwise the whole defense would concentrate against him. This was just what happened. The lethargic Dearborn, far from embarking on a pincers movement from the east while Hull drove from the west, actually negotiated a suspension of hostilities; and although this was disavowed by the government, it meant that Brock was given added assurance

that Niagara could be neglected for the moment and that he could move his whole slender force against Hull.

That general had moved his force across the river and marched against the British fort at Malden. There he settled down to preparations for a siege—preparations which occupied four weeks before the discovery was made that it would be difficult if not impossible to bring up the necessary artillery. By that time he was becoming alarmed at his position. The small garrison, after the first desertions, had been reinforced. The Indians had decided to take an active part on the British side under the leadership of Tecumseh. A party of them had raided Detroit's communications and routed a detachment which was bringing up supplies. Brock was hurrying west with 300 men to aid in the defense. Faced with these various dangers, Hull abandoned the siege and on August 8 fell back on Detroit.

Had he been able to follow his own judgment he would have abandoned that post also and fallen back on the Maumee. He was prevented by the threats of insubordination which the idea aroused. Yet he had no confidence in the security of his position, particularly when the force which he sent out to restore communications with the Ohio failed to achieve this in spite of their victory over a force of British and Indians which they encountered in their path. Brock, on his part, was determined to follow up his advantage with extreme daring, counting on Hull's uncertainty and on the growing demoralization of his army. In a summons to surrender, which he sent on August 15, he warned the American general of the possible consequences of refusal. "You must be aware," said the message, "that the numerous body of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops will be beyond my control the moment the contest commences."

This was a threat which struck Hull in a tender spot and increased the apprehensions for which he already had good reason. The Canadian authorities had felt from the outset that the possession of both Detroit and Michilimackinac was vital, not only to the defense of Canada against the Americans, but as assurance that the Indians would not desert to the enemy. Now, with Brock moving on Detroit, Michilimackinac had already fallen to the British. Brock had previously sent directions to

prepare for offensive action, leaving the commander to choose his own time. The British profited by receipt of the news of the declaration of war at their post at St. Joseph's while the American garrison at Michilimackinac was still unaware that hostilities had broken out. John Jacob Astor, now firmly entrenched in the fur trade of the American Northwest, had both furs and trade goods in Canada for whose security he felt a natural apprehension. His messages to his agents instructing them to get these across the line had been relayed to St. Joseph's. The result was a surprise descent by the garrison which captured Michilimackinac on June 17.

It was a stroke which meant virtual control of the whole Northwest. Although Tecumseh and his immediate followers had joined the British, the tribes in general were dubious. The Iroquois, indeed, flatly insisted that they meant to remain neutral. But the British advance encouraged the tribes of the Northwest to throw their weight against the Americans and to seek revenge for grievances which were still fresh. They were far from dependable allies, but their nuisance value was very great. Their first stroke was the massacre of the garrison of Fort Dearborn on August 16. To the spectacle of Tecumseh's bands, already harrying his communications, Hull's imagination added a vision of hordes of savages descending on Detroit to torture and massacre the troops and civilians who were in his charge. His fears and indecision almost paralyzed his will. Seated in his tent within the stockade, agitatedly chewing quid after quid of tobacco, he tried to make up his mind while Brock with his inferior force, after the ultimatum to surrender had initially been rejected, advanced boldly to the attack.

His daring was consciously reckless, for he was playing for high stakes. A swift triumph would assure his western defenses and allow him to hasten back to the Niagara frontier. In the face of the defending artillery, one blast from which would have wreaked terrible havoc in his close-packed columns, he advanced until the ground near the fort allowed him to deploy his forces where they could take cover. His audacity was rewarded. Faced with the prospect of immediate assault, Hull withdrew the artillery which had been ready to blast the attackers and sent out

a white flag. He had reached the conviction, probably justified, that Detroit was doomed and that no aid could be expected, and the more controversial conclusion that resistance would only mean useless bloodshed. On August 16 he surrendered Detroit and its garrison of 2,500 to a force of some 1,300, fully half of them Indians.

The prompt conclusion of these operations allowed Brock to get back to the Niagara frontier in time to meet the threat which was at last materializing there. Dearborn, who had been a colonel in the Revolution, had for thirty years been occupied with civilian administrative posts. Now, at the age of sixty-one, he found himself a major general and senior in command of the Northern armies. In the course of a few weeks it was gradually borne home to him that this involved some military activity; and, tearing himself away from ineffectual efforts to raise recruits in Boston, and ridding himself of the fixed conviction that his command had nothing to do with the frontier of Upper Canada, he set about organizing an invasion force. By autumn he had collected 5,000 men at Plattsburg and announced the prospective gathering of 6,000 for an attack on the Niagara frontier.

Meanwhile, the actual commander in the Niagara area was Stephen van Rensselaer. He was a major general in the New York militia, and that created difficulties. Regular officers resented the idea that they should take orders from him, and this conflict extended to the subordinate officers of the two branches as well. In particular it affected his relations with General Smyth of the regulars, who succeeded in rebuffing all suggestions of co-operation in the enterprise in hand. Since Van Rensselaer wanted to attack Queenston, while Smyth insisted that the attack should be above the falls, a concerted movement proved impossible, and Van Rensselaer was left to carry out his plan with his own resources.

These, however, seemed adequate for the task in hand. Against a defending force of less than 2,000 under Brock, Van Rensselaer had some 5,000 available. He failed because he could not bring them into action. The first attempt to cross the river was frustrated when the lieutenant who manned the first boat took

all the oars with him and then, finding himself unsupported in hostile territory, moored the boat and went hastily into hiding. But two days later, in the early morning of October 13, the attempt was resumed. This time a body of 600 made the crossing and seized the heights above the river. In trying to dislodge them from this foothold Brock was killed at the head of a small detachment. The initial foothold was maintained, and the way was clear for the main army to cross.

The army refused. The New York militia on the American side had suddenly lost their eagerness for action. In spite of the frantic urging of Van Rensselaer they would not leave their native state to take part in the battle that was going on before their eyes. A summons to Smyth to come to the rescue was equally without results. While the militia looked on as passive if interested spectators the advance guard was overwhelmed by the main body of 1,000 British troops who now assailed their position. The Americans could not stand their ground before these superior numbers. They could not retreat, for the boatmen had fled with all the boats. They even found it difficult to surrender as the Indians swarmed in upon them. Eventually Winfield Scott made a perilous way through the savages to the British lines and there capitulated. Some 900 Americans, of whom 300 had not even got into action, became prisoners in one of the most humiliating episodes of the war.

Van Rensselaer abandoned his command, which passed to Smyth. The unity of direction thus attained was offset by the temperament of the new commander. He had shown one aspect of this in his failure to come to the rescue when he might have turned defeat into victory. He now revealed another by publishing a series of pronunciamientos to the army and the public whose grotesque rhetoric was remarkable even for an Irishman. Announcing that "the ruffian power of the British King" was about to be eliminated from the continent, he began an attack from Black Rock on November 28 with an army of 3,000 men. As at Queenston, an advance force got across the river to spike the defending batteries and destroy an important bridge. But again the army failed to follow. Under Smyth's frenzied direction they spent the day in embarking, disembarking, dining, and

waiting to embark again, while a council of war helped to prolong the inaction. No attempt was made to cross the river. The disgusted troops, unable to bring the enemy under fire, took to loosing off their muskets, and the frequency with which they were discharged in the direction of the general's tent led to a remarkable though local mobility on the part of their commanding officer. By the beginning of December Smyth's army had disintegrated and his officers were publicly accusing him of cowardice. Determined to fight someone, if only a colleague, Smyth challenged one of the most outspoken of them to a duel. But the seconds withdrew the balls from the pistols, and even this martial gesture ended in futility.

Meanwhile, the threat to Montreal, never very serious, had ended in almost spontaneous collapse. Dearborn's inertia had concentrated less attention on him than on the more active generals, in spite of the fact that he was commanding officer and in charge of what should have been the chief operation of the campaign. But if his failure was less spectacular than that of his colleagues it was fully as ignominious. Having done nothing to help Hull, he remained equally idle during Van Rensselaer's sorry enterprise. By November he felt sufficiently recovered from his rheumatism to go to Plattsburg and take active command, and on the nineteenth he set out at the head of the militia in the direction of Montreal. His progress ended after twenty miles. At the Canadian border the militia, like those at Queenston, revealed so strong an attachment to their native soil that they refused to leave it. Yielding to the sentiment of his army, Dearborn turned around and marched them back to Plattsburg. Four days after the expedition had started it was back in winter quarters without ever having engaged the enemy.

Canada had thus successfully parried the first uncertain strokes of her adversary and had even got in a few thrusts in riposte. But although the initial threat had been balked, there was no reason to believe that the check was more than temporary. By 1813 the United States was mobilizing its vastly superior resources for a more determined effort. Canada, on her side, had little prospect of an increase in strength so long as Britain remained involved in Europe, and the loss of Brock deprived her

of a leader whose vigor and initiative were sorely missed. On the American side, although Dearborn survived the Plattsburg fiasco, the other leaders of 1812 made way for new appointments. The second crop of generals, it is true, proved little more competent than their predecessors. But their forces were more adequate if they were properly used, and a more energetic program of naval construction on the Great Lakes promised to introduce a factor which might change the whole balance of the war.

The importance of the naval element was particularly evident in the West. It was responsible to no small extent for the loss of Detroit, and it soon became evident that Detroit would be difficult to recover so long as the British retained control of Lake Erie. William Henry Harrison, the military darling of the West since Tippecanoe, had been appointed as Hull's successor with instructions to "retake Detroit with a view to the conquest of Upper Canada." By the turn of the year he had available for this purpose an army of 6,300. But the very size of his force imposed difficulties which frustrated the initial hope that Detroit might be promptly recovered in the autumn of 1812. Hull, with a comparatively small army and unopposed by the enemy, had managed to march them by land to Detroit, though he had been unable to maintain his communications once he got there. But Harrison soon realized that such a feat during a wet autumn, with the amount of stores carried by the army and the volume of supplies that would be needed, was out of the question. "To get them forward through a swampy wilderness of two hundred miles," he wrote, "in wagons or on pack horses which are to carry their own provisions, is absolutely impossible." He therefore restricted his activities to setting up fortified bases to control the line of the Maumee, and even here he was none too secure.

An advance force which thrust forward to the Raisin River was massacred by Indians at Frenchtown. Proctor at Malden, whom Brock shortly before his death had instructed to keep things in ferment, followed up this stroke in April 1813 with an attack on Fort Meigs which, though ill managed and unsuccessful, showed that the British held the initiative. In July

a threat to Fort Stephenson on the Sandusky so alarmed Harrison that he ordered the place to be evacuated and burned, and only the disobedience of the commander, Major Croghan, enabled it to be held. The somewhat vague project of a winter campaign across the ice had never materialized. The whole summer passed with the American forces clinging precariously to their defensive positions. The idea of an advance on Detroit waited on the successful outcome of Perry's naval operations.

Until the end of July Perry was busy constructing and fitting the necessary ships in the harbor at Erie. Here he was relatively safe from attack, but he confronted a problem of getting out once he was ready for action. The bar at the mouth of the harbor made it impossible to float his larger ships over it if they were weighed down with stores and guns. Even at their lightest there was difficulty in getting them across, and a British blockading squadron lay outside the harbor waiting to destroy them if they emerged unarmed. But just as the time arrived for the effort the British force withdrew and did not reappear until five days later. By that time the American ships had issued from the harbor and mounted their batteries. Perry now had a force superior to that of his opponent Barclay, who was forced to retire to Malden under the guns of the fort.

The positions were now reversed. The American ascendancy opened the possibility of communication with Detroit and cut the British supply lines to both Detroit and Malden. By September the garrisons were in serious straits. In a forlorn hope of breaking this deadly grip the British commander sallied forth with his half-dozen ships against an enemy stronger in numbers and still more superior in armament. The squadrons came into action on September 10 off Put In Bay. In a hard-fought engagement the British force inflicted serious damage on the enemy, including the virtual destruction of Perry's own flagship. But in return it received such punishment that by midafternoon it could no longer continue the action. With its surrender the Americans attained final command of Lake Erie.

This event changed the whole picture in the West. With his communications at the mercy of the enemy, Proctor felt obliged to evacuate not only Detroit, but Malden as well. But in carry-

ing out his retirement he presumed too much on the lethargy which his opponents had hitherto exhibited. Harrison could now move by water to the Canadian side, and his hardy frontier militia pressed rapidly after the slow-moving British force which was encumbered with an excess of baggage as well as civilians and wounded. At Moraviantown on the Thames, Proctor's force was brought to bay. The substantial force of Indians which had been available when the retreat began was rapidly melting away. There remained some 800 to supplement the 400 troops armed with a single six-pounder. They were overwhelmed by Harrison with a force of 3,500. Barely fifty men of the British force escaped the disaster.

This American victory might have had even more far-reaching consequences than it did. Already after Perry's success the Western Indians were wavering. The decision to retreat was hotly opposed by Tecumseh, who flatly accused Proctor of cowardice. Tecumseh himself fell in the battle of the Thames, and tradition has it that the Kentuckians partly flayed his body and used the skin for razor strops. The Western Indians felt themselves abandoned, and the loss of this leader completed their discouragement. If the battle had been followed up by the recovery of Michilimackinac the whole West would have been regained by the Americans.

Nothing, however, was attempted in this direction. There was not even a vigorous effort to extend naval control to Lake Huron. The British, gravely worried by the problem of communications with the West, even contemplated a winter attack across the ice to destroy the American ships at Put In Bay. The ice broke up before this plan was carried out, but an improvised route across the Ontario peninsula saved the situation and indeed allowed the British in the West to capture Prairie du Chien and extend their control to the Mississippi. Meanwhile, Harrison felt that the season was too late to push his invasion beyond the Thames in the absence of a co-ordinated attack in the East. The victory, in consequence, had only a local significance. Harrison devastated the countryside and fell back on the defensive at Detroit, leaving the Eastern generals to demonstrate that on their part the resources of futility had not yet been exhausted.

In the East, too, the naval situation on Lake Ontario was crucial for the campaign. The British had started with a definite advantage in 1812. By midsummer of 1813 the Americans had built up to a position of practical equality, but they had not gained complete ascendancy, and so long as the British were in a position to menace their communications even temporarily, the generals were reluctant to embark on bold strokes. It is true that even though this might restrict operations against Upper Canada it need not have interfered too seriously with an attack on Montreal. But the new Secretary of War, Armstrong, decided that such an attack could not be launched before May and that the preceding period might profitably be employed in clearing out the Canadian forces around Lake Ontario.

This decision, which had some reason behind it, was promptly muddled by arguments about the details of the plan and the order in which the various local objectives should be attacked. Armstrong contemplated an initial move against Kingston, followed by an attack on York, and then a converging movement against the Niagara defenses. But Dearborn's imagination suddenly conjured up a vision of an increase of the Kingston garrison to six or seven thousand and an imminent danger to his base at Sackett's Harbor. He favored a descent on York to destroy the ships that were being built there, followed by the Niagara operation, leaving Kingston until the last. It was the sort of operation which his naval colleague later described as an attempt "to kill the tree by lopping off branches"; but Armstrong consented to the change, on the somewhat formidable condition that Dearborn should command the expedition in person.

On April 27, having gained temporary command of the lake, the fleet and army assailed the muddy little village of York (the present Toronto), then capital of Upper Canada. The garrison of 600 was driven back after a sharp resistance which cost the attackers 300 casualties. A 30-gun ship on the stocks was destroyed, but another whose capture had been hoped for had left four days previously. Some compensation was gained by forcing the treasurer to hand over £2,500 under the threat of burning the town, while the troops embarked on private pillage

of their own. In this they were aided with some enthusiasm by certain of the local inhabitants, for the local authorities were powerless and the American commanders were indifferent, and the opportunity was too good to miss. Not the least enterprising was a British half-pay officer who was under arrest at the time of invasion. He escaped from confinement, acquired an American uniform, placed himself in command of two American soldiers, and took up marauding in a really systematic way. It may even be that it was local enterprise which led to the burning of the Parliament buildings, for which the invaders later paid with the burning of Washington. But there was no attempt to keep permanent possession of the town. Once the work of destruction was over, the army again embarked, and on May 8 it landed at Niagara in preparation for the next move.

The attack took place on May 27. It was made possible by the continued ascendancy of the fleet, which covered the landing in the vicinity of Fort George. The defenders, heavily outnumbered by an invading force of some 4,000, abandoned the fort after a sharp engagement and retreated toward the head of the lake in the vicinity of the present city of Hamilton. The pursuing column of 2,000 Americans was assailed early on the morning of June 6 by a force of 700 Canadians, which checked them in a two-hour engagement at Stony Creek and then withdrew before daylight should reveal the smallness of their numbers.

This minor clash turned out to be the decisive event in the campaign. The two senior American officers had been killed, and the colonel who took command was so bowled over by his elevation that he sent back for instructions as to what he should do next. Before the attack could be resumed the whole picture had changed. On May 27 the British had launched an amphibious attack against Sackett's Harbor. They were beaten off after a three-day struggle, but the defenders at one stage set fire to the shipyard in the belief that its capture was imminent. On May 31 the American commodore, Chauncey, withdrew his ships from Niagara and hastened back to his ravaged base. On June 7 the Americans on Niagara, still waiting for the next move after Stony Creek, saw the British fleet appear over the horizon. The perturbed Dearborn abandoned all thought

of further advance and drew his whole army back to the Niagara River. Their distaste for new enterprises was confirmed when a force of 600, which had been sent to dislodge the British who had advanced to Beaver Dam, was surrounded and forced to surrender. Already ill and agitated, Dearborn collapsed completely on the news of this "unfortunate and unaccountable event." He reported that he was incapable of further command, and his superiors belatedly agreed with him. But in removing him they virtually accepted the abandonment of the Niagara campaign; and although their force there was throughout superior to that of the defenders, it stood for the next two months, in Winfield Scott's words, "fixed in a state of ignominy . . . within five miles of an untrenched enemy."

But there was still Montreal, the deferred ultimate objective, and to the project of an attack on Montreal the wavering attention of the authorities now turned once more. The main force was to be regrouped at Sackett's Harbor and to move down the river out of reach of the British fleet; and at the same time a parallel force would move northward from Lake Champlain. And once more, in the hope of infusing energy into the operations, a new commander would replace the leader who had failed so ignominiously.

It was, of course, something to have got rid of Dearborn, but his successor could hardly be regarded as an improvement. This was James Wilkinson, now about to provide an ineffable climax to a long career of incompetence and intrigue. From the time when, as a young staff officer in the Revolutionary War, he found his natural talents employed in the Gates cabal against Washington, there was hardly an opportunity for corruption or a chance for spectacular treachery to which Wilkinson had not somehow managed to gravitate. His recent career at New Orleans had now become so odorous that the pressure for his removal had become irresistible. These activities had naturally qualified him for a series of promotions interspersed with courts-martial, and it seemed appropriate that this "unprincipled imbecile" (the phrase was Winfield Scott's) should now be given the rank of major general and command of the armies on the Northern front.

But there were immediate complications. While Wilkinson assumed the direction of the operations from Sackett's Harbor the force at Plattsburg was under the command of Wade Hampton. He had perhaps a more respectable character than Wilkinson, but his military talents were not universally esteemed. "God is my judge," wrote one who knew him, "I would not trust a corporal's guard or the defense of a hen roost to him against any equal number of men." He had a violent feud with Wilkinson and refused to take orders from him. Wilkinson retaliated with underhand efforts to force Hampton from his command. The Secretary of War made his contribution by issuing orders to each without the knowledge of the other and by trying to throw on them both the full responsibility for all decisions, only to have it promptly thrown back to him on every occasion. These were not the most auspicious circumstances for the inauguration of the new enterprise.

Wilkinson's first accomplishment was to fall into a state of chronic indecision as to whether he should attack Kingston first or move directly down the St. Lawrence. His irresolution was aggravated by a state of illness that left him physically incapacitated and by an apparent determination to hold an opinion opposite to that of the Secretary of War—a difficult feat, since Armstrong was equally agile in changing his mind to agree with Wilkinson's suggestions. A series of councils of war helped to protract these indecisions. At last, in October, it was decided to by-pass Kingston and move direct on Montreal.

Hampton, meanwhile, with a force of 4,000, had moved up to the Canadian border, and he now received orders to march toward the St. Lawrence and to effect a junction with Wilkinson. More successful than Dearborn in getting his troops to follow him, he advanced into Canada and reached a point within fifteen miles of the St. Lawrence. But he found the prospects anything but appealing, and his discouragement was increased by the receipt of an order to prepare 10,000 huts as winter quarters for his soldiers. It was a clear indication that the capture of Montreal was not really anticipated. His first impulse was to recall his whole force. The impulse was increased when, that same night, he ran into a Canadian force of 800

at Chateaugay. Failing to dislodge them by the first attack, he promptly abandoned the whole effort and retreated to winter quarters at Plattsburg.

The engagement took place on October 25. At that moment Wilkinson was getting his 7,000 troops on the move from Sackett's Harbor to their rendezvous at Grenadier Island at the junction of the lake and the St. Lawrence. Storms disrupted the movement, and it took over two weeks to get the bateaux collected eighteen miles from their starting point. On November 5, however—by which time Hampton had already abandoned his advance—the expedition started down the river. It was not an unhampered progress. Several gunboats which had evaded the American fleet bombarded them from the rear, while Canadian riflemen followed along the bank and took pot shots at the voyagers. To counteract this annoyance from the land, two forces were landed, one to clear the way in front, the other to protect the rear. On November 11 the latter force, numbering at least 2,000 and equipped with six fieldpieces, was assailed at Chrystler's Farm by a Canadian force of 800 men. As usual, it got no help from the other sections of the army, and in spite of its superiority it was so badly mauled that it retreated across the river in disorder. The disaster was followed next day by the news that no help was to be expected from Hampton, who was going back to Plattsburg. These events brought for once a burst of energy from Wilkinson. By the following day he had disembarked his whole force and got it to winter quarters well inside American territory.

The last foothold on Canadian soil was now on the Niagara front, where the remnants of the invading army still clustered around Fort George. But here, too, discouragement reigned. The force was steadily dwindling. No replacements were sent. Neither volunteers nor state militia were ready to enter on such service, and the militia already with the force promptly went home when its term of service expired. The news that fresh British forces were approaching was decisive. On December 10 the Americans abandoned Fort George and crossed the river, burning the village of Newark en route. The latter act was unfortunate for the frontier. The Canadians not only crossed the

river and carried Fort Niagara at the point of the bayonet, but through the rest of the winter let loose the Indians and their own raiding parties to ravage and burn from Lewiston to Buffalo. Once more the attack was being carried to American soil.

This situation, however, like the one a year previously, was temporary at best. The coming of spring found the Americans once more in a position to take the initiative, and the threat was graver than ever. They had shortly the added advantage of eliminating General Wilkinson. Early in 1814 that commander had removed himself and the bulk of his troops from the theater of their recent fiasco to the much-trodden ground of Plattsburg. There, in Mahan's words, he "contrived to give to the beginning of operations the air of absurdity that ever hung around his path." Learning that the British were sending reinforcements up the St. Lawrence to the Niagara frontier, he determined to check this movement by a diversion, and with a force of nearly 4,000 he marched into Lower Canada at the end of March. His first encounter was with a Canadian detachment of 600 which was established in a stone mill at Lacolle. The opposition was too much for him. After losing seventy men he marched his army back to Plattsburg. That was the end of General Wilkinson. He was superseded and brought before a court-martial which at last ended his pretense at a military career.

In the third year of war a number of younger officers now emerged to replace the outworn veterans of the Revolution. Such men as Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott were competent and energetic leaders. On the Niagara frontier, where the main effort was now concentrated, there was at last a body of troops of good quality and fighting spirit numbering some 3,500. On July 1 this army took the offensive. Brown, with a readiness to take risks which showed the new spirit that was developing, decided to by-pass the British-held forts which would be expensive to attack, and to strike behind them into Upper Canada. He moved across the Niagara in the vicinity of Fort Erie and turned to engage the British force, which had fallen back toward Chippewa.

But while the land forces were demonstrating a new offensive spirit the navy on the lakes had still to feel its full revitalizing force. Chauncey, the commander on Lake Ontario, has been described as a lethargic and constipated sailor. Certainly he failed on this occasion to give the generals the support they had been led to expect. He had promised to take the lake and co-operate with the advance. But on May 6 the British fleet attacked Oswego and captured or destroyed the stores that had accumulated there and followed this with a brief blockade of Sackett's Harbor itself. This was sufficient to deter Chauncey from moving for the next two months. He not only failed to support the invasion, but he left the lake open to the movement of British supplies and reinforcements, and thus contributed in a major way to the battle of Lundy's Lane.

The British had been driven from the Chippewa in a clash of advance forces, but the naval support which Brown expected failed to arrive, and he was confronted with a relatively strong British force based on Fort George. This was even reinforced, and on July 25 the British felt strong enough to make an attempt to strike at the American communications. The Americans, detecting the movement in its early stages, countered with an advance of their own. At Lundy's Lane the two forces, each somewhat under 3,000 strong, came together in the bloodiest and most strenuous engagement of the war. Tactically, it was a drawn battle. Both sides suffered heavily and drew off their forces at the close of the engagement. But strategically it was decisive for the whole campaign. Lacking reserves to follow up the enemy, and with Chauncey still clinging to his base at the other end of the lake, Brown was forced to abandon the offensive and fall back on Fort Erie where he was besieged until the latter part of the summer. By that time the Americans had secured command of the lake and cut the communications on which the British on the Niagara front depended, and they were obliged to abandon the siege on September 21. But by that time, too, the tide had turned. The Americans had still shown themselves unable to translate their potential strength into effective action, whereas in spite of the loss of Lake Ontario the initiative had passed definitely to the British side.

This was the result of the end of hostilities in Europe. The first abdication of Napoleon released Wellington's army of veterans, and steps were immediately taken to use them to good effect in America. On July 12 the first contingent arrived in Montreal, and by the end of August there were over 30,000 troops in Canada, the bulk of them British regulars.

The British now embarked on serious offensive operations. At three points along the coast subsidiary blows were directed against the United States. Neither the attack on New Orleans, where Pakenham demonstrated that being a brother-in-law of Wellington was no guarantee of military genius, nor the revengeful prestige raid against Washington which resulted in the burning of the capital had any real strategic importance. The occupation of the coast of northern Maine was political rather than military. New England had hitherto enjoyed a deliberately fostered neutrality, and Nova Scotians had been directed by proclamation at the outbreak of war to avoid distressing their maritime neighbors. Now, however, it was felt that the occupation of northern Maine would be useful to secure overland communications with Canada and would be valuable as a territorial gage when it came to the peace negotiations. But all these were secondary moves. The main stroke was to be an invasion from Canada itself by way of Lake Champlain.

The chief result of this hopeful operation was to prove that the Americans had no monopoly on military paralysis. It was now the turn of the British to fall victims to a combination of naval weakness and military incapacity. Sir George Prevost had already shown certain deficiencies in energy and imagination, but none which proved him unfitted for the command which was now entrusted to him. He had a force of 7,000 veterans of the Napoleonic struggle to lead against Plattsburg, that abode of lethargy whose garrison had been seriously weakened by demands from Sackett's Harbor for reinforcements. With little opposition they reached the town on September 5 and prepared to give battle to the American force which, somewhat strengthened by New York militia and Vermont volunteers, barred their further advance.

Prevost now felt it essential to secure his flank against bom-

bardment from the lake before he pressed the attack. A small squadron of four ships and ten small galleys was assembled in the bay under Captain Macdonough. On the British side Captain Downie had been working feverishly, under Prevost's petulant urging, to get a force into shape. It was numerically somewhat inferior to the American squadron, and the largest ship was not only newly built and very hastily fitted, but was manned with a decidedly scratch crew. Moreover, the armament of the British ships, while superior in range, was weaker than the American in weight of metal, and thus inferior at close quarters. Since it was Downie who must attack, Macdonough was able to choose the conditions most favorable to him. He moved his ships toward the entrance to the bay and behind a headland which the British ships must pass, and thus took up a sheltered position where it was only at short range that they could be attacked. Nonetheless, Prevost ordered Downie to close, implying that he, on his part, would simultaneously attack Plattsburg by land. But by the time he had completed his leisurely dispositions on September 11 the battle had ended with the destruction of the British flotilla. With the Americans thus supreme on the lake, Prevost decided that Plattsburg would be untenable even if he could take it. Rather than make the effort, he tamely marched his army home again. Wilkinson himself could hardly have done better for the enemy.

It was clearly time to bring the dreary and inconclusive conflict to an end. The Americans could no longer count on the conquest of Canada—indeed, Madison was soon writing: "The most that can fairly be hoped is that the campaign may end where it is." The United States, gripped by the British blockade and by growing economic difficulties, and faced with the disruptive threat of the Hartford Convention, was in a serious strait. On the British side there was no hope of conquering the United States or even of seizing any substantial portion of territory. The British people, exhausted by twenty years of warfare, were in no mood to prolong hostilities if any reasonable settlement could be reached.

Efforts at peace had, in fact, been under way almost from the beginning of the war. News of Britain's repeal of the Orders-

in-Council had led the United States to suggest an armistice, but the proposal fell to the ground when Britain refused to abandon impressment on the high seas. An offer of mediation by the Tsar, however, brought not only an American acceptance, but the actual dispatch of an American delegation to St. Petersburg. The move was premature, for Britain rejected the mediation proposal, but a later offer to conduct direct negotiations kept hope for a settlement alive. As an outcome of these somewhat leisurely interchanges a conference was at last opened at Ghent in August 1814.

Both sides came with somewhat high pretensions. The Americans had abated none of their demands on the maritime issues, and at the same time they wanted an abrogation of the concessions in Jay's Treaty which promised access to the American West. Britain, on her part, now saw a chance to secure an effective revision of the treaty of 1783. Although for the greater part of the war there had been an effort to cultivate the good will of New England, even to exempting that section from the blockade, the Maine boundary had proved a real disadvantage. With the St. Lawrence frozen over, it was not easy to send reinforcements from the eastern provinces to Quebec, and twice in the course of the war a body of troops had been obliged to trudge on snowshoes by a roundabout route through New Brunswick. The seizure of northern Maine in 1814 was meant to remove this disadvantage and was intended to be made permanent at the peace. The security of communications with the West was also to be assured by the acquisition of a strip east of the Niagara River and the retention of Michilimackinac, as well as a further boundary revision to give access to the Mississippi. Finally the idea of an Indian buffer state reappeared, encouraged by British successes in the west, and the United States was asked to accept as a boundary with the tribes the Greenville line of 1795.

Between these two sets of proposals the distance was almost too great for ordinary negotiations to bridge. Even with Britain in possession of the territory claimed, the United States would hardly agree to such extensive cessions without a further struggle, and the prospect that Britain might try to gain her ends by

threatening to exclude Americans from the fisheries only added to the danger of continued war. Britain indeed contemplated the full possibility of a new campaign to bring the Americans to terms, and the ministry seriously considered sending Wellington to take charge of operations in 1815.

The whole outlook, however, was changed by the development of a new crisis in Europe. Negotiations at Vienna had revealed serious conflicts between the victorious allies. Russian designs on Poland and Prussian avidity for Saxony were particularly disturbing, and by the autumn of 1814 the actual prospect of war over these issues loomed on the horizon. Under the circumstances Wellington suggested that his presence in Europe might soon be desirable and bluntly advised the ministry to make a peace without annexations. Once again the balance of power made its influence felt on American affairs, this time to the direct advantage of the United States. While the Americans on their part acquiesced in silence on the maritime questions—which, now that active hostilities had ceased, were no longer a live issue—Britain agreed to surrender her conquests and to accept not merely the pre-war boundary, but the modifications in her position which the United States desired. On that basis the Treaty of Ghent was concluded on December 24.

The result was to end decisively the Canadian hope, pursued ever since 1783, that the partition of the western domain might be modified to the advantage of the Canadian economy. Although the full boundary was not yet settled in all its details, the main dividing line was stabilized as it never had been before. The economic partition now became definite. The fate of the Indians was virtually sealed. The fur trade of the American Northwest was doomed in favor of the agrarian pioneer. The Canadian economy had to accept the necessity of working out new relations both to its own resources and to the activities of the neighboring republic, and the outcome was a commercial revolution in the St. Lawrence system in the course of the next generation.

CHAPTER VII

The Uneasy Border

THE PEACE OF 1814 is a notable landmark in the history of the North American continent. An apparently inconclusive treaty which terminated an unsatisfactory war was to prove the beginning of an era of peaceful relations which have endured to this day. It was by no means a foregone result. There were to be times when relations were strained almost to the limit and when it seemed that armed conflict was in imminent danger of being renewed. But urgent efforts on both sides, based on a mutual desire for peace and harmony, always succeeded in averting the outbreak of hostilities between the two communities which now settled down to an increasing acceptance not only of the partition of the continent, but of the necessity to share it in amity.

Their success was all the more striking because it did not depend on them alone. For another century Canada lacked complete control over her relations with her southern neighbor. The diplomacy of the empire remained firmly in the hands of the British government and was motivated primarily by British interests. That did not mean that colonial interests were disregarded, but the influence which Canada could bring to bear on British foreign policy was distinctly limited in the period before confederation, and even after that it grew only gradually. The mother country was never more matriarchal than when matters of diplomacy were involved.

This position reduced Canada to a somewhat negative role in the development of harmonious relations with the United States. The positive steps which she could take toward the consolidation of confidence and good will were limited by her colonial status. It was much easier in that situation to provoke wrath than to win affection or admiration. But it was at least possible to follow a conscious policy of avoiding any steps which would rouse American hostility, and on the whole such a policy was pursued with admirable consistency. There were a few minor occasions when untoward circumstances arose to prevent its complete effectiveness. But on the rare occasions when war actually threatened it was less over matters which were within Canada's control than from quarrels between Britain and the United States whose results seemed likely to be visited once more upon Canada as they had been in 1812.

Happily the attitude of Britain herself was calculated to reduce these occasions to a minimum. As the century progressed the desire to avoid a conflict with the United States became more and more a cardinal feature of British policy. It was matched by a similar spirit on the part of the United States. There were times when arrogance or impatience on one side or the other jeopardized this growing good will, and there were occasions when the popular temper on either side was none too favorable to the maintenance of peace. But with few exceptions the British and American governments strove earnestly to avoid a breach, even when legitimate interests seemed at stake; and Canada profited from the success of these efforts, in which her own vital interests were so deeply involved.

The inauguration of a period of good relations was facilitated by the fact that the legacy of specific controversies from the War of 1812 was smaller than the rather negative character of the treaty might suggest at first glance. The primary causes of hostilities, with which the treaty almost entirely failed to deal, disappeared of their own accord in the face of changing conditions.

The quarrel had arisen from two major sets of issues connected with maritime rights and with the situation on the western frontier. During the peace negotiations and in subsequent discussions the Americans made a determined effort to reach

some definite agreement on the questions of the right of search and impressment on the high seas. But England remained adamant in her refusal to abandon her basic claims, and the concessions which she offered proved unsatisfactory to the United States. The problem, however, was no longer a matter of urgency. The end of the war had removed it as a practical issue; and although its ghost occasionally reappeared in connection with the problem of suppressing the slave trade, the decisive fact was that not until 1914 did the British navy again have occasion to enforce belligerent rights against the neutral commerce of the United States. By that time the question of impressment, which of all aspects of maritime rights had aroused the most heated passions, was dead and buried. The use of the press gang combined with intolerable conditions in the navy of Nelson's day had largely been responsible for the desertion of British sailors to the American marine. The elimination of these features virtually laid the problem to rest.

Similarly the issues which had so disturbed the western frontier disappeared as a result of changing conditions. They had arisen when the struggle between the Indians and the American frontiersmen for the possession of western lands coincided with the Canadian attempt to hold the fur trade south of the lakes in virtual alliance with the Indian tribes. But after 1814 the Canadians gradually surrendered the southern area to their rivals. The traders from Montreal now turned their attention to the Canadian northwest and to the Pacific coast, leaving Astor in control below the boundary. The failure of the British to secure a substantial rectification of that boundary at Ghent, coupled with the death of Tecumseh, ended both the prospect of an Indian buffer state and the prospect of an Indian confederacy which should stay the advance of white settlement. When during Jackson's administration the removal of the Indian tribes west of the Mississippi was successfully carried out, their connection with Canadian traders and authorities was finally severed, and such clashes as took place at a later date were domestic affairs with no international implications.

With these major issues out of the way, it was possible in the years which immediately followed the war to settle minor ques-

tions in a way which contributed to a further relaxing of tension. Although the settlement of the boundary held trouble for the future, the matter was not immediately acute. The argument over whether Moose Island and Astoria were included in the clause which provided for a return of conquests was settled without serious friction. The acceptance of the forty-ninth parallel as the boundary from the lakes to the Rockies and the agreement on joint occupation of Oregon postponed, if it did not finally settle, the controversy over the dividing line. And the agreement on the fisheries and the convention providing for disarmament on the lakes removed at least temporarily two potential causes of irritation between Canada and the United States.

The fisheries had been one of the most difficult points in the negotiations at Ghent. Britain refused to renew the privileges in British waters which had been granted by the treaty of 1783. The Americans took the stand that these were not concessions but prior rights which had merely been recognized by the earlier treaty and which were not affected by the interruption of war. The omission of any mention of the matter in the treaty itself left it to be settled by later negotiations, and British procedure in seizing American fishing ships which ventured into territorial waters formerly open to them gave a real urgency to the question. Both sides, however, approached it in a conciliatory temper. A compromise was embodied in the convention of 1818 which excluded Americans from the inshore fisheries to which they had previously had access, but extended their rights on the shores of Newfoundland and Labrador; and although the interpretation of its terms gave rise to later difficulties, it served for the moment to satisfy the essential desires of both parties.

The really notable achievement of this period, however, was the Rush-Bagot convention. The war had shown the decisive importance of naval power on the Great Lakes. This was the real guarantee for the security of either Canada or the United States against invasion. Neither could see the other supreme so long as there was any danger of possible attack. Yet an armaments race would increase the tension and keep alive the fear if not the actual danger of the very thing against which these armaments were designed. On the other hand, a reduction of armed forces

would so diminish the possibility of aggression from either side that it would make a powerful contribution to mutual confidence and tranquillity.

These considerations had long been in the minds of American leaders. As early as the treaty of 1783, which established the separation of the United States and Canada, John Adams had suggested the prohibition not only of naval forces on the lakes, but also of fortifications along the border. The proposal had been renewed by Jay in the negotiations leading to the treaty of 1794. Neither side, however, had been sufficiently concerned to explore fully the possibilities of such an agreement; and although the question had been raised once more at Ghent, the urgent nature of more immediate problems had prevented any effort at action.

With these questions settled by the peace, however, the matter was taken up in earnest. The initiative once more came from the United States. Considerations of expense no less than a desire for improved relations brought about immediate steps to reduce the American naval establishment and proposals to Britain for an agreed limitation of warships on the Great Lakes. At the outset the suggestion was received with some caution on the British side. But reflection made it apparent that, however supreme the British navy might be on the high seas, its power could not be carried to inland waters. Defense on the lakes depended on building facilities there, and those of the United States were superior to anything available in Canada. The probable alternative to an agreement was a building race which would have an adverse effect on relations and in which the advantage would lie with the United States.

Once these facts were appreciated there was no serious difficulty about meeting the American proposals. Both sides suspended construction and agreed on the basic principle of confining their forces to those which were needed for the protection of revenue. With this as a starting point there were few obstacles to a detailed agreement. Although the British authorities had at first been taken somewhat aback by the sweeping nature of the reductions proposed by the United States, no serious objections were pressed. The arrangement, concluded by an exchange of

notes in April 1817 and ratified by the Senate a year later, confined the total force of each side to four vessels of 100 tons each, one on each of Lakes Champlain and Ontario and two on the upper lakes.

Although no mention of fortifications was made in this agreement, they were inevitably affected by its very nature. The need to maintain naval establishments now virtually disappeared, and as their defenses were dismantled, so were those of most of the other forts which guarded strategic points along the frontier. The undefended boundary, if not the actual peace which it henceforth enjoyed, was largely the creation of the Rush-Bagot agreement. And although Canada was debarred by circumstances from any direct share in laying this foundation, it represented a clear interest of her own and a policy from which she had no incentive to depart. The agreement was a legacy which she accepted without qualification as her subordinate colonial status gave way to a fuller measure of national independence.

II

Behind this deliberate effort on the part of the interested governments to create and develop an atmosphere of mutual trust there stood a public opinion whose general acquiescence was modified by a number of less favorable crosscurrents. Neither the conclusion of peace nor the subsequent contributions to an atmosphere of harmony succeeded in removing all sense of hostility between the Canadian and American peoples. Some of the bitterness of war lingered on in certain quarters, and occasionally its results were manifested with disturbing effects on both internal and external politics.

The War of 1812 made a profound contribution to the spirit of nationalism in both the United States and Canada. That spirit, already fully alive in the Republic, received a tremendous impetus from the war—an impetus which was sustained by subsequent developments. The rise of the new West, the growing influence in national politics of the new states whose local patriotism had no such passionate roots as that of the original seaboard communities, the efforts at an integrated national

economy and an effective system of national communications which found expression in the American System of which Henry Clay was the prophet, all were manifestations of or contributions to this spirit. It was not seriously diminished by the simultaneous growth of sectional friction any more than a nationalist tradition was prevented from emerging from the war by the fact that sectional divisions had hampered its effective conduct from the start. The divisions within the house might be growing, but it still presented a united front against the outside world. The Monroe Doctrine was one expression of this, but it ran through the whole expansionist process on which the nation now embarked under the banner of manifest destiny.

In Canada, too, there were sectional divisions which still left room for the emergence of national sentiment. The latter was inevitably weaker and more tentative in the case of Canada than in that of the United States. But there had, nonetheless, emerged a sense of united effort in defense against outside attack which was peculiarly Canadian. Although the Maritime Provinces had very slender connections with Canada proper, they, too, could share this particular feeling. Defense against danger from the south, real or imagined, was a potential force for unity. At the same time there continued to grow a concept of purely Canadian interests which were distinct and separate from the interests of the mother country. The problems of commercial expansion and the evolution of British trade policy in a direction contrary to that which Canadian commercial interests demanded also played their part. Canada was awaking to a consciousness of her separate identity, not only as against the United States, but as against Britain as well.

The latter development, however, was slower and more tentative. It was a suspicion of both the influence and the intentions of the United States which chiefly animated the dominant groups in Canada after 1815. The tradition of the Loyalists was given new strength and new meaning by the war. The oligarchy which controlled the affairs of the provinces put forward as their chief justification their unswerving loyalty to the British connection and their refusal to admire or imitate any feature of American institutions, and they sought at the same time to close

the borders of Canada to any new influx of American settlers which might further corrupt Canadian political and social tendencies—tendencies which, in the eyes of these stalwarts, were already dangerously tainted as a result of American propinquity.

There was, in fact, a countercurrent which this very attitude served to increase in strength. Groups like the Family Compact in Upper Canada regarded the survival of the British Empire as utterly dependent on their own continuance in power. Since it was soon apparent that they represented a small and unpopular minority whose political control would be shattered by the adoption of a democratic system, they were naturally opposed to any advance in democracy. And since an advancing democracy was one particular characteristic of the American development of this period, any advocacy of a similar evolution in Canada was loudly denounced as the entering wedge of disloyalty and separatism and republicanism.

But the forces which were creating the new American democracy were inexorably at work in Canada as well. Loyal or suspect, the population of Upper Canada at the end of the war was nonetheless predominantly American in origin and outlook. The new immigration from the British Isles in the late twenties and early thirties changed the balance with respect to origin but did not affect the outlook to a comparable extent. The settlers were plunged into pioneer conditions similar to those on other sections of the American frontier. Their needs and their desires followed the same pattern. Their economic and social grievances—aggravated by such special features as the Clergy Reserves—led to political impatience. The suspicion that the controlling groups were using their power for corrupt and selfish purposes, which played such a part in the Jacksonian movement, arose in Canada as well. The ideas behind the American movement inevitably spread across the border. Its success stimulated a desire to emulate it and even a belief in the superiority of the institutions which made such success possible, and the more effectively the local oligarchy resisted, with the backing of the British government, the more attractive American conditions seemed by contrast. When even the French leaders were driven to praise the American Revolution and to advocate the adoption of American

models, it showed how desperate the situation had become. The oligarchy might still blame the corrupting effect of American influences on a misguided and unstable population, but a detached observer might well feel that the outcome marked the complete success of the Family Compact in creating the very danger against which they imagined themselves to be the sole remaining bulwark.

Thus in Canada the spontaneous attitude of guarded aloofness from the United States, which was the first and most natural tendency on the part of the bulk of the population, was very greatly modified by the unyielding attitude of the most pronounced anti-American element. On the side of the United States an increasing indifference, if not actual benevolence, toward Canada was in its turn modified by the survival, particularly along the northern border, of a more active tradition of hostility toward the continuance of British rule.

There was actually little tendency toward an aggressive attitude on the part of either the national government or the bulk of the American population. The fear that Canada might be used as a military base for a British attack—a fear which had led to the invasion of Canada in 1775 and had played a real part in determining the strategy of 1812—had almost entirely disappeared. There were still suspicions of British designs against American interests, as there were suspicions of the other European monarchies, but the chief concern was over intrigues in Texas and Central America or alleged ambitions in the direction of California, and not over activities on the northern border. As this fear subsided, so did the most immediate motive for acquiring Canada—the motive of self-defense. In spite of minor controversies the attitude toward Canada, and toward Canadian problems which involved negotiations with Britain, was in general correct and even friendly.

Yet there were circumstances which prevented this attitude from becoming completely reassuring to Canadians. Chief among them was the conviction, announced loudly and repeatedly, of the manifest destiny of the United States to control the whole continent of North America. God and Nature, it appeared from these utterances, had traced on behalf of the American

people a domain which extended from ocean to ocean and from the Isthmus of Panama to the regions of eternal frost. It was of little comfort to Canadians that American faith in this destiny led them to renounce free will in favor of predestination as the means of its achievement. The reiterated assurance that European powers were incapable of retaining their colonies once these had reached maturity, and that a Canada which inevitably would separate from Britain would gravitate with equal inevitability toward unity with the United States, was to many a cause for alarm rather than resignation. Moreover, the United States was not above accelerating the process of predestination, as it showed in the cases of Florida and Texas and California. These were precedents to which Canadians gave considerable attention and in which they found little ground for reassurance.

The more immediate danger, however, lay in the temper of the districts along the Canadian border. These frontier communities, whose political influence had been such a factor in bringing about war in 1812, were not completely satisfied with the negative outcome of the struggle. They still retained a conviction that the existence of the border was undesirable and that it should be eliminated at the earliest opportunity. While other and more powerful sections of the nation were turning their expansionist energies toward the South and West, the expansionist ambitions of settlements from Lake Champlain to Lake Michigan were still directed toward the North and were ready to manifest themselves when a new occasion arose.

The outbreak of rebellion in Canada in 1837 offered such an occasion. In general the hostility of the frontier had been directed not toward the Canadian community as such, but toward the existence of British authority in Canada. Now a group within Canada was struggling against that authority, and the more extreme among the Canadian leaders had reached the point of seeking to overthrow it entirely. The natural sympathy of convinced republicans with such an enterprise was heightened by the flattering tendency of the Canadian rebels to echo the language and the aspirations of 1776. It was equally natural that this sympathy should result in an impulse to aid the champions of Canadian freedom and to a hope that a common effect in

such a cause would be crowned by the happy union of Canadians and Americans, with all their racial and ideological affinities, in a single republic under the existing Constitution of the United States.

III

The difficulties which resulted from this situation along the border were the result of the attempts by Canadian rebels and their sympathizers to carry on the armed struggle from bases on American soil and the inability of American authorities to take effective steps to curb these hostile actions. There was every desire on the part of the government at Washington to prevent trouble from arising. There was on the part of the British and Canadian authorities a readiness to recognize the good faith of the American government and to avoid raising unnecessary complications. Yet in spite of these efforts both sides were eventually pushed by circumstances to the verge of a war which neither wanted and from which neither expected any real advantage.

The *Caroline* affair was symbolic of the whole situation. Refugee Canadian leaders, including William Lyon Mackenzie, had joined with American sympathizers to raise a miniature army whose purpose was to invade Canada and set up a republic there. Part of this force, numbering perhaps 1,000, occupied Navy Island in the Niagara River in December 1837. This was Canadian soil, but supplies came from the American side, and the steamship *Caroline* was the means of transport on which the garrison relied. The Canadian authorities, who felt unable to dislodge the rebels with the limited forces available, fell back on the idea of cutting their lines of supply, and a force was sent to destroy the *Caroline* on the night of December 29. Not finding her at Navy Island, they carried their quest to the American side of the river, where the ship was discovered at the dock in Schlosser. The Canadians boarded her, overwhelmed the passengers and crew, killed one man (Amos Durfee) in the scuffle, and sent the steamer adrift and blazing over Niagara Falls.

The raid accomplished its immediate purpose. Largely as a

result of ensuing supply difficulties, the rebel force was withdrawn from Navy Island on January 14. But there were other and less gratifying repercussions. The radical element along the American frontier blazed with indignation at this incursion into the territory of the United States. Their support to the rebel cause became more active than ever and helped to keep alive the threat of armed aggression which materialized in periodic efforts at invasion during 1838.

The sustaining spirit behind these efforts was provided by a variety of secret societies. This was a natural form of organization under the circumstances. The influence of the federal government and the formal—though not always the actual—power of the state authorities were both directed to the curbing of designs against Canada. But quite apart from a desire to keep such illegal enterprises under cover, there was the enlivening effect of the secret society with all its mystery and ritual on the somewhat drab life of the average frontiersman. There were other incentives as well. The nation was still suffering from the effects of the depression of 1837. Enlistment in the Patriot army made a certain appeal to the unemployed, particularly when it was further rewarded with a cash bounty and the promise of a grant of land in the future republic. But restlessness and a desire for adventure played a major part in rallying a fighting force, and the support behind that force was augmented both by the idea of a crusade for the spread of republican principles and the added thrill which a secret organization provided.

Most of these organizations were short-lived. Groups like the Canadian Refugee Relief Association and the Sons of Liberty failed to survive the fiasco of the early efforts at invasion. But a somewhat longer career attended the Hunters and Chasers of the Eastern Frontier. Organized along vaguely Masonic lines, this group spread its lodge not only along the border from Vermont to Michigan, but into both Canada and the Southern states. At its height it had perhaps 50,000 members, and its declared purpose was the elimination of British monarchical rule from North America.

An active program to this end was formulated at a convention which met at Cleveland in September 1838. A republican gov-

ernment for Upper Canada was set up; a state bank to finance operations by an issue of paper money was created, and steps were embarked upon to enlist men and gather arms for the invasion of Canada.

There had been plans of this sort by the rebels themselves earlier in the year. The force at Navy Island was meant to be the pivot for a concerted movement on Toronto in which forces from the London and Hamilton districts would join, supported by another group which sought to invade western Ontario from Detroit. All these had been easily repelled, and later operations from northern Vermont and against Kingston, as well as a new attempt from Detroit, ended in nothing more than brief skirmishing. But the Hunters hoped that more effective preparations would not only make possible a successful invasion but would also rally Canadian discontent in a new rising on behalf of independence.

The actual attempts, however, ended ingloriously. In November 1838 a force numbering about 1,000 set out from the vicinity of Ogdensburg to attack the town of Prescott across the St. Lawrence. Their general was a Pole and their commodore a pirate; the rank and file consisted largely of seasonal workers, with few leading Hunters among them. Part of the force succeeded in getting across the river and occupying a stone windmill, where they stood a siege of five days; but the authorities promptly established a river patrol which cut the invaders off from either reinforcements or retreat and ultimately forced their surrender. At the beginning of December a body of 200 launched an attack on Windsor under a "General" Bierce who, in true Gilbertian fashion, chose to lead them from behind. It proved to be an uninspiring method, and an attack by the Canadian militia promptly scattered the invaders.

These successive episodes, which naturally caused considerable irritation in Canada, also aroused concern on the part of the moderate elements in the United States. "The game of pirating upon our neighbors has been carried far enough," wrote one journal at the beginning of 1839. "Neither Canada nor Great Britain can stand it much longer. The United States would not have borne it so long." Not the least danger was that the dis-

turbed state of the border would result in armament increases which would add to the tension. Britain was already sending military reinforcements. A series of incidents on the lakes in which retaliation for the *Caroline*—expressed in the burning of the *Sir Robert Peel*—provoked further reprisals from the Canadian side had reached a point where the British authorities felt obliged to disregard temporarily the limitations of the Rush-Bagot Treaty by arming additional ships upon the lakes. By November 1838, with the Hunters openly preparing their attacks, the British Minister in Washington was moved to outspoken protest.

"Vast hordes of banditti and assassins," he wrote, "are maturing their plans for the desolation and ruin of a British territory: they are engaged in this work within the jurisdiction of the United States, where no British authority can reach them, but where Her Majesty's authorities rely confidently upon the friendship and honor of the United States themselves to exert the necessary power. It would not be fit for me to suggest modes of proceeding: but surely there must reside somewhere, in every well-constituted state, the power to prevent those who live under its laws from persisting in the perpetration of violent and atrocious wrong against a friendly foreign people."

The American government was by no means inclined to contest this general thesis. It sought by pressure on the authorities of the various states to get action which would prevent the recurrence of plots and attacks against Canada. But where the states proved to be reluctant or ineffective the federal government found its own powers somewhat inadequate. Its civil agents could take little action. There was an attempt to amend the existing neutrality act to provide for prevention as well as for punishment of these disturbing activities, but the new law added little to existing powers. Moreover, it still left most of the burden on the military authorities, and their resources as well as their powers of intervention were distinctly limited. Nonetheless, the sending of General Winfield Scott to take charge on the northern border was a useful step and one which showed the desire of the United States to restrain its own citizens. That, in fact, was Scott's main task—a fact which was fully recognized

in his instructions and which he made his chief concern. But while he may have been able to curb certain minor activities, he proved unable to check more serious efforts such as those of the Hunters. It was the failure of these efforts and the consequent collapse of faith in their authors, rather than positive and effective action by the authorities, which led to a temporary easing of the situation in 1839.

Then when these particular difficulties seemed to be disappearing of their own accord the threat of conflict was revived in a far more serious fashion when the unquiet ghost of the *Caroline* affair materialized once more in the person of Alexander McLeod.

McLeod was a deputy sheriff who, in the course of efforts to gather evidence against the leaders of attacks on Canada, found frequent occasion to cross the border. The nature of his activities aroused considerable resentment on the part of border sympathizers with the Canadian rebels. At the same time the search by the New York authorities for the persons engaged in the destruction of the *Caroline* led them to turn their attention to McLeod among others. How doubtful was his connection with that affair was shown by the fact that he had already been twice arrested but released through lack of evidence. But McLeod presumed unduly on that record. He aggravated his unwisdom in crossing the border at all by imbibing too freely at a border tavern and crowned his recklessness by boasting (probably quite untruthfully) that his was the hand which had struck down Amos Durfee. A new arrest resulted; mob demonstrations amounting to a threat of lynching prevented his release on bail offered by the Canadian government, and the prospect that he might be tried and executed created a situation in which war seemed not only possible but imminent.

This was to no small extent the outcome of the attitude adopted by Palmerston. To the detached observer it might seem that McLeod had wantonly brought upon himself any consequences which he might suffer. But Palmerston now exhibited that mood of ebullient nationalism which was later to reach a classic climax in the affair of Don Pacifico. The question of McLeod's guilt or innocence was brushed aside. The *Caroline*

affair was represented as an act done under the orders of the constituted authorities. Although Britain had steadfastly refused to offer either apology or redress, it was now insisted that the individuals who had acted under orders should not be held responsible. The efforts of British diplomacy were directed not merely to preventing the punishment of McLeod, but to securing his release without trial.

This was asking too much of the American authorities. The affair roused passions in the United States fully equal to those expressed in England, and hot debates in Congress were featured by demands for redress for the *Caroline* and by attacks on the Administration for the alleged subserviency of its attitude toward Britain. Webster, indeed, as Secretary of State, displayed the utmost anxiety to settle the matter to Britain's satisfaction. But in this, as in previous matters, the power of the federal government was limited. The charges of murder and arson against McLeod brought him within the scope of state rather than federal law, and while Governor Seward of New York was also anxious to minimize the incident, he was in no position to give hostages to the opposition by allowing any interference with the rights of the state.

For nearly a year after McLeod's arrest in November 1840 the matter dragged on, to the serious detriment of relations between Britain and the United States. Palmerston demanded McLeod's release outright and warned that his execution would mean war. Webster was unable to see any way by which the federal government could effect such release through due legal process. The Supreme Court of New York, to whom the question was referred, confirmed the jurisdiction of the state courts and returned McLeod for trial. The hope that an appeal might be taken to the federal Supreme Court was dashed when McLeod, already weary of his incarceration, preferred to stand trial rather than wait on the law's further delays. A change of ministry in England, resulting in the replacement of Palmerston by Aberdeen, brought a more conciliatory temper on the British side, but aroused public sentiment in England still made the situation dangerous. But all ended fortunately when McLeod's trial resulted in his acquittal in October 1841. A major factor

in this outcome was a last-minute disappearance of the two chief witnesses of the prosecution—a happy circumstance which the British Minister suspected involved a certain collusion between the federal and state authorities.

With this episode the series of difficulties arising out of the Canadian rebellion virtually came to an end. The *Caroline* affair was formally buried in the following year. But by this time other difficulties had arisen to shadow the earlier ones, and the danger of war which had loomed over the McLeod case was protracted by the new disputes which flared over the northeastern boundary between Maine and New Brunswick.

CHAPTER VIII

Defining the Boundary

THE TREATY OF GHENT, which provided for a mutual return of conquests in North America, still left a very considerable uncertainty about the actual dividing line between the territories of British North America and those of the United States. The whole of the border west of Lake of the Woods remained undefined, largely as a result of the failure of the Mississippi to extend as far north as the original treaty makers had assumed it did. There was a definition of the boundary east of that point, but its terms had already given considerable trouble, and large stretches of it still remained to be established with precision. The negotiators at Ghent, confronted with more acute difficulties in securing an acceptable basis of peace, deliberately postponed the settlement of these vexed questions and provided for the creation of three commissions whose task should be to reach an agreement in the future.

The most immediately troublesome of these questions was that concerned with the boundary between Maine and New Brunswick. The treaty description of the northeastern boundary of the United States, as drawn up in 1783, had, in fact, created difficulties from the outset. The clause in which it was embodied began with the words: "That all disputes which might arise in future on the subject of the boundaries may be prevented." But the aspiration proved to be overoptimistic. There was not

a single provision respecting the line from the coast to the St. Lawrence which was not ultimately called into question, and the accumulated irritation which grew out of the prolonged controversy eventually created a crisis which might quite conceivably have ended in war.

The foundations of the definition were entangled in the ancient charters of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, the rival claims of France and England over the boundaries of Acadia, and the lines established after the conquest of Canada in 1763. In general it was these last provisions which were the model for the terms accepted at the close of the American Revolution and embodied in the treaty of 1783.

The treaty accepted the St. Croix River as the starting point of the northeastern boundary. From "the northwest angle of Nova Scotia," where a line due north from the source of the St. Croix met the "highlands," it was to follow those highlands which divided the rivers falling into the River St. Lawrence from those falling into the Atlantic Ocean. When it reached the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut River it was to follow that river to the forty-fifth parallel of latitude and then proceed west along that parallel to the St. Lawrence.

This description involved certain assumptions. It was assumed that it was known what river was meant by the St. Croix and that its source had been or could be ascertained. It was presumed that the highlands existed and could be recognized and that there would be no difficulty in deciding which rivers emptied into the St. Lawrence and which into the Atlantic. It was taken for granted that the northwest head of the Connecticut was equally ascertainable and that there would be no difficulty about discovering the location of the forty-fifth parallel. All those assumptions were unfounded; and when to the disputes over their application was added a controversy over the islands in the Bay of Fundy—whose ownership depended on a complex relation between a line drawn from East Florida, a distance of twenty leagues from the coast of the United States, and prior possession by Nova Scotia—it was little wonder that a final settlement proved to be anything but easy.

In the period between 1783 and 1812 a certain amount of

progress was made toward a reduction of the number of points in dispute. The first problem was to locate the St. Croix. Several rivers were put forward as claimants to that name, but the choice narrowed down to the Magaguadavic and the Schoodic, which ran into Passamaquoddy Bay from the east and west sides respectively. That problem was referred to commissioners under Jay's Treaty. Their award in 1798 upheld the British claim to the Schoodic and went on to determine the source of the river in a way which left to New Brunswick a substantial strip of territory west of the St. John.

This decision affected the further claims of the contending parties. The American claim to a line due north of the St. Croix was automatically shifted to the west. But there was still the question how far that line would extend, and this depended on the location of the highlands defined in the treaty. The British claim would have placed these mythical features south of the St. John and its tributaries. The American claim extended 143 miles farther north, to a point beyond the Restigouche, and followed a line some twenty miles inland from the lower St. Lawrence. When to this was added a further disagreement over the source of the Connecticut, it meant that there was in dispute a rough triangle of territory with an area of some 12,000 square miles.

This was the situation which was referred to the commissioners under the treaty of 1814 and which proved to be a problem beyond their ability to solve. Progress was made on the less extensive question of the islands in the Bay of Fundy, which had been the subject of abortive conventions in 1803 and 1807 and which was finally decided by the convention of 1818. But the commissioners who were concerned with the boundary from the St. Croix to the St. Lawrence found themselves in hopeless disagreement. Their differences extended to every essential point, and by 1822 they decided to abandon their efforts to reach a conclusion and to leave to their respective governments the problem of further attempts.

This situation had been provided for at Ghent. In case the commission should prove unable to agree on an award, the dispute was to be referred to a friendly sovereign for arbitration.

Even this, however, created difficulty, for both sides found that the friendship of sovereigns was an uncertain quantity, and each looked askance on the monarch suggested by the other. By 1825, however, the local situation in the disputed area had begun to give cause for uneasiness as the claims to jurisdiction between Maine and New Brunswick came into definite conflict. After prolonged negotiations an arbitration convention was signed in September 1827, and after further delays the King of the Netherlands was accepted as arbitrator.

This effort, too, was without success. The only real conclusion which King William drew from the evidence was that the provisions which he was supposed to apply were "inexplicable and impractical." That being so, he felt that the only possible award was one which would effect a conventional division of the area in dispute, without attempting to apply the strict letter of the treaty. In consequence his decision of 1831 drew a line along the St. John and the St. Francis rivers and across to the highlands above the St. Lawrence, leaving the northern third of the disputed territory to Britain and giving most of the remainder, with the exception of a small triangle west of the upper Connecticut, to the United States.

This was an attempt to reach an equitable settlement by a departure from the strict terms of reference by which the arbitrator was technically bound. Against such a procedure the American envoy at The Hague promptly and somewhat hastily protested. The protest was backed by an outcry from the states affected and from their representatives in Congress. Maine, in particular, still in the new flush of statehood which had been granted to her in 1820, objected to relinquishing a claim to a very substantial area and denied the right of the federal government to alienate her lands. There were also objections to the competence of the arbitrator on the ground that the Belgian revolution of 1830 left him no longer the King of the Netherlands, to whom the question had been referred, but merely King of Holland; and protests against "the doings of the King of Holland on the subject of the boundary" were embodied in resolutions of the state legislature. In the face of this situation the federal government with some reluctance evaded direct responsibility for acceptance

or rejection of the award and requested the advice of the Senate. In spite of the fact that Britain had signified her willingness to abide by the decision of King William, the Senate advised rejection. The problem was back to its original starting point.

It could no longer rest, however, in the comparative tranquility which it had enjoyed during the years after 1783. The territory in dispute was no longer entirely a remote wilderness whose occupation and exploitation lay in the future. It was an area into which settlement had begun to penetrate and whose forest resources were being actively invaded by a variety of interested parties. And the determination of Maine to develop these assets, coming into conflict with the insistence of New Brunswick on maintaining what she regarded as her rightful jurisdiction, resulted in a series of incidents which ultimately threatened to provoke a border war.

Naturally enough, many of these incidents arose out of controversies over timber rights. From the earliest days the lumbermen found in the absence of settled jurisdiction a chance to extend their operations without limit and with little regard for the boundary claims of either side. But as the scale of these operations grew larger, and as rival enterprises pushed into the same territory, they found it an advantage to secure some legal basis for their claims from the most convenient authority. Licensees from New Brunswick operated in territory claimed by Maine. Maine granted cutting rights in territory claimed by New Brunswick. Constituted authorities on each side seized timber cut under authorization from the other, and the victims of the seizures appealed to their respective governments for protection and redress.

The situation was complicated by the spread of settlement. New Brunswick already claimed jurisdiction over the Madawaska settlements along the upper St. John. But settlers from Maine were moving into the same area, and the Maine authorities proceeded to make grants of lands and to send in surveyors to mark out townships and roads. New Brunswick attempted to bring the settlers within the domain of its own courts. Participation by the settlers in a Maine election in 1831 and the persistent efforts of an American census agent to enumerate the settlers in 1837—the latter at a time when the handing over of the federal surplus to

the states and its distribution to individual localities offered a natural inducement to the Madawaska settlers to be numbered among the favored—brought the active intervention of the New Brunswick authorities. For over a decade there were periodic flurries of writs and warrants, accompanied by arrests and seizures, in the disputed districts. Tempers rose on either side, and the appeals of Maine for protection by the federal government took on an increasing sharpness of tone. "Maine has a right to know, fully and explicitly," asserted the governor in 1838, "whether she is to be protected or left to struggle alone and unaided."

Meanwhile the state proceeded to take action. Following the appointment of an agent to investigate the situation, and his report that large numbers of lumbermen from across the border were trespassing on Maine lands, measures were set on foot to end this "work of devastation and pillage." In February 1839 a land agent with a party of 200 men was sent out to expel the New Brunswick lumbermen from the Aroostook Valley. It was hardly a successful foray. In a surprise night raid fifty of the party were captured and marched off to Woodstock Jail. There the news of the size of the Maine force and the information that their armament included a six-pounder moved the more impetuous among the inhabitants to raid the local arsenal and to set off for the Aroostook front. Governor Harvey summoned them back by proclamation, but at the same time he informed Maine of the British claim to the territory in question and of preparations to send troops for its defense. Maine passed a grant for the raising of an army and appealed to Congress. Congress appropriated \$10,000,000 and authorized the raising of 50,000 troops for the support of Maine. The British Minister and the Secretary of State exchanged communications in which each defended the actions of his own nationals and appealed to the other to exercise a restraining influence over his own local authorities.

Happily the Aroostook War stopped short of bloodshed. The forces which gathered within gunshot of each other showed no haste to engage in actual battle. The governors were anxious for any measure of conciliation compatible with a reasonable appearance of dignity. A way was found when Winfield Scott, whose

restraining influence had already been felt along the frontier farther west, was rushed to the scene of action with messages advocating compromise. The prisoners were released. The forces of both sides were withdrawn. The civil authorities of Maine were left in nominal control of the disputed region of Aroostook, and New Brunswick was tacitly conceded a provisional control in the Madawaska region. A crisis whose continuance might have added new fuel to the passions aroused by the McLeod case was fortunately abated before that dangerous episode reached its climax.

Nonetheless, its foundations remained, and restraint was dependent very largely on the belief that new negotiations were in prospect which would bring the dispute to a definite conclusion. The inherent dangers were aggravated by the excitement over the McLeod case and by the way in which the truculence aroused by that episode was reflected in the attitude of both Palmerston and Forsyth on the question of reaching an agreement on the northeastern boundary. The aggravations on both sides were accumulating and creating a perilously inflamed temper. It was clearly time for a comprehensive effort to reach a settlement of all outstanding issues before they precipitated a major quarrel; and the conciliatory temper which followed a change of administration in both Britain and the United States in 1841 made possible a sincere and mutual effort toward that end.

II

The appointment of Lord Ashburton as a special envoy to negotiate a settlement of the outstanding questions between Britain and the United States was a sign of Britain's desire to reach a practical agreement without too much insistence on the formal aspects of diplomacy. The head of the financial house of Baring had enjoyed a long connection with the United States. His firm had substantial business dealings in America. He himself had spent part of his youth in the United States as manager of the firm's American interests. His marriage to the daughter of a Pennsylvania senator, his part in helping to finance the Louisiana Purchase, his long advocacy of harmony between the two countries which had led, among other things, to his opposition to the

Orders-in-Council previous to 1812 were all calculated to make him acceptable to the United States, while his business experience seemed to fit him for the type of bargaining which appeared most likely to produce an agreement acceptable to both sides.

His mission was a comprehensive one. He was charged with the settlement of the boundary problems which remained, not only on the northeastern portion, but along various other sections. Oregon, among them, remained a problem, and one on which no progress was made at this time. But there were also details to be settled along the water boundary from the St. Lawrence to the Lake of the Woods, for although some progress had been made by the commission appointed under the Treaty of Ghent, the matter had been prolonged by difficulties over the surveys, and these in turn had raised problems which the commissioners had been unable to solve. These questions, however, were chiefly concerned with the channels which the boundary should follow through the Detroit and the St. Marys rivers and the consequent disposition of certain islands, and with the line to be drawn from Lake Superior to Rainy Lake. Neither question involved issues which were of major importance at that time, and little difficulty was found in reaching a settlement acceptable to both sides.

It was also Ashburton's task to dispose of the *Caroline* affair. "It has occupied the public mind for nearly five years," he wrote to Aberdeen, "and what is called a *settlement* of it is expected, and indeed without it there is reason to apprehend that there would be a general indisposition to settle anything else." But while he believed it desirable that the United States should be given formal satisfaction, he was not ready to admit unconditionally that Britain was in the wrong, and he was determined that in return for a guarded apology there should be action to overcome such jurisdictional complications as had arisen in the McLeod case and to make it possible to remove from state to federal courts, by means of habeas corpus, cases in which the accused had acted under the authority of a foreign government. It was only when a bill to this effect had been passed, not without the exercise of considerable influence by Ashburton himself, that he tendered his regrets for the fact that "the hurried execution of the necessary service" which involved the destruction of the *Caro-*

line had disturbed the harmony between the two nations which the British government wished to maintain.

A further provision arising out of the recent border disturbances was an agreement with respect to extradition. The difficulty on both sides of recovering fugitives from justice, after the expiration in 1807 of this clause in Jay's Treaty, had been seriously aggravated by the rebellion and the border raids which followed. Canadian application for the surrender of escaped rebels and raiders and incendiaries had been consistently refused by the state governors, and the federal government professed its inability to interfere. At the same time the growing activity of the Underground Railroad and the determination of the Canadian authorities not to become obligated to surrender escaped slaves presented an obstacle to the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement. Extradition on the ground of theft, for example, might force the return of a slave who was accused of stealing the clothes in which he had escaped. But with this restriction, and with agreement on the exclusion of political offenses or charges arising from internal disturbances, it proved possible to decide on a specific list of extraditable offenses which included murder, arson, and forgery; and if it did not end all controversy, it did much to diminish the more immediate causes of resentment in this particular field.

It was, however, the settlement of the northeastern boundary which, as Ashburton recognized, formed the most difficult and the most important part of his mission. He approached it with a determination to achieve the most favorable settlement possible but at the same time to accept any honorable and reasonable agreement which secured the essential interests of Great Britain. "No slight advantage to be derived from contrivance & cunning," he wrote to Sir Charles Bagot, "can for a moment be placed in comparison with those to be derived from having as a result of my negotiations a reciprocal feeling of respect & harmony."

This approach was matched on the American side by the attitude of Webster. The Secretary of State had for some time entertained the conviction that the problem could only be settled by compromise and was ready to negotiate on the basis of a conventional line. Recognizing that this would involve an abatement of American claims, he set out to pave the way by reconciling the

states involved, and particularly Maine and Massachusetts, to a surrender of their more extreme pretensions. In 1842 he arranged for commissioners from these two states to be present in Washington during the negotiations, and all through his discussions with Ashburton he was simultaneously engaged in the task—in certain respects a more difficult one—of extracting from these representatives their consent to terms sufficiently moderate to be acceptable to the British negotiator.

This practical need to defer to local sentiment on the part of the American government was not present to anything like the same degree on the British side. Ashburton, it is true, entered into correspondence with the governors of both Canada and New Brunswick and sought, where possible, to take their views into consideration in arriving at the terms of settlement. But none of the provinces was directly associated with the negotiations, and their opinions were not of major influence in the final agreement. This was a treaty negotiated by the British government from the point of view of its imperial interests, and the local interests of British North America were secondary considerations which had to be accepted as subordinate to these larger purposes.

There was, in fact, on both sides a considerable divergence between local and general interests. Neither Britain nor the United States considered the resources of the territory in dispute to be of serious importance from the national point of view. But to Maine and New Brunswick the lands and forests in that area represented a substantial body of assets which they were reluctant to surrender. In addition, New Brunswick was now contemplating the construction of a railroad to the St. Lawrence, and the boundary line claimed by Britain would make this practical by offering a direct route to Quebec. Surveys, indeed, had already begun, and this activity in the disputed territory had added to the apprehensions of Maine and her determination to uphold what she regarded as her rights.

The interests of the two major governments, on the other hand, were not so much economic as strategic. Britain on repeated occasions had experienced difficulty in reinforcing Canada during the winter months when the St. Lawrence was closed to navigation. The problem had been raised once again as a result of the

tension which followed the rebellion of 1837. It was felt essential to maintain a favorable route for military purposes from St. John to Quebec. The concern, it will be noted, was not with a defensible frontier for New Brunswick, over which there was little alarm; it was for adequate communications with the St. Lawrence and Canada, the area most open to invasion and most immediately threatened in case of war with the United States.

The United States, on her part, looked to the same area. There was little risk of a serious invasion from New Brunswick, whatever Maine might think. The possible military base from which danger was to be apprehended was Canada, and the traditional line of prospective invasion was by Lake Champlain and the Hudson. To protect this approach a fort had been built at Rouses Point in the belief that it lay south of the forty-fifth parallel. But Valentine and Collins in their surveys of 1771-74 had made a mistake. As new surveys revealed in 1818, the true line lay farther south, and its acceptance would leave the fort at Rouses Point about a quarter of a mile within Canadian territory.

Here, then, was a possible basis of compromise and one which was suggested in the instructions which Aberdeen sent to Ashburton in March 1842. The British government, although it had withdrawn its assent to the award of the King of the Netherlands after the American rejection, was prepared to return to it as a basis of negotiation. But it was essential to preserve the present route through New Brunswick, which ran up the St. John and the Madawaska; and the Netherlands line, following the St. Francis and bringing the border close to the St. Lawrence, "very materially interferes with the freedom and security of our communications." Ashburton was therefore instructed to seek an arrangement which would give Britain the line of the upper St. John, in return for which Britain was prepared to abandon her claim to Rouses Point and if necessary to add a cash compensation to Maine.

But Maine, on her part, was aiming at a different sort of bargain. For any territory which she gave up she wanted not money but land. She sought to gain the islands at the mouth of the St. Croix and, if possible, the narrow strip of land which lay between the St. John and the western border of New Brunswick. She also

demanded adequate rights of navigation on the St. John. These were terms which Ashburton could not be expected to accept. He disliked, it was true, the idea of insisting on the upper St. John as the boundary and persuaded his government to allow him more freedom on that point, and even then he felt that the insistence on securing a military road involved more sacrifices than the objective was worth. But the further concessions demanded by Maine would have meant a still greater sacrifice in return for gains to which he attached little importance.

Fortunately these claims were modified by the time the real negotiations began. This was perhaps the most significant outcome of the Battle of the Maps. The discovery in the archives of the French Foreign Office of a map whose markings supported the British claims and whose general nature seemed to answer the description of a map on which Franklin had traced the American claim during the negotiations of 1783 led the State Department to issue instructions that further search for such disconcerting evidence should cease. This made it possible for the Foreign Office in London to keep from American eyes the map from the British Museum which supported the American case. It was perhaps as well that this mutual concealment was successful, for a revelation of these documents might have simultaneously excited and confused the already heated opinion in both countries to a point where all compromise would have been impossible. But meanwhile Webster made a point of calling the attention of Maine to the map in his possession (which, as much later discoveries revealed, had no relation to the Franklin map after all) and suggesting the risk that might lie in protracting the negotiations. Even then the effort by the state to keep its surrender to a minimum and raise its compensation to a maximum threatened in midsummer to make an agreement impossible. The scale was turned when Webster offered \$150,000 each to Maine and Massachusetts in return for their consent to a line which he believed Ashburton would accept.

Already, in fact, a basis of settlement had been worked out in informal conferences. The basis was a division of the disputed area north of the St. John in a manner more favorable to Britain than the Netherlands award, and in return the concession to the

United States of a more westerly boundary at the head of the Connecticut, the acceptance of the old and inaccurate survey of the forty-fifth parallel, leaving Rouses Point to the United States, and the agreement to accept the compromise favored by the United States in respect to St. Marys River and the boundary west of Lake Superior. Maine was further gratified by being given the use of the St. John to the sea for the transportation of forest products. Webster estimated that the territory thus gained by the United States, while it was in area seven twelfths of the total in dispute, was in value at least four fifths. Ashburton himself wrote somewhat ruefully to Bagot: "The present line, for which I have made greater sacrifices than the thing is worth, is to satisfy certain military critics by bringing the Americans from off the crest of the highlands which overlook the valley of the St. Lawrence, so as to give us the command of those heights."

It was an outcome not completely satisfactory to any of the parties, but it was probably as fair a compromise as could be achieved. Britain and the United States benefited as nations by the removal of a dangerous cause of controversy without any sacrifice of essential interests. But Ashburton's contempt for the value of the disputed territory and his willingness had he been left to himself to cede the northern wedge in preference to the areas farther south perhaps showed an imperfect appreciation of the geographical problems of British North America and the bearing of the settlement on the future problem of communications. In New Brunswick particularly his name continued to be held in little honor for a considerable period after the treaty had been concluded.

But the fault, if fault there was, was beyond his power to remedy. It traced far back to the decisions of the British government in the preceding century. If the assertion in the commission to the governor of Nova Scotia in 1763, that the province of right extended to the Penobscot, had been implemented at the time, much of the controversy would have been avoided. When the opportunity was let slip—and even at that date the claims of Massachusetts had to be reckoned with—it was not easily regained. It might not have been impossible by hard bargaining to secure a better frontier in 1783 and perhaps even in 1814. But the

passage of time made it steadily more difficult, and it seems clear that from 1820 on no better settlement could have been secured except by force of arms. Indeed, there still remains enough doubt about the actual views of the negotiators in 1783 to make it conceivable that New Brunswick was fortunate to retain even as much as she did.

III

The northeastern boundary was a matter in which the British provinces had a direct interest but over whose settlement they had virtually no influence. The controversy over Oregon was a matter which at the time hardly concerned them even indirectly and in which Britain could act without any reference to the claims of specific colonies. Nonetheless, the outcome of the controversy was ultimately of very real significance for British North America, and the episode had a profound effect on future policy and even on the process which led to the formation of the Dominion of Canada.

At the conclusion of the Treaty of Ghent, the boundary west of the Lake of the Woods was left in what one is driven to describe as a state of troubled non-existence. It had been in that nebulous condition ever since the treaty of 1783. If the treaty description of the northeastern boundary was difficult to apply, that referring to the western section was completely inapplicable. It envisaged a line from the northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods due west to the Mississippi. But a due-west line would seek in vain to reach the Mississippi, whose nearest branch lay over a hundred miles to the south. Within a few years after the signing of the treaty it was clear that some new definition must be agreed on for the northwest boundary.

The search for an agreement was complicated by the relation between the boundary and the right to navigate the Mississippi. Britain, to whom that right had been granted, contended that this implied physical access to the river and sought to extend this still farther by securing a line which would strike the navigable reaches below the Falls of St. Anthony. The Americans, who viewed the concession of the right of navigation with increasing

regret, were determined not to accept the latter claim and were by no means averse to establishing a boundary which would miss the Mississippi altogether. This attitude hardened after the Louisiana Purchase. If there was reluctance to admit Britain to the river while it retained an international character as the boundary between the territories of Spain and the United States, there was a new determination to exclude her now that the river was wholly within the American domain. In addition, there were new reasons for keeping the boundary as far north as possible. Any line drawn through the territory east of the Mississippi would be a precedent for the boundary to be applied between the river and the Rockies. The stakes had increased, and American firmness had increased with them.

In consequence, the negotiators at Ghent refused either to renew the privilege of navigating the Mississippi or to assent to a boundary acceptable to Great Britain. The settlement of the boundary was left to the negotiations which followed in 1818. By this time the dividing line westward to the Rockies had virtually been established. A convention drawn up in 1803 had provided for a line from the Lake of the Woods direct to the source of the Mississippi. But the settlement had collapsed when the Senate refused to ratify this arrangement, and the possibility of reviving it was ended by the purchase of Louisiana. A new convention in 1807 drew a line due south to the forty-ninth parallel (leaving the peninsula at the western end of the Lake of the Woods as a monument to American tenacity) and thence along that parallel to the Rockies. Although this convention also failed of ratification, its provisions were now revived and embodied without change in the convention of 1818.

When it came to the boundary west of the Rockies, however, new disputes arose. The rival claims of the two countries to the Pacific coast had now emerged as an active issue, and neither was as yet prepared to accept the basis of settlement which the other was ready to offer.

Behind the controversy lay a tangle of claims based on the activities of both sides in exploration and occupation. The voyages of Cook and Vancouver, the activities on the Columbia of Lieutenant Broughton and Captain Gray, the expeditions of

Mackenzie and Lewis and Clark, the activities of Astor and of the North West Company were all put forward as justifying title to the whole area. There were further complications from the claims put forward by Spain and Russia. These, it may be said here, were very shortly defined when the treaty between Spain and the United States in 1819 placed the northern limit of the Spanish claims at the forty-second parallel, and when Russia, by treaties with the United States in 1824 and Britain in 1825, agreed to stay north of 54:40. But even these agreements, while they reduced the number of potential rivals, added new complexities to the claims of the two who remained.

A further complication was created by the question of Astoria. This post, which Astor had established at the mouth of the Columbia in 1811, had fallen victim to the vicissitudes of the War of 1812. Sooner than see it captured without recompense, Astor's local representative had prudently sold out to the North West Company. Nonetheless, a British naval commander had taken formal occupation after the post had changed hands, and this action, according to the American view, brought it within the scope of the clause in the Treaty of Ghent which provided for a mutual return of conquests. An expedition was sent to effect a symbolic reoccupation, and Castlereagh, while protesting against the mode of procedure, acknowledged the validity of the American contention. The event lent added strength to American claims in the Oregon region.

The area which was actually in serious dispute was, however, only a portion of that territory. The British looked upon the Columbia River as an essential artery of the fur trade and a vital outlet for the whole transmontane region. The Americans were determined to secure possession of the Straits of Juan de Fuca, not so much because of the value of the intervening territory as because the area of Puget Sound offered the only good harbors north of San Francisco. But Britain rejected the suggestion that the forty-ninth parallel be extended to the Pacific, and the United States refused to concede the Columbia River as the boundary. As a result the final settlement was left in abeyance, and the convention of 1818 provided for joint occupation for a period of ten years. Negotiations were renewed in 1826, following the elimina-

tion of Russia and Spain. But neither side would recede from its territorial claims, and the offer of the United States to concede free navigation of the Columbia was no more acceptable than the offer by Britain of a harbor on the straits. In 1827 the arrangements for joint occupation were in consequence extended, this time without limit, but with the provision that they could be abrogated by either side on twelve months' notice.

This provisional arrangement worked in the end to the advantage of the United States. Although at this period it was the British alone who were in effective occupation of the disputed area, that occupation was represented by the fur companies. There was little immediate prospect of a more substantial settlement from British territory farther east. The Hudson's Bay Company favored agricultural establishments near the posts for the sake of supplies, and when the problem of more extensive occupation became pressing there were efforts to promote a pioneer movement from the Red River settlement. But there was no such population surplus available as that which was pushing the American frontier of settlement steadily westward and which was now flowing over the Rockies to claim the Pacific coast.

This advance was powerfully assisted by the attitude of the chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company in the Columbian District. Of all the Scotsmen who lifted the fur trade to its days of greatness—the McGillivrays and McTavishes and Frasers, the McKays and McKenzies without number—not the least remarkable was Dr. John McLoughlin. He was the White Eagle to the Indians, the King of Old Oregon to the settlers. For twenty years he ruled with a strong but benevolent hand over a domain which lay between the Rockies and the Pacific and which stretched from California to Alaska. In this vast area he managed the widespread activities of the fur trade that was carried on by the 500 servants of the company and the numerous Indians attached to the organization. But this extensive enterprise was only the beginning. He farmed 3,000 acres. He raised stock for provisions. He traded in furs with the Russian American Company, and in lumber and provisions with the Sandwich Islands. He kept an efficient control over the 80,000 Indians who roamed the area and taught them a law of which he was for them the embodiment. His remarkable

personality made him the unquestioned authority around which the life of Old Oregon revolved.

McLoughlin's superior, Sir George Simpson, recorded his first impressions of the man in vivid if unflattering terms. "He was such a figure as I should not like to meet in a dark night in one of the bye lanes in the neighborhood of London, dressed in clothes that had once been fashionable, but now covered with a thousand patches of different colors, his beard would do honor to the chin of a Grizzly Bear, his face and hands evidently showing that he had not lost much time at his *Toilette*, loaded with Arms and his own herculean dimensions forming a tout ensemble that would convey a good idea of the highwaymen of former Days." Behind such a description lay a profound difference of temperament between the two men. Simpson, bustling about the wilderness of half a continent, working out ways for the canoes to carry bigger loads with fewer men, expressing his horror at the extravagance of the posts and the way that "large quantities of Luxuries and European provisions are annually consumed at prodigious cost," had the soul of an efficiency expert whose delight was in his balance sheets. McLoughlin, expansive and generous and with a temper that was balanced by rigid control, was like a feudal baron of old in his attitude and his way of life.

This outlook was reflected in the atmosphere at Fort Vancouver, the company's main post on the north bank of the Columbia near the mouth of the Willamette. Here, in a great hall within the courtyard formed by the stockade, McLoughlin held baronial state. Dinner was an affair which maintained much of the formality of English country life, with the chief officers seated according to rank and McLoughlin presiding at table. On ceremonial occasions, when guests were being entertained with honor, the Highland touch was added by the pipers who stood and played behind the host's chair. When McLoughlin toured a portion of his domain it was with a caravan complete with cooks and equipage and a colorful escort of trappers and their Indian women in their most vivid costumes. These were trappings which were tangible symbols of McLoughlin's virtual sovereignty and its acceptance by the community over which he had charge.

Such a way of life could not long survive an influx of settlement.

McLoughlin himself recognized the fertility of Oregon and the inevitability of ultimate occupation of the land. For a long period, however, there were few signs that this was imminent. There were visitors who had seen the possibilities at an early date and had tried to profit from them by stimulating both immigration and government action. But the pioneers found land closer at hand, and Congress was skeptical about the practicality of extending control over Oregon. (For one thing, a congressman in the 1820s would need 465 days for a return trip and would demand \$3,700 in traveling expenses, and few congressmen set that value on potential colleagues.) It was not until the missionaries were attracted to Oregon that the foundations of settlement were laid.

The first arrivals were the Methodists in 1834, intent on bringing spiritual enlightenment to the Flatheads. They were followed within a year by the Presbyterians. Their religious activities were not spectacular. Braves who were converted during the tedious winter tended to backslide during the spring. Indian children adopted by the missionaries tended to die, with Christian resignation but with unhappy frequency. But in more mundane activities the talents of the newcomers found more successful employment. The Methodists were soon impressed with the possibilities of the Willamette Valley. Their leaders shortly abandoned active preaching and devoted themselves to land promotion. Their glowing descriptions found an audience when the depression of 1837 moved some of the restless and discontented on the old frontier to try their fortunes farther west. An advance party in 1840 heralded the beginning of a new migration. By the beginning of 1843 some 400 settlers had established themselves, chiefly along the Willamette. In that year a definite movement got under way which brought an increasing flood of immigrants whose total was over 10,000 by 1848.

Their arrival posed serious problems for McLoughlin, which increased in gravity as the number of arrivals grew. The hardships of the Oregon trail were nearly fatal to the early arrivals. They arrived starving and destitute on the verge of winter, with no resources to see them through. Only the generosity of McLoughlin in extending credit and providing supplies enabled them to survive. He used his full authority to restrain the Indians who were

ready to wipe out the newcomers. He held prices down to their normal level in a situation which gave every inducement to profiteering. It was to him that the new settlers owed their security and even their lives.

Their gratitude in return was anything but extravagant. Tales had been spread of the tyranny and selfishness of the company, and the settlers arrived with a feeling of aggressive hostility which their reception only temporarily softened. The ruder element among the migrating frontiersmen was ready to demand from the company what was felt to be needed and to become embittered at any refusal. If McLoughlin tried to prevent the depletion of stores which must be husbanded for the future or warned settlers off the lands which the company had pre-empted, there was immediately a patriotic wave among the Americans against these British pretensions. As their needs decreased their aggressiveness grew. By 1844 they had established a provisional government, and McLoughlin felt that for the sake of safety he must co-operate with that body, as he explained to London, "to prevent disorders and maintain peace, until the settlement of the Boundary Question leaves that duty to the parent states."

The company regarded his policy with increasing disapproval. Whatever might be said about saving the pioneers from starvation—and the directors were none too sure that even that was desirable—it was another matter to extend credits amounting to about \$30,000 whose recovery was only too dubious. Although McLoughlin had tried to avoid compromising British claims to the Columbia boundary by keeping the settlers south of the river—there were, in fact, only eight Americans north of it in 1845—any settlement meant danger, and recognition of the provisional government seriously weakened the British position. McLoughlin argued that any other course would precipitate a storm to which they must yield or be prepared to resist by force. But the company was only too well aware that the territory in any case was about to slip from its grasp. The pioneers were now making vigorous representations to Washington, and sentiment throughout the country had been aroused to a point which would make the possession of Oregon a national issue.

It crystallized in the election of 1844. The Democrats linked

Oregon with Texas and entered the campaign with the slogan "54:40 or fight." Actually the party, and Polk, who was its successful candidate, were less belligerent than the cry suggested. Their real attention was directed toward the Southwest, where a war with Mexico was brewing. Such a war would confirm American possession of Texas and add the coveted region of California. There was some danger that Britain might interfere in the dispute and little desire to increase the risk by precipitating a direct conflict over the question of Oregon.

But Polk had reason for confidence that Britain, on her part, had little desire to fight for Oregon; and, fortified by that conviction, he played his cards skillfully and successfully. He renewed the American offer of the forty-ninth parallel as the boundary to the Pacific, with the concession of a free port on the tip of Vancouver Island. When this was rejected as inconsistent "with fairness and equity and with the expectations of the British government" the proposition was specifically withdrawn; notice was given of the termination of the agreement on joint occupation; a British suggestion of mediation was refused, and the United States embarked on preparations which seemed convincing proof of a readiness for war.

Britain, too, was taking military measures, but purely for purposes of defense. War with the United States would endanger not only Oregon, but Canada, which would inevitably become the main object of attack, and the stakes were not worth such a major risk. The British government decided on surrender, modified only by certain limited concessions on the part of the United States. One was the acceptance of the Straits of Juan de Fuca as the final stretch of the boundary, thus leaving the whole of Vancouver Island to Britain. Another was the concession of the navigation of the Columbia to the Hudson's Bay Company, together with a clause which preserved the proprietary rights of the company and of other British subjects south of the new boundary. Although the definition of the actual channel through the straits was to remain a matter of dispute until 1872, the signing of this treaty in June 1846 virtually completed the definition of the boundary between Canada and the United States.

Thus the western territory which the Dominion was to inherit

was delimited twenty years before it actually came into the possession of Canada. Meanwhile the Oregon crisis provided an example and a warning. The dangers which might arise from the infiltration of American settlement were clearly evident, and the need for measures to prevent a similar outcome in other areas was henceforth constantly before the eyes of the British and Canadian governments. The organization of Vancouver Island as a crown colony, the subsequent steps to extent effective authority over the mainland of British Columbia, the concern over the possible fate of the Red River settlement which played its part in the movement for confederation could all be traced directly to the lesson of Oregon. The loss of the disputed triangle between the Columbia and the straits was possibly offset by the resulting vigilance which made possible at least the retention of what now remained in British hands north of the forty-ninth parallel.

CHAPTER IX

The New Orientation

THE UNIQUE POSITION which Canada occupied between Great Britain and the United States during this period was most clearly reflected in the various diplomatic episodes involving Canada which arose in the thirties and forties. Its political significance, however, was wider than merely the questions connected with the boundary or the problems consequent upon frontier disturbances. Here were two poles of attraction whose influence permeated the very fabric of Canadian life. If British traditions and British imperial supremacy were the first realities in shaping the form of Canadian public institutions, the American pattern was nonetheless discernible in their practical working. The fundamental basis of Canadian life, the public policies arising out of the needs of the Canadian community were largely determined by conditions indigenous to the American continent. Canada retained many of the characteristics of a pioneer society engaged in the opening and the development of a new land. She inevitably experienced many of the results which the same process had made evident in the United States, and these results were emphasized in their effects by the very fact that they had already been manifested on a larger scale in the more powerful nation to the south.

The growth of self-government in Canada probably emphasized rather than diminished this duality. As Canada secured fuller control over her own policy she tended to become not only more self-

confident, but more fully aware of her own individual interests. If there was less tendency to cling unquestioningly to Britain, there was also less feeling that the alternative was to rush into the arms of the United States. But that did not mean that Canada could view either of these nations with indifference. Politically her relations with each of them remained of the utmost importance. There could be discerned a certain shift in the balance between them, a tendency to assume a tone of greater equality in discussions with Britain and to broaden the basis of relations with the United States. But it was not a question of abandoning one in favor of the other. Canada needed to retain and develop this dual connection, and her chief problem was to guide that development along the lines most in harmony with her own expanding interests.

This was most strikingly evident in the economic sphere. The Canadian economic structure offered no basis for the development of national self-sufficiency. It was basically dependent on substantial external connections. Here, too, the connections with Britain and the United States were the twin foundations, and here, too, the adjustment of the balance between them, at a time when the economic needs and policies of these two nations were themselves in process of transition, represented a major problem in the evolution of Canada.

The problem was accentuated by the very fact that a transition was taking place. This was something over which Canada could exercise no control. Yet its results, expressed in the changing policies of the United States and Britain, had fundamental effects on her own fortunes. The most that she could do was to try to adapt her own activities to the necessities created by external developments and to find a new basis of approach when the initial assumptions on which her economy had been built were shattered almost simultaneously at their two pivotal points.

In the beginning the dominant ambition reflected in Canadian policy was the creation of a commercial state. This was based to no small extent on the supposed geographical advantage which Canada enjoyed. The St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes offered an avenue of trade which would link Europe with the interior of the American continent. Through this would flow the natural products of that vast land—the furs which were its chief wealth

before the spread of settlement, the wheat and timber which developed as staple exports as the frontier moved westward. And in the other direction would pass the manufactured products of Europe, and particularly of Britain, to the markets offered by the new and growing communities in the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi.

Into this process there naturally entered the staple products of the Canadians themselves. The mercantile groups developed an interest in immigration and settlement, in the exploitation of forest resources and the expansion of wheat farming. To the extent to which the prosperity of these producers depended on export markets they had a common interest with the merchant class in maintaining a preferred position in the British market. But the scale of their production was still too small to be adequate as a basis for the commercial state of which the merchants dreamed. Theirs was a vision on a continental scale, and it could only be fulfilled if Montreal became the main entrepôt between Europe and the Middle West.

One incentive which might further this end would be the admission of all Canadian shipments, irrespective of their origin, to the advantages of imperial preference. A system which combined free trade in the interior of America with British protection favorable to colonial products would give Montreal and the St. Lawrence route a definite advantage over competing American ports. But although this aim was pursued with diligence and persistence, it was never fully realized. Britain was generally reluctant to admit that American products were naturalized simply by transit through Canada, and the significance of the American boundary as a line of economic division was soon great enough to hamper the full access to the interior which the Canadian merchants desired. Their chief reliance, therefore, was on the natural advantages of the St. Lawrence route, on those elementary qualities of cheapness and convenience as the real attractions which might enable them to capture American western trade.

Nature, however, needed improvement before this route was complete. In the twenties a beginning was made on a series of canals to circumvent such obstacles as the Lachine Rapids and Niagara Falls. But canals also offered to the United States a means

by which trade might be drawn into rival channels. The chief cities on the Atlantic seaboard were reaching out toward the growing commerce of the new West. With the construction of the Erie Canal, New York outdistanced its rivals in the East and at the same time presented the St. Lawrence system with a formidable rival. The opening of the Erie in 1825, four years before Canada completed the Welland Canal across the Niagara peninsula, offered an alternative route to an Atlantic port and drew off a substantial part of the traffic which Montreal had confidently expected to flow to its own doors.

This major event came at a time when other factors were combining to create a critical situation for the economy of the St. Lawrence. The fur trade, which had laid the original basis for that economy, had just been lost to it. Montreal after the conquest had kept alive the St. Lawrence route in competition with Hudson Bay, and the North West Company had ultimately emerged as the specific embodiment of Canadian interests. But the burden of competitive expansion, which carried the rivals to the Pacific coast, had proved too heavy, and in 1821 the North West Company, facing imminent bankruptcy, merged with its ancient rival. "Thus," lamented William McGillivray on the conclusion of the agreement, "the Fur trade is forever lost to Canada!" Furs and supplies now went by the cheaper Hudson Bay route, and Canadian trade was thrown more completely than ever on the soberer products of the forest and the soil.

There were other troubles during this decade—the revenue disputes between the provinces, the failure of the agitation for union which the Montreal merchants brought to a climax in 1822, the growing internal difficulties which were particularly symbolized by the political conflict between English and French. Not the least perturbing development was the modification of the old English mercantile system which began with the fiscal reforms of Huskisson. They still left Canadian staple products with a preferred position in English markets, but they nonetheless foreshadowed the ultimate doom of the old colonial system as the economic changes consequent on the industrial revolution pressed England steadily in the direction of free trade. The decline of the former basis of imperial trade, coincident with the rise of a vigorous

continental economy in the United States, heralded a revolution whose consequences would be of major importance to Canada.

For a full generation the central factor in this situation was the attempt by Canada to overcome the new and successful competition of American transport routes. The union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1841 made possible the inauguration of a vigorous program of public works to improve the navigability of the St. Lawrence. It was an attempt to offset the attractions of the Erie by offering more appealing facilities. The Welland Canal was enlarged; the Lachine was deepened and improved; the intervening rapids were circumvented by new construction. By 1849 a complete waterway with a general depth of nine feet had been constructed at a cost of \$20,000,000.

Simply as a waterway this had a number of real advantages over the Erie system. Lake vessels could traverse its full length instead of having to transship their cargoes to barges at Buffalo. Long stretches of open river made for easier navigation and lower tolls. For a cargo moving from the upper lakes the distance was shorter and the cost lower to Montreal than to New York.

At the ports, however, the export shipper found other differentials which offset the advantages enjoyed by the Canadian route. Ocean freight rates from Montreal were higher than those from New York by as much as two shillings on a barrel of flour. Insurance and pilotage and incidental port charges were all greater on the Canadian route. Cargoes to New York from European ports were more plentiful than to Montreal, providing a better balance of two-way traffic. Above all, New York was ice-free the year round, while the closing of the St. Lawrence doomed Montreal to virtual stagnation during the winter months. "Old Winter is upon us once more," mourned one writer in 1850, "and an embargo which no human power can remove is laid on all our ports. . . . Far away to the South is heard the daily scream of the steam whistle—but from Canada there is no escape: blockaded and imprisoned by Ice and Apathy, we have at least ample time for reflection—and if there be comfort in philosophy may we not profitably consider the PHILOSOPHY OF RAILROADS."

It was on railroads, in fact, that Montreal now pinned its chief hopes of retrieving its position. A permanent sea outlet demanded

a connection with the Atlantic coast which only land transportation could give. Already the American railroads were adding a new element to the competition which the Erie Canal had begun and were building up a network of feeders behind the chief ports. More serious still, these ports were not only attracting the trade of the American West—they had begun to reach out for Canadian trade as well. A series of laws, beginning in 1845, provided first for a tariff drawback on imports which were re-exported and followed this by provisions allowing the bonding of goods in transit. Producers and merchants in Upper Canada, who held low costs to themselves in greater esteem than they did the prosperity of Montreal, showed no hesitation in taking advantage of these new privileges. Here was a new and a telling blow at the St. Lawrence system in a vitally strategic spot.

So Montreal had no choice but to find new advantages to offer which might offset the growing attraction of the American routes. At the same time the new bonding regulations made it possible to use an American outlet for this purpose. A rail connection with Portland was Montreal's answer to the threatened inroads by New York. Thus was inaugurated the St. Lawrence and Atlantic—the predecessor of the Grand Trunk and the first international railroad ever built. It was also the first step in a general effort to supplement the existing system of water transport by a through rail connection which should tap the western trunk lines of the United States for the benefit of Montreal. Even before the new canal system had been completed the needs of Canadian commerce had resulted in the inauguration of the railroad era.

It is a question whether, even under the best of circumstances, this new departure was capable of redressing the balance in favor of Montreal. As it was, its effectiveness was seriously compromised by the further adverse circumstances with which Canadian commercial development was now confronted. While the merchants were struggling to uphold one pillar of the old system by retaining the trade of the American West the second pillar tottered as their preferred position in British markets was undermined by the coming of free trade.

The blow was all the more severe because it followed a brief period of renewed hope on the part of Canada. As a result of the

Canada Corn Act of 1843 the prospect was held out that American wheat, by being ground in Canadian mills, would receive the same preference as native Canadian flour. Whatever the Canadian farmers thought of the arrangement, Canadian investors saw a new and golden opportunity for profits from mills and for prosperous traffic through the new canals. The English crisis which resulted in the repeal of the corn laws in 1846 dashed all these hopes. Canada lost her preferred position, yet shipping from Canada remained for another three years burdened with the heightened costs consequent on the maintenance of the Navigation Acts. The actual effect of these changes has been questioned by recent authorities, who point to the depression of the late forties as a more general factor accounting for Canadian distress. But the mercantile interests saw cause and effect in the reverse order. To them it was the sudden sweeping away of the old colonial trade system which was the immediate cause of their woes and which forced them to seek a drastic reorientation of their whole policy whose basis now seemed to have been completely undermined.

II

To at least one important group in Canada the implications of the new situation were not only economic but political. The blow that had been struck at their trade was followed almost at once by another blow at the political basis of the old colonial system. The long struggle for responsible government ended with its achievement under Lord Elgin in 1849. Canada attained a new degree of freedom to manage its own affairs, and the minority groups, whose local control hitherto had depended on the willingness of the imperial authority to sustain them by interfering in colonial matters, now saw their political security shattered at the very moment that their economic interests seemed to have been betrayed.

Canadian Toryism was a roughhewn but faithful copy of its English prototype. Its lines were more rigid, and its temper was that stalwart variety of an older day before the Reform Bill had broken the main defenses of English privilege. The difference

represented the time lag between developments in England and the slower political and intellectual progress in the colonies. Nonetheless, the Canadian Tories held to a creed whose fundamentals were the historic foundations on which English Toryism had rested for two centuries. The defense of Throne and Altar, the maintenance of the Protestant Church and the monarchical system, the guarding of the empire against attack from without or disruption from within were the guiding principles of their conduct and the peculiar virtues of which they claimed a monopoly.

Their ardor in this self-appointed task was increased by the conviction, to which they stubbornly clung, that the dangers against which they fought were great and imminent. In their own eyes they represented the sole bulwark against the threatened disruption of the empire. This belief was strengthened rather than diminished by the perturbing changes which were being manifested in Britain's own attitude. As the stalwart guardians of the imperial tie, the Canadian Tories believed that they had a right to the unquestioning and unrestrained support of the home government. But that support now showed alarming signs of wavering, and the Tories, in consequence, felt more than ever that the whole weight of the struggle was laid on their own shoulders and that if they relaxed their efforts the empire was doomed to collapse.

The danger which they envisioned came simultaneously from without and within. The Tories retained a rooted distrust of the designs of the United States and a firm conviction that the Americans would seize on any opportunity that offered to effect the annexation of Canada. They connected these designs with the political activities of the reformers in Canada itself. In their eyes the demand for constitutional change, and particularly for any change which implied an increase in popular control, was merely republicanism in disguise; and they were equally convinced that its inspiration came from the United States and that those who agitated for it were secretly desirous not merely of separating from Britain, but of merging with the American Republic. It was thus the task of the Tories not merely to maintain the defense of Canada against foreign aggression, but to combat the more insidious threat of American political infiltration. They pointed to the

record as proof of the strength of the forces of disloyalty and their own unique claims to be the only group in which reliance could be placed. The Loyalist tradition, the events of the War of 1812, the issuance of democratic agitation in the rebellion of 1837 seemed clear evidence of their case. In a report in February 1838 a committee of the Assembly of Upper Canada triumphantly pointed to the lessons of the rebellion and asserted their own attachment to the British connection, "not merely from the abstract sentiment of loyalty, or from interest, but because they glory in being British subjects; they feel that the safety and security of their lives and liberties depend on their repelling the encroachments of democracy, which they detest, and because they see and feel the superiority they have over the neighboring Republic in being governed by British laws." In consequence they strongly recommended fresh measures which would "serve more plainly and distinctly to draw the line between those sound, substantial, and we trust, enduring principles of Monarchy which may well boast their pre-eminence over the hollow and ever-varying fancies, that spring from a Democracy that is controlled by the un-English, unmanly, immoral and degrading system of vote by ballot, and the pernicious influence of Universal Suffrage."

The same report drew a rigid line between the English and the French population of Canada. This, too, was part of the battle which the Tories were waging so valiantly. If American influences represented one threat, the reluctance of the French to become English represented another. The Tories, indeed, were willing to regard the two as identical on the slightest occasion. There was, however, some difficulty in accusing the French of republicanism when their nationalist sentiments were hostile to American influences and when the Church threw its full and effective weight against the doctrines of the French Revolution. But whatever the political creed of the French, the Tories had no doubt that they were disloyal to Britain. Their refusal to be assimilated, the tenacity with which they clung to their language and customs and laws, their explicit repudiation of English ways and English institutions convinced the Tories of their unreliability, and the fact that the numerical and political strength of the French had been used to thwart the economic progress which the

English merchants desired was a further and still more damning mark against them.

Yet it was to these forces of encroaching democracy and French solidarity that Britain surrendered with the grant of responsible government. The right of majority rule was conceded, and with it the right of the French, as the most coherent bloc, to exercise a dominant influence in the government. To the Tories, already wounded in their economic interests, this political desertion seemed a fatal blow. "The empire," explained A. T. Galt, "had been interpreted to mean racial supremacy and trade profit, and now that both were threatened the empire appeared to have no longer any excuse for existence."

This, in fact, was the startling conclusion to which the party of ultraloyalism now felt itself driven. The more extreme element at least was not reconciled to accepting what it regarded as political and commercial ruin for the sake of maintaining the British connection. "When poverty enters the door," commented the *Kingston Chronicle*, "love is said to fly out of the window, and it is very much the same with loyalty. . . . The Montreal annexationists doubtless desire to retain their loyalty, but they flatly declare they can no longer afford the luxury." If the essential economic objectives which they sought were no longer attainable in conjunction with Britain they would seek some other alternative rather than abandon these aims, and that alternative was a union with the United States.

This was the foundation of the annexationist movement of 1849. To gain access to the wider markets of which they felt such desperate need and to avert the threat of renewed French domination which seemed to loom before them, a group which had been loudest in condemnation of all who sought to relax the ties of empire or to emulate American institutions and methods now set out ardently to achieve the merging of Canada with the United States. The new and glowing advantages which they suddenly discovered in this prospect were set forth in the manifesto which the leaders of the movement published in October 1849. American capital would be made available; credit would become plentiful, and property values would be raised; a growth of manufactures and a rise in farm prices would be accompanied by a

lowering of the cost of imported commodities; the new canals, threatened with stagnation under present conditions, would at last fulfill their purpose of making the St. Lawrence the great highway to the West, and railroads would supplement them to the benefit of Canadian commerce. On the political side the existing racial strife would be ended by the swamping of the French in the vast American Union, and Canada, whose inability to influence imperial policy had been only too clearly shown, would have a definite voice in the central government at Washington and free entry, without the badge of colonial inferiority, to the highest posts in the public service of the nation.

Yet in spite of these tempting prospects, the movement was ineffective and short-lived. The bulk of the Canadian people proved skeptical of the advantages thus enticingly portrayed. The chief support came from the English commercial groups in Montreal and the Eastern Townships—the groups hardest hit by commercial collapse and most directly embattled with their French neighbors. Their brother Tories in Ontario were less ready to repudiate their basic traditions and their past professions. They might dislike the conduct of the local government and the British policy which made that conduct possible, and indeed they expressed themselves with some vigor on both points. But they were not yet prepared to cast off the ties with the mother country, however unnaturally she might be treating them at the moment. The more radical groups, who had a greater natural sympathy toward the United States, were restrained from joining the annexationist movement by the new freedom which had been won in local government and by the disillusionment which such leaders as Mackenzie had experienced from actual contact with the working of American institutions. As for the French, only a small radical group was attracted to the idea of annexation. The very fact that it would reduce them to a small and unprivileged minority was enough to deprive it of any appeal to the habitant and his accepted leaders.

Externally, too, the response was disappointing. The manifesto, while admitting that it would be impossible to secede from the empire without Britain's consent, had pointed to British policy as proof that peaceful separation was definitely in prospect as a

result of Britain's own initiative. "That it is the resolve of England," asserted the signers, "to invest us with the attributes and compel us to assume the burdens of independence is no longer problematical." This was immediately and vigorously denied by the leaders of the British government. A dispatch from the Colonial Secretary stigmatized the manifesto as "scarcely short of treasonable" and asserted the Queen's determination "to exert all the authority which belongs to her, for the purpose of maintaining the connection of Canada with this country, being persuaded that the permanence of that connection is highly advantageous to both." It was a pronouncement distinctly dampening to the hopes of the signers of the manifesto and restraining in its effect on other groups who might have been inclined to sympathize with them.

On the side of the United States there was a discouraging lack of any really positive response to the opportunity which the manifesto might seem at first glance to have presented. It was welcomed by certain sections of the press and by the areas traditionally favorable to the acquisition of Canada. The Middle West, with its interest in free navigation of the St. Lawrence, showed some enthusiasm. The legislatures of Vermont and New York passed approving resolutions. But even these were moderate in tone and showed no desire to take up the matter and press it vigorously to a conclusion.

For the moment the energies and the attention of the United States were concentrated elsewhere. The Mexican War had just resulted in the acquisition of a new and vast area. The California gold rush was attracting the migratory and expansionist elements in the population. The sectional conflict had reached a most threatening point, and the efforts which ended in the Compromise of 1850 absorbed the full energies of the political leaders. The injection of such an issue as the absorption of Canada, with its consequent effect on the sectional balance, might have complicated the situation beyond remedy. As a result, American opinion showed a remarkable restraint which reflected at least a momentary indifference to the future of relations with Canada. No organized group or party took up the cry for annexation, and

demagoguery had more impassioned topics on which to exercise itself. Manifest destiny, gorged with its recent achievements, slumbered for the moment, willing to trust to inevitability without attempting to force the pace.

Not least important, there was an easing of the economic situation in Canada itself, and with it a decline of the political passions which had led to the stoning of the governor in the streets of Montreal after his assent to a Rebellion Losses Bill which seemed a yielding to the French. Good harvests were accompanied by a rise in exports and an easing of credit. The new political situation, if still distasteful to the Tories, began to seem more enduring. New railroad projects attracted the interest and the energies of the commercial leaders. Canada's economic problems were still far from solved, but at least there was a chance to attempt a solution on economic lines without accompanying it with a political capitulation to the United States.

III

"Depend upon it," wrote Lord Elgin, "our commercial embarrassments are our real difficulty. Political discontent, properly so called, there is none. . . . I am confident I could carry Canada unscathed through all these evils of transition and place the connection on a surer foundation than ever if I could only tell the people of the province that, as regards the conditions of material prosperity, they would be raised to a level with their neighbors. But if this be not achieved, if free navigation and reciprocal trade with the Union be not secured for us, the worst, I fear, will come, and that at no distant day."

This was the objective which now emerged as the real and more hopeful alternative to the idea of annexation. It represented a new orientation in Canada's commercial outlook. Hitherto the idea of an actual exchange of products had played a comparatively small part in Canadian trade relations with the United States. The Canadian merchants sought access to American products in order to export them to Europe. They sought access to American markets in order that Canada might become the main channel for the import of European manufactured goods. Theirs

was the view not of either consumer or producer, but of middleman, and upon this view their whole policy had been built.

But the conjunction of the changing economic structure of the United States with the alterations in British commercial policy had changed all that. By the late thirties the Canadian farmer was finding in the Eastern states an occasional market for his wheat, and the Canadian lumberman was beginning to discover a sale for sawn timber. These were opportunities which increased only slowly during the next decade. But from 1845 on the rise of urban centers and the development of industrial areas, accompanied as they were by demands for construction materials, opened up new possibilities. The drawback acts of that year, although in intention applying only to transit trade, had the effect of familiarizing this commercial connection. The Canadian producer began to see in American markets the solution to his problem of surplus products. The Canadian consumer—who was often the same person—showed a readiness to accept American rather than British manufactured goods, or natural products which were not locally available, when they were recommended by cheapness or convenience. And even the Canadian merchant began to see in this form of exchange a possible alternative to the intercontinental economy on which his eyes had been set and which was now being undermined at both ends.

Thus when the revolution in England's trade system threatened to revolutionize the Canadian economy conditions were already ripe for a shift in direction and emphasis. That imaginative and energetic, if somewhat undependable, Canadian entrepreneur, William Hamilton Merritt, early seized on the possibilities. He was deeply involved in both canal construction and milling ventures, and he saw in the free entry of American agricultural products a way in which the stricken fortunes of such enterprises might be retrieved. In 1846 he began his agitation for reciprocity by securing the adoption of an address by the Canadian legislature asking that a treaty be concluded to that end.

A treaty was a matter outside of Canada's control. Only Britain could conclude an agreement of that type, and Britain felt no urgency in the early stages. Moreover, when the project was placed before the new American administration in 1849, President

Taylor expressed a reluctance to deal with a matter involving revenue in a manner which would exclude the House of Representatives from direct participation. Already, however, another basis had been mooted. Bills had been introduced into Congress providing for the free admission of certain natural products whenever reciprocal action should be taken by Canada. Here was a method by which Canada could proceed without the intervention of the imperial government. Although the American bills failed of adoption, Canada proceeded to give proof of her willingness to respond. Under the influence of Merritt an act along similar lines was adopted, to take effect when analogous legislation should be passed by the United States.

This method, however, was doomed to inadequacy. Legislative action by Congress, although attempted on several occasions during the next few years, was blocked by a general indifference backed by a certain degree of positive hostility. Foremost among the adverse factors was the heightened sectional conflict in the United States. There was a general opinion that reciprocity, by drawing closer the economic ties with Canada, would prove to be a prelude to annexation. Such a belief was sufficient to turn the South completely against the whole idea. Moreover, the North itself was by no means united in its views. The border areas, which might hope to profit directly from the agreement, were naturally in favor of its conclusion. So were the expansionists who sought to smooth the way toward the absorption of Canada. But the rising protectionist element of the North, which was particularly strong in the Whig party, included such groups as the coal and lumber interests, which had no desire to facilitate foreign competition, and even groups less directly affected who had no desire to encourage the principle of greater freedom of trade. In the face of these sentiments the movement was able to show little progress up to 1851.

It was invigorated by the injection of a totally unrelated issue. The fisheries question, which seemed to have been settled in 1818, was once more giving trouble. By the existing agreement American fishermen were excluded from the coastal fisheries of the British colonies, but the extent of that exclusion had now become a matter of controversy. The British authorities claimed that the

three-mile limit extended from headland to headland. The Americans insisted that it must follow the sinuosities of the coast, for any other interpretation would exclude them from the various bays in which they were accustomed to fish and would have a disruptive effect on the existing basis of the industry. When in May 1852 the British government announced its intention of protecting the fisheries by sending a naval force the resulting excitement in the United States forced the Administration to dispatch a warship to the same area. A situation had arisen which might easily lead to a clash which neither side desired.

Both Britain and the United States were anxious to settle the issue. The former was facing the crisis which resulted in the Crimean War; the latter saw, as the only alternative to an agreement, the necessity of forcible action to protect the fishermen at the risk of war with England. The chances of effecting an arrangement would clearly be improved if the United States were willing to offer concessions in return for a British acceptance of her claims, and the connecting of the reciprocity proposals with the fisheries question seemed a hopeful method of reaching the desired end.

Thus, while steps looking toward reciprocity by mutual legislation were still continued, it was the effort to proceed by treaty negotiation in the dual matter of fisheries and trade that represented the really serious approach. By the beginning of 1853 two American drafts, one for a treaty and the other for a bill in Congress, afforded an initial basis from which negotiations could proceed.

It was now a question of reconciling the numerous and somewhat divergent interests which had by this time become involved in the project. The Canadian interest was in securing the entry into American markets of such commodities as grain, meat and dairy products, plants, shrubs, and furs. They offered in exchange the right of free navigation of the St. Lawrence canals—a concession from which Canada herself had good hopes of profiting—as well as reciprocal entry of American products. From their point of view the concession of the fisheries was incidental. To the Maritimes, however, it was of vital importance. They showed an inclination to cling to their rights without compromise; and

though Prince Edward Island was prepared to welcome freer trade, the mainland provinces were doubtful of its value to them. They had little or no surplus of the chief products for which Canada sought an export market. If they were to be compensated it must be by provision for such products as lumber and fish and coal, and even then Nova Scotia was generally of the opinion that such compensation would be entirely inadequate for the surrender of her exclusive rights in the inshore fisheries.

On the American side the fisheries were the crucial question, though the right of navigation of the St. Lawrence had a real appeal to the states of the Northwest. To gain these ends the United States was prepared to offer limited trade concessions, but every effort was made to keep these to the minimum. Coal, furs, vegetables, poultry, plants, and shrubs were among the articles omitted from the bill introduced into Congress in 1853, and in return for the admission of lumber to the United States it was demanded that the reciprocal privilege should include not only the colonies, but free entry of American lumber into the United Kingdom and equality with the colonies in the West Indian market, and that American lumbermen should be granted free use of the St. John River. To mollify the Southern states, still resolutely suspicious of the political implications of any agreement, a number of specifically Southern products such as tobacco, sugar, and rice were included—products which would give Canada no reciprocal advantage. There was also a demand that the treaty should include both Newfoundland and British Columbia. In short, while the Americans professed to be ready to conclude a bargain, their offer was too one-sided to be accepted except under the most urgent necessity.

The Canadians felt no such necessity. A return of good times had eased their economic position; and although Elgin was still urging the treaty on the British government, his ministers were now less insistent. Britain herself desired a settlement of the fisheries controversy and was prepared to use her imperial authority to force on the colonies any reasonable agreement. But the agreement must be reasonable, and when the United States showed a reluctance to modify its draft proposals the British authorities adopted an attitude of comparative indifference which placed on

the American government the responsibility of taking a more moderate stand before the fisheries situation issued in a serious crisis.

That did not mean, however, that the matter was left in abeyance. The appointment of Lord Elgin as special envoy in 1854 was a sign of Britain's real concern to arrive at a stable settlement. Elgin was chosen not only for his diplomatic talents, but because his prestige in the colonies would be extremely useful in soothing any ruffled local feelings that might result from the final terms. He was definitely warned against giving the impression that he was out to reach an agreement at any cost, lest the United States be encouraged to stiffen its terms still further; but he was, nonetheless, given a free hand, in the confident expectation that he would use it to secure an acceptable arrangement.

There were other influences at work toward this same end. In 1849, when the project was still in the exploratory stage, Israel deWolfe Andrews had been appointed by the President as special agent to report on political and commercial conditions in the British provinces. Andrews was a native of Eastport, Maine, whose boyhood chores had involved a certain amount of nocturnal activity not unconnected with smuggling. Apparently this roused in him some distaste for the system which gave rise to such toil and inclined his sympathies toward the elimination of customs barriers. He now entered on a career which not only enabled him to work toward that end, but which gave unique scope for his peculiar talents. For Andrews was a born public-relations man. He was equally adept in reaching the persons on whom persuasion could usefully be exerted and in securing the promise—though not always the payment—of substantial funds from several interested parties at once. During the next few years he enlisted the support of the American, British, and Canadian governments for his activities; and although those activities became somewhat tangled as their tempo increased, it is quite possible that all his patrons got value for their money.

His activities soon broadened from mere investigation to a more active type of intervention. He circulated actively—and apparently effectively—among Maritime legislators and officials, taking “such measures as the circumstances of the case require in

New Brunswick to moderate the opposition and keep the public mind in a quiet state." His tranquilizing efforts were aided by funds from both Canada and the United States, and Canadian publicists and officials who needed quieting—or encouraging—were also among the beneficiaries.

By the time of Lord Elgin's mission the situation in the provinces could be left to the local and imperial authorities; the real need was to smooth the way in the United States for the coming agreement. Here again the talents of Andrews were enlisted to secure favorable publicity and to canvass individuals. Andrews asserted that to carry the bill speedily and successfully—and, in fact, any prolonged discussion would seriously have jeopardized its fate—subsidies were needed to many parties both in and out of Congress; and he later claimed that he had distributed \$118,000 among some ninety individuals. Whatever the accuracy of his statements, there seems little doubt about his assiduity during the period when the treaty and the necessary implementing legislation were before Congress.

Elgin, on his part, was equally busy. His negotiations with Marcy, the Secretary of State, seem to have gone with reasonable smoothness, for Marcy was anxious to avert any trouble on the fishing grounds and prepared to meet the major points desired by Elgin, even at the risk of rousing the opposition of the coal interests. For the moment, under a Democratic administration, protectionist influence was at a low ebb, and Northern benevolence toward the treaty was aided by the continued conviction that it would pave the way toward ultimate annexation.

Happily the South was no longer inclined to share this view. This was a change of the utmost importance. The negotiations took place against the background of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and any suspicion of advantage to the North was enough to range the South solidly against any proposal. But the conviction was spread among Southern representatives that reciprocity, far from leading to annexation, would remove the chief motives which might lead Canadians to consider such a step and, by helping them to find economic prosperity, would remove any incentive to abandon their political separatism. Possibly Elgin himself had not a little to do with

planting this opinion in the right quarters, and certainly his genial personality and the lavishness of his entertainment warmed the hearts of the devotees of hospitality on a truly Southern scale. It was in particular the Democratic senators who held the fate of the treaty in their hands who were his favorite guests, and he was triumphantly rewarded. The treaty, signed in June 1854, was accepted in August almost without debate. Indeed, the most troublesome sign of opposition came not from Congress, but from the affronted legislature of Nova Scotia whose interests had been bartered away in what seemed an unduly highhanded manner. Even here, however, effective opposition was kept in check, and the necessary legislation from the colonial legislatures was secured without serious difficulty.

The treaty embodied the main objectives of the principal parties. Although British Columbia was outside its scope, the United States secured access to the inshore fisheries of the other Maritime colonies. The gesture of reciprocal admission to American coastal fisheries above Florida was largely meaningless, but the free admission of Maritime fish to American markets was a more tangible benefit. Nova Scotia coal and New Brunswick lumber were both on the free list, as were the chief natural products of Canada. The securing of Southern votes was facilitated by the inclusion of such products as turpentine and rice and unmanufactured tobacco, and the Northwestern states were gratified by freedom of navigation of the St. Lawrence in return for admission of Canadian shipping to Lake Michigan. The treaty was to run for ten years, subject thereafter to denunciation on twelve months' notice by either side.

It was a new and a promising departure in North American relations. The elimination of the economic boundary, which the Canadian merchants had sought after 1783 in the interests of commerce, had never been achieved, but a modification of that barrier in the interests not only of commerce but of staple producers on both sides was now effected to their mutual benefit. Although there remains some question of the precise effect of the treaty as compared with other causes affecting the development of trade during the succeeding decade, opinion then and since has given it the major credit for the real, if fluctuating, in-

crease in trade which took place during the period of its operation. In the end the prospect that it might presage a growing freedom of commerce between Canada and the United States was doomed to disappointment. But it nonetheless represented a new approach on the part of Canada which illustrated the changes in her structure and her commercial orientation and which remained as a permanent feature of her national outlook and interests during her subsequent development.

CHAPTER X

The Advancing Frontier

THE ANNEXATIONIST MOVEMENT and, still more, the Treaty of Reciprocity were striking examples of the pull which the forces of continental unity were exerting against those of political sectionalism. They were also an indication of the limited strength of the unitary factors as compared with the forces of separatism. Economic developments on both sides of the line had drawn Canada closer than ever toward her neighbor to the south. Trade necessities were forging links which the smaller country could not afford to see broken. But her policy was directed toward the dual end of extending and strengthening those ties while at the same time avoiding any weakening of her separate political identity. If a crisis should arise of such magnitude as to force her to choose between these two aims, self-preservation might compel her to consult her economic welfare even at the risk of losing her political independence. Short of this, however, she had little motive to seek incorporation in the American Union. She sought a closer co-operation and a wider intercourse between the two communities, not their gradual merger into a single entity.

Yet there were undercurrents which worked against this objective and which made Canada aware of the precariousness of her future prospects. For while Canada as a community clung tenaciously to her separate identity, Canadians as individuals were often far less prejudiced in this respect. When economic

opportunity beckoned, the question of political allegiance was frequently a minor consideration. The Canadian no less than the American was reluctant to allow political boundaries to restrict his scope for individual initiative. He, too, had a continental outlook, and when he felt himself cramped by local conditions he was quite prepared to ignore the existence of the international boundary in his search for a more promising land.

This phenomenon was particularly evident in the years following 1837. The depression of that year inaugurated a new stage in Canadian developments. A brief period of expansion had been momentarily checked. Economic distress was aggravated by political disturbances. The absence of new outlets added a sense of frustration. To many Canadians it seemed that insuperable barriers had been raised to their hopes of prosperity within their own community and that the solution lay in seeking the more distant and inviting prospects which seemed to lie in the United States.

This was all the more inexorable because of the geographical disadvantages under which Canada labored. The American pioneer was pushing the frontier of settlement steadily toward the Mississippi, and beyond lay the vast reaches of the prairies and the fertile valleys of the Pacific coast. But there were few such prospects north of the border, and such as did exist were difficult of access. In particular there was the absence of a Canadian middle west through which settlement could spread from the older communities. That fertile central area from Indiana to Minnesota had no equivalent north of the Great Lakes. Instead there was the forbidding area of the Laurentian Shield, that vast stretch of rocks and muskeg between Lake Superior and Hudson Bay, which offered nothing to the pioneer and which cut him off from direct access to the prairies beyond. Some eyes were beginning to turn to this prairie region and to contemplate its possibilities, but for the moment it was beyond the reach of all but the most adventurous.

Yet the same factors which were behind the American westward migration were at work in Canada as well. Population pressure and the lack of opportunities for expansion were driving the enterprising or the discontented from the older communities to make a fresh start in new and undeveloped lands. In the Mari-

time Provinces, where fertile lands were limited in extent, the best had already been occupied. The staple activities which these provinces had developed on the basis of other natural resources offered limited opportunities. The fisheries of Nova Scotia felt the growing pressure of American competition, particularly after the markets of the West Indies were thrown open to American fish. Lumbering in New Brunswick was hit by the reduction of the timber preference in Britain and the consequently increased competition from Baltic timber. Shipbuilding and the carrying trade offered some opportunities, but all these together failed to absorb the full natural increase in population or to hold the more energetic element among the youth of the provinces.

In Canada proper the difficulties were still more complex. While a certain amount of land remained, there were barriers to its occupancy which were only slowly removed. The grip of speculators and land companies, the lack of adequate roads, the controversy over the Clergy Reserves which continued until 1854, all hampered the further spread of settlement in both English and French Canada. Many of the immigrants of the forties, discouraged by the prospects, moved on to the United States, and the migration was joined by native Canadians. Durham, in 1838, was impressed by the power of attraction which was exercised by the superior advantages which the United States seemed to offer, and that attraction continued through the succeeding decades.

For in spite of the temporary setback experienced in 1837, the expansion of the United States embraced a wide variety of activities. The growing towns of the Eastern states attracted many young Canadians, particularly from the Maritimes. French Canadians, too, went as laborers to both the towns and the farms in the Northeastern section. Large-scale construction, including the canals and later the railroads, offered opportunity for employment. It also made demands on the forest industries, and these in turn recruited an increasing number of skilled woodsmen from north of the border. As settlement spread to the prairies the demand for lumber increased, and the expansion of lumbering activities in the states of the Northwest drew Canadian workers to that area. It may even be some indication of the place they occupied that the Paul Bunyan of legend was represented as a Canuck.

But above all there was land. The act passed by Congress in 1820, followed by the pre-emption act of a decade later, made plentiful land available on easy terms. There was no area in Canada in which a land seeker from the Maritimes could acquire a farm with comparable ease. Canadians themselves in many cases felt that the American West offered a better selection at a lower price. Faced with limited choices at what in many cases seemed monopoly prices, more than one discouraged farmer packed up his family and set out for Iowa.

Thus there set in a trend which reversed that of half a century previously. Up to the War of 1812 Canada had received a continued though possibly a dwindling influx from the United States. But now the frontier had swept beyond that area, and Canada was no longer even on the flank of the western movement. Yet the frontier remained continental in its nature and its appeal, ignoring national boundaries and political affiliations, drawing from the older areas without distinction, and occupying new and desirable ones with only minor concern over claims to sovereignty and possession. The effect of these claims in such matters as land policy and taxation and restrictive regulations might be real and tangible enough to be deterrent, but it was these practical considerations, and not the question of Canadian or American rule, that seemed important to the pioneer. Americans after the Revolution were easily transformed into Loyalists by a policy of royal generosity in Canadian grants. Now that the situation was reversed and the Republic was more openhanded than Canada, more than one Loyalist descendant found himself a Republican at heart.

In these circumstances lay much of the explanation of why the Canadian west remained unsettled for so long. Distance and the lack of direct communications, the uncordial attitude of the Hudson's Bay Company and the more hospitable aspect of American land policy, all combined to attract the Canadian migrant to the United States. Even to reach the Canadian prairie region he would have to pass through the pioneer areas of the American West, and there was no incentive to go much farther to conditions which were much more uncertain when good land and prospective markets and friendly neighbors could all be found on Amer-

ican soil. Still less was there any temptation to press on to the remote and unsettled region beyond the Rockies. Even in that area Oregon had its attractions as compared with British Columbia, but it was the gold of California that chiefly lured Canadian as well as American fortune seekers to the coast. It was estimated that 5,400 Canadians were in California in 1860, but the 8,000 who had settled in Iowa were more typical of the general movement.

To the pioneer this might seem a reasonably satisfactory state of affairs. To the mass of Canadians, however, it was anything but acceptable. It was only a small minority whose dissatisfaction was strong enough to impel them to emigrate. The more settled elements constituted a permanent Canadian community. But they desired a prosperous and expanding community, and the drain of population to the United States was a real cause for perturbation. Even more serious, the prospect that Canada might ultimately be in a position to develop a western area of her own was gravely compromised by the delay in undertaking this enterprise in the face of the steady advance of American settlement.

By 1850, indeed, the final stage of American continental expansion was already in prospect. Iowa and California had become states; Minnesota and Oregon had been organized as territories. Projects for a transcontinental railroad were already afoot, creating the situation which led to the organization of Kansas and Nebraska; and the construction of the Union Pacific would soon open the prairie region to settlement. Such developments would outflank the vacant area which lay north of the forty-ninth parallel, and the attractions of that area were likely, in their turn, to prove irresistible when the American West was occupied and the growing population pressure thrust against the international boundary. The fate of Oregon was a warning and an example of what might happen. If Britain hoped to prevent the loss of further territory as a result of a new American infiltration, steps must be taken promptly to forestall such an event by effective occupation and settlement of the prairies and the Pacific coast.

"It is obvious," said Lord Grey shortly after the Oregon treaty, "when an eligible territory is left to be waste, unsubdued to the use of man, it is impossible to prevent persons from taking irregu-

lar possession of the land. We have found it impossible in all our dominions to restrain such persons. The government of the United States will be equally unable to prevent such an occurrence." To this expression of concern many leading Canadians added a fervent amen. In their eyes the effective possession of the West was vital for the future of Canada, and the margin by which it might be assured was dwindling with alarming rapidity. The next two decades, in fact, saw a race to achieve this end before the possibility was completely swamped by American expansion, and it seems not improbable that it was accomplished barely in the nick of time.

II

In the tremendous area stretching from Hudson Bay to the Pacific Ocean, and from the forty-ninth parallel to the Arctic, the sole effective authority after 1821 was the Hudson's Bay Company. But although its control was unitary, the basis and extent of its authority was not uniform throughout the whole region. By the original charter of 1670 the company secured not only a monopoly of trade, but full ownership of all the "lands, countries, and territories upon the coasts and confines of the seas, streights, bays, lakes, rivers, creeks, and sounds" within Hudson's Straits—a grant whose generosity was aided by a complete geographical ignorance of what it implied, and whose vagueness allowed the company to interpret it as covering well over a million square miles and embracing by far the greater part of the Canadian northwest. In such territory as remained east of the Rockies the company secured a monopoly of trade in 1821, together with the exclusion of all other British subjects from trade on the Pacific coast. And in 1849, when Vancouver Island was made a crown colony, it was handed over to the company on condition that they should undertake its settlement.

This last step was a direct result of the Oregon crisis. The British government, as Lord Grey's speech showed, was acutely aware of the possibility that the boundary of 1846 might prove only a temporary barrier unless steps were taken to forestall American expansion northward. At the same time the imperial authori-

ties shrank from the expense involved in a deliberate attempt to plant a settlement on the Pacific coast. There was no present hope that natural attraction would bring Canadian or British settlers there on their own initiative. It was estimated that for the government to attempt to found a colony would cost an initial £50,000, quite apart from the annual subsidies which would be needed to maintain it during the early years. It was decidedly preferable to devolve the task on the commercial organization which was already on the spot, in the optimistic belief that it would somehow find a way to combine the work of empire building with the extraction of a profit from the enterprise.

Such a basis was completely anomalous. The specialized interest of the company rested on the maintenance of a wilderness untouched by any extensive settlement. A few small communities might be tolerated as sources of food supplies, but the danger that they might expand into larger and more independent settlements whose spread would encroach on the fur-trade areas and whose members would escape the control of the company's monopoly was a cause of constant apprehension. The company, no less than the government, wanted to maintain British control of the area and to prevent its loss through American infiltration, but its motives were completely different, and the methods which the government envisaged were alien to the whole tradition and outlook of the Hudson's Bay men.

Thus the expected growth of settlement failed to materialize. A scheme was drafted for a number of farms on which tenants would be settled under bailiffs appointed by the company. A few settlers were brought out to put the plan in operation. But the bailiffs proved to be inefficient and extravagant, and most of the laborers were lured away by the prospect of higher wages in California. The high price which the company set for its land had no attraction to the independent settler, who could buy public land in the United States at one fifth the cost. As far as building up a community to forestall an American influx was concerned, the company not only failed in this function, but by helping to delay its undertaking by other bodies it actually endangered the area it was meant to safeguard.

Yet there might be some ground for the contention that it was

the company which saved it in the end. If it failed to promote settlement, it at least established the framework of effective authority, and that was to prove a crucial factor in the situation. The tradition of the American frontier was one of spontaneous democracy. Settlement frequently outran even the surveys and normally was well in advance of the organs of constituted authority. Thrown upon their own resources, the pioneer communities created their own local governments and developed their own brand of rude and often hasty justice, and their preference for these simple procedures over the more complex institutions with which they were later endowed created a profound tradition of extralegal action, of which lynch law was only one and the least attractive part.

This, too, had been part of the story of Oregon. The formation of a provisional government by the early settlers had crystallized the local conflict and precipitated the international crisis. When British Columbia, in its turn, received a sudden influx from across the border there was every prospect that a similar pattern of events would lead to a similar result.

The incentive which attracted the first substantial body of settlers was not land, but gold. Just as the California boom began to subside news leaked out of discoveries on the Fraser River. The result was a rush to that area in 1858; and two years later, when the limited extent of the new discoveries had become apparent, a fresh strike in the Cariboo region revived the waning interest of the fortune hunters. An area hitherto devoted almost exclusively to the fur trade had suddenly been invaded by settlement.

The gateway to the gold areas was Victoria at the southern end of Vancouver Island. This tranquil little port with its grass-grown streets found itself transformed almost overnight into a boom town. Twenty thousand immigrants, it was estimated, arrived there during 1858. At times it seemed that the whole population of San Francisco had moved north en masse. In the harbor lay ships and small craft of every description. The town was clamorous with transients demanding supplies and equipment and transportation and in urgent haste to depart again for the gold fields. The turbulence that had marked the early days of California was now transported to Victoria and thence to the mining towns that

sprang up on the mainland, with their rough and somewhat unstable population.

Here was a problem not only of law and order, but of political control with all the broad implications lent to it by the precedent of Oregon. It was met effectively by authority on the spot. James Douglas, the chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company at Victoria, was also governor of the colony. He had received the post after the first unhappy appointee, finding that he had neither colonists nor salary, retired in disgust. Douglas thus united a formal authority from the Crown with the practical power which he wielded as an official of the company—the only effective authority which the Indians understood—and in that dual capacity he now undertook to deal with the new and unruly influx which gold had brought.

He had the lessons of experience behind him. For sixteen years he had been one of McLoughlin's right-hand men. He had seen the results of immigration into Oregon and of McLoughlin's benevolence. He had been the man selected to choose a new site for the company's headquarters when the position at Fort Vancouver became precarious, and Victoria was the spot he had chosen. He had no intention of seeing the earlier experience repeated. McLoughlin had helped to lose Oregon for Britain and had seen his own career broken as a result. Douglas, a sterner and more practical character, was determined that neither of these things should happen if he could prevent it.

There was one difficulty at the outset. The legal authority of Douglas was confined to Vancouver Island—he had none as governor over the new settlements on the mainland. But he recognized at once that this was no time to boggle over questions of territorial jurisdiction. He boldly assumed the power to act, which circumstances demanded, and issued a series of regulations which would preserve both British authority and the company's interests in British Columbia.

The resulting efforts at strict control were only partly inspired by patriotic motives. Douglas was also anxious to preserve as far as possible the trade monopoly which the company had hitherto enjoyed. His orders therefore were directed to restricting and controlling the influx into new areas. He was afraid, and with

some reason, of the upsetting effect on the Indians and the clashes which might—and actually did—result. He also desired to prevent intrusion upon the trade which the Indians carried on with the company. He even put obstacles in the way of regular transportation to the mainland except on company ships. But the frantic gold seekers were not to be delayed. They embarked on craft of their own and even risked the rip tides of the gulf in skiffs and canoes, often with tragic results. It was with reluctance that Douglas at length felt obliged to license American steamers between the island and the mainland, and even then he exacted a royalty on their passengers and freight.

He kept an equally strict hand on mining rights. He announced by proclamation that gold was the property of the Crown and that miners must acquire a license under penalty of civil and criminal prosecution. Since licenses at first cost ten shillings a month, and the fee was later raised to twenty-one shillings, it was a somewhat formidable condition. At the same time he tried to exclude outside merchants by announcing that trade with the Fraser River area was illegal for anyone except the Hudson's Bay Company. In this he went too far. The home government, while approving his policy in general, pointed out that the company had a monopoly only of trade with the Indians, but it gave retro-active validation to his other decrees and to his assumption of authority over the mainland.

This established the most important element on the political side. It meant that the incoming settlers were confronted from the very outset with established and effective authority. When the miners at Yale created a spontaneous government of their own Douglas promptly established a system of justices of the peace. When a clash between these same miners and the Indians provoked a critical situation Douglas intervened to call both parties sharply to submission. He embodied the principle of authority under the direct auspices of the imperial government, and he exercised it with adequacy and effectiveness. This did not necessarily mean that the settlers would be contented with such a state of affairs or that they might not attempt to alter it by spontaneous community action. But they would act not in a political void, but in the face of a legally instituted government, and the very exist-

ence of that government would offer the opponents of action a morally strong point around which to rally.

Even this, however, did not eliminate the possibility that the colony might gravitate toward the United States. There were indeed a number of natural factors which favored such an evolution. Britain and Canada were both far away. The sentimental connection with the eastern provinces was feeble at best, and even the feeling of attachment to the Crown, shared as it was by only a part of the population, diminished in potency as economic difficulties accumulated. The natural geographic connection was with the states of the Pacific coast; indeed, hardly any other connection was available, in view of the lack of communications with Canada. The building of the Union Pacific offered a further link which attracted British Columbia into the orbit of the United States. Trade difficulties and a heavy debt burden and the high cost of local government all motivated a search for an external solution, and the prospect that the United States would assume the local debt and that Victoria might become the western center of American commerce exercised a powerful attraction over the minds of many of the settlers.

Thus during the sixties a definite annexationist movement came into being. The fact that a considerable body of the inhabitants were Americans of recent origin strengthened a sentiment which had its primary roots in economic interest. The complacency of English opinion toward the possibility found its expression in a *Times* editorial which frankly stated that no serious obstacle would be put in the way of its realization. The interest of annexationist opinion in the United States found expression in various speeches and editorials, in suggestions that the transfer of British Columbia might be accepted as liquidating the *Alabama* claims, and even in the Banks Bill envisioning—as part of a project for annexing the whole of British North America—the admission of the colony on a territorial basis. A petition by the Victoria annexationists to the Colonial Office in 1867 virtually asked permission to join the Republic, and two years later another petition was circulated which would have asked the President to arrange for the transfer. Although only a minority of the settlers were ready to go to such lengths, it was by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that

the movement might ultimately meet with success and that the majority would acquiesce in the result.

The opponents of annexation, however, were able to offer an alternative. By 1867 the federation of Canada had been achieved, and the possible admission of British Columbia was specifically included in the new constitution. The physical difficulties which stood in the way of implementing this provision were modified when the intervening territory was acquired from the Hudson's Bay Company and the promise of a transcontinental railroad became practicable. It was true, as the annexationists pointed out, that the promise would only be realized after a considerable period of delay and that its actual value to the colony was uncertain at best. But it served to strengthen the hands of those, particularly on the mainland, who were more concerned with the threat of competition from the free entry of American products than with the dubious opportunity of sharing in American trade. The achievement of confederation enabled this group, by vigorous organization, to carry the province into the Canadian union and to avert that drift to the United States which, had confederation not been consummated, might have ended in the loss of the Pacific coast by Canada.

III

The possible loss of the prairie west was equally a problem during this period and was an even greater matter of concern to Canadian leaders. The Ontario agrarians, whose political expression was the mildly radical party of the Clear Grits, were particularly perturbed over the prospect. Motives not only of economic expansion but of political and sectional interest led them to view the opening of the prairies to Canadian settlement as a matter that was vital to the national future; and here, as on the coast, there was growing reason to fear that delay might mean the loss of the territory by default to the United States.

A nucleus of settlement had been planted on the Red River early in the century. The efforts of Lord Selkirk, unhappy in many of their aspects, had founded a community in the vicinity of Fort Garry on the site of the present city of Winnipeg. Around

this had grown up a settled district with a conglomerate population of Scots, French, Swiss, and half-breeds, organized as the district of Assiniboia under the rule of the Hudson's Bay Company. However benevolent in intention, that rule was not universally beloved by the settlers. One of the chief concerns of the company was to restrict the inhabitants to their agrarian pursuits and to prevent their engaging in the fur trade to their private advantage. The company, too, while using the district as a source of food supplies, showed little desire to encourage its expansion or to provide outside markets for its surplus products. A growing restiveness with this policy consequently developed and resulted in a tendency to look beyond the bounds of the colony for economic and political remedies.

This was increased toward the end of the fifties when a trickle of settlers from Canada resulted in the appearance within the colony of a group which, though small in numbers, was vigorous in its ambitions and aggressive in its policy. In this "Canadian party" the Ontario agrarians and the business groups who now shared their interest in western expansion found vocal allies to advocate the immediate acquisition of the West by Canada. Nonetheless, they faced real difficulties in carrying this project. Quite apart from the problem of liquidating the claims of the Hudson's Bay Company, the physical fact of distance and the lack of communication, raising practical questions which were none too easy to solve, made it uncertain that Canada was capable of forming the connection or exercising the attraction which would offer any tangible advantages to the inhabitants of the Red River colony.

In contrast, the connection with the United States was real and growing. Westward expansion brought the creation of Minnesota territory in 1849 and its achievement of statehood in 1858. Between those dates its population increased by something like 150,000. Not only was there a populous and growing community on the threshold of the Canadian west, but it was one which exercised a very powerful attraction over the settlers in that area. The possibility of finding markets on the American side of the line—particularly markets for unauthorized private fur trade—now made its appearance. The creation of a trading post at

Pembina facilitated this traffic. A wagon road was developed from the Red River to St. Paul, and the westward advance of the American railroads to the Mississippi provided a link with the Eastern states. The appearance of a steamboat on the Red River in 1859 drew these ties still closer. When the Hudson's Bay Company began to use American routes to and from the colony the significance of these developments was underlined. Efforts were made from Canada to create a rival route by way of Fort William on Lake Superior, but the project collapsed after three years of struggle in 1861. Even the mail to and from the colony used the American postal system, and the summer mail which went in by the Canadian route in 1860 totaled exactly four newspapers.

Such developments held serious implications for the future. The advancing American settlement almost inevitably lapped over onto British territory. The Red River colony acquired an American minority, weaker numerically than the Canadian influx, but strongly imbued with the desire to attach the territory to the United States. Their desire was reflected in Minnesota and the other Northwestern states, where advocates of annexation awaited any opportunity to forward their aim. In the face of this situation the negative policy of the Hudson's Bay Company, which neither satisfied the colonists nor offered any effective obstacles to American designs, alarmed both the Canadian government and the Canadian party in the colony. The alarm of the latter group was expressed in a petition calling for the immediate elimination of the company's rule, whose continuance had become intolerable. "It would seem," this document warned, "that we have no other choice than the Canadian plow and printing press, or the American rifle and Fugitive Slave Law."

The Hudson's Bay Company clung stubbornly to the vast domain which it had no desire to see occupied, yet which it could not in the last resort defend. In a formal Parliamentary investigation it beat off the attacks of the critics and evaded the Canadian charge that its charter was invalid. It refused to help build a telegraph line across the prairies. It refused to grant land to those who were prepared to build it. "What!" broke out the governor to the Colonial Secretary. "Sequester our very taproot!"

Take away the fertile lands where our buffalo feed! Let in all kinds of people to squat and settle and frighten away the fur-bearing animals they don't hunt and kill! Impossible. Destruction—extinction—of our time-honored industry. If these gentlemen are so patriotic, why don't they buy us out?"

The unexpected suggestion was soon followed up. A group which included the transport interests who contemplated a trans-continental line bought out the existing company in 1863. They never built their railroad, and the change of ownership did nothing immediately to solve the problem of the West. But the new men at least realized that there were other sources of profit than the fur trade. They were quite prepared to accept settlers who would provide profit from land sales and to turn over control of the West to Canada if acceptable terms could be arranged. Meanwhile, the determination to forestall American acquisition of the West was one of the salient motives which led to confederation, and confederation, in its turn, facilitated the negotiations. It still took the intervention of the British government to bring an agreement on terms. But by 1869 the matter was arranged, and the company surrendered its charter to the British government, which prepared to turn the West formally over to Canada.

By this time, however, new difficulties were developing. In its concern over the acquisition of this extensive property, little attention had been paid by the Canadian government to the people who went with it. Yet there were some 12,000 of these, mostly half-breeds, of whom the bulk were French and Catholic. They looked with growing concern on the aggressiveness of the Canadians and their supporters in the colony. They became alarmed over the security of their land titles. Their alarm was increased when surveyors ignored the river-lot farms of the half-breeds and started running rectangular surveys through their lands. They determined not to accept a transfer to Canadian authority until their rights had been secured.

Their opportunity was presented by the procedure involved in the transfer. The Hudson's Bay Company surrendered its charter in November 1869. The British government prepared to transfer Rupert's Land to Canada. But on the news that disturbances had broken out Canada postponed acceptance. The government in-

sisted that the new acquisition must be delivered in good order and that the responsibility for seeing to this condition lay with Britain or the company. Meanwhile, Canada had no authority in the West. Britain had conferred no authority on anyone on the spot. The Hudson's Bay officials washed their hands of the whole matter. They were affronted and indignant at the way in which the company had twice changed hands without the active traders being consulted, and their local governor, stricken with a fatal illness, was in no condition to handle a difficult situation. For practical purposes the end of 1869 saw in the West an interregnum whose prolongation threatened the most serious consequences.

Into this void stepped Louis Riel. A native of Red River, of French ancestry with a touch of Indian blood, he was accepted by the half-breeds as one of themselves. His dynamic personality and superior advantages marked him out for leadership. He had been educated for the priesthood, and although his erratic views about Catholic dogma and his own divine mission soon convinced his masters that he had best remain a layman, his education and his fervor were both assets in this situation. The spontaneous movement of protest against any transfer to Canada in the absence of guarantees brought him forward as the leader, and the curious legal situation gave him at least some claim to authority so long as Canada refrained from assuming it.

That authority was rapidly consolidated. The governor who had been sent from Canada in anticipation of the transfer and who had to travel through American territory was stopped at the border. The Hudson's Bay post at Fort Garry was seized and occupied. A provisional government was set up and was confirmed by an elected convention which met early in 1870. It drew up a claim of rights and entered upon negotiations with a special envoy who had been hurriedly sent from Canada to quiet the situation.

All this was achieved without bloodshed. There had been arming and demonstrating by the Canadian party which wanted immediate union with the Dominion, and even an abortive expedition against Fort Garry. There had been captures by Riel's followers of several groups of their opponents. In spite of this no

actual armed clash had taken place. But the tension had been increased by the threat to Fort Garry, and Riel decided that it was time for stern measures as an example to his opponents. His particular choice fell on one of the prisoners named Thomas Scott. He was a rash and violent young man whose insolent and unruly conduct had made him thoroughly objectionable to his captors. Riel had hitherto kept his own unstable temperament under remarkable restraint, but under this were mounting passions which more and more needed an outlet. Scott was now the victim of that need. Riel held a midnight court-martial on March 3, and Scott was shot next day.

However much this act was deplored by the moderates, it had no effect on the local situation. Steps had been taken to negotiate with Ottawa, and the settlement awaited their outcome. But in Canada the news brought an explosion of wrath. Scott was an Orangeman, and his judicial murder by men of another race and creed roused a cry for vengeance in Protestant Ontario. This new element tremendously aggravated the critical nature of the situation. Quite apart from the added danger of civil war in the West, the external factor became more acute than ever. Riel himself was not aiming at a severance of the British connection, but merely at the securing of satisfactory concessions. But some of his associates were ready for more drastic steps which might lead at least to republicanism. The small American party in the settlement—whose normal meeting place was the bar of the principal hotel—was prepared to use every opportunity to turn the movement into one for annexation. The small group of Fenians had in William O'Donoghue a leader who was closely associated with Riel. In Minnesota were active expansionists ready to encourage any tendency toward annexation and Fenians preparing for an armed incursion into the territory. The strength of the annexationist sentiment in the United States, which was virtually at its peak in 1870, made it possible that the moral and even the material support of the Republic would be given to any move which would detach the West from British rule.

This was the fear which now haunted the Canadian government. Ontario was clamoring for a punitive expedition to put down the rising. But the use of armed force might throw Riel

and his followers into the arms of the United States and bring the loss of the whole West just when Canada had it within her grasp. It was to avert this danger that the government belatedly embarked on an effort to satisfy the grievances of the half-breeds. Their delegates who came to Ottawa succeeded in reaching an agreement. Although a military expedition was dispatched to the Red River, it was with the purpose—however imperfectly fulfilled—of assuring peace and tranquillity. The promises of the government were embodied in an act of Parliament which admitted Manitoba as a province within the Dominion. Riel accepted the settlement, and only his fear of arrest for the murder of Scott drove him in flight to the United States—a move which the Prime Minister found so gratifying that he paid Riel \$4,000 to prolong his absence, at least until after the next election.

The West was at last secured to Canada. When the Fenian threat materialized in a feeble incursion over the border the settlers, with Riel's blessing, rallied to resist it. The Treaty of Washington paved the way for a settlement of the various difficulties with the United States and for a subsidence of the more aggressive annexationist agitation. Here, as in British Columbia, the achievement of confederation made it possible for the Dominion to establish a firm title to the western territories. But there had been little margin of time for this achievement. Not since 1814 had Canada been confronted with more acute dangers from her southern neighbor than during the decade of the sixties; and confederation, which was to no small extent the product of the Civil War and its aftermath, perhaps alone made possible the retention of the full extent of territory which forms the present Dominion of Canada.

CHAPTER XI

The Renewed Crisis

FOR A BRIEF PERIOD after the conclusion of the Reciprocity Treaty in 1854 relations between Canada and the United States were marked by a lull which had all the aspects of newborn harmony. The outstanding causes of controversy had been liquidated. Trade relations had been eased. Even Anglo-American relations, after a brief flurry of resentment over attempts to enlist Americans for the Crimean War, had lapsed into apparent tranquillity. With the United States now absorbed in the last stages of the sectional conflict which preceded the resort to arms, there seemed every reason to hope that Canada would remain untroubled by her larger neighbor so long as she refrained from giving offense.

Beneath the surface, however, were undercurrents which revealed a certain lack of stability in the new relationship. The most tangible modifying factor was the situation in the West and the increasing concern in Canada over the possible results of American expansion. Less concrete but even more pervasive was the continued distrust of the ultimate good will of the United States. Manifest destiny was still very much alive. A revived annexationist sentiment echoed in the pronouncements of a variety of American leaders. An anti-British temper that was traditional to many Americans was accentuated by the flood of immigration from Ireland in the years after 1846; and so long as this re-

maintained, Canada as a British possession felt herself exposed to its unfavorable results.

It was naturally the Canadian Tories who cherished the most inveterate distrust of American intentions. If they no longer felt that the United States as a nation seriously contemplated the armed conquest of Canada, they were still apprehensive of unofficial raids from across the border. Just as Texas had offered a warning example in a previous decade, so American filibustering in Central America now seemed an illustration of the sort of activities against which Canada must remain on guard. It even led to a reluctance to diminish Canada's defensive strength by raising troops to aid Britain in the Crimean War. "The Committee," the ministry reported, "are also impressed with the conviction that a large and lawless party exists in the U.S. unfriendly to Great Britain and desirous, if possible, of depriving her of her North American Colonies." A protracted war, in their view, might lead to a renewal of the sort of attempts that had occurred after the rebellion of 1837.

Some of this apprehension at least proved only too well founded. The outbreak of civil war in the United States and the international episodes which occurred during the course of the struggle ended by straining to the limit the relations between Canada and the government at Washington. To this result some contribution was made by the episodes in which Canada was directly, however innocently, involved. But the root of the trouble was the revival of hostility between Britain and the United States. The offenses of Canada might have been treated with more understanding if they had stood by themselves. But there was little impulse in America to deal charitably with the offenses of Britain or to distinguish between the imperial government and the colonial authorities. As always in this particular case, the sins of the parent were visited on the progeny nearest at hand, and American resentment against Britain placed Canada in the forefront of danger.

It seems clear that the initial and, on the whole, the general attitude of Canadians was sympathetic to the Northern cause. Anti-slavery sentiment was general throughout the Northern colonies. There was a particular dislike of the Fugitive Slave Law

and the attitude which it symbolized. Canada, the terminus of the Underground Railroad and the haven of thousands of escaped slaves, had resolutely protected them in their newly won freedom and refused to expose them to the risks of extradition. The radical temper of the western agrarians made the Grits particularly outspoken in support of the North and its aims. There was also the economic incentive. Wartime demands were to prove advantageous to certain Canadian producers and traders, but the initial effect of the outbreak of hostilities was a dislocation of normal trade, and it seemed to many that a speedy victory by the North was the most hopeful remedy and consequently something to be earnestly desired.

But while this might be the prevailing opinion it was by no means unanimous. The suspicions of the Tories were particularly directed against the North as the most aggressive and expansionist group. Southern expansion, in contrast, held no menace to Canada or even to Britain, and Southern sectionalism had in the past proved a useful deterrent to Northern ambitions. The Tories were inclined to view with complacency the prospect of a weakening of the American state, or even its disruption, and the Tory press made little secret of these sentiments. As the war progressed this attitude on the part of the more substantial urban groups was stimulated by an influx of Southern refugees, some of them convalescent officers, whose charming manners and tales of adventurous deeds were calculated to have a particularly potent effect on the feminine part of Canadian society.

There was an unfortunate tendency on the part of at least a section of the Northern press to take these Tory sentiments as representative of the general Canadian attitude and to respond with fierce diatribes which completely ignored the other side of the picture. As resentment against Britain increased, so did the incidental invectives against Canada and the expression of annexationist desires. By August 1861 the *Toronto Globe*, one of the staunchest sympathizers with the North, was moved to complain: "The insolent bravado of the Northern press toward Great Britain and the insulting tone assumed toward these provinces have unquestionably produced a marked change in the feelings of the people. . . . It is not in human nature long to maintain

cordial sympathy toward those who are pouring insult continuously upon you."

There were other factors which contributed to an atmosphere of misunderstanding and friction. A considerable number of Canadians—traditionally estimated at 40,000—enlisted with the Northern armies. But voluntary action was one thing, and attempts by draft brokers to entice young men across the border with pretended offers of civilian employment was quite another. There were instances of Canadians being virtually shanghaied into the Northern armies and few cases in which redress was ever secured. Moreover, the early attitude of Lincoln toward the issues of the struggle had the same dampening effect as it did on certain Northern supporters. His insistence that the war was being fought for the Union and that it was not a crusade against slavery left many plain minds with a sense of baffled emotions until the full character of the struggle became clear.

On the whole there was little positive support for the South in Canada. There were few supporters of slavery and many who would welcome its abolition with enthusiasm. Canada's chief contacts were with the North. Her economic interests, particularly under the Reciprocity Treaty, attached her to the Northern cause. Her impulses—the extreme Tories always excepted—were to be friendly and helpful. The attitude of the North did nothing to make this easy. Yet even when it led to resentment that feeling was chiefly defensive. Canada wanted to stand with Great Britain and to resist any designs on her own territory. But if she were left a free choice she would have little temptation to hamper the North and much inclination to help.

In Britain, however, the balance of opinion was somewhat different. There, too, there was wide popular sympathy for the Northern cause, embodied in such leaders as John Bright. But the ruling class as a whole definitely inclined toward the South; and in spite of the efforts of the government to maintain an attitude of correctness, the sentiments of such leaders as Palmerston and Russell and Gladstone were clearly unfavorable to the North.

This was something whose implications might be of the utmost seriousness. Hostility on the part of Canadians would be little

more than a cause for irritation. Hostility on the part of Britain gave ground for serious alarm. From the outset the South pinned high hopes on the prospect of European recognition, and the British attitude was crucial for their realization. Consequently the North watched with nervous suspicion for any sign that Britain was departing from the strictest impartiality. Her conduct, indeed, was scrutinized with far greater distrust and far less charity than that of France, who was much more ready to offend. Louis Napoleon was anxious for his own purposes to recognize the Confederacy, and only his reluctance to act without Britain restrained him from this step. But Britain won little gratitude from the North for this service—indeed, she perhaps deserved none, for the government before Antietam was on the verge of yielding to Napoleon's pressure. All the ancient suspicions and hostility, reinforced by the memories of recent controversies over Maine and Oregon and the fisheries and recent charges of British intrigues in Texas and California, now rose to the surface. Britain was a traditional offender, and the North, fighting for its very existence, was little inclined to give her any benefit of the doubt.

This was the uneasy atmosphere which burst into storm over the *Trent* affair. The mission of Mason and Slidell to Britain was a perfect illustration of the ground of American apprehension and the danger which the North felt it had a right to suspect from the British side. The fact that Captain Wilkes, by taking off the Confederate agents and then allowing the *Trent* to proceed, had put his country completely in the wrong only added to the fury of American indignation. The tone of the British demands did little to soothe this wrath, and American resentment at being forced to admit error lingered to inflame such subsequent episodes as the escape of the *Alabama*. The *Trent* episode was fundamental for Anglo-American relations throughout the war and colored all the subsequent developments during the course of the struggle.

It was also of salient importance for Canada. The *Trent* affair brought Britain and the United States to the verge of war, and the danger did not disappear when the affair itself was nominally closed. As the cause of the South declined after Gettysburg and a Northern victory became more and more probable the fear that

the victorious armies would turn and wreak their resentment upon Britain continued to be acute. It was particularly menacing for Canada, which would be the initial object of attack, and from 1861 on the danger of invasion loomed as a real possibility before Canadian eyes.

In British opinion, it is true, the alarm of the Canadians was rather tepid. The rejection of a militia bill in 1862 seemed a proof of Canada's complacency in the face of danger and her willingness to rely on the mother country for protection. But in spite of the acerbity thus provoked, both parties did, in fact, take steps to strengthen Canadian defenses, and a substantial body of British regulars was sent to reinforce the depleted garrison. This added still further to American resentment, and the consequent discussions of the advisability of reinforcing the border had in turn an alarming effect in Canada. From the surface friendship of a few years before the two countries had moved to a position in which each was standing tensely on guard, momentarily expecting a blow from the other and prepared to strike back at once.

II

During the first two years of the war the recriminations exchanged, though hot enough at times, were more or less general in their nature. Complaints on the side of the United States were directed against the unfriendliness of Canada's attitude rather than against specifically unfriendly acts. But from 1863 on the situation grew more serious as incidents multiplied in which Canada was directly involved and which led to a sharper and more dangerous antagonism on the part of the North.

These incidents grew out of the increased activities of Confederate agents on Canadian soil. Such activities were of a minor nature during the first two years and were chiefly—and not very successfully—directed toward the purchase of munitions and supplies. But as the cause of the South grew more desperate the temptation to extreme expedients increased, and one of the projects which grew in attractiveness was the creation of a diversion from Canada which would occupy the attention of part of

the Northern armies and so relieve the crushing pressure on the South.

The Confederate plans do not seem to have embraced any direct help from the governments of the British colonies or even any active support from Canadian sympathizers. The most that was expected was a measure of tolerance while the plans were put in train, including acquiescence by Canada in the purchase of the necessary equipment. It was an effort to use Canada as a base for hostile action against the United States, as the United States had been used as a base against Canada in 1838 and 1839 and would be used again in 1866. But in contrast to the activity of the Canadian refugees after the rebellion, the Confederates made little effort to recruit a force in Canada. They hoped chiefly for an attitude of non-interference while they collected their own forces for the projected enterprise.

It was the province of Canada which provided their main base of operation. The Maritime Provinces were involved only to a minor extent. There was some friction between the latter and the United States over the enthusiasm with which Maritime skippers and shipowners engaged in the lucrative though risky enterprise of blockade running and some resentment in the Maritimes over the methods by which the North strove to enforce the blockade. But the Maritimes were little suited as a base for operations against the land frontier of the North, and Northern naval power effectively barred any serious operations by sea. The chief episode that arose from this quarter centered about a ship which bore the historic name of the *Chesapeake*. This vessel, while on her regular run from New York to Portland, was seized by fourteen Confederates. Having secured their prize, the captors showed some uncertainty about what they should do with it. They worked their way north along the coast, putting into occasional ports to sell the cargo piecemeal, and ultimately arrived in Nova Scotia. Here they abandoned the ship to its pursuers and sought refuge on British soil.

The incident created a problem for the provincial authorities which they were not too adept in solving. It was easy enough to decide on the disposal of the *Chesapeake*. It was taken in charge at Halifax, furnished with coal, and returned to its owners at

New York. But the arrest of the culprits opened up embarrassing prospects which the outraged American authorities did little to ease. In their eyes the offenders were pirates who should be delivered to the United States to be tried and hanged as such. This was something which neither the provincial authorities nor public opinion was prepared to allow, but the question of what other status could be attributed to the Confederates was decidedly a ticklish one. When after their first arrest the prisoners were released on habeas corpus an opportunity was given for evasion of the issue. New warrants were issued, but no furious efforts were made to execute them, and the discontent with which the Americans viewed this procedure was probably no greater than would have been provoked by any other action to which the provinces could have consented.

The Confederate activities in Canada were of a more serious nature. They covered only a brief though hectic period of a few months in 1864. But in spite of their episodic character and their ineffectual outcome, they were startling enough to be the foundation for constant alarms and excursions during the rest of the war and to accentuate the bitterness of the more extreme Northern elements toward the Canada that had involuntarily harbored them.

The chief Confederate agent during this period was Jacob Thompson. Formerly Secretary of the Interior in the Buchanan Cabinet, he had become military aide to Jefferson Davis as a prelude to a career in which the political and the military were somewhat obscurely mingled. After Gettysburg, as Southern fortunes showed signs of progressive decline, he put before Davis his schemes for diversions behind the Union lines for which Canada might be a base of direction. In April 1864 he received from Davis a commission to proceed to Canada, "there to carry out such instructions as you have received from me verbally, in such manner as shall seem most likely to conduce to the furtherance of the interests of the Confederate States of America." In July, plentifully equipped with funds, he arrived in Toronto to carry out this ambiguous mission.

His first efforts were along the line of sabotage. Schemes to burn shipping at St. Louis and to form corps of incendiaries to

ignite Cincinnati and New York were among the objects for which subsidies were ineffectively disbursed. But he shortly revived another scheme which had been on foot during the previous year but had been frustrated by the vigilance of the Canadian authorities. This was the freeing of the captured Confederate soldiers who were held in Northern prison camps, and particularly at Johnson's Island near Sandusky and Camp Douglas near Chicago.

For this enterprise it was necessary first of all to be assured of immunity from interference on the Great Lakes. The only American armed vessel on the lakes was the steamer *Michigan*, and her capture would give naval supremacy to the plotters. Their hopes were brightened by the appearance of a gentleman named Charles H. Cole, who claimed to have been commissioned a lieutenant in the Confederate navy. He had become intimate with the officers of the *Michigan* and had found them convivial companions. He proposed that he should entertain them at a wine-drinking party on September 19 and that when the revelry was under way sober Confederates from another ship should board the *Michigan* and take her captive.

The next step was to provide the other ship. It was solved by the acquisition of the little steamer *Philo Parsons* which ran from Sandusky to various Canadian ports. At Malden and Sandwich groups of Confederate agents came aboard in the guise of excursionists and, when properly embarked, proceeded to take over the ship. When they stopped farther on to take on extra fuel another little steamer unsuspectingly joined them and was promptly seized and scuttled. These preliminaries attended to, the *Philo Parsons* and her adventurous crew set off for Sandusky to capture the *Michigan*. Unfortunately for them, things had not gone so well at that end. The wine party had fallen through, for Cole, provided with \$4,000 by Thompson, had embarked on a protracted party of his own, and his schemes had leaked out to the federal authorities. When, therefore, the *Philo Parsons* approached the ship the sight of her fourteen guns, presumably manned by sober men, brought a sudden discouragement. The raiders turned back toward Sandwich, put some loot ashore, and attempted to scuttle the steamer which had now become a liability. Even this was

muddled, however, for they sank her on top of a sand bar which was only a few feet below the water, and within four days she had been raised and repaired and restored to her more prosaic service.

That ended the designs against the *Michigan*, although schemes for sabotage and for the release of war prisoners lingered on. The financing of Copperhead peace meetings in Illinois was intended to be the prelude to a rising in the Middle West which never took place. The encouragement of such anti-Administration groups as the Sons of Liberty was also meant to pave the way for action. As the Democratic convention at Chicago approached, armed men slipped over the border from Canada and proceeded there in the guise of delegates. Their purpose was to co-operate with the Sons of Liberty in a surprise attack which would free the prisoners at Camp Douglas and then capture Chicago itself. But reinforcements to the camp balked the first part of this plan, and a new scheme for a rising in Chicago on Election Day was frustrated by its discovery and the arrest of the leaders.

Thompson was now finding his efforts increasingly impossible. In November he bought a ship which he intended to use for the arming of other boats on the lake. But he was now under close surveillance and complained that he was beset by detectives or informers on every corner. Canadian and American authorities were both on the alert. A new Canadian Aliens Act in 1864 strengthened the powers of the government. By the time winter set in it was clearly hopeless to think of using Canada as an effective base for serious operations. But before these efforts were abandoned an attempt was made at one more enterprise which, meaningless in its effect on the fortunes of the Confederacy, created a situation of the utmost gravity for Canada.

This was the St. Albans raid. A Confederate lieutenant named Bennett H. Young had been provided with letters which vouched for "his integrity as a man and his piety as a Christian." These qualities apparently fitted him for some judicious burning and looting throughout New England—a project which, it was later alleged, was in revenge for Sheridan's devastation of the Shenandoah Valley. The enterprise was inaugurated on the night of October 19 when Young, at the head of twenty-five men, crossed from Canadian soil to the village of St. Albans in Vermont.

Although not in uniform, they claimed to be a military force acting under the direct authority of the War Department of the Confederacy. Their military accomplishments consisted in wounding two men, setting a number of fires, and robbing the bank of some \$200,000. This achieved, they fled with their booty back across the Canadian border, hotly pursued by the outraged citizens and depositors.

The Canadian authorities through all these developments had earnestly tried to act with the utmost correctness. They had informed the American government of any plots that came to their attention and had taken such steps as lay in their power to prevent any hostile incidents. They were fully conscious that the St. Albans raid, launched as it was from Canadian territory, called for effective action as proof of good faith, particularly since the now-chronic state of irritation in the United States had already been inflamed by the abortive attempt on Johnson's Island. Thirteen of the raiders were arrested and were held, along with a part of the stolen bank funds, for future action.

The nature of that action, however, became something of a problem. The Confederates claimed to be acting under orders and to be entitled to the protection of those principles which the British government had asserted on behalf of McLeod in 1840. The North, on the other hand, insisted that these were unauthorized offenders who must be handed over in accordance with the terms of the extradition treaty of 1842. While the matter was still being argued by the diplomats the prisoners were brought up before a magistrate in Montreal. To the consternation of the Canadian government that official not only ordered their discharge on technical grounds, but refunded the money which had been found in their possession. New arrests at once took place in an attempt to bring about a more satisfactory solution, but existing Canadian legislation proved somewhat inadequate to the complexities of the case, and though amendments were promptly adopted at the next session of the legislature this evidence of concern for international amity failed to mollify the more extreme elements across the border.

The result was a new outburst of invective directed against Canada. Past evidences of good faith and present action to meet

legitimate American complaints were alike overlooked; past Canadian difficulties and the record of forbearance in the face of incursions from American soil seemed to be forgotten. "The discharge of the highwaymen, murderers, and robbers of the St. Albans raid" brought Canadian offenses to a climax and led to a new crop of rumors about the imminence of new attacks. Rebels were reported to be drilling in Ontario; Confederates were buying and arming lake steamers for a new nautical effort; the alleged disappearance of a fourteen-pounder gun from its ornamental position on a lawn in Guelph became almost a diplomatic incident and provoked a proclamation by the governor general against the exportation of warlike stores. The New York *Evening Post* discovered that the situation left only two alternative courses: "First, to demand from the imperial government such a police of the Canadian frontier as will secure our villages and towns from the descent of rascals who take the name of rebel; or, secondly, in the event that this is not promised, to take the mode and measure of redress into our own hands."

The attitude of the Administration was more moderate. Although Lincoln's annual message referred to the "insecurity of life and property in the region adjacent to the Canadian border," it also acquitted the Canadian government of unfriendly intentions and pointed to their intention to "take the necessary measures to prevent new incursions across the border." When General Dix in an excess of enthusiasm ordered a subordinate in Vermont to hunt down the marauders of St. Albans even if he had to pursue them into Canada, his action met with presidential disapproval. Nonetheless, the impulse toward retaliation was at work and found its expression in a number of steps which Canadians could not but regard as deliberately inimical.

One of these was a threat to the existence of the Rush-Bagot agreement. Just as Canada during the previous crisis had felt the need for more effective defenses against unauthorized raids than were permitted under the convention of 1817, so now the United States became concerned for her security in the region of the Great Lakes. The problem had come under consideration at the outset of the war, without any action being taken. But with Confederate designs already made evident by the plot against John-

son's Island, and with the St. Albans raid to illustrate the possibility that Canada might not effectively thwart such projects, the question received more serious attention. In the latter part of October 1864 Seward gave notice to the British government that at the end of six months "the United States will deem themselves at liberty to increase the naval armament upon the lakes, if, in their judgment, the condition of affairs in that quarter shall then require it." The ambiguity of this phrasing, however, left some doubt as to whether it constituted a formal denunciation; and when at the expiration of the stipulated period the feeling of alarm had abated, it was possible for Seward to withdraw the order (in spite of approval and ratification by Congress in the interval) and to agree that the convention should continue in force as though nothing had happened.

There were, however, other steps which were less harmless in their ultimate effects. The inauguration of a passport system in December 1864 might be regarded as a valid precaution against infiltration by Confederate agents from the direction of Canada. The earlier order suddenly imposing an embargo on the export of certain articles, however, had more dubious justification. Although Seward asserted that this had been dictated "by public exigencies growing out of the present Civil War," it seemed doubtful to detached observers whether Canadian purchases of coal and livestock would either create a shortage in the United States or find their way into rebel hands. On the other hand, the order was an interruption of normal trade relations which caused serious inconvenience, and it held a perturbing significance when viewed against the background of the agitation which was now being conducted, not only against the continuance of bonding privileges, but also against the Reciprocity Treaty.

The strained relations resulting from the war presented an opportunity to those groups whose hostility to the treaty had grown steadily during the period of its operation. Fish and coal, lumber and transportation interests, all desired an end to Canadian competition. The rising protectionist element, released from the restraint that had been imposed by Southern representation in Congress, had set out in 1861 to create a more satisfactory tariff system; and although the question of reciprocity was not im-

mediately raised, the British Minister reported that that was thanks "more to the haste, I am afraid, than to the good will of the legislators." His forebodings were justified in the next session of Congress. A report on the operation of the treaty was brought in which constituted a general attack on its present operation and on the policy of Canada since its inauguration. Discriminatory tolls on Canadian canals, the Galt duties of 1859 on manufactured goods (about which the British manufacturers had complained with considerable bitterness), the creation of free ports in Canada and the Maritimes, the use of Canadian revenue to build railroads and canals which competed with American interests were all cited as proof of the charge that Canadians were of set purpose violating the true spirit of the agreement for their own selfish advantage. The fact that, while the trade of both countries had increased, the advantage had been consistently on the side of American exports to Canada made little impression. The protectionists were rallying their forces for an attack on the treaty as soon as its original term of operation should expire.

Their purpose was facilitated both by the popular resentment against Canada and by the growing annexationist sentiment. A feeling that Canada was deriving substantial trade advantages and was repaying these by a deliberately unfriendly policy was accompanied by a belief that the termination of those advantages would force the British provinces to seek union with the United States. Although the first direct assault on the treaty was repelled in the spring of 1864, the incidents during the latter part of the year increased the American willingness to adopt retaliatory measures. In December a resolution was introduced into Congress instructing the Executive to give the necessary notice of termination, and as a result of its adoption the formal steps were taken which resulted in the abrogation of the treaty in March of 1866.

The provinces were now faced with a serious blow to their economic interests, and behind this lay a continued fear of actual military attack. The prospect that the triumphant armies of the North might turn in victory to attempt the conquest of Canada was present in the minds of many Canadians. With the utmost relief they saw it disappear as the Northern forces began to disband after Appomattox. Yet even then the danger to the border

was not over. If the nation as a whole was willing to forego the invasion of Canada, there were, in fact, "large and lawless elements" which were by no means ready to accept a peaceful policy, and chief among them were the members of the Fenian Brotherhood.

III

The Fenians represented a new and significant development in the struggle of Ireland against her English masters. The aftermath of the famine of 1845 and the rebellion of 1848 had been a wave of emigration to America. The emigrants carried to the New World their deep-rooted bitterness against England and their fervent devotion to the cause of Irish independence. Their romantic and intransigent nationalism gave them a coherence which made them a potent political force and which provided a solid backing, not merely in sympathy, but in funds and in influence, for the continued efforts on behalf of Irish freedom.

These efforts materialized in successive attempts to create an organization in America which should be the directing body for Irish revolutionary activity, and one of the earliest of these groups was the Fenian Brotherhood. Its organization was completed in 1857, and by 1863 it had rallied sufficient support to hold a convention in Chicago, at which the Irish republic was proclaimed and a government was formed. By that time, too, there were high hopes that the forces of direct action would soon be available. Numbers of Irishmen had enlisted with the Northern forces, and it was conceivable not only that their military experience could be turned to profit, but that the gratitude of a government which felt little affection for Britain under the best of conditions would find tangible expression in support for Ireland and her champions.

The actual plan of campaign, however, remained somewhat vague. One group was for carrying the war directly against England, and the outrages in both Ireland and England which marked the latter years of the sixties were in part attributable to its inspiration. But there was another group which saw in Canada the nearest point of attack and the best starting point for a crusade. Even if the Fenians should prove too weak by themselves to effect the conquest of Canada they could at least embarrass the British

power in that portion of the empire, and it was not beyond possibility that border disturbances would lead to incidents which might ultimately result in further affronts to American susceptibilities and perhaps even provoke a war from which Ireland could well expect to profit.

By 1865 the two groups had split over this question of tactics, with the advocates of a Canadian enterprise carrying with them a substantial body of Fenian support. Even before that the strength of their demonstrations and the loudly proclaimed plans for aggression had created in Canada an uneasiness which lasted until after 1870. In the final analysis the Fenians were less dangerous than they tried to pretend. For all their expenditure of noise and energy, they accomplished even less than the Hunters of a generation before. Yet merely by existing in this minatory fashion they kept alive Canadian apprehension for a full five years, and their memory is deeply embedded in Canadian tradition, while that of the Hunters has all but disappeared.

The difference is explained by the changed attitude of the United States. Canada could no longer count, as she had thirty years previously, on the desire of the American government to foster international amity. On the contrary, there was only too much evidence of a willingness to view with complacency any activity which might embarrass the Canadian and British governments, so long as it did not too seriously involve the United States. As the British Minister felt constrained to point out, the loud protests of the American government against Confederate activities in Canada were somewhat in contrast to the tolerance with which it viewed the avowedly hostile designs toward the British dominions which the Fenians were so vigorously pursuing.

It was not only the popular sentiment of the North that lent tacit or even avowed support to the movement. Minor officials were closely linked with the Fenians. Members of Congress expressed their sympathy, not merely with the accustomed platitudes, but more eloquently with cash contributions. A general of the United States Army accepted the post of Minister of War in the Fenian cabinet and undertook the organization of a military force. The Fenian leaders charged, though with suspicious vagueness, that they had been promised effective support from high

quarters. Certainly in the bitter political struggle which marked the presidency of Andrew Johnson neither side intended to risk the loss of the Irish vote by trying to suppress the movement or even by condemning it in public. The attitude of Seward himself was so dubious that the British Minister felt it wise not to press for definite action. "If Mr. Seward," he reported, "were called upon to make any formal declaration on the question it is very likely that he would accompany it with some expressions of sympathy with the national aspirations which underlie the movement rather than lose for his party the support of the Irish vote at this critical moment." Indeed, the Administration in general showed a tendency toward the attitude that it was really Britain who was embarrassing the United States and that if she would only settle the Irish question the whole difficulty would disappear.

As a result, no serious preventive action was taken to avert border incursions, and it was chiefly the inherent weaknesses of the Fenians in organization and leadership that made them so ineffectual. Their original plans called for an invasion of Canada on St. Patrick's Day, 1866. But although the Canadian militia was called out to meet the danger, the great day came and passed with no move from the aspiring but volatile warriors of General Sweeny. In April a group from Maine made threatening gestures against New Brunswick but on second thoughts decided not to challenge the militia of that province. Early in June a force which crossed the Vermont border succeeded in destroying property to the value of \$15,000 but scurried hastily back when the troops approached. But, meanwhile, on the Niagara frontier an invasion had taken place which, feeble as it was, embodied the nearest thing to a serious threat that the movement ever produced.

On the night of May 31 a body of some 1,500 crossed the Niagara River under the leadership of John O'Neil. They had neither artillery nor supplies, but to offset this they carried a proclamation in which Sweeny (who remained on the American side of the river) announced that they were invading Canada in order to free Ireland. "Looking about us for the enemy," he said in support of this curious geographical concept, "we find him here—here in your midst, where he is most vulnerable and convenient to our strength."

In the early morning of June 1 the invaders occupied the old ruins of Fort Erie and requisitioned food and transport from the local population. Then they moved down the river, foraging as they went. Meanwhile, the Canadian volunteers who were holding themselves in readiness were being rushed toward the scene of action. They were hardly better supplied than the Fenians, for the commanders had overlooked such desirable articles as food and water, but these were supplied by the civilians en route, and the volunteers were supplemented by a regular force which included a battery of artillery. Early on June 2 the volunteers who had reached Port Colborne and the regulars who were at Chippewa set out to make a junction at Stevensville a few miles back from the Niagara frontier.

O'Neil was also on the move. Perhaps with the idea of dealing with the Canadian forces separately, he placed himself between them and marched toward the weaker force of about 1,200 volunteers advancing from Port Colborne. He was aided by the lack of co-ordination in the Canadian plans and the confusion of orders that passed—or on occasions failed to pass—between the commanders. One result was that the volunteers had left an hour earlier than the plan originally called for and encountered the Fenians when the Chippewa force had barely begun its march toward the junction point.

The clash took place at eight in the morning at the spot known as Ridgeway. The encounter was something of a surprise to the defenders. They had no scouts out to warn them that they were approaching the enemy and no knowledge of his numbers or disposition when they came upon him. They simply sighted the Fenians and proceeded to attack at once. But the Fenian ranks contained veterans of the Civil War, and the hotness of their fire threw the untrained volunteers into some confusion. This was completed by the inept orders of an inexperienced commander. The attack was consequently beaten off, and the volunteers fell back to their starting point.

But the Fenians, too, decided to retreat. The volunteers had shown their mettle in spite of their repulse, and O'Neil decided not to challenge the force of regulars with its stronger numbers. He returned to Fort Erie to find that a small body of Canadians

had arrived by ship and taken possession of the town. Most of the seventy men in this detachment were promptly captured, and their commander only escaped by hastily shaving off his distinctive Dundreary whiskers and fleeing in disguise. But O'Neil found that no help was forthcoming from the local population and that no reinforcements were in prospect from the American side. During the night he decided to abandon the whole enterprise and withdrew his invading army back across the frontier.

Now that violence had actually broken out, the American government took steps to bring it to an end. A gunboat patrolled the Niagara River to prevent aid to the Fenians once they had crossed, and helped to round up a considerable number as they returned. The arms they had collected were seized, and fresh troops were sent to the frontier. But although for the moment the danger subsided, Canadian apprehensions were by no means at an end. Most of the Fenians were released without trial. Their organization was not dissolved. They continued to meet in convention, to parade the streets of American cities, and to raise funds for renewed attempts at invasion. By the spring of 1870 definite preparations were once more under way, and this at a time when Britain was taking steps to withdraw her remaining garrisons from Canada. "At this moment," wrote Sir John Macdonald with some bitterness, "we are in daily expectation of a formidable Fenian invasion, unrepressed by the United States Government, and connived at by their subordinate officials. . . . We are left to be the unaided victims of Irish discontent and American hostility, caused entirely by our being a portion of the Empire."

The invasion, when it did materialize, was not so formidable after all. In May 1870 a feeble incursion into the Eastern Townships was easily driven back, and the leaders were arrested by the American authorities. The attempt against Manitoba in the following year was equally contemptible. It had its origin in the perturbed situation which followed the collapse of Riel's movement. The Canadian volunteers who accompanied the military expedition to the Red River regarded themselves as a punitive force, and a number of outrages which the authorities failed to check aroused the alarm of the half-breeds and doubts about the relia-

bility of the government's promises. The result was a meeting in September 1870 at which Riel and a number of other leaders considered the advisability of some new action in case their fears should prove well founded.

William O'Donoghue, the Fenian, saw a new chance to press for a pronouncement in favor of annexation to the United States. He failed to win the support of Riel, but he did gain for himself a mission to carry to President Grant an appeal for his good offices, coupled with a strong hint that in the last resort the settlement might throw itself upon the United States for protection. The President paid little attention to this document, and Riel himself broke with O'Donoghue as the situation in Manitoba became easier. But O'Donoghue saw a chance to strike out on a line of his own in an attempt to carry his aims by direct action.

He first made contact with the annexationists in Minnesota and in Washington. Finding them unwilling to commit themselves to any positive course, he turned to the Fenian Council in New York. But the council had turned cautious after the failure of the recent raid. They were ready to let O'Donoghue try his schemes but not to take any part in them. They told him they could give him only their prayers, and O'Donoghue had an instinctive feeling that hard cash would be more effective in Minnesota. In 1871 he set out on a speaking tour, aided by O'Neil, who had recently been released from jail. But their efforts could raise no more than forty men to launch the invasion in October 1871. They managed to cross the border and take the Hudson's Bay Company post at Pembina, but the province was prepared to resist, and a squad of American soldiers followed the Fenians across the border and took them into custody. It was the end of the Fenian effort. Although the movement lingered on for several years it was no longer an active menace to Canada.

Nonetheless, the prolonged tension which the movement had created had had a very deep effect. Arising coincident with a number of other circumstances, it had added its own stimulus to the stirrings of Canadian nationalism. It helped Canada to feel more than ever that she must find in her own resources the strength to deal with the external as well as the internal problems which confronted her. Throughout the whole decade of the six-

ties Canada had faced on her southern border successive manifestations of antagonism which at times amounted to threats against her existence as a separate community. For her own safety she felt impelled to seek a wider union, and she achieved it in the federation of 1867.

CHAPTER XII

A Stronger Nationalism

THE CONFEDERATION OF CANADA was the product of a combination of circumstances which together affected almost every important phase of the national life. It was a transient and fortuitous combination, and without such a coincidence of factors it is highly probable that the political readjustment would have taken a different and more limited form if it came about at all. There is little doubt that a federation of the provinces would sooner or later have been achieved, but without the operation of such numerous and varied motives working simultaneously to a single end, the task of overcoming the obstacles to unity would have been more difficult and the process far more prolonged.

By no means the least potent of these factors was the apprehension which had been roused in Canada by the attitude and policies of the United States. When so many powerful incentives were at work, and when their operations were intertwined in so complex a fashion, it is not easy to assess the relative weight of any one of them. But the few were more pervasive in their influence than the desire to present an effective resistance to the dangers which now seemed to threaten from the Republic to the south. It was not merely a question of military defense, important as that was. It was a threat to a wide variety of interests, political and economic and geographical, which was far more comprehensive than the risk of armed aggression. Almost every single motive

which arose out of domestic conditions within the confines of British North America was heightened and made more urgent by American activities. The United States loomed as an imminent obstacle to the plans and the ambitions which now seemed vital to Canada's future, and only the speedy realization of those plans, it seemed, could save them from being balked forever by a new American advance.

The immediate incentive for the attempt to create a new political structure was to be found in the domestic situation of the 1860s. The province of Canada had reached a state of political deadlock that was aggravated by economic stagnation. In spite of the benefits of the Reciprocity Treaty the aftermath of the Crimean War and the dislocation incidental to the American Civil War showed the vulnerable nature of Canadian prosperity, and the growing certainty that reciprocity would be abrogated by the United States at the earliest possible moment was an added cause for apprehension concerning the future. Sectional divisions in the united province of Canada had reached a point where no party could command a stable majority. Economic problems in both Canada and the Maritime Provinces had reached a point which made it impossible to solve them by purely local action. A wider union and the opening up of new fields of enterprise were vital to the restoration of political stability and the broadening of economic opportunity.

These aims naturally enlisted the support of powerful and interested groups within the community. As in the United States during the period following the Revolution, there were individuals and classes whose interests transcended the boundaries of the various provinces. The traders and investors, the land speculators and the aspiring industrialists who rallied to Hamilton and the Federalists had their counterparts in British North America. The scope afforded by separate and local fields of enterprise was now too narrow for their purposes. They wanted to reduce and even to eliminate the provincial boundaries with their restrictive effects. They wanted the creation of a broad national economy which would allow them to pursue their activities on a continent-wide scale. And they desired a national government which would not only look favorably on their activities and protect them from un-

due interference, but which would be possessed of comprehensive powers enabling it to take positive action in facilitating and forwarding the ends they had in view.

In one respect their problem was less urgent than that of their American predecessors. They were not confronted with the social and economic aftermath of a revolution. They might be apprehensive about a possible decline in public credit which would affect their own securities, for the commitments of the Canadian government through its aid to railroads and canals had resulted in a heavy burden of debt, and British investors—the chief source of outside capital—were showing some skepticism about the soundness of provincial securities. But although these might decline in value there was no such risk of a repudiation of bonds and currency as that which haunted the holders of Continental securities after 1783. Still less was there any such threat to property and the established order as that which Washington and his associates saw embodied in Daniel Shays. There was some risk of economic stagnation and of a depreciation of securities on the market; there was none of property confiscation or economic collapse.

Nonetheless, even these more moderate perils were serious enough to enlist substantial and influential groups in the effort to achieve a broader union. Their enthusiasm was particularly aroused by the vision of the acquisition and the opening of the West. A union between Canada and the Maritime Provinces would offer only a partial amelioration of the existing difficulties. The transfer of the vast western empire from the Hudson's Bay Company to the new federation would transform the whole outlook for the future. The infant industries of central Canada anticipated a repetition of American developments in which a flood of settlers, pouring in to populate the vacant prairies, would create a lucrative home market for manufactured goods. The railway interests saw a new field of expansion in which they might retrieve their declining fortunes. Financial groups, whose interests were bound up with public as well as private investments in the transportation system, hoped for a revival of public credit as well as for new opportunities through the resulting stimulus to the whole economy. Even the agrarians of Upper Canada—that frontier element so similar in many respects to the class which

furnished a substantial part of the opposition to centralized government in the United States—evinced a considerable enthusiasm for the project. The strained relations between English and French in the united province would be solved by its division. The risk of French domination would be reduced by a federal structure, particularly after the West had been settled by a predominantly English immigration. Land seekers who were now leaving Canada for the United States would be able to find in the new West the farms which were no longer available in Ontario, and the drift of population which hampered Canadian progress would at last be checked. It was not, indeed, from the frontier areas, but from the older settlements in the East—the Maritime farmers and businessmen who were skeptical about securing their rightful share in the benefits which their Canadian brethren envisaged so enthusiastically—that the most serious opposition to federation eventually arose.

Over all these aspirations the shadow of the United States now hung dark and menacing. There was scarcely a factor involved in the movement for confederation which was not directly touched by existing relations with the United States. The political deadlock in Canada was, it is true, the outcome of purely indigenous conditions on which the broader international situation had little direct effect. But that situation heightened the sense of urgency and of the need for an immediate and even a drastic solution. The possibility that a continuance of the deadlock might favor American annexationist designs was not entirely absent from consideration. It was reflected in the support which the higher clergy in Quebec gave to the project of confederation as a preferable alternative to absorption in the United States—a support which helped to bring at least acquiescence from a French population which showed little positive enthusiasm for the new plan.

The future of the West, so salient an element in the broad aspirations which confederation was intended to advance, was a problem whose critical nature was directly due to the fear of American expansion. The rising tide of American settlement which was lapping over the border of the Canadian prairies, the unconcealed annexationist sentiment among the American settlers on the Red River and in British Columbia, the active campaign for annexa-

tion in the neighboring states and its rising echoes in Congress and the press, all these were danger signals which could not be ignored. If events were allowed to take their natural course, the loss of the West was almost predestined. Only direct and vigorous action could counteract the results of American infiltration, and the margin of time in which such action could still be taken successfully was rapidly and perilously diminishing.

Here was a prospect which affected a wide variety of interests. The Grits who looked forward to the swamping of the French by the settlement of a vast area populated by English-speaking Canadians, the homeseeker who desired to make a new start on British soil, the traders and manufacturers with their vision of a tremendously expanding home market, all would see their hopes dashed if the West should go to the United States by default. The transportation interests would feel the blow even more seriously. The protracted efforts to channel the trade of the American West through the St. Lawrence Valley, first by the building of canals and later by the construction of trunk railroads, now had to be recognized as having failed. The rival American routes had proved their superior attractiveness as outlets for the products of the Middle West. A railroad such as the Grand Trunk, built to handle the through traffic of the continental interior, found itself forced to rely chiefly on local traffic within a limited area in which the population was still too scanty to make the road a paying proposition. The idea of bringing into being a Canadian west whose growing population and productivity would offset these earlier disappointments naturally presented itself as an attractive alternative. But immediate steps were necessary to assure the possibility. Quite apart from American population pressure and political designs, American transport routes had already begun to reach toward the Canadian prairies. Just as the Erie Canal had captured the trade of the Old Northwest from the St. Lawrence, so the Northern Pacific might forestall the Canadian railroads in Manitoba if matters were allowed to drift, and the links thus created would powerfully reinforce the annexationist threat. The desire to prevent such a development was not lessened by the chronic financial difficulties of the Grand Trunk and the consequent suffering not only of the private shareholders, but of the

Canadian taxpayers whose government had been so generous with guarantees and loans. The lifting of the railroad out of the "organized mess" which its new president found he had inherited was a project close to the heart not only of the company, but of the community at large.

While apprehension over American activities thus stimulated a desire for a transcontinental route which would secure and develop the West, the attitude of the American government simultaneously forced the railroad interests to turn somewhat anxious eyes toward the East. The Atlantic terminus of the Grand Trunk was Portland, Maine. Unhampered access to this outlet was made possible by the bonding regulations which developed from the American drawback law of 1846. The threat of cancellation of these privileges, which seemed imminent by 1864, created a perturbing situation and made it necessary to contemplate the construction of a route purely on Canadian soil to a port in the Maritime Provinces. This met with the project which Maritime leaders had been pressing for two decades of a railroad which should tap the St. Lawrence to the commercial advantage of Halifax or St. John. Here again was a plan which must eventually have been carried out but whose achievement was greatly hastened by existing strained relations with the United States.

All these factors were of vital importance to the economic welfare and the future prospects of British North America. The abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty had an even more direct bearing on their prosperity. Substantial interests in all the provinces envisaged dire results from this threatened exclusion from the American market. The concern of the government was shown by its restrained but persistent efforts to find an acceptable basis for a new agreement. That concern was not diminished by a recognition that at least some of the American advocates of abrogation were animated by a belief that the resulting blow to the prosperity of the provinces would force them to seek annexation to the United States. The search for new trade outlets, necessitated by American action, was at least a secondary motive in the movement to draw the provinces together into a single union.

Underlying all these considerations and strongly coloring the approach to the question of a wider union lay the problem of de-

fense against a possible attack from the United States. It is possibly indicative of the confidence of Canadians in the ultimate good sense of their neighbors that this purpose, important as it was, did not become a dominant motive in itself. The general view was fairly close to that expressed by Dunkin in the debate on confederation: "The real danger is not war with the United States. It is from what I may call their pacific hostility . . . from the multiplied worries they may cause us by a judicious alternation of bullying and coaxing." Yet the possibility of a more serious crisis could not entirely be ignored, particularly when Fenian vociferousness foreshadowed not merely raids by that body, but a deliberate effort to create on the border a state of chronic disturbance which might ultimately embroil the United States in war with Canada and Great Britain. It was the province of Canada which was most immediately affected by the prospect, and the feeling of necessity for a defensive union diminished in the other provinces in proportion to their relative security. But when New Brunswick felt that the Fenian threat was directed at its own borders the situation contributed to a change of view from its earlier reluctance to approve the terms which its delegates had brought back from the conference at Quebec.

The real importance of the question of defense in its bearing on the achievement of unity lay in its influence on the attitude of Great Britain. The initial attitude of the imperial government toward the idea of Canadian federation was not wholly devoid of inconsistency. The desire to get rid of colonial responsibilities was virtually at its peak in the 1860s. The willingness to abandon control of the colonies and allow them to pursue their own destinies was, however, somewhat less in evidence. The prospect that a stronger Canada might become more independent of British control, if not indeed of British rule, was one which the home government did not entirely welcome even when some of its members regarded such a development as ultimately inevitable.

But British possession of Canada, at a time when relations with the United States were still extremely strained, presented a major problem in imperial defense. There was an attempt at insistence that Canada should herself provide such forces as Britain considered necessary to meet an attack, and there were sharp recrimi-

nations when the Canadians chose instead to relate their military preparations to their own resources. It was impossible to evade the necessity of imperial aid to Canada in case of attack if Canada was to be preserved as a part of the empire, but anything which would reduce the demands on the mother country was almost certain to be welcome there.

This was one of the chief arguments which the Canadian leaders used in their efforts not merely to secure British approval of confederation, but to enlist the positive and vigorous influence of the home government in carrying it to completion. The dubious and even hostile attitude of London when the project was first put forward was reversed primarily by the fact that the Colonial Secretary arrived at the conviction that the union "was eminently calculated to render easier and more effectual the provisions for the defense of the several provinces." Not the least factor behind this belief was the realization that federation would facilitate the construction of a railroad from Halifax to Quebec. This road, which Canadian interests sought for commercial purposes, was ardently desired by Britain for purposes of defense. There had already been too many occasions on which reinforcements, rushed to Canada to meet a threat of invasion from the United States, had arrived too late to reach Quebec before the close of navigation and had been obliged to set out on unfamiliar snowshoes on the long march through the wilds of New Brunswick. There had even been the recent occasion when the permission of the United States had to be requested for the passage of troops, intended for defense against the United States, across American soil by rail to Canada. With the danger of a clash between Britain and the United States diminished but by no means dissipated, anything that promised more effectual provision for Canadian defense was definitely to be encouraged. British encouragement took the tangible form of pressure on the recalcitrant provinces to abandon their opposition and to accept the federal scheme; and this pressure, though not universally effective, was a decisive factor in bringing about the initial union in 1867.

II

In the meantime it had become abundantly clear that American hostility, if seriously directed against Canada, would now be far more formidable than it had been during the past generation. Even when the spirit of manifest destiny was at its height the possibility that it would manifest itself in a determined effort at conquest was considerably modified by the growing sectional rift within the United States. Now that restraint had been removed by force of arms. The victory of the North meant the triumph of nationalism and the supremacy of the federal government. In the dominant North it brought a new self-assurance born of the successful struggle against the forces of disunity and an added determination to brook no affronts from foreign nations whose jealousies and intrigues had, it was firmly believed, encouraged the South to attempt secession and strengthened it by covert support throughout the conflict. The renewed determination to exclude European influences from the American continent was backed by an army of veterans. The revived conviction that the United States was destined to control the whole of North America could be translated into aggressive action backed by unified direction and policy. And if resentment against Britain should be fused with American continental ambitions in a single dominant purpose, Canada would be the inevitable victim.

To this stronger American nationalism which now confronted them the answer of the British North American colonies was an affirmation of their own national aspirations, expressed in the creation of the Dominion of Canada. It was an affirmation of individuality not only against the United States, but in certain aspects against Britain as well. Canada's federal constitution was meant to give her a still wider control of her own affairs, and one incidental effect might be to impress the United States with the fact that Canada was no mere appendage of Britain but a community in her own right with a distinctive outlook and a will of her own. Macdonald talked of the relation of protection and dependence being replaced by that of a healthy and cordial alliance and of Australia and Canada emerging from the status of colonies to that of subordinate nations. The title originally suggested

for the new state—the Kingdom of Canada—was itself an indication of the aspirations toward full autonomy entertained by the fathers of confederation.

But it was autonomy, not independence. If the desire to escape from the position of a perpetual scapegoat for the sins—real or alleged—of England against the United States was an added reason in favor of the assertion of Canada's individuality, the danger that Canada might be attacked on her own account was sufficiently acute to make her feel the need for continued imperial protection. Even had this been absent there were other and powerful motives of both sentiment and interest which would have dictated a continued loyalty to the British Crown. The question of military aid from Britain merely strengthened other incentives which were fully adequate in themselves. But it was by no means a negligible consideration at a time when annexationist agitation was rising in the United States and the Fenians presented an imminent threat. On the other hand, Canada had already learned that help from Britain, while it would assuredly be sent eventually, might be neither prompt nor lavish. The persistent pressure on Canada to set up a more adequate defense organization had behind it the desire of the home government to withdraw the remaining British garrisons from Canada in the interests of economy. If Canada were to be left alone to bear the initial brunt of attack she must have both unity and freedom of action.

That freedom, however, was to be attained within the structure of the British Empire. The preamble to the British North America Act specifically affirmed the desire of the provinces to be united in one Dominion under the British Crown. It also affirmed Canada's adherence to the basic political tradition which she had inherited from England. The new constitution—in a phrase that was pregnant with implications, both legal and political—was to be "similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom." It was a tacit rejection of the American model in favor of that of the mother country.

In actual fact, however, the rejection was far less complete than the words might seem to imply. Britain, after all, was a unitary state. Canada was committed by inexorable circumstances to a federal structure. The necessity was accepted with some reluc-

tance by a number of Canadian leaders. Macdonald in particular frankly avowed his preference for a legislative union. The reluctance of the other provinces to surrender their identity, and particularly the fear on the part of the French Canadians that their peculiar institutions would disappear if provincial boundaries were eliminated, made such a union impossible. Its supporters might try, and with considerable success, to come as close to it in practice as was possible within a federal framework. But such a framework had to be accepted if any form of union was to be achieved.

In such circumstances the American federal structure inevitably imposed itself as a model. There is perhaps no greater tribute to the genius of the American fathers than the fact that their work has set the pattern for all true federations in the modern world. Macdonald and his supporters deliberately used the term "confederation" in an effort to soothe the susceptibilities of the supporters of provincial autonomy, just as they used the words "treaty" and "compact" in a successful effort to prevent embarrassing amendments to the original Quebec resolutions. But a confederation implies a union in which the basic power rests with the constituent states and the central government is merely their agent. That was the situation in the United States before 1787 under the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution of that year adopted a completely different system which created a central government with sovereign powers within its allotted sphere and with authority to act in a national capacity directly upon the individual citizen without the intervention of the states. This was the type of government which Canada adopted. Hardly any responsible leader could have been found to advocate the adoption of the earlier and looser structure. If a union was to be formed at all, it should be a strong union with the broadest powers vested in the central government. The American Constitution, the pioneer experiment in this type of political structure, was inevitably the starting point for any effort toward such an end.

There were other factors which reinforced this in the case of Canada. Proximity was one of them. Canadians for nearly a century had been closely watching the operation of the American

system of government, with diverse emotions which were sometimes expressed in heated controversy but always with keen and unfailing interest. Moreover, the structure of American society and the realistic methods of American politics bore a great deal of similarity to conditions in Canada itself. To add to the familiarity of Canadians with the institutions of the Republic there was the fact that these institutions had grown out of a fundamental English tradition. They had taken an original form, partly from the necessities imposed by existing conditions in the United States after the Revolution, and partly from the lessons of colonial experience which influenced certain basic features not only of the federal Constitution, but of the state constitutions which had preceded it. But although Canadian experience and Canadian tradition had led to a different sort of development, the political systems of the two North American nations stemmed from the same English root.

Yet while the American structure offered an initial pattern, it represented only a starting point. Its adaptation to Canadian purposes involved some very considerable alterations in a number of essential features. "Our friends on the other side of the House," charged one critic, "have not only looked to Washington, but absolutely gone there and imported the worst features of the republican system for incorporation in our new Constitution." The charge was exaggerated at best and certainly was completely contrary to what the framers of the new scheme of government firmly believed they had done. The repeated reference to the American Constitution and its interpreters showed how powerfully it had affected their initial approach. But far from having accepted and copied it, they were strongly convinced that they had adapted and changed it for the better. After paying tribute to that instrument as one of the most perfect organizations that ever governed a free people, Macdonald went on to say: "We are happily situated in having had the opportunity of watching its operation, seeing its working from its infancy till now. . . . We can now take advantage of the experience of the last seventy-eight years, during which that Constitution has existed, and I am strongly of the belief that we have, in a great measure, avoided in

this system which we propose for the adoption of the people of Canada, the defects which time and events have shown to exist in the American Constitution."

The most obvious difference, and one which was emphasized in the debates, was in the organization of the executive branch of the government. The formal vesting of the executive power in the Queen and her successors was an affirmation of Canada's adherence to the British connection and the monarchical principle. By implication it was thus a decisive answer to that body of American opinion which held that Canada was moving steadily and inevitably toward union with the United States. But it was also a rejection not only of republicanism, but of the more advanced aspects of American democracy. In the recurrent struggles over the presidency the Canadian leaders found an illustration and a warning of the results of that democracy in operation. It led to the selection of the highest authority in the land by a process of partisan and often embittered struggle, which made the Chief Executive not the accepted leader of the nation, but a party chief who continued to be opposed throughout his term of office by a substantial part of the electorate. Cartier in particular, as the spokesman of French conservatism, looked on this phenomenon with something akin to horror. He cited American authorities to support the opinion that "the governmental powers had become too extended, owing to the introduction of universal suffrage, and mob rule had consequently supplanted legitimate authority." From such a fate, he and his associates hoped, Canada would be preserved by the retention of the monarchical form of government.

What this meant in actual practice was adherence to the cabinet system in preference to an elective basis for administrative office. In actual fact, the choice between the two had already been made a quarter of a century previously. It was a testimony to the way in which the theory and the working of cabinet government had been clarified since 1787. When the American Constitution was framed that system was still passing through a formative stage, and its operation in the hands of George III and Lord North did not recommend it as a model to a nation whose recent struggles seemed to have been necessitated largely by executive tyranny. In the search for an alternative the elective principle was

not adopted outright. It was rather permissive and indirect, with the electoral college hopefully looked on as a safeguard against undue democracy. For all federal offices except that of Chief Executive the method of appointment was retained, subject to the check of Senate ratification as a safeguard against executive domination. But as the individual states evolved toward a more democratic system the extension of the elective principle for public office became more and more characteristic of American political methods. To the early Canadian reformers, struggling against the domination of an irresponsible executive, the adoption of this principle seemed increasingly attractive as a guarantee of political liberty. But the more moderate among them saw in a system of cabinet government based on majority rule in the legislature a more acceptable alternative, and by 1840 they had established this as the chief issue in the battle for responsible government which was won in 1849. Certain radical groups continued to echo the older views about the desirability of popular control over individual officials. But the last serious advocacy of the outright adoption of the American system was in the period immediately preceding the rebellion of 1837. The years that followed in American politics revealed some of the less attractive aspects of democracy in action and helped confirm the choice of the British model—a choice to which Mackenzie himself was converted by his residence in the United States. As the Canadian sense of political separatism from the United States grew in strength it was reinforced by a divergence in the form of political institutions which the architects of confederation were concerned to strengthen rather than to modify.

In a second major respect the lessons offered by the United States powerfully reinforced a decision which was already adequately motivated by purely Canadian considerations. This was the distribution of powers between the central and local governments. The centralizing nature of the forces behind confederation, the strongly Hamiltonian outlook of Macdonald and his chief associates stand out clearly as salient features of the whole movement. Although forced by circumstances to accept a federal basis the framers of the new scheme sought, in Macdonald's words, "to form a government upon federal principles, which

would give to the general government the strength of a legislative and administrative union." So far as was possible the provinces were to be reduced to subordinate entities under the unquestioned supremacy of the central government.

But if added arguments were needed to bolster this decision they were provided by the recent history of the United States. State sovereignty had provided a constitutional foundation for the growing sectional struggle which had culminated so tragically in armed conflict. It offered an object lesson for Canada which strengthened the belief in the wisdom of centralization. "They commenced, in fact, at the wrong end," said Macdonald of the United States. "They declared by their Constitution that each state was a sovereignty in itself, and that all the powers incident to a sovereignty belonged to each state, except those powers which, by the Constitution, were conferred upon the General Government and Congress. Here we have adopted a different system. We have strengthened the General Government. We have given the General Legislature all the great subjects of legislation. We have conferred on them . . . specifically and in detail, all the powers which are incident to sovereignty."

Indeed, the proposals—on paper at least—carried Hamiltonian ideas to a point which Hamilton himself might have envied. The residuary power was vested in the central government. The provinces were confined to a narrow range of purely local matters. Banking and commerce, communications and the criminal law were given to the Dominion without qualification, and even purely provincial projects might be brought under federal control by a declaration that they were "works to the general advantage of Canada." In the Senate—an appointed body whose members held office for life—the provinces were denied that equality of membership upon which the small states had insisted in its American counterpart, and the regional equality which was substituted was merely a shadowy concession to the theory of federalism. Provincial laws might be disallowed by the central government. Lieutenant governors of the provinces were appointed by the Dominion and were fondly expected to act as federal agents in keeping the provinces within bounds. Perhaps most vital of all, the provinces were shorn not only of powers, but of finances, and

were to be restrained from efforts to extend their activities by a lack of resources (unless they risked the odium of imposing direct taxation) and a dependence on federal subsidies for even the limited functions which were left to them.

It is true that the balance thus contemplated failed to survive in practice. Macdonald's proud assertion that all conflict of jurisdiction had been avoided and that the advantages of a legislative union had been achieved within a federal framework reckoned without the judicial mind. The subtlety of that marvelous instrument proved adequate to discovering the most complete confusion in what appeared to be the clearest and simplest of provisions. It was brought powerfully to bear by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, with results which eventually stultified the purposes which the authors of the Canadian constitution, on their own repeated evidence, had deliberately set out to achieve. It is not impossible that the Privy Council in its turn, in spite of its rejection of all extrinsic considerations, may have been influenced by the body of precedents which the United States Supreme Court had created in the process of drawing the line between state and federal powers. But if the consequence was ultimately to encourage in Canada the very doctrine of provincial rights which the fathers sought to prevent, the result has been only an added testimony to their foresight in making the attempt.

In the United States, whose influence upon the whole movement had been so powerful and so pervasive, opinion in general seems to have paid only passing attention to the achievement of confederation. The final stages of the war, the problems of readjustment and reconstruction, the embittered conflict between Johnson and the Radicals made domestic affairs sufficiently absorbing to overshadow external developments. Such interest as was aroused resulted in a somewhat mixed attitude to the new national structure that was emerging north of the border. Those moderate annexationists who believed in political predestination were inclined to look upon confederation with benevolent approval. To them it seemed one more stage in the inevitable process of separation between Canada and the mother country and the entry of Canada upon a sort of novitiate which would eventually make her fit to enter upon her ultimate and glorious

destiny of admission as an equal into the noble republican company of the states united under the American Constitution.

There were, however, some dissenting voices. Those aggressive elements who believed in lending manifest destiny a vigorous helping hand united with the anti-British and anti-monarchical groups who saw in Canada a potential spearhead of European aggression. Governor Chamberlain of Maine, his military laurels still sitting ponderously upon him, invited his legislature to view with alarm "the scheme for the consolidation of the British provinces on our border, which I believe to have been, along with the French Empire of Mexico, a part of the great conspiracy against liberty on this youthful continent." Representative Raymond wanted the House to request information whether the President had remonstrated over the proposed consolidation or whether American consent had been given to the project. General Banks carried a resolution that a monarchical confederation which was carried without popular consultation would offend the principles and endanger the interests of the United States.

These, however, were comparatively isolated incidents. It is true that the British Minister reported some dislike of the proposed title "Kingdom of Canada," and Lord Stanley made consideration for the susceptibilities of the United States the ostensible ground for his objections to this designation. The word "Dominion" was therefore substituted—a choice sufficiently non-committal to be inoffensive. But whatever the change may have meant to the subsequent progress of Canadian autonomy, it had no effect upon the purposes which animated the sponsors of confederation. Internally the forces of expansion were to be released and encouraged. Externally Canada was to assert her individuality against both of the two great nations with which her destiny was so closely linked and to stand forth as a nation in her own right—a nation whose desire to remain British was unabated, but whose position and primary interests lay on the American continent, and whose determination to uphold those interests against both Britain and the United States was an outgrowth of the unsatisfactory and anomalous situation in which Canada discovered herself during the Civil War and its aftermath.

CHAPTER XIII

A Decade of Tension

BY 1867 THE FORCES making for division within the American continent had gained a new ascendancy over the factors favorable to unity. The stronger nationalism which was evident on both sides of the line was both a symbol of this situation and a stimulus to its development. The United States, emerging from a successful struggle against the forces of disruption within its own borders, was indeed in a temper which favored new efforts toward a complete domination of the continent. But that very temper had encouraged in Canada a spirit of resistance which found expression in a more effective organization as a bulwark against conquest or absorption, and the external pressure which had helped to bring confederation to completion continued during most of the decade which followed and encouraged the consolidation of that national unity and sense of independence which confederation itself was meant to serve.

For although the danger of American attack abated with the disbanding of the Northern armies after the war, the possibility of serious difficulties was by no means at an end. The United States in its triumph was self-confident, but it was also resentful. It was a disturbing combination when the anger against Britain and the irritation at Canada, which had grown during the war, were carried over into the period of peace. The aggressive tone of certain extremist groups was now more pronounced than ever. They

found new ground for agitation in the specific causes of friction which arose to aggravate an already strained situation. The Fenian threat lurked continually in the background as an added and highly disturbing factor. The prospect of war might be remote, but it was by no means unthinkable. Not since 1814 had relations been less harmonious between Canada and the United States.

To Canadians the most alarming aspect of the situation was the new life which victory over the South had infused into the expansionist spirit of the North. It was illustrated by the attempt to purchase the Danish West Indies and by the persistent efforts of the Grant Administration to secure the annexation of Santo Domingo. It came still nearer home with the purchase of Alaska—a step which Senator Sumner triumphantly hailed as setting a watchful Yankee on each side of John Bull in North America. In that situation Canada was bound to attract the particular attention of the advocates of expansion. Antagonism against Britain stimulated a desire to expel her from the American continent. Resentment against Canada gave rise to the idea that further irritation could be prevented by suppressing the irritant. Canada's recent assertion of her individual aspirations to nationhood needed to be emphatically repeated in various forms and on a number of occasions before it made any real impression on her neighbor.

The strength of American annexationist sentiment was in marked contrast to the situation a decade or so previously. The Canadian movement of 1849 had met with virtually no response in the United States. But every sign during the sixties that Canadians favored entry into the Republic was seized upon and magnified by the expansionist element. The change was primarily the result of the elimination of the sectional issue after the Civil War. The acquisition of Canada would no longer be blocked by a determined and effective Southern opposition. The chief restraint on Northern expansionist ambitions was consequently removed; indeed, there was an added temptation to feel that the absorption of Canada would be the logical completion of that work of continental unification which had been so tremendously advanced by the defeat of the South.

Even at the outbreak of war some eyes had been turned toward

Canada. It was a tempting thought, to many in the North who were willing to allow the wayward Southern states to depart in peace, that Canada might be annexed as compensation. The New York *Herald* under James Gordon Bennett was one advocate of this project. Bennett was all the more attracted to the idea because of his persistent dislike of England and his desire to separate Canada from the British Crown, and this sentiment found expression in continued attacks on Canada's attitude and repeated advocacy of annexation throughout the war and the period which followed. Other Northern journals, as relations became more strained, were ready to support the suggestion, and some of those which lacked the *Herald's* belligerency were ready not only to testify to their faith in manifest destiny, but to suggest that the time was ripe to lend destiny a helping hand.

In both the Administration and Congress there were advocates of similar views. Seward, in the campaign of 1860, had expressed a patronizing approval of the industrious way in which Canadians were building excellent states to be admitted ultimately to the Union, and in 1867 he reaffirmed his belief that the whole continent was designed by nature to come within that magic circle. His successor, Hamilton Fish, had much the same approach. His suggestions to the British Minister that Canadians be permitted to hold a plebiscite on the question may have been partly in jest, but somewhat the same idea appears to have been quite seriously considered by Grant. In Congress the aggressive expansionists among the Radicals were able to muster considerable support from colleagues who had no very strong feelings on the matter but who had no objections to any advance which could be achieved without too much trouble, particularly if it was at Britain's expense. Their eager attention to any annexationist sentiment which appeared in British Columbia or Manitoba or the Maritime Provinces showed their readiness to capitalize on even the slenderest opportunities. Their positive support was meager in Congress and probably not much greater in the country at large. There was no serious attention to the bill introduced by General Banks in 1866 providing for the voluntary entry of any or all of the provinces, or to Senator Chandler's demand in 1869 that the President open negotiations for the surrender of all British

possessions in North America. But the existence of these ambitions, expressed so vocally and pursued so pertinaciously, was anything but reassuring to the Canadians against whose independence they were directed.

Moreover, they were held by persons in high places who had a direct voice in any efforts that might be made to settle existing points of friction. In consequence, the American attitude toward specific questions was at least colored by the annexationist agitation. Problems such as the San Juan boundary, the renewal of reciprocity, even of the *Alabama* claims, were affected by the question of the bearing which any proposed settlement might have, or could be made to have, on the prospects of annexation. It was looked on as an added affront in these quarters that Canada should not only take an independent line on such of these questions as directly affected her interests, but should show by her stand an obstinate indifference to the dictates of manifest destiny. At times, and for rather different reasons, this independence was decidedly unwelcome to England as well, and the effect was to lead to a triangular and often confused wrangling before the major causes of friction were ultimately liquidated.

II

From the point of view of Canada the foremost matter of concern was the question of reciprocity. The desire for the continuance of the treaty of 1854, or, failing that, for a new agreement which would offer substantially the same advantages, was general throughout the provinces. The increase of trade during the past decade was generally attributed to the operation of the treaty, and the loss of the outlets which it had provided was expected to have a serious if not actually a disastrous effect on Canadian prosperity. The sense of imminent crisis was revealed by the strenuous efforts to secure new markets to compensate for the prospective exclusion of Canadian products from the United States—efforts which played a real part in the movement toward federation.

But the desire for closer trade relations was almost entirely on Canada's side. Although the exports of the United States to

Canada had increased far more than those of Canada to the United States, they represented a far smaller proportion of the total trade, and the few voices which were raised in support of the treaty were feeble compared with those which demanded its denunciation. In the state of general irritation against Canada which grew out of the war the protectionist forces had little difficulty in rallying the spirit of retaliation behind their interested efforts to bring reciprocity to an end.

As a result Canadian efforts to discover a basis for a new agreement only revealed the hopelessness of the prospect. An exploratory mission to Washington in the summer of 1865 encountered a general indifference on the part of both Congress and the Administration. An exchange of proposals between the Canadian ministry and the House Ways and Means Committee early in 1866 was equally abortive. The best that the Americans were prepared to offer was a moderate level of duties in return for a continuation of the fishing rights granted in 1854. The suggested free list was derisory. It consisted of five articles—millstones, rags, firewood, grindstones, and gypsum. However anxious they might be for an agreement, the Canadians felt that such proposals offered no basis even for negotiation.

In actual fact, their anxiety abated somewhat as the results of abrogation became apparent. A number of individual interests were adversely affected by the new tariff barriers. Canadians in general, however, discovered that though trade might suffer somewhat, they were far from being ruined. Their privileged position in the American market was at an end, but access to that market was still possible, though on a reduced scale. The desire for a new agreement continued, but sooner than accept a one-sided bargain, Canadians felt able to wait until circumstances were more favorable to the conclusion of arrangements that would be fair to both sides. "Until Congress thinks the American interest will be advanced by such a treaty," wrote Macdonald in 1869, "there is no use in our moving in it."

By June of that year there seemed a possibility that the American government might be prepared to take the initiative. A tentative suggestion from Secretary Fish led to the dispatch of Sir John Rose on an unofficial visit, and the resulting conversations

issued in the drafting of a possible basis of agreement. Natural products would be exchanged "as near free of duties as possible," and the possibility of favorable terms on manufactured goods was left open. But it was soon clear that there was no prospect of the implementing of such terms by the United States. Grant's message to Congress asserted that the Administration was opposed to any renewal of reciprocity, on the ground that "the advantages of such a treaty would be wholly in favor of the British producer." It was clear from his further suggestions on the desirability of some commercial arrangement that the real aim was the securing of concessions on canals and fisheries without serious American concessions in return.

This attitude, highly agreeable to the protectionist elements, was equally acceptable to the annexationists. They cherished the belief that Canada was utterly dependent on trade with the United States. Contrary to earlier hopes, reciprocity had not been a steppingstone to annexation; on the contrary, it had made it possible for Canada to maintain her separate existence. Now that it had been abrogated Canada would be driven by necessity to seek union with the United States in order to gain access to the markets without which she could not survive. These were views which harmonized with the conviction that Canada had been the sole gainer under the previous agreement. For such benefits she must be willing to pay by dropping her inexplicable reluctance to merge herself in the Republic that was so generously prepared to welcome her. And if in her obstinacy she remained blind to the obvious desirability of this step, she might be jolted into a sense of reality by a killing blow at her economy.

The matter, however, was not quite so simple as that. Even if the Americans had been right in their view of the one-sided results of the commercial provisions, there were other aspects of the treaty in which the United States had a very real interest. The right of free navigation of Canadian canals was of peculiar interest to the West. Access to the inshore fisheries was still regarded as vital by the New England fishermen. These privileges rested on the treaty of 1854. They were ended by the action of the United States in abrogating that treaty, and the situation returned to the less favorable basis established by the treaty of 1818.

For the moment there was no disposition in Canada to press matters to extremes. The Maritime Provinces were more inclined to take stringent action, and at the time the treaty expired the process of federation had not yet reached completion. But Canada, continuing the privileges of American fishermen in return for a license fee of fifty cents per measured ton of each ship, persuaded her sister provinces to adopt similar regulations. When the Dominion came into being in July 1867 it placed the fisheries of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, though not of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, under federal authority and made uniformity still easier. The initial approach was definitely conciliatory, in the hope that a moderate attitude might facilitate a new agreement.

The attitude of Congress was more aggressive. Although Canada refrained from pressing the previous claim of the right to exclude American fishermen from the bays along the coast, the American legislature showed a disposition to revive old controversies, including the headlands dispute, and to insist that steps be taken for the full protection of American rights. But the attitude of the Administration was more restrained. There was a sincere desire to prevent a renewal of the irritating incidents on the fishing grounds which had created such a perturbing situation in the fifties, and overtures were made to Britain for the establishment of a commission which should regulate the privileges and the conditions under which the American fishermen might operate.

The proposal failed largely because it implied unilateral concessions. While Canada was prepared for an amicable agreement it was felt that concessions on the fisheries called for American concessions in return. In particular there was a desire that the United States should at least relax the duty on fish. There was, however, no immediate prospect of this, and Canada was reluctant to surrender an important bargaining asset until some compensation was assured. If, however, a commission were appointed Britain would be unwilling to jeopardize the prospective agreement by enforcing the exclusion of American fishermen while negotiations were in progress. This was a prospect which

Canada viewed with disfavor, and the suggestion was abandoned as a result of her disapproval.

The next few years saw the controversy growing in seriousness. In 1867 the license fee was doubled, although the policy was still to warn offenders in the first instance rather than to seize them. But the higher fee tempted Americans to dispense with licenses in view of the moderate risk which they ran, and Canada responded by a still higher fee and a less generous policy of warnings. Five years of conciliation had met with no response, and the United States was warned that a still stricter policy would be adopted unless an agreement were reached.

In January 1870 the threat was carried out. Not only was the licensing system abandoned; a number of privileges which American fishermen had customarily enjoyed, but which were not strictly within the terms of the treaty of 1818, were also brought to an end. The most important of these was the privilege of entering British ports to buy bait and other necessities and to land their catch for transshipment. At the same time the Canadian government, distrusting the willingness of British naval officers to enforce the strict letter of the regulations, decided to send six cruisers of their own to police the waters, backed by the moral support of the British warships on station. There was still no attempt to enforce the headlands claim, and seizures were restricted to vessels illegally fishing within three miles of the actual shore. Nonetheless, some 400 American ships were captured in the course of three months during the season of 1870.

Canadian mildness had brought no answering amiability in the United States. Canadian firmness provoked an outburst of wrath accompanied by a demand for immediate reprisals. The outcry of the fishing interests who were directly affected was backed by the clamor of the annexationists. One of the loudest voices was that of General Ben Butler, a part of whose lavish talent for offensiveness was now being devoted consistently to Britain and Canada. But he had the support of many of his Radical colleagues and a measure of sympathy from the Administration. Grant's message to Congress called attention to Canada's offenses, asserting that "this semi-independent but irresponsible agent has exercised its delegated powers in an unfriendly way," and threatening the

cancellation of bonding privileges and the exclusion of Canadian ships from American ports. But the Administration had no desire to adopt retaliatory measures which might lead to a serious clash, and the certainty that the fishing season of 1871 would bring a renewal of friction if present circumstances continued was good reason for a new effort to settle outstanding difficulties.

It was desirable that any such effort should be comprehensive in its scope. Quite apart from the questions directly at issue with Canada, there were other pending issues which chiefly concerned relations with Great Britain. Even in these, however, Canada had become indirectly involved, and the views of the new Dominion could not be entirely ignored in any proposed settlement.

The chief problem which now troubled relations between the United States and Britain was the question of the *Alabama* claims. Under this term were summed up the demands for compensation for the damage done by various Confederate commerce raiders which had been built in British ports. Although they had left England in the unarmed guise of merchant vessels, to be fitted out later at sea, it was contended that their purpose had been clear from the outset and that their escape should have been prevented by the British authorities. Moreover, the *Alabama*—whose successful depredations, besides the direct havoc they had wrought, had created such apprehension as to deter many ships from even putting to sea—had come to symbolize the whole issue of Britain's alleged complicity with the South. There was a determination not merely to get substantial redress for the losses which the raiders had inflicted, but to force England to make public acknowledgment of her fault.

As early as 1863 the United States had suggested that the *Alabama* case should be submitted to arbitration. Lord John Russell was prepared to submit the question of American claims to a joint commission but not to accept an outside arbitrator. "Her Majesty's government," he asserted, "are the sole guardians of their own honor. They cannot admit that they have acted with bad faith in maintaining the neutrality they professed. The law officers of the Crown must be held to be better interpreters of a British statute than any foreign government can be presumed to be."

Lord John's successors, however, showed a tendency to recede from this rigid position. The door was opened for a new effort by suggestions which Lord Stanley put forward in 1866, and although they offered too narrow a basis to be acceptable to the United States, they provided a starting point which issued in the Johnson-Clarendon agreement of 1869 providing for a joint commission on claims and the submission of matters of disagreement to an outside arbitrator.

The convention was rejected by the Senate with only a single vote in its favor. Apart from specific objections to its terms, such as the lack of any formal expression of regret on the part of Britain, the domestic political situation and the reluctance of Congress to confer a last shred of credit on the expiring Administration of Andrew Johnson helped to motivate this action. But the really important development was the transformation of the whole question as a result of Senator Sumner's speech in the course of the debate. In a summary of the "true grounds of complaint" against Great Britain he put forward a calculation of the national claims which were due as a result of her actions during the war. These reduced the actual loss from commerce raiding to a distinctly minor part. Far more important were the indirect claims, based first on the check to commercial expansion as a result of the presence of the raiders on the high seas, and second on the assertion that British intervention in the form of encouragement to the South had prolonged the duration of the war, perhaps to twice its normal length. This meant that half the cost of the war—a sum of two billion dollars—could legitimately be assessed as damages against Great Britain.

There was little expectation that such a sum would be handed over in cash. That, indeed, was not the aim behind the new demands. It was rather the hope that Britain might be forced to offer an equivalent in territory. With Sumner's speech, which was received with wide popular approval, the apparently irrelevant issues of the *Alabama* claims and the annexation of Canada became linked together. Sumner, in his speech, hinted that the surrender of Canada would satisfy him as an equivalent. His colleague Chandler was even more explicit. Introducing a resolution to negotiate for the cession of Canada as a method of settling

all controversies, he exclaimed: "I put on file a mortgage on the British North American provinces for the whole amount, and that mortgage is recorded and the security is good." And Sumner himself, in his memorandum in January 1871 on the proposed renewal of negotiations, laid down the dictum: "The greatest trouble, if not peril, being a constant source of anxiety and disturbance, is from Fenianism, which is excited by the proximity of the British flag in Canada. Therefore, the withdrawal of the British flag cannot be abandoned as a condition or preliminary of such a settlement as is now proposed."

To aggravate the situation the dispute over the San Juan water boundary continued to drag its protracted and irritating course. It dated from 1857, when the commission engaged in marking the boundary agreed on by the Oregon Treaty found themselves at variance over the course of "the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island." The dispute gained significance from the fact that it involved the ownership of San Juan Island, whose strategic situation gave it potential command of the chief harbors in that area. A threatened clash between the rival local authorities was averted by the mediation of General Winfield Scott in 1859, and conversations were opened between the two countries in an effort to reach an agreement. But a British offer to arbitrate the question met with no response, and new local disturbances in 1866 showed that serious difficulties might yet develop if this unsettled state of affairs were allowed to continue.

Hitherto the matter had not been one in which Canada was directly concerned. Now, however, with confederation nearing completion and with the prospective entry of British Columbia into the Dominion, the interest of the government in its prospective western boundary was naturally aroused. Almost simultaneously there arose a doubt about British tenacity in pressing legitimate claims. In a memorandum to the Colonial Office, Canadian ministers reminded Lord Granville of the unhappy nature of the Ashburton award and called upon him to "prevent a similar, & in some respects, a worse blunder, in reference to our position on the Pacific Coast."

As a result of negotiations during 1868 the principle of arbitration was accepted and embodied in a convention in January

1869. But the time was unpropitious. The fate of the Johnson-Clarendon agreement on the *Alabama* claims showed how tempers were running in Congress, and there was little disposition to compromise on the claims with respect to the boundary. No steps were taken toward its ratification within the year's time limit stipulated by the convention. It consequently expired in January 1870, and the boundary question remained as an irritating element in what was now a highly disturbing situation.

Thus by the summer of 1870 a series of difficulties had accumulated to create an uneasy and even a dangerous atmosphere. There was no immediate risk of a clash, but if some new crisis should arise it might inflame tempers to a point where a clash could easily be precipitated. At the same time the possibility of reaching an agreement was somewhat more promising than it had been in the previous year. The annexationist agitation, having reached its peak, was showing signs of abating. It was beginning to dawn on the more moderate observers in the United States that few Canadians had any desire for union with the United States. The strength which the creation of the Dominion had added to Canadian nationalism was beginning to be realized. This meant that such questions as boundaries and fisheries would continue to create difficulties until they were settled by negotiation. It was in consequence desirable to take fresh steps toward a comprehensive agreement which would settle all outstanding difficulties.

The way was opened by an informal suggestion of Secretary Fish to the British Minister in September 1870. Finding that discussions over Canadian questions had reached a deadlock, he put forward the idea of a general settlement of the questions pending between Britain and the United States. If Great Britain would agree to arbitrate the *Alabama* claims the United States might accept arbitration of the San Juan boundary. If Americans could be admitted to the inshore fisheries the United States in return might grant freer trade in certain articles. While the British government was moving somewhat cautiously toward an acceptance of these ideas Fish entered on the process of persuading President Grant to give them his support. The result was seen in Grant's annual message in December. In spite of its carping tone and its diatribes against Canadian unfriendliness on such ques-

tions as the fisheries and the navigation of the St. Lawrence, it did express the willingness of the Administration to meet any British desire for a full and friendly adjustment. By this time the government in London had decided to send Sir John Rose on an unofficial mission to explore the possibility of a joint commission to deal with the various matters in dispute. With agreement quickly reached on this form of procedure in January 1871, it only remained for Fish to rally his supporters in Congress and secure the deposition of the recalcitrant Sumner from his chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. The way was open for the negotiation of the Treaty of Washington and the liquidation of the difficulties of a decade.

III

The negotiations at Washington marked a new stage in Canada's progress toward nationhood. They were also a significant contribution to the education and the development of Canadian nationalism. Once more interests which she felt to be vital to her were the subject of bargaining between the two great powers with which she was most intimately associated. But in contrast to previous occasions Canada herself had a voice in the discussions, and the limited effectiveness of that voice, and the manner in which her representative had to fight her battles not only against the United States, but to some extent against Britain as well, strengthened her conviction of the need for a continued advance toward a more independent control of her own particular affairs.

In form the task of the joint commission was to reach a settlement of the questions at issue between the United States and the British Empire. In fact, the problem was more complex. Among the things at which the United States aimed were objectives with which Britain, even in her imperial capacity, was very little concerned. They were also matters which she did not feel free to settle purely on her own initiative. A question such as the *Alabama* claims she could negotiate on her own responsibility. A question such as the fisheries, on the other hand, was first of all of interest to Canada. Yet the United States was determined to have the

fisheries and was prepared to adopt an attitude on other matters which would force Britain to add the weight of her imperial authority to her efforts to gain that end.

Britain, indeed, not only had the legal right to reach a settlement without Canadian intervention—she alone had the legal right to negotiate a settlement at all. In her imperial capacity she could take decisions binding on the whole empire. Canada had no power either to embark on formal negotiations or to arrange a treaty of her own. Practically, however, it was difficult, if not impossible, to push this legal position to extremes. With the achievement of confederation Canada had gained in strength and self-confidence. Her resentment at any attempt to ignore or override her views would be far more formidable than during the previous generation. Moreover, any agreement on the fisheries would, for practical purposes, need Canadian legislation to put it into effect. Such an agreement must therefore be reasonably acceptable to Canada. She might be persuaded to make some concessions for the sake of the broader imperial interests, but only if her own fundamental interests were reasonably considered and adequately safeguarded.

This virtually meant that Canada must have a voice in the negotiations. She would not have the status of a separate party, for the British commission was to act as a unit on behalf of the whole empire. But the inclusion of a Canadian as a member of the commission was highly desirable if not actually essential. Secretary Fish, harking back to the precedent of Elgin's mission in 1854, dropped a hint that the governor general would be an acceptable appointment. But Canada had come a long way since the great proconsul had floated reciprocity on a flood of champagne. When the Colonial Office passed the American suggestion on to the present governor general, Lord Lisgar, his reply made it clear that Canada would not regard him as a true representative of the Dominion. Only a responsible member of the Cabinet would be acceptable, and the obvious choice was the Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald.

Even so, there were grave doubts in Canada about the desirability of being represented at all. Lisgar at one stage actually feared that the Cabinet would reject the proffered opportunity.

The position of any Canadian representative was certain to be of the utmost difficulty. He would be held responsible at home for any shortcomings which Canadians might see in the resulting treaty. Yet his voice in the framing of the treaty would inevitably be a minor one. Britain, concerned chiefly to settle the *Alabama* affair, would not jeopardize that settlement by too rigid an insistence on such questions as the fisheries and would, if necessary, bring pressure on the Canadian member to accept the American proposals. Against this double assault Macdonald realized that it would be difficult for him to stand out alone, particularly if his resistance threatened to wreck the settlement which Britain had so much at heart.

Yet the very fact that Canadian interests were in danger of being overshadowed was a strong motive for securing a voice in the conference, in spite of the political risks involved. The *Globe*, commenting on the prospects, underlined the importance of a vigorous effort on behalf of Canada even while it warned Macdonald of the political consequences of failure. Recalling the aversion of British leaders to any appearance of shabby haggling and the consequences as illustrated by the Ashburton treaty, the editorial warned of similar dangers in prospect. "British politicians have been generally so triumphantly ignorant of almost everything connected with this continent, and so ready to believe that a few millions of acres here or there did not matter much, that they have generally had the worst of the bargain." It was for Macdonald to do what he could to redress the balance, and if he should weaken in that task the opposition would hold him strictly to account.

On the eve of the conference there was thus foreshadowed a divergence of views among the three parties involved, based on the different emphasis which each placed on the various questions at issue. British policy was animated by the broad aim of restoring harmonious relations with the United States. In order to achieve this Britain was prepared to make the real sacrifice of yielding over the *Alabama*, even though she believed that she had right on her side. Friendly relations, in her eyes, had become more important than a strict maintenance of her own views, however justifiable. They were important not only to the United Kingdom, but to the whole empire. There was therefore no disposition to allow

their restoration to be jeopardized by Canadian intransigence. Every effort would be made to see that Canadian interests received due consideration, but if Canada's views proved to be unreasonably rigid Britain was prepared in the last resort to override them in the interests of the welfare of the empire at large.

This brought into prominence the divergence of views between Britain and Canada with respect to the fisheries. Throughout the controversy Britain was a consistent advocate of moderation. But Canada, on her part, had now become convinced of the futility of appeasement and the necessity for a strict enforcement of her rights if the United States was to be brought to terms. At the same time she recognized that it would be difficult to carry firmness to the point of wrecking the prospects of agreement. Even if her interest in the settlement of the *Alabama* claims was indirect, it was by no means negligible. Anglo-American friendship was undoubtedly an imperial interest in which Canada had a major share. Anything which gave rise to friction between Britain and the United States involved a potential threat to Canada. This was particularly evident now that the *Alabama* claims had got tangled up with the question of annexation. From every point of view it was desirable that this troublesome controversy should be laid at rest.

There was the further consideration that Canada could not hope to challenge the United States alone. If by her actions she precipitated a breach she must in the last resort count on the backing of the mother country. But it was now more than probable that such aid would only be forthcoming if Britain felt that the United States and not Canada was the offender. Lord de Grey, head of the British commission, was prompt to point this out when it seemed that Canadian stubbornness was getting out of hand. "I spoke pretty plainly to Macdonald," he reported, "and told him that if the Dominion caused the failure of these negotiations on grounds which people in England did not consider reasonable, and if difficulties with the United States resulted therefrom, the Canadians would find very little inclination in England to help them get out of the troubles they had created for themselves."

This attitude was all the more aggravating to Canadians because their ultimate aim was not the exclusion of Americans from

the fisheries but the securing of reasonable terms for their admission. Canada had no hope of keeping exclusive rights in her own fisheries, and no particular desire. But the fisheries, along with navigation of Canadian canals, represented the chief bargaining assets through the use of which Canada might hope to secure a trade agreement with the United States. The United States was not only refusing all suggestions of a fair bargain but was trying to enlist Britain in the effort to force on Canada terms which she regarded as completely one-sided. The effort met with only moderate success as far as the government in London was concerned. In a dispatch on February 16, 1871, the Colonial Office assured the Canadian government that "the fishery rights are rights beyond dispute and can only be ceded for an adequate consideration." There were further assurances that Britain had no intention of disposing of them without Canada's consent. But this did not prevent strong pressure on Macdonald by his British colleagues to abate his demands—pressure which at one stage brought him to the verge of resignation from the commission.

The essence of Canada's policy, therefore, was to get as adequate a compensation for surrender as was possible in the face of the joint pressure to which she was subjected. The essence of American policy was, naturally enough, to demand as much and concede as little as possible. This was supported by the somewhat less logical assumption that other parties should recognize the fitness of giving the United States what she wanted without asking anything from her. On the *Alabama* claims and the San Juan boundary, which were regarded as unquestioned American rights, there seemed to be no room for serious arguments. But when Canadians, in their turn, stood on their rights with respect to the fisheries, their attitude was viewed as an unenlightened and unfriendly denial of concessions which the United States regarded as necessities. Although there was a real desire to restore friendly relations with Britain there was far less feeling of urgency than that which animated the British government, and the United States had no such fear of unfavorable consequences from a refusal of trade concessions to Canada as Canada had from a refusal to concede the fisheries to the United States. The American negotiators were in an extremely favorable bargaining position, and it is per-

haps a tribute to their desire for amity that they conceded even as much as they did.

The matter most easily dealt with was that of the *Alabama*. Britain had reconciled herself to the acceptance of arbitration for the sake of harmony and even to the expression of formal regret for the escape and depredations of the raiders. There had been some hope on the part of Canada that the matter might be got out of the way at an early stage, thus leaving the British commission free to take a vigorous stand on the questions that were specifically Canadian. But it took time to agree on details, including the rules of the duty of a neutral on which the United States was insistent, and there was also an American insistence on placing first on the agenda the more acute questions of fisheries and waterways. (The *Alabama*, in fact, was placed fifth on the list, below reciprocal trade and the San Juan boundary.) Thus, although the reference of the *Alabama* to arbitration was the most celebrated—and doubtless the most significant—outcome of the negotiations, it was the questions at issue between Canada and the United States which were the real focus of discussion and which at one stage threatened to wreck the prospects of the treaty.

The key to this situation was the Canadian insistence on a reciprocal trade agreement in return for the opening of the fisheries. Such a demand, in view of the strength of the protectionist forces in the United States and the existing temper of both Congress and the Administration, was virtually hopeless from the start. The Americans replied with the suggestion of a lump sum to purchase the fishery rights not for a limited period, as Canada desired, but in perpetuity. They offered a million dollars in cash and added the possibility of reduced duties on a few articles such as coal, salt, and fish. Macdonald met this with an outright rejection, and cipher messages to his colleagues in Ottawa outlined the telegrams which they obediently sent to him supporting his stand. Privately, however, they were gloomy about the prospects and inclined to take the best offer that could be secured. The British members of the delegation, viewing with growing anxiety the possibility of a deadlock on this issue, urged Macdonald to accept the American offer. While he and De Grey both bombarded London with demands for support to their respective views Macdonald found

himself under increasing pressure from his colleagues who made speeches at him in the privacy of the British commission while they continued to present an apparently solid front to the American negotiators. "Never in the course of my whole public life," wrote Macdonald, "have I been in so disagreeable a position and had such an unpleasant duty to perform as the one in which I am now engaged here. However, the work had to be done, and I am resolved to do it."

By the middle of April, some six weeks after the conference had begun its serious deliberations, matters seemed to have reached an impasse. The Canadian Cabinet was still insisting that any sale of the fisheries on a basis such as that proposed would be rejected by Parliament. On the other hand Fish was being informed that the Senate would refuse to accept such provisions on the ground of their excessive generosity. He therefore took advantage of Canada's refusal to accept the existing offer as an excuse to withdraw it entirely. It almost appeared that the fisheries question would have to be abandoned if any agreement was to be reached.

The situation was retrieved by the emergence of other topics which had hitherto been in the background. The San Juan boundary had remained in abeyance, largely from the refusal of the United States to abandon the claim to the Northern or Haro Channel. But a hint that this stand might be modified if a comprehensive agreement would be facilitated evolved into a suggestion that both the San Juan boundary and the money value of the fisheries should be submitted to arbitration. The British commissioners insisted that the United States should also agree to the free admission of fish, but on this basis they were ready to bring new pressure on Macdonald. This time the home government backed them up. Macdonald was placed in the position of standing alone as the sole remaining obstacle to a general agreement.

His first impulse was to resign in protest. The Cabinet at Ottawa—possibly stiffened by Macdonald himself—was still insisting that the agreement "would be promptly rejected by Parliament and cause incalculable mischief by creating the impression that the right of Canada has been sacrificed to imperial interest." A formal protest to the home government asserted that to force Canadian acceptance, after promising that the fisheries

would not be disposed of without Canada's consent, "would be a breach of faith and an indignity never before offered to a great British possession." Even with agreement in sight Macdonald and his colleagues had not yet given up the struggle.

Their acquiescence, if not their approval, was secured by the introduction of another and apparently an irrelevant matter. Among the questions in which Canada was concerned, but which she had hitherto had no success in advancing, was the claim for compensation for the Fenian raids. The United States, which was so insistent that Britain should pay for her lack of due diligence in the matter of the *Alabama*, sedulously ignored the Canadian attempt to establish the same principle in the matter of the Fenians. Now the British government intervened. Sooner than have this question arise as a further obstacle to the treaty, they offered to assume these obligations in case the United States refused to acknowledge them. Since it was virtually certain that the United States would refuse, this was little short of a bribe to persuade Canada to accept the American offer on the fisheries. It was adequate for its purpose. Although Macdonald still had qualms about the political battle which lay before him on his return to Canada and even thought of divesting himself of formal responsibility by refusing to sign the treaty, he contented himself in the end by putting his objections on record in a letter to Lord Granville and signing in his capacity not as a representative of Canada, but as an imperial commissioner.

The treaty was not itself a final settlement of all questions, but it provided for the attainment of finality. Americans were to be admitted to the fisheries for a ten-year period. Free navigation of the St. Lawrence was balanced by reciprocal privileges—for any Canadians who wanted them—on the rivers of Alaska. The United States would urge the states to permit free navigation of their canals, and Britain would urge similar concessions on Canada. Mutual bonding privileges were arranged for a period of twelve years, and there was to be a limited reciprocity in the carrying trade of the Great Lakes. The major questions which had occupied the conference—the *Alabama* claims, the San Juan boundary, and the value of the fisheries—were to go to arbitration. Canada's desire for a trade agreement had come to nothing

except for the free admission of fish, and the American basis of cash compensation had won out.

There were still difficulties to be faced even after the signature of the treaty. The Senate, realizing that all the vital objectives of the United States had practically been assured, approved with little difficulty in spite of the disgruntled attitude of such Radicals as Butler. There was more serious criticism in the Canadian Parliament, and a revolt against the government seemed by no means an impossibility; but Macdonald's insistence that everything possible had been gained and that sacrifices were necessary in the cause of those imperial interests, including Anglo-American friendship, so vital to Canada's own security, swept everything before it. The San Juan decision which upheld the American claim and the Geneva arbitration which assessed \$15,500,000 against Great Britain to settle the *Alabama* claims effectively closed these matters. But the troublesome fisheries question still continued to plague relations in spite of the treaty provisions.

One cause was the delay by Congress in implementing the agreement. The Senate might approve the terms, but legislation was needed to carry into effect the provision for free admission of fish, and against this the interests affected at once raised an outcry. "The Canadians," wailed the Gloucester fishermen, "will clamber into fortunes on our necks." At the same time, however, the same interests were urging that the Canadian fishing grounds be opened at once in accordance with the treaty. But the Canadian government, in spite of pressure from Britain, refused to take action until the promised equivalent was assured. Even when the implementing of the fisheries agreement was ultimately arranged for July 1, 1873, arbitration on the money compensation due to Canada was not completed until 1877, and the award of \$5,500,000 for the life of the treaty aroused such resentment in the United States as to help bring the abrogation of the agreement in 1885.

By that date, however, relations between the two countries had become relatively tranquil. The major causes of friction had been removed, and only comparatively minor irritants remained. But the decade of tension which preceded the Treaty of Washington had a profound effect on the outlook of Canada. It led to the hardening of a political nationalism of which confederation was

the most notable result. It increased Canada's awareness of the individual character of her interests and of their close relation to her position on the American continent. And it gave her a new confidence in her separate political destiny in spite of the continual pull exercised by the continental economy. These twin themes were to mark more clearly than ever the course of Canadian nationalism during the period which followed.

CHAPTER XIV

Crosscurrents

THE DESIRE OF CANADA to combine the maintenance of political separatism with the economic integration of the continent met with little response in the United States. If the more aggressive manifestations of the annexationist spirit gradually subsided after 1870, that development only hardened the protectionist forces in their determination to maintain and strengthen the trade barriers against Canada. For although the earlier feelings of hostility speedily disappeared, the faith in manifest destiny remained. Until Canada was prepared to accept the dictates of nature and link her destinies with those of the United States the latter saw no reason to extend to her commercial advantages which she was unwilling to accept at the price of political union. There was an occasional revival of the idea that a relaxation of trade barriers might hasten the process of absorption. But the general sentiment—not entirely uninfluenced by the prevailing protectionist outlook—inclined to the belief that the working of predestination would be best facilitated by a denial of any special economic advantages and by pointing out the moral of the folly of resisting the inevitable. "Our whole history since the conquest of Canada by Great Britain in 1763," said Senator Sherman in 1888, "has been a continuous warning that we cannot be at peace with each other except by political as well as commercial union. . . . This union is one of the events that must inevitably come in the future; it

will come by the logic of the situation, and no politician or combination of politicians can prevent it."

This attitude was all the more satisfactory because the limited degree of economic integration which best suited the dominant American interests was not seriously hampered by the maintenance of economic barriers. It was being brought about in spite of them by the logic of the situation. Although Canada's failure to secure reciprocity of trade had led her by 1879 to adopt the alternative of reciprocity of tariffs, the effect of such retaliation was not seriously felt by American export industries. The value of Canada's imports from the United States in 1891 was double that of 1871 and had taken first place over imports from Britain which actually showed a decline. American imports doubled again between 1891 and 1901 to reach \$107,000,000, while imports from Britain remained practically stable at \$42,800,000. Clearly the Canadian tariff, while it might affect certain American products, was not formidable enough to be used effectively as a club to force trade concessions. And as the great corporations with their mounting reserves of capital developed at the turn of the century it was an easy matter—in such cases as the Canadian tariff made a really substantial difference—to establish branches in Canada which might even turn the Canadian protective tariff to the advantage of American interests.

While American industry thus continued to enjoy effective access to Canadian markets it also gained increasing access to Canadian raw materials. This was a development which in theory was favorable to a relaxation of the economic barriers. But although the users of copper and nickel and newsprint naturally desired to secure these natural staples at the lowest possible cost, their general support of the principle of protection deterred them from too strenuous efforts which might issue in a serious assault on that cherished ideal. The domestic producers of these natural products, on the other hand, fought strenuously for higher duties against foreign competition, and if these were denied their advocates might take their revenge by turning on the industries which enjoyed protective duties on their finished products. Thus, although the link between American manufacturing and Canadian natural production drew steadily closer, it was a decidedly selec-

tive process which kept the benefits to the Canadian national economy within somewhat moderate bounds. During the period from 1871 to 1891, in which imports from the United States were doubled, Canadian exports to the United States increased by only 20 per cent, and although there was a more rapid rise during the following decade, the \$107,000,000 imports from the United States were only partly balanced by exports of \$68,000,000. The selective integration with which the United States was content was anything but satisfactory to Canada.

Thus the effort to create an integrated national economy which would reduce Canada's dependence on foreign outlets remained one of the major tasks of the Dominion during the closing decades of the nineteenth century. One of the essential purposes of the federation of 1867 was to pave the way for the creation of such an economy, transcontinental in its scope and fostered by the constructive efforts of a strong centralized government. It was a comprehensive aim which embraced three specific elements—the building up of a protected local industry, the construction of a national system of transportation stretching from sea to sea, and the settlement of the prairie West.

The first two of these involved on Canada's part a strengthening of those very factors of economic partition which were already embodied in the policy of the United States. The rising wails of Canada's infant industries, sharpened by the depression of 1873, reached a point where it was merely a question which of the two major political parties would risk affronting the farmers in order to gain the support of the manufacturers. When the Liberals put aside the temptation during their brief period of office after 1873, the Conservatives under Macdonald—who had been poised to do battle for a low-tariff policy in case their rivals should pronounce for protection—decided to come out for a tariff adjustment which would "afford fitting encouragement and protection to the struggling manufactures and industries as well as to the agricultural products of the country." As Macdonald recognized, the word protection had no very pleasing ring in the ears of most Canadians, "but we can ring the changes on National Policy, paying the United States in their own coin, etc." It was on such a basis that he campaigned successfully in 1878, and it was under the title

of National Policy that a protective tariff averaging 25 per cent was put into effect in the following year.

The question of a transcontinental railroad was also colored by political as well as economic nationalism. The fear that the advance of American transport routes might attach the West to the United States, not only commercially but politically, remained alive even after confederation had been achieved. The building of a railroad was part of the bargain which had brought British Columbia into the union, and delay in carrying it out eventually resulted in a threat of western secession which might be a prelude to annexation to the United States. The settlement of the West, from which so much was hoped, depended on the provision of adequate transportation. If the purposes of the Dominion were to be served an all-Canadian route must be constructed which would avert the threat of American infiltration.

This problem became more urgent as the Northern Pacific pushed its way toward completion. Here was an American line which could easily extend its feeders northward and offer a perfectly practical outlet for the Canadian west. It even endeavored to reinsure its prospects by securing a major influence in a nominally Canadian syndicate formed for the purpose of bidding for the new railroad, apparently with the idea that a single system could be devised which would serve both the Canadian and the American Northwest. Although this project failed it served as a warning of the dangers of delay, and a further danger arose when Hill began the enterprise that was to result in the construction of the Great Northern. It was to Hill and his associates, indeed, that the government turned for the funds and the experience which—with very substantial public aid—made possible the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway; and even then there was eventually a struggle against Hill's attempts to harmonize the new enterprise with his American interests before its essentially Canadian character was assured.

To both the growth of Canadian industry and the success of the new transportation system the settlement of the West was basic. The aspiration of the founders of the Dominion was to provide opportunities within Canada which would check the drain of its population to the United States and to divert to its own vacant

lands part of the emigration from Europe which was flowing into the American West. It was an ambition which was stimulated by the spectacle of the amazing growth of the neighboring Republic—a growth which Canada hoped she might be able to parallel in view of the vast untouched resources which lay within her boundaries.

If the success of the United States offered grounds for emulation, the land system of the Republic provided a natural precedent for Canada to follow. The transfer of Rupert's Land from the Hudson's Bay Company placed at the disposal of the federal government an imperial domain which could be devoted to the creation of an expanding national economy. Land grants—so lavishly used for similar purposes in the United States—could be used to facilitate the construction of railroads. Land sales would provide a revenue out of which cash subsidies for similar purposes might be made available. But more important than either of these, a rapidly growing population would provide the stability and the prosperity of which the authors of confederation dreamed so optimistically. The dominant concern, therefore, was less to raise a revenue from land sales than to get settlers on the land in the quickest and most effective way, and the recently adopted free homestead system in the United States—the culmination of a long development—offered a model admirably suited to Canadian purposes. American methods and American experience, applied to conditions which were basically similar north of the border, were the guides in the development of land policy in the new western domain. "Seldom," writes Professor Martin, "has such a wealth of experience been appropriated with such abounding good will and admiration. The sectional survey and the railway land-grant system; the free homestead system, school lands, 'swamp lands,' and pre-emptions . . . all these attest the American prototype."

Not all the soaring dreams built on these policies were realized. They involved an optimism which expected too spectacular results in too short a time. Some of the hopes were disappointed; others were delayed in their realization. The depression of 1873 struck a hard blow at the exposed Canadian economy. Tariffs might cushion the shock for some industries, but they could not provide markets for the producers of staples who depended on

exports, and distress in agriculture and lumbering and fishing affected the whole economy. The delay in the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway helped to retard the settlement of the West. The expectations of a flood of immigration were not realized, and many of the immigrants who did enter proved to be only in transit to the United States. What was still more perturbing, Canada continued to experience a population drain as her own sons sought wider opportunities across the border.

The movement in the early seventies was not entirely in one direction. There were cross currents as the depression in the United States sent many Canadians, particularly those who had sought employment in the growing industrial cities, back to their home provinces. Economic prostration in the West reduced its attractiveness to new settlers and persuaded some land seekers in Canada to seek their fortunes in Manitoba or the newer sections of Ontario. But the pull southward was not ended—it was only temporarily diminished. The ephemeral recovery in the United States in 1879, in which Canada had little share, renewed its strength, and until the recovery at the end of the century the tide of settlement continued to move steadily toward the south.

The factors behind the movement were the traditional ones of population pressure and inadequate local opportunities. The passing of wooden ships and the decline of the West Indian market affected the staple industries of the Maritime Provinces, lumbering and fishing. Agriculture did not take care of the growing population. There was a tendency on the part of the younger fishermen to ship with the Gloucester fleet, particularly after the fisheries agreement ended in 1885. Colonization in Quebec was not on a large enough scale to take care of the traditionally large families in that French province. The Ontario farm economy was shifting under the competition of the new wheat-growing West, and the new areas of the provinces offered only a limited appeal. A certain amount of settlement moved toward the Canadian west all through the period, but a larger stream flowed toward the United States—the Middle Western farms, the factories and railroads and construction works, which even in a period of limited prosperity provided wider opportunities than could be found in Canada.

"The Americans say with truth," wrote Goldwin Smith, "that if they do not annex Canada they are annexing the Canadians." The numbers of Canadians living in the United States rose from 148,000 in 1851 to 500,000 in 1871, and twenty years later were just short of a million. It was estimated that when to native Canadians were added those immigrants who moved on across the border, a million people left Canada in the decade before 1891. The number of immigrants who stayed failed to balance the losses—indeed, the growth of Canada's population during the period was slightly less than the estimated natural increase. For a full generation active elements of the Canadian population were being drawn away to the frontier and the cities of the United States.

This failure to expand the national population helped to stultify the hopes which had been placed in the creation of an independent national economy. It meant a continued dependence for prosperity on the production of staples for export. In spite of a growing nationalism the attraction of a continental economy as a solution for Canada's difficulties still lingered. The longing for reciprocity died hard, and among its advocates were some who, convinced that Canada's destiny still lay on the American continent, kept alive a remnant of that minor but persistent sentiment which favored annexation to the United States.

II

The failure of the Treaty of Washington to secure a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States, and the substitution of a money payment in compensation for American access to the fisheries, was the feature of the agreement which aroused the greatest indignation in Canada. The fishermen themselves might profit by this arrangement, but it had been hoped to use the fisheries as a national asset to gain national commercial advantages, and this hope had been brutally disappointed. The result was an outburst of wrath against American rapacity, British neglect, and the supine submission of John A. Macdonald. It was a remarkable tribute to the skill and persuasiveness of the Conservative leader that he emerged so triumphantly from the

"stern account of his doings" which the opposition demanded.

Foremost among the critics was George Brown. This journalist and politician had been the accepted leader of the agrarian Democrats who were the mainstay of the Clear Grit party. He had become almost the patron saint of the new Liberal party into which the Grits evolved after confederation. By his vigorous ideas and his incisive style he had made the Toronto *Globe* a leading, if not the most influential, newspaper in Canada. Although he had joined briefly with Macdonald to carry confederation ("the only patriotic thing that man ever did in his life," said Macdonald with some bitterness) it was an uneasy association which ended even before the formal completion of the project. Brown's personal antipathies, his complete distrust of Macdonald's political honesty, his rooted hostility to the business and financial interests who used the Conservative party as an instrument in their nefarious schemes made any firm co-operation impossible. By the time the first election to the Parliament of the new Dominion came around Brown was assailing his ancient rival with all his old enthusiasm.

Although Macdonald completely vindicated himself in his defense of the treaty it was not long before Brown's worst suspicions seemed justified. The Pacific scandal, arising out of campaign contributions from the financiers who were to undertake the Canadian Pacific Railway, drove Macdonald from power in 1873. A Liberal administration under Alexander Mackenzie came into office. The arbitration on the value of the fisheries, which was to determine the money payment, had not yet been undertaken. Here was a chance for a renewed attempt to alter the treaty arrangements and to satisfy agrarian Liberal sentiments by negotiating in the stead of the prospective money compensation the trade agreement which Macdonald had failed to secure.

Although Brown was no longer in active politics he came forward as the principal figure in the ensuing negotiations. He may have been animated by the desire to achieve a striking diplomatic success which would be a personal triumph over Macdonald. But he was also encouraged by a rosy conviction that American sentiment was also eager for a reciprocity agreement. The *Globe* was giving prominence to every hint from Washington, real or imag-

ined, of the growth of this sentiment. And when Fish's receptive attitude to the idea of reciprocity eventually convinced the British Minister that prospects had improved, it is not entirely surprising that Brown set off for Washington with hope far higher than the situation actually warranted.

This mood of exuberant self-deception continued throughout the negotiations. Brown read into personal conversations and newspaper comment an enthusiasm for reciprocity which was non-existent. When Fish showed increasing doubts about the possibility of getting any substantial agreement adopted by the Senate, Brown was amazed at such inexplicable timidity. He envisaged a general eagerness in Congress and a willingness on the part of Grant to lend vigorous support, and in spite of all the checks he encountered he went forward in complete confidence of ultimate success.

In spite of the tepid enthusiasm of Fish an agreement was actually drafted after three months of discussion. Fish refused to consider a return to the basis of 1854 and left it to Canada to make the first suggestions. The effort to meet American views involved an extension of reciprocal concessions from natural products to an increased list of manufactured goods, a promise to enlarge the Canadian canals to carry vessels with a draft of fourteen feet, reciprocal free navigation on the canals of both parties, and various other concessions concerned with coasting trade and subsidiary matters. On this basis a treaty was signed which provided for reciprocal trade not only on a specific list of sixty natural products, but on a considerable range of agricultural implements and on thirty-seven other manufactured articles. It was to run for a period of twenty-one years.

The agreement offered substantial advantages to both sides. If it was likely to make little appeal to Canadian industrialists it secured for the farmer a greatly enlarged access to American markets. Navigation of the Canadian canals gave something which the United States seriously wanted and which it was not entirely to the disadvantage of Canada to grant. A favored list of American manufactured products would be assured of access to the Canadian market in the face of a rising protectionist clamor which promised to bring a higher level of duties unless the treaty

was accepted. But the incentives were not great enough to enlist any substantial support in Congress. Grant, indeed, sent the treaty to the Senate with the comment that many features deserved favorable consideration but added that he was not prepared to say whether it gave everything which the United States had a right to expect. The Senate decided to deny it the benefit of the doubt. The treaty was laid over until the end of the year, and although Brown appeared in Washington to use his influence when it came up for consideration the event revealed how hollow his optimism had been. If the treaty had few determined enemies it had almost no resolute supporters, and the decision of the Senate to refuse consideration was a measure of the general indifference of the United States toward the whole idea of reciprocity.

This was a rebuff which helped make possible the inauguration of Macdonald's National Policy with its retaliatory aspect against American imports. But even Macdonald and his supporters—the actual beneficiaries of the new tariff naturally excepted—recognized that this was something of a second choice. The extent to which reciprocity remained the ideal was shown by the provision in the new tariff act, which empowered the government by proclamation to reduce or eliminate the duties on natural products whenever similar action was taken by the United States. The economic division of the continent was something which Canada was still reluctant to accept as final.

A more positive effort was renewed during the next decade. In 1885, when Congress had brought the fisheries provisions of the Treaty of Washington to an end, a serious political situation was brewing in Canada. The West had been disturbed by a new rising under Louis Riel. The death sentence passed on him by an English judge and jury had roused bitter resentment in Quebec. Discontent in the Maritimes was shortly to issue in a secession movement in Nova Scotia. Protection had failed to restore prosperity, and the farmers were becoming increasingly resentful of the high cost of the tariff on manufactured goods. There were good motives for an attempt to allay these feelings by a new effort at a favorable trade agreement.

The occasion was offered by the negotiations for a new fisheries

agreement to replace the one that had just expired. The British delegation to Washington, of which Joseph Chamberlain was the head, included Sir Charles Tupper as the Canadian member. But although the immediate occasion for the appointment of the commission was the fisheries problem, the Canadian desire was for a broadening of the conversations to cover the possibility of a commercial agreement. This had already been discussed unofficially and seemed to be regarded favorably by the American government. But Cleveland was already running into difficulties over the tariff question. His attempts to get his party to implement its pledge of lower duties had resulted in a strained situation between President and Congress which was unpropitious for Canadian aspirations. When the negotiations opened in November 1887 the American delegates refused to consider commercial questions and successfully insisted on narrowing the discussion to the fisheries alone. Tupper, indeed, continued his efforts outside the commission, but without success. Even the fisheries convention was rejected by the Senate, to no small extent because the concessions to American fishermen were conditional on the free admission of Canadian fish and fish oil. The protectionist forces were rallying to do battle against Cleveland in the coming election, and the Canadian fisheries, once so powerful a bargaining weapon, were steadily declining in importance to the United States at large.

Yet it was from the American side that the initiative came for a Canadian agitation which added to the seriousness of Tupper's endeavors. The rejection of Brown's draft treaty had not ended a certain amount of speculation in the United States on the possibility of some arrangement with Canada that would be more in harmony with the prevailing American outlook. In January 1876 the House Committee on Commerce had even suggested the negotiation of a limited customs union. This was an idea which a number of protectionists found more appealing than a renewal of reciprocity along the lines of 1854, and for a number of years it lingered rather nebulously in the consciousness of the legislature, appearing periodically in resolutions of congressional committees and in occasional speeches—now decreasing in frequency—on the theme of manifest destiny. It was kept alive to no small extent by

the personal activities of one or two individuals. Erastus Wiman, a Canadian by birth who had achieved a substantial financial position in the United States, became the most persistent advocate of the commercial union of the two countries. Closely associated with him was S. J. Ritchie, who had considerable mining interests in Canada and was seeking a charter to exploit the newly discovered nickel deposits near Sudbury. An Ohio congressman named Butterworth became the chief spokesman for the idea in the House and sponsored the bills and resolutions which kept the question before the legislature.

This was in a sense a small pressure group, working toward its goal by influence and propaganda in selected quarters. In Canada, and particularly in Ontario, the movement rested on a much broader basis. The restiveness of the farmers under the protective system inclined them to view with approval any proposal which would reduce the cost of manufactured goods while at the same time opening the wider markets they desired. The left wing of the Liberal party entertained similar views. Edward Farrer, then editor of the *Toronto Mail*, lent journalistic support. Not least influential was Goldwin Smith, whose intellectual leadership was consistently devoted to educating the Canadian people in their essentially American destiny. Commercial union, he insisted, would "bring Canada within the commercial pale of her own continent and thereby put an end to the commercial atrophy which her isolation entails." He lent his voice and his pen to the cause and aided in the creation of a number of organizations to give the movement effective support.

The victory of Cleveland in 1884 stimulated the movement with the hope that American policy would move toward a relaxation of tariff barriers. The failure of Cleveland's effort and the rebuff which Tupper's overtures encountered were serious disappointments. An even worse blow was the return of the Republicans after 1888 and the adoption of the McKinley tariff in 1890. This raised American duties to a new high and increased the problem of assimilating the Canadian and American tariffs to form a common customs system for a united free-trade area. But the growing opposition to protection which this measure encountered in the United States, expressed in a Democratic victory in

the mid-term elections, kept the movement alive and made it a potential political force in Canada.

The Liberal party there had been unwilling to adopt commercial union outright. It contained a considerable number of moderate protectionists who were disposed at least to give the National Policy a fair trial. But the free traders, under the powerful leadership of Sir Richard Cartwright, pressed for a more advanced policy. They succeeded in committing the party to the somewhat ambiguous program of "unrestricted reciprocity" as a cure for the continued distress which protection had failed to remedy.

Sir John A. Macdonald watched these developments with an anxious eye. In 1888 he had written hopefully to Tupper: "Commercial union is a dead duck." But the deceased refused to lie down, and it was only too apparent that the movement for reciprocity had become extremely strong in the rural areas. Macdonald had already shown his willingness to satisfy the demand by his own policy at Washington and by his sending of Tupper to renew overtures in 1887. Now with an election in the offing it seemed a sound idea to steal the Liberal platform from under his rivals by a new and successful attempt at a trade agreement.

That impulse miscarried, with nearly fatal results. The cause was the Conservative effort to appear in the role of the party most capable of persuading the United States to come to terms. It was represented that negotiations were about to begin and that prospects of a trade treaty had been opened by overtures from Secretary Blaine on behalf of the American government. There were, in fact, negotiations in prospect, arising out of Canada's desire to be included in the conversations which had been inaugurated between the United States and Newfoundland. But Blaine repudiated the implications of the Conservative announcement in a public statement which asserted: "There are no negotiations whatever on foot for a reciprocity treaty with Canada, and you may be assured no such scheme for reciprocity with the Dominion confined to natural products will be entertained by this government."

This statement called for quick action by Macdonald and his followers to remedy their blunder. It was characteristic of the

veteran leader that he had no hesitation in retrieving his position by a complete about-face. Since he himself had no hope of achieving reciprocity he proceeded to attack the Liberal advocacy of reciprocity as unpatriotic and subversive.

He was fortunate in finding material at hand to support his charge, at least well enough for his purpose. The term "commercial union" was meant by implication to rule out political union. But a movement for closer relations on this scale naturally attracted the support of those who believed that Canada's ultimate destiny lay with the United States. Goldwin Smith made little secret of his views along this line. More important was the revelation of a pamphlet written by Edward Farrer and suggesting measures by which the United States might hasten Canada's gravitation toward union. Although only a dozen copies were printed, and that under the strictest precautions, a printer with a keen sense of political material managed to snatch a surreptitious proof. It was somewhat blurred and by no means complete, but it served well enough. Here was proof that unrestricted reciprocity was in reality "veiled treason," as its opponents had always claimed. With the exclamation that he was born a British subject and a British subject he would die, Macdonald led his cohorts once more to victory in a fine emotional crusade for the preservation of the empire. It was not the first or the last time that patriotism was the salvation of the Conservatives at a time when their plight seemed desperate.

His victory by no means settled the issue. With the death of Macdonald a few months later, the party lost its only trusted leader and its greatest cohesive force. Five years of disintegration ended in its collapse before the new Liberalism led by Laurier. But by that time, although reciprocity remained the professed creed of the victorious party, its urgency as a political question was on the wane. A new era was dawning for Canada, and a burst of expansion now lifted the Dominion from its prolonged depression and thrust both commercial and political union with the United States into the background for the next fifteen years.

III

The closing years of the nineteenth century ushered in a new period of world economic activity which brought a revived prosperity to the American continent. A fresh stage in imperialist expansion, economic as well as political, added its stimulus to a variety of other factors which led to a new industrial expansion in the chief manufacturing countries. An accumulation of capital for investment made for easy credit and low interest rates which facilitated the growth of new enterprises. Better communications and low ocean-freight rates helped to stimulate world trade. In spite of the high-tariff policies which had by this time been adopted by all major nations except Great Britain, the opening of new markets and the increased demand for industrial raw materials, the steady urban growth which brought increasing dependence by western Europe on imported food, resulted in the expansion of world commerce and an active exchange of commodities between nations.

These were developments which were highly favorable to Canada. As a producer of natural staples for export she was in an advantageous position to profit by the new demands, all the more so because to the older staples were added new ones which were just coming into production and whose expansion was stimulated by the new conditions. Such traditional exports as lumber and newsprint and wheat found new outlets. Fruit and meat and dairy products found growing markets abroad. The mineral wealth of the Canadian shield was gradually being uncovered, and such products as gold and silver, nickel and copper and zinc became of increasing importance in Canada's foreign trade.

This, in turn, had its effect on domestic expansion. At long last it seemed that the integrated national economy which had been envisaged at confederation was being achieved. Domestic manufactures flourished with the expansion of the home market. The transcontinental transportation system not only justified itself as a national enterprise but found its existing structure outgrown by the demands laid on it, and new—and unfortunately extravagant—construction added a further stimulus to the general economic activity. Above all, the settlement of the West, which had lagged

in such a disappointing fashion, was virtually completed within a decade. It seemed that the firm foundation had at last been laid for the national development envisioned half a century before.

It was not a self-sufficient economy, nor was it meant to be. Canada, exporting one third of her production, was still dependent on world markets. But to Canadians, imbued with new confidence under the genial glow of revived prosperity, it seemed that the rest of the world was to no small extent dependent on Canada. There appeared to be no reason why the world's demand for wheat should not continue to grow, why Canadian minerals would not be increasingly essential to foreign industry, why Canadian forest products should not find steadily broadening markets. It began to seem that Canada, more than any other country, had been blessed with a wealth of almost untouched riches for which the rest of the world must continue to bid. The legend of Canada's "boundless natural resources" exercised a growing fascination over the panegyrists of Canada's prospects in an increasingly interdependent world, and Laurier summed up their faith in the prophecy that if the nineteenth century had belonged to the United States, the twentieth century would belong to Canada.

In all these developments the influence of the United States was important and pervasive. The continental integration, which rival tariff walls had failed to check, went on apace under the stimulus of the new prosperity on both sides of the line. Although the expansion of Canadian industry was largely financed from domestic resources, and the London money market was the chief resort for outside capital, American enterprise was also beginning to be interested. The growth of great corporations in the United States, with their monopolistic tendencies, meant an increased attention to the Canadian market and possibly made it easier to embark on the establishment of branch factories in Canada. But perhaps more significant was the influx of American capital into the mining and forest industries. The development of Canada's resources in raw materials to supply the needs of American manufacturing industry strengthened the links between the two economies and created that desirable condition of economic access without political responsibility which was one characteristic of

dollar diplomacy. American interests which could reach across the border for the raw materials they desired and which met in Canada with none of those difficulties from political instability which so often troubled them in Latin America had comparatively few incentives to press for political annexation.

But it was in the west that the most spectacular development took place. The American frontier was still continental, and now that the incentives which had drawn Canadians to the free lands of the American West had practically disappeared, it was the turn of the Canadian west to profit from the continued land hunger which pressed settlement forward to occupy the last great vacant area of the agrarian frontier.

In the generation after 1870 there had been a continual growth of settlement on the Canadian prairies. But it was a marginal movement on the flank of the steady westward migration which filled up the American states between the Mississippi and the Rockies and flowed across the mountains to the Pacific coast. The factors which made these areas more attractive than the Canadian region to the north continued to exercise their pull, and it was not until good free land was no longer available that either Canadian or American land seekers in any substantial numbers would turn their attention to the Canadian northwest.

By the nineties, however, that condition had materialized. The free land of the United States was now exhausted, except for submarginal areas. Yet the desire for land remained, stimulated by the high wheat prices and the active foreign demand which now developed. It was natural that eyes should turn to the last remaining area in which free land was available, particularly since some of the earlier deterrents to settlement had now been removed. New strains of early-maturing wheat made it more possible to push the line of cultivation to the north. Canadian railroads had gradually spread through the fertile belt, making its lands more accessible for the settler and assuring him of a transportation outlet for his crop. The Canadian homestead system invited the pioneer, and the pioneer responded by flooding in to people the Canadian west.

This was the final thrust of that advancing frontier which for two centuries had paid little attention to political boundary lines.

Indeed, many Canadians from the earlier migration, who had taken up land in the United States, joined in the new movement which led them back to Canadian soil. But whatever part sentiment may have played in encouraging this removal, it was inferior to the economic incentive which affected Canadians and Americans alike. The American communities of the Middle West had passed from the pioneer stage to that of stable settlement. A younger generation could no longer find farms in that area except at considerable expense, and there was nothing left in the American West. So the more energetic repeated the process that had become traditional and moved on to the only pioneer area that remained, with no more qualms about questions of political allegiance than Canadians on their part had experienced at a previous stage. Even the farmer in Minnesota and the Dakotas who had cleared his land and who saw it rise in cash value was occasionally tempted to sell out and start a new homestead on Canadian soil.

Thus the Canadian prairies benefited not only from American pioneering experience, but from the added advantage of American capital which many of the pioneers brought with them. There were other indirect repercussions resulting from the exhaustion of free land in the United States which redounded to the benefit of Canada. The Dominion itself continued to produce potential pioneers—those who still found opportunities inadequate in the older provinces and who sought new and wider outlets. Some of them continued to find those outlets in the industrial cities of the United States. But to those whose interest was centered on the land the United States no longer offered its former advantages. It was the Canadian west which had now become the land of promise to emigrants from Ontario and the Maritimes. Inevitably the same held true for the land seekers from Europe, and the exhaustion of land in the United States turned this tide also to the Canadian prairies.

The scale of the movement and the significance of this diversion are illustrated by the influx of population into Canada, in striking contrast to the outflow which had marked the previous decades. An immigration of only 20,000 in 1897 had risen to 184,000 by 1906 and to 400,000 by 1913. It doubled the population of Manitoba. It brought into being the new provinces of Alberta

and Saskatchewan. It reached far north to the undeveloped lands along the Peace River. "An area larger than Vermont," writes Professor Martin, "was 'entered' in free homesteads in 1909; twice the area of Connecticut in 1910; more than Delaware and New Hampshire in 1911; nearly the area of Maryland in 1912; and more than Massachusetts in 1913."

The government naturally did much to encourage this process. It was energetic in propaganda not only in Europe, but also in the United States. Its agents were active in the states of the border and the Middle West. The railroads and Canadian land companies naturally added their efforts to secure settlers. The American land speculator, so potent a force all through the history of expansion, was again enlisted through the sale of large blocks of land to American companies whose energies—to the disgust of rival groups who still held lands in the American West—were thenceforth directed to persuading their fellow countrymen to emigrate across the border.

But such activities were not the cause of the migration. They merely helped to encourage and direct it. The movement itself was a natural outgrowth of characteristically American conditions, a continuation of that process of expansion which had been steadily under way since the first permanent communities were established on the shores of the continent. There were times when the frontier advance had brought major political consequences in its train. The struggle with France for the Mississippi Valley, the Louisiana Purchase which carried the American empire to the Rockies, the war with Mexico which won Texas and California, and the controversy with Great Britain which secured Oregon were all the outcome of the American pioneering advance. There had been times within living memory when that advance had threatened the future and the very existence of Canada. But that danger had disappeared by 1900. The last great migration of the American pioneers thrust north across the border, not to extend American political sovereignty, but to increase the population and the strength of a neighboring nation with whom for thirty years a state of growing harmony had existed—a harmony on which the occasional controversies which still arose had now only minor and ephemeral effects.

CHAPTER XV

Alaska and Reciprocity

THE FIFTY YEARS which followed confederation saw a gradual advance by Canada not only in national strength and coherence, but in effective control of those external matters in which her interests were directly involved. Quietly, but nonetheless persistently, she pursued a policy of establishing her right to deal with such questions with a minimum of interference by the imperial authorities. The recognition by London, in connection with the Treaty of Washington, that the legislation which should implement the fisheries agreement was a matter for the Canadian Parliament was one example of a devolution of power which was steadily expanded during the years that followed. The admission of Canada to a voice in these same negotiations was the beginning of an evolution toward the ultimate goal of full control in matters of diplomacy. And although some of the landmarks in this progress were provided by Canada's participation in international conferences and various trade negotiations with Spain and France, it was inevitably her relations with the United States that occupied her chief attention and called for the most constant and direct contacts to settle the various problems which arose.

This growth of a practical freedom of action, however, was not as yet reflected by any real change in formal status. Although Britain normally refrained from the use of her imperial power to override Canada's views and policies in matters of specifically

Canadian interest, she was still not prepared to grant the Dominion the right of independent negotiation with foreign states. The diplomatic unity of the empire was something to which the British government clung tenaciously long after an almost complete legislative autonomy had been granted to the chief self-governing colonies. Even when the actual conduct of negotiations was left to a Canadian representative the formal association of a British official with the signature of the resulting agreement, as well as the formal control over the appointment of the plenipotentiaries and the ratification of the convention or treaty, was insisted upon by the imperial authorities.

Until at least the early part of the twentieth century the United States was on the whole in favor of the maintenance of this situation. There were no doubt some inconveniences involved. Matters which were directly at issue between the United States and Canada, and which could only be settled by the free acquiescence of both parties, still had to be dealt with through the roundabout channels of the imperial diplomatic machinery which centered in the Foreign Office in London. But in the eyes of the American government there were advantages as well. In purely Canadian matters the British government was something of a disinterested party, more amenable to American persuasion than the government at Ottawa. Imperial pressure could occasionally be enlisted to urge Canada to accept a compromise in the interest of Anglo-American harmony. The greater amenability of the imperial authorities in such cases was an incentive to the United States to insist on dealing with Britain as the sole recognized authority in diplomatic matters and to lend no encouragement to the advance of Canada toward an independent status in foreign affairs. It was only when the combination of Root as Secretary of State and Bryce as British Ambassador introduced a more generous spirit that the advantages of direct contacts with Ottawa began to be somewhat more appreciated in Washington.

This situation, however, did not result in practice in any serious aggravation of Canadian-American relations even when it occasionally gave rise to minor irritations. The liquidation of the strained situation which existed during the sixties and early seventies was followed by a remarkable period of tranquillity

tempered by a chronic but not too serious bickering. There were few broad questions which arose to stir national passions on either side. The process of economic expansion, the selective integration of the two economies as that expansion proceeded were profoundly important to their national interests but made comparatively few demands on diplomacy. When special groups or local interests seemed to be adversely affected their protests might be strong enough to enlist the support of the government and bring representations from one side or the other. But few such issues were general enough to rouse widespread popular interest or support. Local politics and domestic enterprises, external crises which led Canada to send troops to South Africa and the United States to embark on the conquest of Cuba and the Philippines were all more spectacular and exciting. Until the end of the century the aspirations for wider trade relations with the United States continued to agitate the Canadian public. But apart from this, there were few questions which attracted general popular interest, and even these only emerged spasmodically into prominence.

It was natural that one of these recurrent issues should be connected with the fisheries. That unquiet controversy, the object of so many discussions and agreements, remained persistently alive in spite of all efforts to lay it at rest. The basis agreed on at Washington in 1871 was satisfactory to neither party. Canada eventually acquiesced, but the American fishing interests continued to view it with resentment, and that resentment became more general as a result of what was felt to be the exaggerated and unfair award of the arbitral tribunal appointed to decide on the value of the Canadian concessions. The consequent abrogation of the agreement by the United States was followed by the imposition of strict regulations by Canada and by numerous seizures of American vessels, and the rejection by the Senate of the draft agreement of 1888 left the basic controversy still unsolved.

Nonetheless, the negotiations resulted in an easing of the situation, helped by the diminishing importance of the fisheries as a national issue in the United States. Even the fishermen no longer regarded the inshore fisheries of Canada as of substantial importance, and the American government was chiefly concerned to

vindicate its theoretical legal rights. The chief practical question that arose was the result of the Canadian regulations excluding American fishermen from the ports where they had been accustomed to purchase bait and supplies. But the conclusion of the draft treaty was accompanied by an agreement to modify this policy during the time required for the consideration of that document and the introduction of a licensing system under which American fishermen could regain access to the ports. Although the treaty was rejected this arrangement was continued on a yearly basis, and the controversy slumbered for nearly twenty years.

It was revived in the first instance in connection not with Canada, but with Newfoundland. That colony, too, had adopted a licensing system, but, like Canada, it continued to cherish a hope that its fisheries might be used to bring about a trade bargain with the United States. In 1902 it entered on negotiations which resulted in a draft treaty of reciprocity. This success was not looked upon by Canada with an entirely generous spirit. She felt that it might prejudice her own prospects for a trade treaty with the United States, and she brought successful pressure on the imperial government to veto the agreement. The United States Senate, on its part, viewed the concessions with disfavor, and it soon became clear that there was little chance of ratification. As a result Newfoundland proceeded to adopt retaliatory legislation which excluded American fishermen from the privileges which they had heretofore enjoyed. The ancient controversy seemed on the verge of renewal.

There was, however, a disposition by all parties concerned to settle the matter amicably, and the situation presented an opportunity to clear up the long-standing question of the legal rights of American fishermen under the treaty of 1818 in both Canadian and Newfoundland waters. The signature of a general arbitration treaty by Britain and the United States in 1908 and a series of exchanges between Washington, London, and Ottawa over a period of three years paved the way for the signature of a special convention in January 1909 which provided for the submission of a series of questions to The Hague tribunal. The headlands dispute, the right of commercial access to British ports by Ameri-

can fishermen, and the right of local authorities to impose reasonable regulations on the treaty coast of Newfoundland (which included a variety of questions, from the prohibition of purse-seine nets to the enforcing of the Newfoundland Sabbath) were among the chief points which the tribunal was called on to decide.

The decision was issued in December 1910. On the whole it upheld the main British contentions, subject, however, to their reasonable application in practice and the avoidance of discrimination between American and British citizens. The right of the fishermen to enter convenient ports for shelter and repairs was established, but they were denied a right to engage simultaneously in fishing and in trade. On the headlands dispute it was recommended that bays which were ten miles or less from headland to headland should be considered as territorial waters to which the treaty did not give access.

There were also certain suggestions by the tribunal as to the rules of procedure which might be adopted for the settlement of any future disputes, and these gave rise to some further discussion as a result of certain objections by Canada. But the dispute had now been reduced to one over legal niceties rather than over practical grievances. Laurier, jealous of Canadian claims to sovereignty, was reluctant to admit that an American objection to Canadian regulations should lead to their suspension until the matter had been decided. Happily he was persuaded that no serious disadvantage would result from the proposed procedure. It was thus possible to conclude a convention in 1912 providing for a Permanent Mixed Fisheries Commission to deal with any future disputes. Meanwhile the Canadian licensing system, which had worked so satisfactorily, was continued in effect; and when in 1924 Canadian resentment over the Fordney tariff helped to bring about its cancellation, the fisheries question had ceased to be a matter likely to disturb the essential harmony of the two nations.

While matters were thus gradually being adjusted with respect to fisheries in the Atlantic a dispute of a somewhat different character had arisen in the Pacific. This was the Bering Sea fur-seals controversy, which emerged almost simultaneously with the abrogation of the fisheries agreement of 1871 and produced a sec-

ondary but nonetheless disturbing controversy over the extent of American jurisdiction.

The root cause of the dispute was the attempt of the United States to extend its jurisdiction beyond the usual three-mile limit in order to conserve an important economic asset whose existence would otherwise be threatened by the activities of foreigners. The fur seals, particularly with the rising price of pelts after 1870, represented an important resource which the United States had acquired with the purchase of Alaska. It was, however, one which could easily and rapidly be depleted. A selective killing on land which was restricted to a reasonable number of males could be carried on without endangering the existence of the herd. Pelagic sealing, on the other hand—the killing of the seals in the water—was a wasteful method which slaughtered many whose pelts were valueless, as well as the females, whose rapid reduction in numbers would soon threaten the whole herd with extinction.

With the acquisition of Alaska the United States moved promptly to regulate sealing in its new domain. The industry was leased to a private corporation under regulations modeled on those which had been in force under Russian rule. The company was allowed to take a limited number of seals during a limited season annually on two of the Pribilof Islands. It was not to kill seals in the water or on the landing beaches, or to use firearms which might tend to frighten them away from their accustomed resort.

These restrictions, however, were an imperfect safeguard. While Americans were excluded from pelagic sealing other hunters continued their activities on the high seas. The long migrations of the seals and the range they covered in their search for food exposed them to depredations whose growing scale soon became alarming. In an effort to make its protective measures more effective the American government was moved to enlarge its claim of jurisdiction to take in the whole northeastern part of Bering Sea.

The ground for this claim was found in the terms of the treaty of cession describing the boundary of Alaska. The water boundary in the west was to be drawn southwest from Bering Straits to include the Aleutian Islands. Russia in 1821 had, in fact, claimed

exclusive jurisdiction over Bering Sea and sought to exclude foreigners from that area. This act—which had played its part in bringing the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine—had promptly been protested by the United States, and American rights to free navigation had been conceded by Russia in the treaty of 1824. But circumstances had now modified these earlier views. It was a temptation—to which the government succumbed—to claim that Russia had ceded the jurisdictional rights which the United States had formerly denied and that American legislation prohibiting the killing of seals “within the limits of Alaska Territory, or in the waters thereof,” could be validly interpreted to cover all of Bering Sea west of the water boundary.

By 1886 the enforcement of this interpretation had led to the seizure of a number of Canadian vessels outside the three-mile limit and to protests against this procedure on the part of Great Britain. Without abandoning its claim of right the United States responded with a sound proposal for an international agreement to regulate and protect the future of the sealing industry. It met with a favorable reception not only from Britain, but from Russia, France, and Japan. Canada, however, imposed objections. The attitude of the United States in respect to the Atlantic fisheries and her indifference to Canada's desire for a trade agreement made Canada little disposed to abandon a valuable legal right without concessions in return, even in the commendable cause of natural conservation. Her refusal effectively blocked the proposed treaty, and the continued seizure of her ships by the American authorities threatened to create a serious situation.

The American government, however, pursued its efforts to reach a settlement. In 1890 Secretary Blaine put forward the suggestion of arbitration accompanied by a temporary agreement regulating the seal fisheries. Arrangements to this end were made in 1891, and in 1892 a convention providing for arbitration was concluded between Britain and the United States.

In the course of these discussions, and in the later arguments before the tribunal, the United States developed a case whose ingenuity was worthy of admiration. Blaine himself, whose attitude toward the strict truth was notoriously a trifle casual, had hardly been successful in endeavoring to prove that his country

and Britain had both acquiesced in the Russian claims of 1821, for the protests on that occasion were vigorous and unambiguous; nor was he particularly convincing in his assertion that the words "Pacific Ocean" did not include Bering Sea. But in revealing an admirable if not wholly characteristic concern for "the rights of good government and good morals the world over" he was on ground which had a moral if not strictly a legal relevancy to the problem; and in claiming for the United States a right to property in the Pribilof herd he opened a fascinating vista to the legal imagination. This argument, which placed the seals in the category of domestic animals, was exhaustively developed before the tribunal by James C. Carter with analogies which ranged from rubber plants to oysters, and from deer to bees. "Nothing," he asserted, "can be more wild in its nature than a bee. That nature is not in the slightest degree changed when a hive is put inside of a box. . . . But what is the consequence of that? It is that a supply of honey is taken from that animal. . . . That is a great service to society." Similarly, the fact that the seals were induced to resort to the Pribilof Islands by the assurance that they would only be killed selectively gave the United States a claim over them in virtue of such results of its regulations. "The seals are freely invited to come to those islands. No obstacle is thrown in their way. Their annual return is cherished in every way it can be cherished." It was a touching picture, only paralleled by Sir Charles Russell's pathetic and detailed description of the fatal outcome of an attempt to tame a seal pup named Jimmie. His implication was that an American attempt to domesticate the Pribilof herd was unlikely to meet with any greater success.

The decision of the tribunal in 1893 was a denial of the American claims. It recognized that such rights as Russia formerly possessed had been transferred unimpaired to the United States, but those rights gave no jurisdiction over Bering Sea outside ordinary territorial waters, and the United States had no right of property or protection over seals found outside the three-mile limit. It was a decision which was thoroughly consonant with international law but which was of no direct help in solving what was a very real problem. What it did was to remove finally all prospect that the matter might be settled on the sole authority of

the United States and to make it necessary to pursue the more difficult method of international agreement.

The chief difficulties were still presented by Canada. The tribunal suggested certain concurrent regulations for the protection of seals, but although Britain and the United States adopted these rules, Canada failed to pass the necessary legislation. The American government showed a continued reluctance to treat with Canada direct and insisted that it would negotiate only with the imperial government. The relaxation of this attitude at the end of 1897 paved the way for the meeting in the following year of a joint high commission at which the sealing question among others was discussed. No agreement was reached, however, for new questions had by this time arisen between Canada and the United States which kept alive Canada's irritation at her neighbor. But in the next decade a more co-operative spirit was growing, and by 1911 the Canadian reluctance to make concessions was at last overcome, and an international agreement in which Russia and Japan were included made possible the effective regulation of the sealing industry.

Concurrently with these more important questions other minor matters arose which involved an active and continuous correspondence between Canadian and American authorities. There were difficulties over extradition. There were protests about the smuggling of Chinese across the border. Water diversion for purposes of irrigation and sanitation and hydroelectric power had frequently an international aspect, particularly when the Chicago drainage canal threatened to lower the lake levels by diverting water into the Mississippi. And although it did not touch the major aspects of policy the continued though transient wildness of the last frontier west injected a colorful element which gave rise to a good deal of local friction along the border.

The elimination of the Hudson's Bay Company as the effective authority in the West called for the substitution of some other force capable of maintaining law and order throughout the vast unsettled territory. It was in the established tradition of British North America that the power of the civil authority should operate well in advance of the spread of settlement. It was also desirable in view of frontier conditions in the United States and

their tendency to spread across the border. Whisky trading with the Indians was organized from Montana on a disturbing scale. So, when conditions favored it, was horse stealing. Clashes between whites and Indians occasionally led to such serious incidents as the massacre of a group of Crees by a band of American traders whose horses had been allegedly stolen by the Indians. "An imaginary line," wrote a later Westerner, "separated Canada from the United States for a distance of 800 miles. South of that line strategic points were garrisoned by thousands of United States soldiers; an almost continuous condition of Indian warfare prevailed, and the white population in large measure ran free of the restraints of established authority. There had been an overflow of 'bad men' from Montana into what is now southern Alberta and southwestern Saskatchewan, who repeated in Canada the exploits by which they had made Montana infamous. In large measure the world took it for granted that lawlessness must accompany pioneer conditions. Canada's Mounted Police was the challenge to that idea."

This famous force was organized in 1874. To the 300 men who composed it was given the task of seeing that the law was obeyed from Manitoba to the Rockies and from the forty-ninth parallel to the Arctic Circle. Their fulfillment of that task is a record of patience and endurance, of courage and resourcefulness. Organized whisky traffic with the Indians was broken up within a year. Horse stealing was made so precarious that there was seldom need for the drastic community action which was the normal procedure in many parts of the American West. Perhaps most important of all, Canada was enabled to avoid the series of desperate conflicts with the Indians which was necessary to clear the way for the final advance of settlement in the United States.

Canada's Indian policy was embodied in a series of treaties by which the tribes, in return for surrendering their lands, were assured of substantial reservations and of government subsidies and supplies. Their acceptance was to no small degree a tribute to the confidence which the police had built up among the Indians during the first few years of activity. The more responsible chiefs welcomed the suppression of the liquor traffic. They were impressed by the fact that, if Indians were punished for crimes

against the whites, the whites were equally punished for outrages against the Indians. Their previous experience had taught them to appreciate such impartial justice. "If the police had not come to the country," said Chief Crowfoot in accepting the treaty for the Blackfeet, "where would we all be now? Bad men and whisky were killing us so fast that very few of us would have been left today. The police have protected us as the feathers of the bird protect it from the snows of winter."

This did not mean, however, that all Indians were perfectly amenable, and still less that they were subject to perfect control. There were constant annoyances arising from the depredations of the tribes on one side of the line against the hunting grounds or the horses of rival tribes across the border. There were cases in which fugitive Indians from the United States, taking refuge on Canadian soil, made themselves a nuisance to the authorities there and a worry to the American authorities by their threats of incursions and depredations. There were similar annoyances resulting from the migration of Canadian Indians to the United States. It was the return of one of the latter bands numbering over a thousand which offered a most spectacular illustration of the difference in methods on either side of the frontier. They were escorted to the border by a strong force of American cavalry under the command of an officer named John J. Pershing. They were met by a lone Canadian policeman who, with an air of casualness which concealed his acute realization of the hazardous nature of his enterprise, took over his sullen and recalcitrant charges and shepherded them successfully on an eighteen-day march past a hostile reservation to their destination at Battleford.

On the Canadian side some of the gravest difficulties arose from the flight of Sitting Bull and his warriors into Canada after the battle of Little Big Horn. He and the chiefs who followed him—The-Man-Who-Crawls, Pretty Bear, The-Eagle-Sitting-Down—were no doubt brave as well as spectacular, but they added seriously to the problems of the Canadian government. Canada wanted to get the Sioux leader and his band back to the United States. The American government wanted him to return and make formal submission. But in spite of an offer of amnesty Sitting Bull had little faith in American promises and no desire to

place his tribe unarmed at the mercy of American policy. "You come here to tell us lies," he told the American commissioners, "but we don't want to hear them. This country is mine, and I intend to stay here and to raise this country full of grown people."

However complimentary his choice was to Canada, it was far from welcome. It meant a new and turbulent Indian tribe to be educated in peaceful relations with other Indians as well as whites, and in respect for the property of others, including the horses of the Mounted Police themselves. Moreover, it aggravated the problem of the food supply. The government refused to take over the support of Sitting Bull and his band. The buffalo were dwindling with alarming rapidity. The inroads made by the influx of the Sioux helped to speed their extinction. By 1880 the buffalo, the chief source of food on the plains, had virtually disappeared, and the Sioux, reduced to destitution, gradually made their submission and drifted back to American soil.

By this time the situation had brought about one of the few serious crises with the Indians which Canada had to confront. Even then it might not have arisen if there had not been simultaneous difficulties with the half-breeds. These, too, were affected by the ending of the buffalo hunt, and those who had settled on the Saskatchewan had become alarmed about the security of their land titles on the same grounds as had arisen on the Red River over a decade before. Once more the government neglected to take the necessary steps to remedy the grievances. The result was that the leaders of the half-breeds sought out Riel in his refuge in the United States and persuaded him to return and champion their cause.

Riel's career in the interval had been far from reassuring. His religious prepossessions had become more and more disturbing. He claimed to be a chosen instrument of direct revelation, and his strange manifestations had landed him on several occasions in insane asylums. Now, after setting up his headquarters at Batoche on the South Saskatchewan, he proceeded to support his temporal influence by claims to divine authority. He set up a church of his own. He had his council decree that he was a prophet. He also made preparations for armed resistance, in which the skilled buffalo hunter, Gabriel Dumont, was his most able assistant. The

movement encouraged the more restive among the Indians to join in rebellion against the government. Their age-old way of life was shattered by the disappearance of the buffalo. There were grievances over the carrying out of the treaty terms. The advance of the railroad and the activities of the whites who accompanied it led to further friction. As a result half-breeds and Indians joined to enforce their claims by arms.

The storm broke in 1885. Although the rebellion was hopeless it was nonetheless alarming. The Indians who participated under the leadership of Poundmaker and Big Bear were comparatively few in number, but there was always the danger that other tribes might rally to them if they showed any real signs of success. But the clash which was begun in March with the defeat of a small party of police at Duck Lake was virtually settled in May with the capture of Batoche and the seizure of Riel a short time later. With the suppression of the half-breeds the Indian rising collapsed, and a force of Crees which had been implicated in the hostilities fled across the line to the United States. Here was the reverse of the situation created by the flight of Sitting Bull. The United States had no particular desire to retain these embarrassing guests yet was not prepared to go to the trouble and expense of expelling them unless Canada would co-operate. It was not until 1896 that satisfactory arrangements were made by the two countries and the chastened remnant of the refugee Indians was delivered back across the border.

With so many minor irritants arising on both sides, only continuous consultation and co-operation between American and Canadian officials could prevent them from becoming chronic, and this was not altogether achieved. By the time of the meeting of the joint high commission of 1898, first in Ottawa and later in Washington, a number of problems had accumulated and were calling for settlement. The agenda listed a dozen topics, ranging alphabetically from Alaska to Wrecked Vessels. But in spite of this effort to clear the slate the commission was unable to reach an agreement. By this time one acute controversy had emerged to overshadow all other problems and to block any immediate effort to deal with them. This was the conflict over the Alaska boundary.

II

The basic definition of the boundary emerged from the controversy over Russia's effort in 1821 to close Bering Sea. The protests of Britain and the United States led to the conclusion of an agreement with Russia by each of these powers. The American treaty of 1824 settled the dividing line between Russian and American claims at 54:40 north latitude. The British treaty of 1825 laid down the dividing line between Russian territory on the coast and the British possessions in the interior. Starting at the southern tip of Prince of Wales Island, the line was to run up the Portland Channel to the fifty-sixth parallel. Thence it would follow "the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast" until it met the one hundred forty-first degree of west longitude, which it was to follow to the Arctic. But this definition was accompanied by an important modification. Where the mountains proved to be more than ten marine leagues from the coast a new line was to be drawn which should be "parallel to the windings of the coast, and shall never exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom."

As in the case of the Maine boundary, the geography on which the treaty makers based their description turned out to be highly imaginative. There were plenty of mountains in the region, but there was no distinguishable chain which conveniently paralleled the coast; and although in theory the selection of an arbitrary series of peaks might be contemplated, in practice the surveyors who considered the problem shrank back appalled from the task with which this would confront them. The alternative task of drawing a line parallel to the windings of a coast which was deeply indented with a multitude of inlets was, if anything, even more of a nightmare. A conventional compromise offered the only escape from terms which were impossible of application.

The problem, however, did not arise while Russia continued to hold Alaska, and it remained in abeyance during the early years of American occupation. It was the discovery of gold on the Stikine River in 1872 that first gave the question of the boundary a practical importance. At the instance of British

Columbia the Canadian government, through the British Foreign Office, made overtures to the United States for the determination of the dividing line. In response President Grant recommended to Congress the appointment of a joint commission to conduct the necessary survey. But the United States as yet felt no particular interest in the matter, and the fact that the work was estimated to cost \$1,500,000 was enough to prevent congressional action. When in 1877 the question of jurisdiction was raised as the result of the arrest of an American by the Canadian authorities, the problem attracted greater attention. An agreement, however, on a temporary boundary on the Stikine without prejudice to the final settlement was enough to take care of the existing situation and to prevent any fresh incidents in that area.

The next twenty years were marked by periodic efforts to get action which led to no practical results. They were sufficient, however, to reveal the serious gap between the views of the parties concerned. In 1877 the Canadian government had sent a surveyor to locate a line which should follow the general bearing of the coast at a distance of ten leagues. Such instructions implied the ignoring of small channels and inlets in the interests of practicality. When during the eighties the surveyors of Canada and the United States engaged in discussions over the boundary line they found themselves in agreement as to the hopelessness of applying the strict letter of the treaty but completely at variance as to the conventional line which must be substituted. The periodic efforts of either side to secure arrangements for a joint survey, while they resulted in a draft convention in 1892, brought no progress toward the actual undertaking, and a new convention in 1897 was equally without result.

By that date the question had suddenly assumed the appearance of major importance. Gold had been discovered in the Yukon, and the rush to that area was soon under way. The chief route of access lay up the long inlet known as the Lynn Canal, and it was clearly of importance to Canada to have this channel give access direct to her own territory without the interposition of American authorities and customs houses. The failure of the project for a Canadian overland route combining a railroad with a wagon road accentuated this desire. When, therefore, the

matter was raised in the joint high commission of 1898 Canada put forward her claim for a boundary which would follow the main trend of the coast and would cut across the numerous long inlets which offered access from the sea.

This claim the American negotiators rejected outright. In the course of the discussions, however, the possibility of compromise emerged. Canada's real object was to secure a port of her own at the head of Lynn Canal. If this could be assured she was disposed to drop the more general application of her contention and to accept the American claim as applied to the remainder of the boundary. Her suggestion was that a conventional boundary should be drawn which would give her access to Pyramid Harbor, leaving the rest of the disputed territory to the United States. The Americans were not ready to concede outright possession, but they inclined to an offer to Canada of jurisdiction at Pyramid Harbor for a period of fifty years, with its reversion to American control should Canada fail to occupy it. But an outcry from the Pacific-coast states and the reluctance of Canada to agree to possession without ownership combined to prevent the adoption of this arrangement.

In the face of this disagreement the natural inclination of both parties was to suggest arbitration. Such a method of settling disputes had now been firmly established as the normal procedure in controversies between the United States and Britain or Canada. The most recent and most striking instance was the arbitration over the Venezuela boundary, forced on Britain by Cleveland's threat to step in and impose an American decision unless the proposal was accepted. Now Canada proposed that the Venezuelan arbitration should be accepted as a model for the settlement of the question at issue. This the United States refused. In the Venezuelan case she had no possessions at stake; in Alaska there were American settlements which might be placed in jeopardy. She was therefore unwilling to submit the question to an outside authority, and Britain was unwilling to accept the countersuggestion of a mixed tribunal with no outside arbitrator. The discussions of 1898 ended without result.

The matter, however, was not allowed to rest. While a temporary line was agreed upon at the head of Lynn Canal, Secretary

Hay pursued his efforts to persuade Britain to accept a mixed tribunal. The continued resistance of Britain to this proposal and her insistence on an outside arbitrator were strengthened by the negotiations which were simultaneously in progress for a revision of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. To this treaty, which gave Britain a right to share in the construction and control of any future Panama canal, the United States now objected. Her desire to replace it by an agreement which would give her full freedom to go ahead by herself raised a question of important concessions for which Britain might be able to extract assent to an impartial form of arbitration on the Alaska boundary. But her advantage was not pressed to that point. She still desired harmony with the United States even at the price of unilateral concessions. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty accepted the American desires with respect to Panama, and in 1903 a convention was signed which agreed to submit the Alaskan question to the type of mixed tribunal for which the United States still held out.

"The tribunal," read the chief clause, "shall consist of six impartial jurists of repute, who shall consider judicially the questions submitted to them, each of whom shall first subscribe an oath that he will impartially consider the arguments and evidence presented to the tribunal, and will decide thereupon according to his true judgment."

In spite of her continued desire for an outside arbitrator Canada acquiesced in this agreement. Unfortunately for the prospects of harmony, the steps which Theodore Roosevelt took to implement it were hardly in the spirit of the agreement as Canada conceived it. Roosevelt was firmly opposed to the idea of arbitration in its strictest sense. He was convinced that the American case was not open to reasonable doubt, and he regarded Canada's attitude as "dangerously near blackmail." He was prepared to use the famous Big Stick if it should prove to be necessary—indeed, he had already ordered his Secretary of War to send additional troops "as quietly and unostentatiously as possible to southern Alaska." He was also threatening, in case no agreement could be reached, to ask Congress for the necessary money to run the line in accordance with the American claim. His soft-

ness of speech throughout the controversy indeed left something to be desired.

In Roosevelt's eyes the procedure envisaged by the convention was not arbitration in the formal sense. To that, he insisted, he would never agree; and, in fact, the adjective "arbitral" applied to the tribunal had been eliminated from the preliminary draft before the treaty was signed. Thus in spite of the stipulation that the question was to be considered judicially Roosevelt persisted in regarding it as a meeting of representatives who were trying to reach an agreement. He had already asserted that in case a commission were appointed he would instruct the American members not to yield any territory but to insist on the entire American claim. Now he was as good as his word. He told them, indeed, that they were impartially to judge the questions which came before them, but he added that "in the principle involved there will of course be no compromise." He had no reason to doubt that the appointees would act in the spirit thus indicated.

The appointments of Root, Lodge, and Turner, in fact, revived and aggravated a tension that had shown signs of subsiding. Root, and possibly Lodge, might have been accepted as jurists of repute, but by no stretch of the imagination could they or Senator Turner (a representative of the Pacific-coast states) be regarded as impartial. Root, as a member of the Administration, was clearly committed to the American case. Lodge's hostility to Britain was well known, and he had recently expressed his vigorous condemnation of Canada's claims. Against these appointments Canada protested as a violation of the spirit of the treaty, and an effort was made to get Britain to delay ratification until redress had been secured.

Britain, however, was unprepared to enter on a controversy whose most probable outcome would be the collapse of arbitration and direct action by the United States. The best that the Colonial Office could suggest was some consideration "as to the most advantageous manner of constituting the British portion of the tribunal." Nor would the home government consent to leave all three appointments to Canada. The outcome was that to Lord Alverstone, the Lord Chief Justice of England, were

added two eminent Canadians. Sir Louis Jetté was lieutenant governor of Quebec and had previously held high judicial office. His original colleague was a member of the Canadian Supreme Court, who was replaced after his death by A. B. Aylesworth, a prominent lawyer who shortly afterward became Minister of Justice. If in the outcome these members showed themselves as thoroughly convinced of the Canadian case as the Americans were of theirs, the conviction was reached honestly and sincerely.

The same sincerity must of course be credited to the American members. What prejudiced their position was the fact that they had already committed themselves to certain definite views, and it was because of these commitments and their consequent freedom from any suspicion of impartiality that they had been appointed. Roosevelt later claimed that in the first instance he had approached two members of the Supreme Court without success. If so, he had reason to welcome their refusal. It began to appear that the Senate might raise objections to the convention, and it was only after Roosevelt had privately conveyed through Lodge the news of prospective appointments which were calculated to end all risk of concession that the threat of opposition collapsed.

Thus the United States came before the tribunal with the assurance that even if she did not win she could not possibly lose. In addition, there were further steps which were calculated to advance the American prospects by impressing the British government with the necessity of a settlement. Intimations were conveyed to both Chamberlain and Lansdowne that the United States would take direct action in case of the failure of arbitration. Balfour, then Prime Minister, was suitably impressed with the seriousness of the situation. Whether the government brought any influence to bear on Alverstone, there is no doubt that his American colleagues endeavored to do so, and it is not improbable that the general atmosphere inclined the Chief Justice to make every effort to satisfy the United States.

Alverstone, indeed, was from the start in a most difficult position. The Canadians confronted the unpleasant fact that, given the nature of the American appointments, they had no hope of a majority decision. The best they could expect was a deadlock,

and then only if their English colleague stood firm. To the memory of past incidents in which Britain had yielded to the United States on Canadian questions, and to the new resentment at Britain's apparent weakness over the composition of the tribunal, was added a suspicion of Alverstone as an Englishman who would be ready to throw over Canada in order to mollify the United States. If Alverstone should decide against the Canadian case he would need convincing reasons for doing so.

The Canadian case had initially rather more to be said for it than outside commentators usually admit. The treaty of 1825 clearly implied that the boundary was not to lie more than ten marine leagues from the ocean. Were the long but narrow inlets to be regarded as part of the ocean, or were they included in the term "sinuosities of the coast"? Something of the same problem had been raised with regard to the bays on the Atlantic coast in connection with the fisheries. Alaska was to some extent the headlands dispute in reverse, and on both these questions the Canadian attitude was quite consistent. The fact that in this case consistency was a definite advantage was merely an added incentive for maintaining it.

If, however, the somewhat casual wording of the actual clauses was read in the light of the underlying purpose of the treaty the provisions took on a very different aspect, and one which was decidedly adverse to the Canadian claims. The treaty arose out of Russia's efforts to close Bering Sea. The extent to which she could be persuaded to abate that claim depended in part on the limits which could be placed on her territorial possessions. Stratford Canning, indeed, asserted that the real negotiation was over the maritime claims and not essentially about boundaries. "We negotiate about territory to cover the remonstrance upon principle."

What Russia insisted upon, however, was a protective strip of coast line to support the various establishments which she had planted in Alaska and on the islands along the coast. To make that protection effective, the Hudson's Bay Company must be excluded from the territory in question, and that meant denying these competitors any access from the interior to the coast above 54:40. In the negotiations in 1824 Sir Charles Bagot fought hard for an outlet as far to the north as possible. When it proved im-

possible to get this in the form of territorial possession he fell back on the proposal to confine the coastal strip to a maximum depth of ten leagues. But he also stipulated for perpetual access to the present Sitka and for rights of trade and navigation along the coast. It was over these stipulations that the first negotiations broke down, and only their abandonment by Britain made possible the conclusion of a boundary treaty in 1825.

The main intentions of its provisions were clear from these circumstances. The mountains were to form the boundary when they ran close to the coast. The ten-league stipulation was a maximum line, and the strip might be much narrower if the mountains were nearer to the sea. But although the *lisière* was kept deliberately narrow it was clearly intended to be unbroken. The Russian refusal of an outlet was definite and uncompromising and was ultimately accepted by Britain. The later maps which indicated the general boundary showed it as running around the heads of the inlets as the Americans claimed.

Unfortunately, in rendering a decision to this effect, Alverstone laid himself open to the suspicion of political motives. Some compromise indeed was almost unavoidable. The attempt to solve the boundary problem by a judicial interpretation of descriptions which had an imperfect relation to reality would have been confronted by insuperable difficulties. Yet the compromise adopted gave ground for charges that the decision was political rather than judicial and led to the refusal of the Canadian members to sign the award. The essential point of the decision was the denial of Canada's claim to have access to the inlets and the vindication of the American contention for an unbroken *lisière*. But while this principle was fully supported by historical grounds, its detailed application involved certain arbitrary decisions about the course of the actual line which the Canadian commissioners felt justified in protesting. Even more important, from their point of view, was the decision with respect to the Portland Channel. The difference between the Canadian and the American claims involved the ownership of four small islands. At an early stage in the proceedings Alverstone expressed his belief that the Canadian claim was unanswerable. But in the final decision the islands were divided, on grounds which were by no means con-

vincing. The islands themselves were of little significance, in spite of Aylesworth's belief that they had a strategic importance. But Jetté had some reason for his charge that their division was "totally unsupported either by argument or authority, and it was, moreover, illogical." It was this action in particular which seemed to Canada proof of political surrender by Alverstone and provoked a storm of criticism against the award.

The resentment, concentrated on the unfortunate Alverstone in the first instance, also extended to the British government, whose willingness to yield to the United States was looked upon as the root of the whole trouble. Laurier threatened to lay the whole correspondence before Parliament and pointed to the award as an example of the disadvantages inherent in Canada's lack of treaty-making powers. There is little doubt that the episode further encouraged the efforts of the Dominion to secure control of her own foreign relations.

On the side of the United States there was a satisfied feeling that justice had been vindicated. "Our case was ironclad," wrote Roosevelt, "and the chief need was a mixture of unyielding firmness in essentials and a good-humored courtesy in *everything!*" Canadians would hardly agree that Roosevelt's courtesy or good humor—if he really thought he had exhibited those qualities—had been quite so evident during this episode. But their wrath against Britain helped to divert a large part of their irritation away from the United States. The replacing of placer mining by large-scale operations in the gold fields diminished the immediate importance of the lack of sea access. Though memories still rankled for some time the disturbing effect of the controversy on the relations of Canada and the United States was comparatively brief. Not least important, the faith in conciliation and arbitration remained, and these methods continued to be applied as the discussion of the problems which had been overshadowed by the boundary dispute was resumed in the succeeding years.

One of the most significant developments, indeed, was the creation of permanent machinery for the application of this method in future disputes. A new effort to clean the slate by direct consultation was undertaken by Secretary Root in 1906. It developed into an attempt to establish some method for more effective deal-

ing with the problems which were now constantly arising, particularly with respect to boundary waters. As early as 1902 a Waterways Commission had been provided for, with powers of investigation and report. But both its accomplishments and its limitations suggested that a body with wider functions and more extended powers was highly desirable. The result was the creation, by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, of an International Joint Commission, a judicial body of three permanent members from each nation which was to decide all matters pending or arising between them. It was given the specific functions of deciding questions which involved boundary waters, regulating their diversion, and investigating any frontier disputes. In addition, wider matters of controversy might be submitted to it by joint consent of both parties. Not the least significant provision was the stipulation that the Canadian members were to be appointed by the King on the advice of his Canadian advisers. Thus there was created a body which made possible, within a limited sphere, direct diplomatic settlements between the United States and Canada, and over whose membership and procedure the British government, on its part, had virtually renounced control. It was an unspectacular but definite advance by Canada on the road toward independent international status.

III

With the revival of prosperity in Canada at the turn of the century, and the broadening of economic connections with the United States which accompanied it, the agitation for a reciprocal trade agreement which had persisted since 1866 receded temporarily into the background. Sentiment in its favor was by no means at an end. It emerged in the recurrent demands of the farmers for a lowering of the Canadian tariff, and the discussions aroused by Chamberlain's campaign for British tariff reform in the interests of imperial preference brought forth echoes of the earlier discussions of commercial union with the United States. But reciprocity was no longer a major issue in the decade after 1900. The need had abated, and Canada seemed to be finding alternative avenues toward national economic expansion.

This outlook was expressed in the trade policies of the Laurier administration. The defeat of the liberals in 1891 on the issue of unrestricted reciprocity had weakened the influence of the free trade wing and encouraged the moderate protectionists. With the latter group Laurier himself was in sympathy. He made his gesture toward the traditional attitude of his party by sending a mission to Washington to discuss a possible agreement in 1897 and by raising the question at the meeting of the joint high commission in 1898. But a Republican administration which had just saved the nation from the menace of Bryanism by its advocacy of the appealing policy of the full dinner pail, and which was in process of adding new touches of perfection to the protectionist system by the Dingley tariff, was little inclined toward a relaxation of duties. The rebuffs which Canada's overtures had consistently encountered during the past thirty years were repeated on this occasion, and there were no indications that the American attitude was likely to change in the near future.

The result was a public renunciation by Laurier of any further efforts. "There will be no more pilgrimages to Washington," he asserted. "We are turning our hopes to the old motherland." It was a situation with which he was probably well satisfied. It enabled him to avoid any drastic reorganization of the tariff structure which he had inherited and to embarrass the imperialist element among his opponents by the granting to Britain of a preferential level of duties which still left substantial protection to Canadian industry. It was a shrewd compromise course which attracted criticism from both high- and low-tariff advocates but which seemed to give reasonable satisfaction to the country at large.

As the years went on, however, an underlying restiveness in the rural areas began to gather strength. The conditions which had led to the Granger movement in the United States and which had brought a climax in the Populist campaign were as yet only partially duplicated in Canada and were slower to produce a definite political movement. Nonetheless, there had been a spread of farm organizations across the border and a tentative emergence of political sentiment in the Ontario elections of 1894. By 1910 there was a revival of interest in effective organization if not in

direct political action, expressed in the organization of the Canadian Council of Agriculture in the previous year.

The strongest sentiment was to be found among the farmers of the prairie west. Grievances against railroads and elevator companies, against industrial monopolies and the tariff which sheltered them began to be vocal, as they had been in the United States during a previous generation. Efforts to influence government policy and to secure intervention on behalf of the farmer had revealed his weakness in political matters. His discontent manifested itself at the hearings of the tariff commission which were held throughout Canada in 1905. This had been intended as a prelude to a general raising of the tariff, but the strength of agrarian sentiment kept the changes within comparatively moderate bounds. Even so, they were enough to exasperate the western farmer. When Laurier toured the west in 1910 he was met by demands not merely for lower tariffs, but for new efforts at reciprocity, and the development of a similar sentiment in rural Ontario showed how important the tariff issue might easily become in the next election.

By this time it had also emerged as a major issue in the United States. Theodore Roosevelt had successfully staved off any action on this thorny problem during his regime. But by 1908 a rising tide of protest made it clear that some effort must soon be undertaken. With a bold gesture, now that his responsibility was practically at an end, Roosevelt threw the problem into the ample lap of his successor, and Taft accepted the legacy with a definite promise of revision downward. His efforts to redeem his pledge culminated in the Payne-Aldrich tariff and an outburst of resentment by a public which felt itself shamefully betrayed.

The new tariff proved to be a catalyst in the trade relations of Canada and the United States. It gave an American administration, for almost the first time in half a century, a sound political motive for seeking an agreement with Canada in order to offset the opposition which its tariff policy had aroused. It came at a time when similar political incentives had revived in strength on the side of Canada. Moreover, it coincided with the emergence of a definite problem as to tariff levels which gravely concerned both countries. The Canadian tariff of 1907 had prescribed three

levels, the lowest representing the British preference, the intermediate one the rates which might be conceded to foreign countries with which Canada had a trade agreement. The treaty with France in the same year implied admission to these intermediate rates. The Payne-Aldrich tariff, on its part, provided for maximum rates, above the normal level, to be applied to countries which discriminated against the United States. The American government now claimed that it must be placed on the same footing with France and other most-favored nations with respect to the Canadian tariffs, otherwise the Payne-Aldrich maximum rates must be applied against Canadian imports.

In an effort at amicable adjustment of this difficulty a delegation of American officials visited Ottawa early in 1910 to negotiate with the Canadian government. No immediate progress was made in these discussions. Canada insisted that her intermediate rates were a reward for concessions by other parties, which the United States had not earned, and that to admit the American contention would mean a surrender of her right to negotiate free agreements with other states. But while the specific problem remained unsolved, hints were dropped on both sides that a direct trade agreement might bring an adjustment of the difficulties. The door had been cautiously opened toward the revival of reciprocity.

It was pushed further ajar by sheer accident. The editor of the *Toronto Globe* was now Rev. James A. Macdonald, a somewhat impulsive clergyman turned journalist. He had just been through a strenuous ordeal in the course of defending his paper against a libel suit and felt the need of a holiday. At the suggestion of a colleague he decided on a month in Washington. On his arrival he naturally fell in with members of the press gallery, and—equally naturally—their conversation turned on the tariff situation. Someone was inspired to inform Taft of Macdonald's arrival. The President was immediately interested. Here was an intimate of Laurier, a stanch Liberal free trader, and the editor of one of the most influential papers in Canada. He might even have the status of an unofficial envoy. Taft summoned him to an interview which was a prelude to a round of discussions with the President and his chief advisers over the week end and which impelled Macdonald to cut short his holiday and return posthaste

to Canada. According to his colleague, he reported that "Taft was almost in a panic over what he could do to secure exemption for Canada from the effects of the bill the high-tariff gang are forcing on the country. He wanted to know if I thought Sir Wilfrid would meet him to consider a reciprocity measure. So I am here to find that out."

Laurier, when this message was conveyed to him, was interested but cautious. He professed his inability to leave Ottawa but was prepared to send Fielding, his Finance Minister, to discuss the matter. On March 20, 1910, Fielding met Taft at Albany. Their conversations resulted in a compromise which exempted Canada from the maximum Payne-Aldrich rates in return for certain token concessions, and in arrangements to inaugurate negotiations for a general reciprocity agreement.

It was originally contemplated that this agreement should take the form of a treaty. When, however, discussions opened at Ottawa in November, Fielding had changed his mind and expressed his preference for the method of concurrent legislation. He also showed an inclination, which may have been based partly on tactics, toward a somewhat restricted basis of mutual concessions. The United States was prepared for a comprehensive agreement based on a wide free list and lowered duties on other products. But Fielding saw risks in the inclusion of manufactures and wanted them excluded. This the Americans would not accept. "We could not be satisfied," they stated, "with an agreement as to natural products alone and could not deal except on the basis of a comprehensive inclusion of manufactured articles."

Disagreement on this point seemed likely to wreck the negotiations at the outset. A breakdown was avoided when Canada consented to consider the inclusion of some manufactures, and the United States agreed to accept a selected list. But details had still to be worked out at a further conference in Washington, and it was not until January 16 that the final basis was adopted. It provided for a free list embracing a wide variety of natural products, a list of both natural and manufactured products to be admitted at identical rates which were lower than the existing ones on either side, and the lowering of duties by each party on a number of articles which were outside the reciprocal clauses.

Provision was made for free admission of pulp and certain grades of paper to the United States when Ontario and Quebec should abolish their restrictions on the export of pulpwood, and Canada promised to reduce the license fee on American fishing vessels to a purely nominal level.

The announcement of the agreement roused powerful forces in opposition on both sides of the line. The strong protectionist element in the United States, which had already scored a dubious triumph in the Payne-Aldrich Act, joined battle to prevent this new threat of a breach in the protective-tariff wall. They endeavored to bolster their ranks by revealing a new-found solicitude for the farmer, who would be exposed to Canadian competition. They were joined also by some groups, including a number of the Insurgents who had recently appeared in Congress, whose desire for a lower tariff was offset by their determination to prevent the Taft Administration from gaining any credit for its achievement. But against them were not only the anti-protectionist protests throughout the country, but a substantial group of newspaper publishers who resented their failure to secure the repeal of the duties on newsprint and who saw in the new agreement a chance to attain this objective. Although Senate opposition delayed the passage of the necessary legislation, it was overcome in special session, and by the latter part of July the bill was on the American statute books.

In Canada the opposition rallied more slowly but ultimately with far more success. The first feeling of the Conservatives was that Laurier had stolen a successful march on them. In spite of their glorification of protection they were fully aware of how deeply the aspirations toward reciprocity were embedded in Canadian tradition and how numerous had been the efforts of their own party to obtain an agreement in the past. Sir Robert Borden records the doubts and divisions in the party caucus which he called and the emphatic assertions by western members that they did not dare oppose the proposals. "The atmosphere that confronted me was not invigorating; there was the deepest dejection in our party, and many of our members were convinced that the government's proposals would appeal to the country and would give it another term of office."

If Laurier had called an election at once such views might have been vindicated. But he tried first to get the new agreement embodied in legislation, and the resulting delay allowed the various elements of opposition to rally to the fray. The economic partition which the protectionist groups in the United States had insisted on maintaining for their own benefit, modified though it was by an increasing integration in certain selective aspects, had in the course of half a century inevitably produced its reaction in Canada. Strong groups with special interests had grown up, aided by the protective system which Canada, in her turn, had adopted. The efforts toward economic nationalism had brought into being an industrial structure which sought to monopolize the domestic market and a transportation system designed to overcome the advantages of an artificial political geography. If the barriers on which they counted were now to be swept away the whole economic outlook would be changed to their disadvantage.

Even before detailed negotiations had been inaugurated, indeed, the preliminary attacks had begun. Fielding's meeting with Taft had roused the immediate apprehensions—never far from the surface—of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. Its warnings against any weakening of the tariff structure were echoed by chambers of commerce and by Conservative newspapers. With the announcement of terms which involved concessions on manufactured goods, their worst fears seemed justified, and they rose almost solidly in protest. The railroads, if less unanimous, proved powerful allies. The Grand Trunk, with its international connections and the close association which it now enjoyed with the Liberal government, might view the prospect with complacency. But the Canadian Pacific had battled too long against the threat of American intrusion to welcome the idea of Canadian trade moving freely across the boundary. Van Horne, its former president, announced that he was "out to bust the damn thing" and proved a powerful campaigner in the battle which soon got under way.

But although economic motives were the foundation for opposition, economic arguments soon sank to secondary plane. The Conservatives, remembering Sir John A. Macdonald's success with the old flag in 1891, made the patriotic cry the keynote of

their campaign. It is possible that some of them sincerely believed that closer trade connections with the United States would weaken the political ties with Britain; but the exaggeration, amounting at times to hysteria, with which this point of view was in many cases presented seems too fantastic to have been quite honest. Reciprocity, in spite of the efforts of the somewhat bewildered Liberals, was not really discussed on its merits. It was drowned in a wave of spurious emotion deliberately roused by businessmen concerned for their special interests and politicians hungry for office after fifteen years of exile.

They were helped by a number of Americans, including Taft himself. The President's statement in submitting the agreement to Congress that Canada had come to the parting of the ways was seized on by the Conservatives as proof of the sinister designs which reciprocity implied. Even more impressive was the letter to Roosevelt which he made public while the campaign was on. "The amount of Canadian products we would take," ran one passage, "would produce a current of business between western Canada and the United States that would make Canada only an adjunct of the United States. It would transfer all their important business to Chicago and New York, with their bank credits and everything else, and it would greatly increase the demand of Canada for our manufactures. I see this is an argument against reciprocity made in Canada, and I think it is a good one."

This was potent ammunition. Champ Clark helped out with a declaration of annexationist aspirations. "I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possession, clear to the North Pole." It was a sentiment unhappily echoed by other public men of only slightly less prominence and repeated in the editorial columns of the American press. The Conservatives had no lack of evidence to prove that, in the American view, reciprocity was merely a prelude to absorption.

Against this type of attack the government struggled with decreasing success. In Parliament the opposition embarked on a course of obstruction designed to prevent the adoption of the agreement. By summer Laurier had to leave for the imperial conference which was held at the same time as the coronation of

George V. He resumed his efforts on his return, but it was soon clear that they were hopeless. He had no other course than to dissolve Parliament and place the issue before the people. By that time the opposition campaign was in full swing. Eighteen Toronto Liberals, closely allied with large business enterprises, had broken with their party. So had Sir Clifford Sifton, whose powerful organizing ability was now devoted to the defeat of the proposals. He was backed by funds from certain railway interests and aided by the able if none too scrupulous journalistic talents of Arthur Hawkes, whose special appeals to the British born to stand by their heritage was one of the less lovely features of the campaign. Even Kipling was enlisted in the cause and responded with an Election Day appeal: "It is her own soul that Canada risks today. . . . I see nothing for Canada in reciprocity except a little ready money, which she does not need, and a very long repentance."

These tactics were a resounding success. In spite of a close popular vote the constituencies returned 133 Conservatives to 86 Liberals—an almost exact reversal of the figures as they stood before the election. Other issues besides reciprocity contributed to this result. After fifteen years in office the Liberals were bound to suffer from an accumulation of discontents, augmented by the scandals which by this time hovered around certain of the departments. The rising nationalism in Quebec, led by the brilliant and attractive Henri Bourassa, had swung against Laurier's mild policy of imperial co-operation as embodied in his proposals for the construction of a Canadian naval force. The Conservatives had eagerly taken advantage of this situation and had accompanied their campaign on behalf of the maintenance of imperial loyalty by ardent co-operation with the most anti-imperialist elements in the country. Thus they had encompassed the defeat of the Liberals in Quebec on isolationist grounds, and in Ontario and British Columbia on the basis of imperialist emotions; and this victory on the coast and in the more thickly populated central provinces overshadowed the Liberal margin in the Maritimes and the prairie provinces. Canada, which so long had sought reciprocity, had rejected it when it was within her grasp.

There were possible arguments against its acceptance as it

stood in 1911. Although the Conservatives were equally ready to oppose a formal treaty as fettering Canada's autonomy, it was quite true that the adoption of the basis of mutual legislation placed it somewhat at the mercy of possible changes in American sentiment. To this argument was added not only an appeal to let well enough alone, but a prophecy that the rising strength of the Democrats would bring tariff reductions without Canadian concessions, and this was partly vindicated by the victory of Wilson and the adoption of the Underwood tariff. It is quite possible that the agreement of 1911 would not have survived the isolationist reaction and the revived high-tariff sentiment after the war, and that more substantial assurances were desirable than the agreement provided.

But although such arguments were put forward in the course of the campaign, they were not the grounds on which the Conservatives successfully relied. Their victory was the result of a sudden wave of emotion in which the preservation of Canadian national identity and the maintenance of loyalty to King and Empire were combined, perhaps in a confused and irrational fashion, but in a way which nonetheless revealed the tenacity with which Canadians clung to their separate existence and their British heritage. And underlying this was an even more significant and more sobering phenomenon. However positive was the appeal of patriotism, there was a negative factor that was even stronger. That was the distrust and dislike of the United States as a nation and the fear of the overbearing designs which she entertained at the expense of Canada. Here was the outcome of a long record of rudeness and rebuffs, a record in which disregard for the interests and sentiment of the smaller nation had occasionally resulted in an attitude, if not in physical actions, which was openly domineering and aggressive. It was this accumulation of resentful memories which had still to be overcome before complete confidence and harmony could be attained.

CHAPTER XVI

Coming of Age

THE IMPERIALIST UPSURGE which was manifested in the Canadian election of 1911, while it was basically the expression of an inherent attitude, was also the reflection of the growing tension in world affairs and its effect upon the position of Great Britain. In that aspect it was a significant indication of the way in which European developments were intruding their influence upon the affairs of the Americas. The factors which favored the isolation of the New World were weakening in the face of the new forces of nationalism and industrialism and imperialism; and though Canada's situation made her more sensitive to the results than was her neighbor to the south, the fact remained that the United States as well was being drawn inexorably into new courses by the force of circumstances.

For the ninety years which followed the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine had brought about a transformation in the structure of the Western world. Not only did modern transport and communications lessen the significance of distance; the economic integration brought about by the industrial revolution resulted in an interdependence which had profound political implications. George Washington's assertion that "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation" might still retain a considerable measure of validity, but the conclusions to be drawn from it were subject to important

modifications. It was growing more difficult to contemplate a continued extension of commercial interests combined with an aloofness from political entanglements. The expanding nationalism of the leading powers, the external policies which they pursued not only in Europe, but in Africa and Asia, the balance of power which resulted from their growing rivalries, all held a direct concern for the countries on the American continent; and the United States, as the greatest of these, found herself being drawn into the maelstrom of world politics.

The effects were felt even more strongly in Canada. In spite of a growing consciousness that her immediate interests lay on the western side of the Atlantic, she was attached to Europe by her political and economic ties with the motherland. Hence, although her physical position might dictate an outlook on world affairs similar to that of the United States, there were other factors of interest and tradition which modified and even outweighed the influence of geography. The matter was further complicated by the position and even the existence of the United States. If Canada was not ready to become unreservedly American neither was she prepared to regard herself as an appendage to Europe. She was obliged to attempt a dual orientation in external affairs, to reconcile her continued attachment to Britain with her need for harmonious relations with the United States. Any divergence of policy between herself and either of these powers in case of a major world crisis held possibilities of serious strains.

As far as her geographical position was concerned, Canada enjoyed the same advantages as those which, in the eyes of the United States, ensured the latter's inviolability. Canada, too, was sheltered by the broad oceans from the designs of aggressors in Europe or Asia. She, too, benefited, and more consciously than her larger neighbor, from the supremacy of the British navy which gave the oceans their real significance as protective barriers. She also was largely free by this time from any fear of aggression against her land frontiers. The only neighbor on all her vast borders was the United States. And just as American apprehension of an attack by Britain through Canada had now been reduced to a myth, so Canadian fear of aggression from the United States, which had been alive and understandable less than

half a century before, had by 1911 practically receded into the realm of fantasy.

"We are fortunate," said Mackenzie King in 1938, "both in our neighbors and in our lack of neighbors." Canada, possessing in Britain and the United States two powerful, if not always solicitous, friends, had no enemies from whom she stood in fear of attack. Only an outrageous provocation on her part, of a sort to which she was little inclined to be tempted, was likely to arouse in a foreign nation an enmity which would lead to an armed threat. That did not mean that under all circumstances she was immune from the risk of invasion. But such an attack would be launched against her not on her own account, but from broader considerations of strategy. Canada was most likely to be assailed not as an objective in herself, but as a means to a larger end. So long as she refrained from participation in the quarrels of the great powers she had a reasonable prospect of being left in peace.

These were considerations similar to those which had motivated the tradition of isolation in the United States. There were, however, other and divergent factors which led to quite a different attitude on the part of Canada. The United States, born out of a revolution which had behind it a colonial tradition of escape from the corruption of the Old World, sought to keep her republican purity undefiled by contacts with the iniquitous monarchies of Europe. The suspicion that these monarchies entertained envious and sinister designs not only against the territory, but against the republicanism of the New World, put her further on guard. The continued influx of refugees from European countries (and not least from Ireland) helped to maintain and invigorate the established tradition. And the sense of potential power and of destined world leadership, which was evident at a very early stage of the Republic, grew in strength as the United States expanded across the continent.

In these respects the characteristics which mark the development of Canada are almost the direct converse. It was the Loyalists who had fought and suffered from the Revolution who exercised a dominant effect on the Canadian tradition. It was their influence which was thrown most implacably against any sign of republicanism, or even of democracy, and which insisted

on an unquestioned adherence to the British connection with all that it implied. Moreover, in contrast to the self-confident security of the United States, Canada for nearly a century faced a real peril on her southern frontier which she could meet only with the help of the motherland. The strength of Britain was her safeguard on this continent. For her own security it was necessary that Britain be upheld against any European enemies. There was little that Canada could do to this end outside her own borders during the period when she herself felt in danger. But when the threat of American invasion disappeared and Canada's resources expanded, this traditional view still seemed valid; and while Canada might feel no need to aid in minor wars, any major crisis in which Britain's existence seemed at stake was certain to rally the loyal and enthusiastic support of the Dominion.

Thus the outbreak of war in 1914 saw automatic reactions by the United States and Canada which were expressions of these utterly divergent traditions. To the United States at large it seemed that Europe was again embroiled in those chronic feuds which it had neither the wisdom nor the virtue to overcome. The contrast between the exterminating havoc in Europe and the untroubled tranquillity with which an industrious America pursued the arts of peace seemed new evidence of the moral superiority which the United States had consistently taken for granted. The wisdom of standing aloof from all such risks of conflict was more evident than ever. The sordid motives of all the belligerents was an assumption which scarcely needed proof. Memories of 1812 awoke to impel Americans to refrain from partisanship and to concentrate on the full maintenance of neutral rights, particularly on the high seas. Wilson's neutrality proclamation, with its demand for impartiality in thought as well as in action, without doubt expressed a prevailing mood throughout the nation in the autumn of 1914.

If the attitude of Canada was in its way almost equally uncritical, it was at least based on a conviction that there were issues at stake with which the future of Canada, and indeed of the world at large, was irretrievably bound up. But Canadians were naturally disposed to attach to the victorious survival of Britain an importance which the United States was less prompt

to recognize. It is not without significance that this sentiment was far stronger in English than in French Canada. The French, abandoned to their fate by the mother country in 1763, were thrown back on a destiny that could only lie on the continent of America. Once the fear that they might be absorbed by the United States had disappeared, they had few motives for enthusiastic loyalty to England or for attachment to Europe. The geographical factor which contributed to isolation in the United States had its effect in French Canada as well. The British sentiment and the Loyalist tradition, so strong among their English neighbors, meant nothing to them. Laurier and his followers saw things with a wider vision and called for the fullest support of Britain as a bulwark of Canadian freedom. But the narrower nationalism of Bourassa had made a very considerable impression, and the blunders of the government in dealing with Quebec accentuated its appeal and produced a major national cleavage by 1917.

The general Canadian attitude toward Wilson's policy of neutrality, however, was one of growing criticism which ultimately contained a considerable measure of antagonism. The rising debate in the United States itself helped to contribute to this result. The opponents of intervention joined with the supporters of the Central Powers to mobilize all the latent anti-British sentiments in the Republic and launch a steady barrage of invective against England. Even the friendly expressions of admiration from other quarters which Canada received as her war effort expanded could not offset the irritation engendered by these attacks on the cause to which her whole national strength had been committed. The diatribes against England in Congress and in portions of the press (and particularly in the Hearst publications) struck loudly and persistently in the ears of Canadians whose press services and magazine reading largely originated in the United States. They were not soothed by the widening gap between the national standards of living as American war prosperity came into contrast with the heavy burden which Canada's war effort imposed on her resources. It was against this sort of background that they judged Wilson's policy, and their judgment was not always tempered with patience. The President's refusal

to distinguish between the moral status of the belligerents, implicit in the bickering over maritime rights and in the tone of his peace note in 1916, gave very considerable offense. Phrases such as "too proud to fight" and "peace without victory" aroused both scorn and anger. The effort at combined firmness and restraint over the submarine issue, as illustrated by the *Lusitania* notes, evoked little understanding or appreciation. The popular feeling was somewhat muted in its expression by the realization on the part of both the government and the more coolheaded editors of how important it was to avoid giving offense to the United States, but it was a deep-rooted irritation which grew as Canadian sacrifices mounted and American participation was delayed.

By the time the United States entered the war these emotions had become too strongly established to be overcome at once. There was a full intellectual realization of the vital significance of this development and a readiness to welcome with enthusiasm the vast aid which was promised by American strength and resources. But the feeling that such aid was already overdue helped to modify Canadian affection for the new ally, and there remained a readiness to criticize the details of the American effort which was partly the outcome of habits developed during the earlier years and not readily abandoned under the new conditions.

As against this popular attitude there were earnest efforts by the government toward the closest co-operation with the United States. As the war progressed the importance of the freest possible access to American economic resources became steadily more apparent. Canada's domestic financial effort, substantial though it was, had to be supplemented by outside loans. The closing of the London money market turned Canada to New York, where as early as 1915 a loan was floated which was a prelude to others in succeeding years. The dependence on the United States for vital supplies necessary to the war industry was illustrated by the threatened shortage of coal which followed American entry into the war. The increasing volume of Canadian business handled by the Imperial Munitions Board in Washington led in February 1918 to the establishment of a Canadian War Mission, working with the War Trade Board in Ottawa and providing a channel for co-operation with a similar body in the United States. Co-

ordination in wheat marketing and transport facilities and the regulation of migratory labor made for fuller efficiency in the use of common resources. The steps to this end were selective and somewhat tentative, but their lessons were not without value for the future.

II

The war resulted in a tremendous stride by Canada and her sister Dominions toward full international status. The common effort of the British Empire during the struggle had reaffirmed the imperial ties and the desire to maintain them. But it had also revealed how unsatisfactory the old relation had become and how desirable it was to discover a new basis more adequate to the national aspirations of the Dominions and the degree of self-government they had attained. Sir Robert Borden expressed their perturbation at discovering that not only had they been committed to war by a foreign policy over which they had exercised no influence, but that Britain had become obligated by secret commitments of which the Dominions had not even been informed. That was a situation which they unanimously insisted should not be repeated. Canada and Australia had put into the field more men than any of the combatants except the great powers themselves. The other Dominions had played a valiant and a costly part in the struggle. They intended to have a voice in the terms of peace and in the future conduct of the foreign relations with which the whole Commonwealth was concerned.

It was the Canadian Prime Minister who took the lead in demanding this transformation and in working out the details of the new relationship. His determination played a large part in securing for the Dominions separate representation at the peace conference and an equal status in the League of Nations. He helped to formulate the decisions which envisaged a method of continuous consultation in the process of arriving at future policies in foreign affairs and concerted action in implementing those policies once they had been agreed upon. It was a basis in which the continued unity of the empire, particularly in external policy, was to be harmonized with the freedom and equality of the Dominions and Britain as partners in a Commonwealth of Nations.

Throughout this process Borden revealed a continual concern over the maintenance of future harmony with the United States. If Britain was to continue as one pole of attraction in Canada's external interests the United States was emphatically another. The war had heightened the realization of how vitally important it was for Canada to act in concert with her neighbor to the south. The problems which confronted the victors made it more important than ever to Canada that Britain and the United States should act in harmony in world affairs. When Borden discovered on the part of his colleagues in the imperial war cabinet a disposition to treat the United States as a possible rival at the peace conference he raised his voice in emphatic protest. The best asset they could bring home from the war, he asserted, was good relations with the United States, and he pressed for a policy which would steer clear of future European entanglements in favor of closer Anglo-American co-operation. "If the future policy of the British Empire," he said bluntly, "meant working in co-operation with some European nation as against the United States, that policy could not reckon on the approval or the support of Canada."

It was shortly made clear by his successor that this principle extended to Asiatic nations as well. Among the many disturbing questions which troubled the relations of Britain and the United States in the years immediately following the war, not the least serious was the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This pact, which originated in 1902, had been extended by subsequent arrangements to 1921. In that year the question of its formal renewal came to the fore. It was a matter in which the United States took a serious interest. The aggressive policy which Japan had pursued on the Asiatic mainland during the war had threatened to interfere with American interests in the Far East and had revived the old fears of a possible clash in the Pacific. The alliance had been qualified in 1911 by a provision which in effect exempted Britain from any obligation to aid Japan against the United States. But American public opinion was unable or unwilling to grasp this fact, and even more informed leaders looked askance on an agreement which strengthened Japan's position by associating her so closely with Great Britain.

Among the members of the Commonwealth there was a strong desire that the alliance should be renewed. Britain had found it highly useful during the war, in spite of certain embarrassments attendant upon Japanese actions. New Zealand and Australia pressed vigorously for a renewal of the treaty as a restraining influence upon Japan in the Pacific. In Canada, however, a strong sentiment against its continuance developed. Canada, too, had interests in the Pacific, but the danger from a clash between Japan and the United States was far greater than any from possible Japanese designs on Canada. If such a clash should take place while the alliance was in effect Canada's position would be most difficult. Even short of this, the dislike with which the United States viewed the alliance, and the possible effect of that dislike on Anglo-American relations, was something which Canada could only view with alarm.

Thus when the issue arose Prime Minister Meighen gave vigorous expression to Canada's firm hostility to a renewal of the alliance. If some agreement was necessary for security in the Pacific it should be formed on a wider basis in which the United States should be included. In February 1921 he urged this alternative on Lloyd George, with no immediate success. But in the imperial conference which met in June of that year he succeeded in overcoming the unanimous opposition which at first confronted him and in persuading the British government to explore the possibilities. Circumstances favored the effort. The American government at this time was anxious to make some gesture in the cause of disarmament, partly to offset its rejection of the League of Nations and partly to avert the naval race which now threatened with Britain and Japan. It began to be clear that naval limitation might be easier to arrange than general disarmament and that the stabilization of the situation in the Pacific would greatly facilitate this task. When, therefore, preliminary feelers by Britain opened up the prospect of attaining these twin ends and at the same time eliminating the Anglo-Japanese alliance they met with an immediate response. The outcome was the issuance of invitations to the Washington Conference which met in November 1921.

It was somewhat characteristic of the attitude of the United

States during this period that Canada, although she had played so important a part in making the conference possible, received no separate invitation to participate in it. She was not, indeed, excluded from its work. Arrangements were made for the inclusion of members from the interested Dominions on the British Empire delegation, and they signed the resulting treaties on behalf of their separate countries. It was a procedure in which Canada acquiesced and to which the United States raised no objection—indeed, it was highly desirable from the point of view of naval limitation that the Dominions should be specifically bound by the treaty provisions. But it did illustrate a tendency on the part of the United States to look somewhat askance on Canada's new evolution toward independent status and to do little to facilitate her advance toward that goal.

From the outset, indeed, the American attitude was one of the stumbling blocks which Canada had to overcome. Her demand for a separate seat at the peace conference ran into American opposition. Wilson himself, on this and later on similar occasions, does not seem to have felt too strongly and was fairly easily persuaded to accede to the desires of the Dominions. But his advisers were apt to be more rigid, and the American public was slow to accept the idea that a country which accepted British rule was not necessarily under British dictation. The American members of the committee which drafted the charter of the International Labor Organization fought hard against Canada's separate membership, in spite of the important status which she had attained as an industrial and exporting nation. "The people of Canada," protested Borden, "will not tamely submit to a dictation which declares that Liberia or Cuba, Panama or Hedjaz, Haiti or Ecuador must have a higher place in the international labor organization than can be accorded to their country which is probably the seventh industrial nation of the world, if Germany be excluded." He carried his point on this and on the eligibility of Canada and the other Dominions to election to the non-permanent seats on the Council of the League. But Colonel House had strongly opposed this latter concession, and the fact that the Dominions were in the League at all was a strong talking point with the opposition in the United

States, who pointed to the six votes of the British Empire as one reason why the scheme should be rejected.

This somewhat dubious attitude toward Canada's pretensions to maturity was reflected not only in the studious ignoring of Canada as a separate entity in issuing the invitations to Washington, but in the still more important episode of the halibut treaty of 1923. This agreement was the outcome of efforts to provide for the protection of the halibut fisheries in the Pacific, and it did this by stipulating a closed season during part of the year and permitting the authorities of each country to arrest citizens of the other when they were caught violating the regulations. But more significant than the terms of the treaty was the form in which it was concluded. The British Ambassador had expected that, as on previous occasions, he would sign along with the Canadian envoy. But Canada insisted that her representative should sign alone, and after a number of exchanges the imperial authorities agreed to this demand. When the treaty came before the Senate, however, an effort was made to amend it to cover all subjects of the British Empire. To this Canada refused to agree. This was to be a treaty negotiated on her own authority and applying to her alone. When the Senate gave way the right of Canada to negotiate independently in foreign affairs was for the first time established.

Behind this episode lay a further significant development in imperial relations. Borden and his associates had envisaged a common foreign policy for the whole empire, in whose formulation all the Dominions would participate and by whose results they would all be bound. "The instrument of the foreign policy of the empire," explained Lloyd George in 1921, "is the British Foreign Office. That has been accepted by all the Dominions as inevitable. But they claim a voice in determining the lines of our future policy. . . . The sole control of Britain over foreign policy is now vested in the empire as a whole."

The inevitability of this situation, however, was not recognized by the Prime Minister who came to power as a result of the Liberal victory in 1921. Mackenzie King, even more than his predecessors, was alive to the importance of firm relations with the United States. He had been an emissary of Laurier to Washington

on several occasions before the war, and his work with the Rockefeller Foundation had broadened his contacts still further. He was also a believer in the continuance of the imperial connection. "As I see it," he said in 1924, "there are at least three possible avenues of constitutional development: one leading to complete independence, another leading to annexation with the United States, another leading to a more clearly recognized nationhood within the community of nations comprising the British Empire. . . . I believe that the future of this Dominion will be happiest and best . . . if its development is along the line that it has been thus far, toward a fuller recognition of national status within the community of free nations which comprise the British Empire." And emphasizing the significance of this status, he added: "I have been taking my stand from the point of view of Canada as a nation within the British Empire, not Canada as a colony, not Canada in any inferior or subordinate position, but Canada as a country which has gained and which merits equality of status with other Dominions and with the mother country." In these words he expressed the view of a disciple of Laurier, but in his application of these principles he showed an even more acute consciousness of Canada's primary destiny as a nation whose first interests lay not in Europe, but on the American continent.

The consequence of this viewpoint was a significant modification of the basis which Borden and his associates had envisaged. The single front in imperial external relations would have been difficult to maintain under the best of circumstances. The difficulty was increased by the reaction from the war and from entanglements in the affairs of other continents which Canada, along with other countries, experienced after 1919. In that atmosphere the desire to avoid wide commitments in imperial affairs had considerable scope. A number of incidents, including the threat of war between Britain and Turkey which was symbolized by the Chanak incident in 1922, gave a chance for its expression. The outcome was the abandonment of the idea of a single foreign policy and the recognition of diverse interests on the part of the several members of the Commonwealth. There was still an effort to prevent these interests from coming into

conflict, but there was no longer an attempt to embrace the foreign policy of each member within a single imperial policy in which all must share.

For Canada this devolution of interests and functions applied especially to her relations with the United States. There were definite steps to embody it in a test issue which would make its implications clear. In 1922 Mackenzie King set out on a carefully publicized mission to Washington. He announced that his intention was to negotiate on the Rush-Bagot convention of 1817 with the object of giving it a still more permanent character. This might have provided an impressive opportunity to establish Canada's independence in negotiations. As it happened, the halibut treaty was concluded before any positive results were attained and proved to be the more suitable occasion. The Senate amendment at one stage threatened its usefulness in this respect, and Canada offered to proceed by concurrent legislation sooner than see the basic agreement collapse. But the withdrawal of the amendment cleared the way for the establishment of the new diplomatic status; and although the negotiation on the revision of the Rush-Bagot convention reached the stage of alternative drafts presented by Canada and the United States, the main purpose had already been attained and no need was felt to pursue it further.

It may also be conjectured that similar considerations accounted for the delay in establishing a Canadian legation at Washington. The volume of Canadian business, which made the War Mission so useful a device, provided a motive for some form of permanent representation when the specific functions of that mission came to an end. In a dispatch to the Colonial Office in October 1919 the Borden government pointed out that before the war Canadian business had occupied nearly three quarters of the energies of the British embassy and that this condition was likely to continue. The added fact that the personnel of the embassy was selected without regard to such things as familiarity with Canadian affairs was a motive for establishing direct representation. In accordance with the principle of diplomatic unity, however, it was proposed that the Canadian representative should be a part of the embassy establishment and that

he should take charge of imperial interests in the absence of the British Ambassador. In other words, he would be a sort of vice-envoy who, though concerned chiefly with Canadian matters, would have the status of a member of a coherent imperial organization.

It was this feature of the proposal which Mackenzie King chiefly criticized in debate. It was in line with his determination to secure independent rights for Canada apart from imperial diplomacy that he should prefer to have at Washington a Canadian minister who would have no responsibility for general imperial business and who would be immune from interference by the Ambassador or the Foreign Office. As a result of the incidents, including the halibut treaty, which illustrated this viewpoint, the imperial conference of 1923 accepted the principle of decentralization in foreign policy, and the new basis was confirmed and elaborated by the Balfour report in 1926. Not until that date did Canada move to effect the exchange of representatives to which the United States had agreed seven years before—a move forestalled by two years by the Irish Free State. When the new legation was set up, however, it was an independent establishment. The Canadian Minister took no part in the affairs of the British embassy, and his actions involved no responsibility on the part of the Ambassador or the Foreign Office. Canada's independent representation, like her independence in negotiations, was thus firmly established.

It is no disparagement of the usefulness of the new legation to recognize that its activity was somewhat unspectacular. On the contrary, it may be that its existence as a channel for routine business permitted the settlement, without attracting attention, of questions which might otherwise have lingered to create a growing irritation. Yet one may still speculate whether its activities in these useful functions were not unduly restricted in scope or whether circumstances were such that an attempt to broaden those functions would have done more harm than good.

Since her coming of age Canada has tended to pride herself on her role as interpreter between the two great English-speaking nations. Particularly after the war, public speakers in Britain and America were prone to echo that opinion in tones of flattering

sincerity. Looking over the record, it seems doubtful whether Canada has fulfilled that interpretive function to any major extent. There have been occasions, notably in the case of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, when she has sought with success to modify British policy and bring it into harmony with the viewpoint of the United States. But such cases have been the exception rather than the rule. The desire to reduce imperial commitments to a minimum has led to a deliberate refraining from interference in British policy lest interference result in commitments, and in a wary aloofness that has been largely negative in its effect. On the side of the United States there has apparently been the same reluctance to use any positive influence and a consequent failure to play any noticeable part in modifying American policy. But it must at least be said that the task was probably more difficult at Washington than it would have been at London. The sense of self-sufficiency on the part of the United States, which was evident in Wilson's policy at Versailles, was even more positive during the post-war period, and as the United States swung back to a resolute and suspicious isolation its attitude brought a renewal of difficulties on the Canadian side.

III

The refusal of the United States to join the League of Nations affected Canada in a distinctive and rather complex fashion. Membership in the League as an institution represented a distinct advance in status, and this was something quite apart from the virtues or shortcomings of the League itself. The general idea of world co-operation for the maintenance of peace made a natural appeal to a small state which, although unusually favorably situated, was dependent on world economic and political stability for that active world trade on which her prosperity was based. The League offered a meeting place in which Britain and the United States could be brought into still closer co-operation in world affairs, to the benefit of Canada. If as a result both American isolation and British attachment to Europe could be modified a middle ground would be discovered which would be very close to that which Canada herself hoped to occupy.

The American rejection changed these prospects. It weakened Canada's willingness to accept active commitments under the Covenant and strengthened her tendency to draw back into her North American position. Even while the Covenant was under consideration the significance of this tendency had been revealed. Canadian objections to Article X were based initially not on the dislike exhibited by the United States, but on Canada's own view of her interests and position. Borden insisted that Canada was not ready to accept the implication that the territorial settlement was just in all particulars or the obligation to uphold it by sending armed forces to Europe. His attempt to get this article struck out or materially modified met with no success. But the strength of American objections, as revealed in the subsequent discussions of the League, gave a fresh motive for continued efforts by Canada during the early years of the League's existence. It was partly in the hope of modifying these objections that the Canadian delegates sought to have the offending article eliminated or amended. When that failed they fell back on an effort to interpret it in a way which would safeguard Canada's position. A Canadian resolution in 1923 provided that, in case of military sanctions, the special position of each state should be taken into consideration and stated that the degree of participation was a matter for the constitutional authorities of each state to decide. Although the negative vote of Persia blocked the formal adoption of the resolution it was generally regarded as an expression of the League attitude in practice; and its terms showed the extent to which Canada, from motives based on her own interests, approached the point of view of the United States with respect to military commitments outside her own borders. Her subsequent policy in the League, with its negative character and its hostility to the strengthening of the machinery for the application of sanctions, revealed the added consideration of the determination to minimize all possibility of a clash between the United States and Britain over the application of League policies.

But it was not merely in the broad sphere of world politics that Canada was affected by the American post-war attitude. Far more immediate and more tangible was its influence on their direct relations. For the revived isolation which prompted a new re-

nunciation of Europe by the United States had its repercussions in the affairs of the Americas as well. New barriers of economic nationalism were raised not only against Europe, but against all foreign countries, and the easing of the barriers which had resulted from the Underwood tariff and the co-operative arrangements during the war was superseded by a new rigidity whose most striking expression was the Fordney-McCumber tariff.

This was a measure which ran directly counter to the trend toward reciprocity which was once more running strongly in Canada. The problems involved in readjustment and reconstruction and the temporary economic recession which set in after the war brought new demands by the farmers for steps to increase their markets abroad. These demands found political expression in the Progressive party, which pointed out that a considerable part of the reciprocity legislation of 1911 was still on the statute books of the United States and called for the adoption by Canada of the legislation which would at last put that agreement into effect. But Congress in 1921 proceeded to repeal the earlier enactments and embarked on the construction of a new high-tariff wall, and Canada felt once more that she had received an unfriendly rebuff at the hands of an indifferent neighbor.

This development accentuated a popular irritation which was already widespread. The end of the war saw Canada weary and heavily burdened after four years of struggle. The United States, on the other hand, was just getting into its stride and had all the ebullience of a nation which had participated in a decisive victory without the losses which a long conflict would have entailed. There was a proneness in some quarters to assume the major credit for that victory and to ignore the sacrifices which the other belligerents had endured. Every ill-judged bit of boasting or unguarded utterance of self-praise, however innocent of intentional offense, had its immediate impact on Canada, where press and movies and the new instrument of radio kept constantly before the public the more obvious—and not always the more creditable—aspect of the American attitude. Little as the average American was aware of it, his somewhat patronizing benevolence toward Canada was met by a dislike which for a short period

amounted almost to hatred. Not for the first time a military alliance had resulted in sentiments that were anything but amiable.

This feeling would have disappeared far sooner had it not been for the simultaneous and more prolonged irritation which a part at least of the American public exhibited toward Great Britain. In these quarters the reaction against any contacts with Europe tended to take the form of a constant attack on British imperialism. The Irish imbroglio attracted even more than its customary attention and invective. The difficulties in India gave added ground for criticism. The long and unhappy controversy over war debts injected a further element of irritation, and occasional irresponsible suggestions that Britain should cede Canadian territory in payment could hardly help attracting in Canada an attention rather greater than they deserved. Beneath the attitude of consistent friendliness which the Canadian government adopted toward Washington there was for several years a public opinion which was anything but favorable to better relations.

It was largely the growth of prosperity in the late twenties which brought about a modification. While Canadians found themselves able to pursue their economic expansion in spite of American tariffs, the interlocking of the life of the two nations continued apace. American branch factories spread into Canada. American capital, to an amount of some four billion dollars, flowed into industry and mining and public securities. The automobile helped a new section of the American public to discover Canada as a vacation resort, and Canadians discovered that their scenic attractions to tourists were an important economic asset. The prolonged discussion of the St. Lawrence waterway, which issued in the abortive treaty of 1932, envisaged a gigantic project of international co-operation which would link the development of the two nations even more closely together.

Nonetheless, the barriers to commercial integration remained, and their importance was heightened as a result of the depression after 1929. The new Hawley-Smoot tariff in the United States made more remote than ever the prospect of freer trade between the two countries. Once again, as in another depression fifty years before, a Canada which had patiently kept open the

possibility of more active trade intercourse now turned to higher tariffs of her own. The Bennett government sharply raised the protective level and followed this by an imperial trade policy whose result was the Ottawa conference of 1932 and a series of preferential agreements which the United States viewed with considerable perturbation.

This orientation, however, was not looked on as excluding the alternative of an agreement with the United States. Negotiations to this end were, in fact, inaugurated during the Bennett regime. They met with no immediate success, but they were continued and broadened by Mackenzie King following his return to power and issued in an agreement in 1935. The result was an important alteration in the previous commercial policies of both countries and the adoption of an initial approach toward a freer exchange of products, not so much on the basis envisaged by former reciprocity proposals as by regulations which would facilitate the flow of those products of which each country is the principal source of supply for the other. Thus while the chief benefit to Canada came from more favorable rates on natural products, her concessions in return were most important in respect to manufactures and industrial supplies. With this as a beginning steps were taken to broaden the scope of the trade arrangements in a way which would allow the participation of Great Britain. The way was paved by a modification of the Ottawa agreement in 1937, and in 1938 triangular negotiations in Washington issued in new trade agreements between Britain, the United States, and Canada. By accepting some modifications of the earlier preferential rates in the British market Canada facilitated the granting by Britain of a number of concessions to the United States and found compensation in the extension of tariff concessions which considerably widened the terms of the Canadian-American agreement of 1935.

These were significant steps away from the trend toward economic nationalism which in all three countries had reached a climax in the early thirties. They were also indicative of a new approach by both the United States and Canada not only toward their relations on this continent, but toward world policy in general. For it was becoming abundantly clear that the world crisis which

had by this time become chronic was likely at any moment to issue in catastrophe, and the attitude which the American nations would adopt toward that event was becoming more and more an overshadowing issue which involved not only their individual policies toward Europe, but the manner in which their decision on such policies would affect their relations with each other.

CHAPTER XVII

The New Integration

THE DELIBERATE EFFORT at closer relations, symbolized by the new trade agreements between Canada and the United States, was indicative of the broader political trend which was the outcome of the pressure of world politics. In the face of the growing tension in Europe the two nations of North America found themselves drawing closer together in their attitude toward world affairs. The gap between their basic traditions was still a fact. Isolation from European entanglements remained an inherent American tendency as loyalty to Britain remained a powerful force in the Canadian outlook. Nonetheless, the gap was narrowing as Canada placed an increasing emphasis upon her American position, and the United States found herself involved, however reluctantly, in the consequences of international developments.

Both countries, in fact, were now confronted with responsibilities that were the inevitable consequences of the positions which they had attained. The greatness and the wealth of the United States, the power which she possessed in the modern world made it impossible for her to stand completely aloof. The very fact that few major decisions could be taken or implemented without her concurrence placed her in a position where her own decisions, whether she willed it or not, were of vital importance to the world at large. Even if those decisions were negative, even if

they amounted to a refusal to take any positive stand, they would by that very fact have a positive effect. The consequences of power could not be evaded. Canada, on her part, had no such power and no such influence. But she had insistently aspired to the privileges of nationhood, and those privileges, in their turn, carried with them responsibilities. She, too, found that she must make decisions, even if they were only decisions in favor of inaction.

In foreign affairs, indeed, the most consistent feature of Mackenzie King's policy was the avoidance of commitments. He took the stand that the government would not commit the country to any specific course of action but would leave the decision to Parliament and that Parliament would only be asked to make a decision when a crisis had actually arisen. Meanwhile he firmly refused to be bound automatically to join in any punitive action under the Covenant or to promise in advance to support Britain in case she should be involved in war.

It was a negative policy which gave no real hope of security in a major crisis. Essentially it meant that imperial foreign policy was left in British hands, with Canada reserving the right to repudiate the results if she saw fit. Yet if those results should mean a threat to Britain's existence the Prime Minister recognized that it would be virtually impossible for Canada to stand aloof. In less vital quarrels, however, she might be able to choose her own course. "If there were a prospect," he said in March 1939, "of an aggressor launching an attack on Britain, with bombers raining death on London, I have no doubt what the decision of the Canadian people and Parliament would be. We would regard it as an act of aggression, menacing freedom in all parts of the British Commonwealth. If it were a case, on the other hand, of a dispute over trade or prestige in some far corner of the world, that would raise quite different considerations."

Historically there was some justification for this distinction. Canada in the past had seen Britain engage in a series of minor colonial wars and had felt no obligation to go to her aid. When war between Britain and Turkey had threatened in 1922 Canada had felt it possible to reserve her decision until the character of the conflict became more evident. But by 1939 the distinction

between major and secondary wars was becoming more difficult to maintain. The rise of the aggressor nations had created a new balance of power. Two completely incompatible views of life stood opposed to each other, and the fate and the welfare of every country in the world depended on which of these would ultimately prevail. The new balance was by that time so equal that neither side could risk its alteration in even minor details. Peace had become truly indivisible, and even an apparently secondary conflict was likely to be the spark which would precipitate a major explosion.

That, however, was something which both statesmen and peoples were reluctant to recognize, and there were special circumstances in Canada which motivated an avoidance of positive decisions. It was unlikely that Canada herself would be faced with a threat of aggression. The danger was that a war arising from causes which were geographically remote would threaten the existence of Britain, that bulwark on which Canada's security depended. It would be politically impossible to say beforehand that in such a case Canada would refrain from participation. Yet it was almost as dangerous politically to promise aid to Britain even in case of a major struggle. French-Canadian nationalism had been stiffened by the memories of the last war, and particularly the conscription issue. There was a deep aversion to any military effort on behalf of anything except the actual defense of Canadian soil. There was in consequence a genuine fear on the part of the government that a definite pronouncement in advance would precipitate a serious cleavage in the nation. "A strong and dominant national feeling," said the Prime Minister, "is not a luxury in Canada, it is a necessity. Without it this country cannot exist. A divided Canada can be of little help to any country, and least of all to itself." And in a revealing passage which showed how far Canada had moved toward an essentially North American standpoint he added: "The idea that every twenty years this country should automatically and as a matter of course take part in a war overseas for democracy or self-determination of other small nations, that a country which has all it can do to run itself should feel called upon to save, periodically, a continent that cannot run itself, and to these

ends risk the lives of its people, risk bankruptcy and political disunion, seems to many a nightmare and sheer madness.”*

If these words had stood alone they might seem to express Canada's conversion to isolationism. They were qualified by a context which recognized the impossibility of real isolation in the modern world and the need to join in a common effort when common interests were truly at stake. This was in essence the point of view which animated the foreign policy of President Roosevelt as well. Mackenzie King felt it essential to restrain those who would plunge Canada indiscriminately into foreign wars in the wake of Great Britain. Roosevelt's task, on the other hand, was to convince the nation that indiscriminate isolation was impossible and that the vital interests of the United States were bound up with the attempt to form a common front against aggression.

The nation was not easily convinced. The outburst of criticism which greeted the President's "quarantine" speech in 1937 showed how tenacious was the reluctance to risk any embroilment in foreign conflicts so long as the United States was not directly and physically menaced. The neutrality provisions which originated in 1935 and were put into more permanent form two years later were a considered rejection of Roosevelt's demand for power to discriminate between victims and aggressors. The President, desirous of using the moral weight of the United States on behalf of world peace, felt that it could only be effective if backed by the material resources of the nation as a deterrent to the forces of armed anarchy. The sentiment of Congress and of the people was overwhelmingly hostile to the risks which discrimination would involve.

In these policies pursued by Canada and the United States there were parallels at certain points but no evidence of deliberate co-ordination. At most there was the expressed determination of the Canadian government to avoid any serious clash with American policy and the common belief of both administrations in the relaxation of trade barriers as an essential contribution to international harmony. But in the simultaneous development

*For the whole of this very interesting speech see *House of Commons Debates*, March 30, 1939.

of hemisphere solidarity there was a common interest which, while it did not mean identical policies or coextensive spheres of action, nonetheless involved a completely new phase in the growing co-operation of the two nations.

In the good-neighbor policy which Roosevelt enunciated the first emphasis was placed on relations with Latin America. Beginning with the Pan-American Conference at Montevideo in 1933, there was a sustained effort to overcome the long-standing antagonism between the United States and the other American republics and to work out a co-operative basis which would assure peace within the Americas and a common front against outside aggression. Its progress was marked by the adoption of a consultative pact at Buenos Aires in 1936 and the reaffirmation and strengthening of this agreement at Lima in 1938. It was a process which Canada watched with interest but in which her government was not yet ready to seek an active share. There was some Canadian advocacy of entry into the Pan American Union, and it was generally accepted that a hearty invitation would be forthcoming whenever Canada was prepared to take this step. "It is the desire of the American states," wrote James Brown Scott in 1928, "that Canada should join them; it would rejoice them, body and soul, if their representatives in the near future should welcome Canada into their midst." For the moment, however, the motives for such a step were feeble. Canada had few direct interests in Latin America. Her trade with that area remained small in spite of periodic efforts to expand it. Her interest in its strategic security was largely academic. She was separated from it by the potent barrier of the United States, and she felt able to leave the problem of the southern area to her powerful neighbor and to confine her concern to the common problem of the defense of North America.

For although both sides were somewhat chary of voicing it in public, there had steadily been growing a mutual recognition of the need to stand together against any outside attack. The United States, free from any danger on her northern border so long as Canada's freedom was maintained, could never afford to see that country subjugated by a strong and possibly hostile power. Canada, on her part, recognized that the national interest

of the United States would oblige her to come to the aid of Canada if she were threatened with invasion. Canadians on occasion had viewed the Monroe Doctrine with suspicion and dislike and tended to resent the idea that it extended to Canada. But whatever the technical scope of its terms, the warning against any fresh colonial enterprises by European powers on the American continent implied a veto on the transfer of existing possessions; and even if the doctrine had never been formulated, the interest of the United States in excluding all potential enemies from Canadian soil was basic and inescapable. As a corollary it would be clearly impossible for Canada to stand aside in case an invasion should menace the United States. Sooner than risk the seizure of Canadian territory to be used as enemy bases, the United States would insist on placing her own forces in occupancy. In these circumstances Canada might find that protection from overseas aggression had been secured at the price of annexation to the United States.

The prospect of a workable alternative lay in the explicit recognition by both countries of their mutual dependence in matters of defense and a mutual assurance of their willingness to take a full share in the consequent responsibilities. The reorganization of the Canadian armed forces which began in 1936 was not entirely unconnected with the possibility of a European war. But it was also motivated by the growing possibility of war in the Pacific, and the new preparations laid considerable emphasis on the rehabilitation of the defenses of the west coast. Gradually the bearing of this outlook on relations with the United States became apparent as the leaders in the two countries, for the first time in history, publicly avowed the unitary nature of North American defense. Roosevelt's announcement in 1936 that the United States was prepared to defend itself and its neighborhood against aggression was made explicit in its application to Canada by his pronouncement at Kingston in August 1938. "The Dominion of Canada," he said, "is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire." Three days later, speaking at Woodbridge, Mackenzie King stressed the implication of

this new understanding for Canada. "The people of Canada deeply appreciate all that is implied by the President's visit. At the same time they know that they have their own responsibilities for maintaining Canadian soil as a homeland for free men in the Western Hemisphere. . . . We, too, have our obligations as a good friendly neighbor, and one of them is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably expect to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea, or air to the United States, across Canadian territory." Here was the specific connection between American interests and Canadian freedom, between Canadian defense and American security, which was to be so significant for the future.

II

The atmosphere which existed at the outbreak of war in 1939 was thus very different from that of 1914. Although once again Canada entered the conflict while the United States remained neutral this divergence of policy had already been anticipated and elicited far more understanding on both sides. It was indicative of the new attitude toward Canada and her independent status that the American government accepted her as neutral until she formally declared herself a belligerent. It was a somewhat controversial point whether a British declaration of war automatically involved Canada. It was understandable that the German consul should take what advantage he could of the doubt during the brief period before the Canadian Parliament met to take action. But it was from completely opposite motives that Roosevelt, when proclaiming the neutrality act in force against the belligerents on September 5, deliberately avoided applying it to Canada. It was not until the proclamation of September 10 declared Canada to be in a state of war with Germany that she, too, was brought under the terms of the act.†

†On the question of the technical legality of this procedure Roosevelt is reported to have said that if he had to choose "between hurting the feelings of Canadians or the feelings of the Foreign Office he would take the Foreign Office any day." Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, *American White Paper*, New York, 1940.

On the side of Canada, although there was a natural desire to see the United States in the ranks of the allies, there was a far greater comprehension of her position than there had been in 1914. Roosevelt's neutrality, after all, was very different from Wilson's. He himself deliberately pointed the contrast when he told the people in his radio address on the day war broke out: "This nation will remain a neutral nation. But I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral has a right to take account of facts. Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind and his conscience." Behind this attitude was a public opinion which, in complete contrast to 1914, was thoroughly aware of the developments which had led to war and had made up its mind about the basic issues at stake. The American people wanted to keep out of war, but they also wanted to see Hitler beaten, and that attitude found expression in the unswerving efforts of the President, within the limits of his powers, to lend all aid short of war to the opponents of Germany.

Thus the two nations were in agreement as to objectives if not as to actions. Their solidarity of purpose was given new urgency by the shock of the French collapse in the summer of 1940. To Canada this brought a suddenly augmented demand for efforts on a scale not hitherto envisaged. To the United States it presented the prospect that isolation might become an all too grim reality in the face of the triumphant Axis powers. For both countries there were pressing motives for efforts to bolster British resistance and to strengthen their defensive position on the American continent.

These twin policies were embodied in two steps whose closeness in time suggested at least the possibility of a connection between them. The more startling, to the world at large, was the arrangement by which the United States handed over fifty destroyers to Britain and simultaneously acquired defense bases on British soil. But preceding this, and almost as revolutionary in its significance if not in its actual effect on the progress of events, was the Ogdensburg agreement of August 18, 1940, on joint defense arrangements between Canada and the United States.

This was a logical but by no means an inevitable outcome of the political *rapprochement* of the past five years. As early as

1937, when Mackenzie King visited the White House in March, the topic had been brought under discussion. During his frequent meetings with Roosevelt in subsequent years, on both Canadian and American soil, the subject continued to crop up. But a definite arrangement in peacetime would have attracted considerable criticism in both countries, and even in 1940 it was a startling enough departure. The United States, though still at peace, entered into an agreement which was not far from a military alliance. Canada, jealous of her sovereignty and with a long tradition of suspicion of the United States, made an agreement which opened the possibility of American forces occupying Canadian soil. The terms of the agreement as actually announced were, it is true, far less definite than this. They provided for the creation of a permanent joint defense board to study the whole range of military, naval, and air problems and to "consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere." The phrasing suggested that the functions of the board were chiefly investigatory and that its powers were advisory only. But the deliberate use of the word "permanent" showed that the real intention went beyond this, and King made that intention explicit in his explanation to Parliament on November 12. "The link forged by the Canada-United States defense agreement," he asserted, "is no temporary axis. . . . It is part of the enduring foundation of a new world order, based on friendship and good will."

It was also a fundamental part of the extension of the defense system of the whole hemisphere. Roosevelt, by 1939, had arrived intellectually at the conviction, which was emotionally so important in the Canadian outlook, that American security might be jeopardized by the success of potential adversaries in Europe and had managed in consequence to get himself accused of saying that the American frontier was on the Rhine. Now, however, the truth of that thesis was growing daily more evident, and the United States was taking steps to extend her hemispheric outposts toward Europe (and to reinforce her Alaskan and island bases in the direction of Asia). The acquisition of an American base in Newfoundland was a first step. The agreement in April 1941 which brought Greenland under American protection was

a further advance. The sending of troops a few weeks later to take a share in the occupation of Iceland was still more drastic and unprecedented. The integration of Canada into this new line of Atlantic defenses, whose significance was not solely American but entered into the whole structure which was painfully being built up after the ruins of Dunkirk into a new front against the Axis, was essential to its efficient functioning. It was one of the salient functions of the new defense board to work out the steps by which this could best be accomplished; and although the board itself had no authority to impose its decisions, all evidence indicated that they were accepted and applied by the governments concerned.

The collapse of France transformed not only the strategic situation, but also the whole problem of war production. It threw upon the United States the task of converting the existing industrial structure into the arsenal of democracy. Upon Canada it imposed new burdens of a kind not previously anticipated and which she was unable to undertake without a very considerable reliance on the resources of the United States.

In the early stages of the war Canada's position was inevitably that of an auxiliary to the two principal allies, Britain and France. The program upon which she embarked was conditioned by the existing concepts of grand strategy and of the needs which it involved. In consequence Canada found that she was expected to be chiefly a source of food and raw materials. In her military effort the chief emphasis was to be placed on the production of trained pilots under the Commonwealth Air Training Plan. She might raise in addition some small forces of technicians, but she was not expected to provide an expeditionary force on the scale of the last war. Neither was she expected to embark on the extensive development of war industries. She might be given contracts for a certain amount of small arms and munitions, but British factories were expected to provide most of the tools of war, with some supplementary aid from American industry, and British industrialists were reluctant to turn over their designs to Canadian firms. Canada did, in fact, raise three infantry divisions in the course of the first year and took preliminary steps to establish certain war industries, but the fact that her program was

necessarily co-ordinated with the plans and the needs of Britain was something of a restraint on these activities.

Dunkirk completely altered this situation. Britain, though she had saved her armies, had lost their equipment. With the collapse of France the armies which were to have kept Germany engaged on the continent were swept away. The need for new armies and for the tanks and guns and planes which would enable them to meet the prospective German onslaught was immediate and desperate. The main hope inevitably rested on the industrial capacities of the United States. But the embargo on credits imposed by the neutrality act was a hampering factor until it was partly overcome by the lend-lease arrangements of March 1941, and there were as yet few prospects of American man power being sent to the battle front. In both these respects, therefore, a new reliance was placed on Canadian efforts, and Canada found herself confronted simultaneously with demands for a vastly increased scale of military expansion and war manufactures and credit facilities.

The next year saw tremendous accomplishments in response to these demands. The Air Training Plan was accelerated. The army was expanded to two corps of heavily mechanized shock troops. In the vital battle of the Atlantic Canada took an increasing share in convoy activities and naval patrols. A shipbuilding industry, which before the war employed 1,500 workers, was turning out a 10,000-ton merchant ship every four days by May 1942, in addition to such craft as corvettes and mine sweepers, and had embarked on the construction of destroyers. A completely new set of industries had been created to turn out guns and tanks and airplanes—products which had never before been made in Canada and for which no facilities were previously in existence. In spite of a heavy curtailment of consumer industries, the result was an expansion of Canada's manufacturing activity by 50 per cent.

This meant increasing imports from the United States. It was from that source that Canada drew a number of vital products such as steel and coal and oil and machine tools, without which her industrial effort must have collapsed. The results were a rapid rise of imports from the United States with no corresponding

rise in exports to balance it and a problem of American exchange which steadily increased in gravity. Some attempt was made to reduce the increasingly adverse balance by prohibiting the importation of a long list of consumer goods which were regarded as luxuries or which could be obtained in Canada or from Britain. But these measures could not fill the gap, which by 1941 amounted to a prospective deficit of over \$400,000,000. British gold shipments, which had previously taken care of the greater part—though not the whole—of Canadian purchases on Britain's account, came to an end in 1940; yet Canada's need for supplies from the United States to fill British orders continued to increase, as did Canadian credits to Britain—a position emphasized by Canada's decision to make an outright gift of \$1,000,000,000 in 1942. "Our United States dollar position," said the Finance Minister in March of that year, "is still a major cause of concern. I stress this point because our United States dollar problem and our need of foreign exchange are in part a direct consequence of our assistance to Great Britain."

By that time, indeed, the exchange position would have been hopeless if it had not been for the progress toward economic integration which paralleled and supplemented the agreement on common defense. Following the adoption of the lend-lease program consideration was turned to "measures by which the most prompt and effective utilization might be made of the productive facilities of North America for the purpose both of local hemisphere defense and of the assistance which in addition to their own program both Canada and the United States are rendering to Great Britain and the other democracies." This dual end was met by the provisions of the Hyde Park agreement on April 20, 1941. Canada herself was not brought under the lend-lease arrangement, but it was agreed that the supplies which she needed from the United States in order to produce supplies for Great Britain would be entered on Britain's lend-lease account. With regard to her own direct requirements, payment in cash was to be supplemented by payment in kind. A Canada which needed machine tools and airplane engines would continue to acquire them in the United States. A United States which was expanding the demand for small arms and ammunition, as well

as for more spectacular weapons, would acquire some of them from a Canada which had now built up a surplus capacity in these lines. Thus instead of duplicating their expansion, the two countries would integrate it by concentrating on the defense articles which each was best able to produce. The arrangement would relieve Canada's exchange problem to the extent of some \$250,000,000—almost the equivalent of the annual interest payments to holders of Canadian securities in the United States. It was a sum that was small in relation to America's total war program, but it eased for Canada a strain which otherwise would soon have become unbearable.

This agreement was simply the prelude to still more extensive efforts at co-ordination. The continued expansion in both countries and the problem of priorities in the matter of supplies, which was the result, led to the appointment of the Materials Co-ordinating Committee on May 1. This body, working in close touch with the Office of Production Management in the United States and the Department of Munitions and Supply in Canada, undertook the oversight of the movement of raw materials and the distribution of supplies and of electric power. A more extensive task was allotted to the Joint War Production Committee which was set up on November 5. Its duties were to eliminate wasteful overlapping through a survey of the existing production capacities of both nations which would facilitate the maximum use of the joint resources for the purposes of defense. Its influence was seen in the declaration of policy issued on December 22 which virtually amounted to a pooling of the raw materials on the continent and their allocation "in such a way as to permit maximum war production irrespective of national boundaries." To implement this principle arrangements were made early in 1942 for the mutual suspension of tariffs on defense materials and the removal as far as possible of legislative and administrative barriers to the free flow of essential supplies. And a still-wider step toward effective integration was achieved at the same time when the scope of the Materials Co-ordination Committee was extended by the creation of a British body to participate in its activities. In effect, this was not so much a tripartite arrangement as a new relation between British and

North American production plans, and in the title "Joint Materials Co-ordination Board of the United States-Canada and Great Britain" the position of the hyphen was not the least interesting feature.

Meanwhile another body with equally suggestive possibilities had come into being. On June 17 an advisory body called the Joint Economic Committees came into being. This was composed of two separate committees, meeting together to survey existing resources and to explore the possibilities of more effective co-operation and carrying their recommendations back to their respective governments. But their functions were not limited to the existing crisis. They were also charged with "reducing the probable post-war economic dislocation consequent upon the changes which the economy in each country is presently undergoing." This was a clear indication of the intention of the two countries to carry their wartime integration over into the field of planning for peace and to continue the use of their joint resources on a continental scale for their mutual benefit after the more immediate emergency had come to an end.

An indication of this approach, on a more limited scale but in a matter of major interest, had been given earlier in 1941 by the signing of the St. Lawrence waterway agreement. The idea of a seaway into the heart of the continent, which would make the Great Lakes an American Mediterranean, had been under discussion ever since 1912. Its attractiveness as a step on behalf of navigation and commerce was powerfully supplemented by the possibilities of extensive hydroelectric power development which were involved in the project. But its realization called for international agreement and co-operation, for although in theory something might be achieved by unilateral action, the scheme in its fullest form necessitated joint undertakings on the international section of the St. Lawrence.

A project of such magnitude was inevitably studded with controversial features. The commercial usefulness of the project and the amount of power which it would produce were both topics of prolonged argument. Engineers disagreed extensively about the prospective costs. Local interests supported or opposed it according to their views of its effect on their own for-

tunes. (Montreal, for example, saw the possibility that ships would pass her by instead of using her as a point of transshipment.) Railroads and private power interests fought against the new competition which the St. Lawrence development was expected to produce. Thus, although a treaty providing for its undertaking was signed in 1932, neither Hoover nor Roosevelt was able to secure the approval of the Senate. But the matter was revived in 1938 as a result of conversations between Roosevelt and King, and in March 1941 a new agreement was reached which provided for action on the basis of concurrent legislation. Wartime needs provided an added argument for speedy action, and the prospects of industrial development fostered by cheap electric power promised a new factor in the integration of the two communities if the hopes of the advocates of the waterway were realized.

Thus when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, followed by the German and Italian declarations of war, brought the United States fully into the conflict a continental system of war economy and military defense was in process of creation. On the defense side it presented both countries with a situation which, though it had been envisaged for years, neither had faced in its previous history. For the first time the United States confronted an actual danger that its continental territory on the Pacific might be an object of enemy attack. For the first time in a century and a half Canada had seriously to guard against an invasion from overseas. On previous occasions she had seen her land frontiers menaced by the United States, but not since the British conquest of Canada had her shores been threatened by any other enemy. But although Britain could keep her foes occupied at a distance in Europe she could not simultaneously do the same against an Asiatic adversary. Moreover, while Japan might show little interest in Canada for her own sake, she might easily contemplate an effort to use Canada as an avenue of attack on the United States. For the first time since the United States ceased to be an enemy Canada felt her soil endangered by the very fact that the United States had become her friend.

This raised the problem not merely of protecting Canada's west coast, but of assuring an effective defense from California to

Alaska. The whole area was a single problem in defense, in which political boundaries had only a minor meaning. Mackenzie King announced that Canadian troops would serve where they would be most useful, irrespective of the boundary, and it was a fair presumption that American troops envisaged and would be accorded equal freedom of movement.

Already steps had been taken under recommendations by the Joint Defense Board to co-ordinate facilities for defense and particularly to provide more effective communications with Alaska. Neither roads nor railroads connected the United States with that northern possession. Sea communications up the west coast were slow and potentially vulnerable. A commercial air line existed, but its airfields were too far apart to be used by fighter planes. As a result the construction of a chain of air bases was undertaken on Canadian soil, providing a route east of the Rockies away from the coastal fogs and relatively immune from enemy air attacks. At the same time the project for an Alaskan highway was brought under serious consideration. This project had been raised on previous occasions without any positive results. There was some opposition in Canada to the granting of a military road to a foreign power, and controversies over the most desirable route were accentuated by local rivalries. At the end of February 1942, however, the Joint Defense Board recommended that a start should immediately be made, though without expressing any opinion as to the route. The United States War Department decided for an inland route which would follow or parallel the existing chain of air bases—a gigantic construction project through 1,200 miles of unsettled and unsurveyed territory, where mountains and muskeg presented serious engineering problems to be overcome. On March 6 agreement on the highway was announced, and the terms were embodied in a later exchange of notes. The construction and its cost were to be undertaken by the United States. Canada was to acquire the right of way and to afford all facilities, and at the conclusion of the war the road was to be handed back to her control, subject only to the free passage of goods between the United States and Alaska. It was one more strand in the growing bonds which the two nations were so rapidly creating between them.

III

The new integration which was thus proceeding apace held the most profound implications for the future. It was a tangible recognition by Canada and the United States of their interdependence in confronting a world crisis. It extended not merely to the military aspects of defense, but to that mobilization of the national resources which was a necessity in total war and which enlisted the co-ordinated facilities of their joint manpower and productive abilities, not only on behalf of their own armed efforts, but in support of the United Nations with whom they had made common cause. For this overmastering purpose the long-standing barriers between them had been breached at vitally important points. Never since 1776 had the two countries come closer to acting as a single community, and the effects would not completely disappear with the coming of peace.

Yet there were serious modifying factors to be kept in view. The pooling of raw materials, the abandonment of tariff barriers in the interests of war production, the widespread interlocking of resources and industrial capacity would not be easily undone. The post-war plans of the Joint Economic Committees would be tremendously facilitated by these initial accomplishments. Yet it had to be recognized that the integration was by no means comprehensive. On the contrary, it was distinctly selective and was applied to activities whose importance might seriously diminish with the restoration of peacetime conditions. Against this was the fact that the normal type of peacetime contact had been deliberately curtailed. New barriers had been raised by import restrictions and exchange regulations. The obstacles to ordinary business contacts and to the exchange of civilian commodities were greater than ever. It was not impossible that new vested interests might be found entrenched behind these walls when the time came to abandon the stress on co-operation for war purposes and to transfer the spirit which had animated such efforts to the more complex and less urgent field of peacetime consumption and exchange.

The future alone can provide the answer to such questions. One thing, however, is clear. The continued progress of con-

tinental integration in North America will be profoundly affected by the attitude which the North American nations adopt toward the outside world. They have hitherto been prone (Canada, with her external connections, perhaps less so than the United States) to consider their relations largely in terms of their immediate domestic interests. That viewpoint will no longer suffice. Those interests themselves cannot be divorced from world conditions or from questions of external policy and their effect on the post-war world.

For the world of 1942 is paying the accumulated price of an era of evasions. The chance for a sane and stable world order was presented in the years after 1919. It was rejected with a determined and almost universal lack of foresight. In consequence the Americas, together with the other United Nations, have been forced into a desperate struggle for the very existence of those basic values which their negative policy helped to jeopardize. They are now buying a second chance, and buying it at a terrible price. There would be no surer road to a second failure than an insistence on immediate advantages or temporary gains at the price of ultimate and essential objectives.

The decision to no small extent rests with the Western world. The political center of gravity has shifted to North America, and in particular to Washington. The implications of that development go far beyond the present war. An exhausted Europe cannot undertake by itself the colossal task of creating a brave new world. It must invoke the aid of the American continent with its tremendous resources and its unravaged facilities and its reserves in man power and productive capacity and political energy. The Americas, on their part, have a vital interest in aiding in that work. They can no longer hope for immunity from the consequences of anarchy in the rest of the world. They can no longer believe that anarchy can be ended without their active co-operation. Cincinnatus undoubtedly had many admirable qualities, but he is hardly an appropriate model for the greatest industrial community on the face of the earth.

But however inexorable may be the logic against a renewed attempt at isolation, that may not necessarily prevent its being tried, however disastrous the ultimate results. In this respect the

decision of the United States is vital not only to the world at large, but to the narrower prospects for future relations within the North American continent. Theoretically it might be possible to combine an aloofness from general world politics with the continued progress of hemispheric solidarity. Practically it is a most unlikely development. Paradoxically enough, it would be more possible for Canada in spite of her traditional European connections. Her interests during the past century have impelled her to increasing emphasis on relations with the United States, and if a choice were forced upon her she might be able to contemplate a closer integration with her continental neighbor and a corresponding weakening of other ties. The choice would be made reluctantly, but it is not wholly inconceivable. The size and strength of the United States, however, place her in a different position. Behind any determination to renounce external political entanglements would be the forces of economic isolationism, and it seems unlikely that they would distinguish between their American neighbors and other foreigners. It is more probable that they would lead to a return by the United States to the attitude of the paramount power—the attitude expressed by Olney in his declaration that his country's fiat was law upon this continent—and the result would be a raising once more of those barriers which the present trend, in certain important respects, has begun to demolish.

If, however, Canada and the United States accept their responsibilities in the new world order their own relations will be profoundly affected. The forces of sectionalism which have dominated the continent for a century and a half will be further weakened relative to the unifying factors which have so recently come into play. There is no suggestion that this will mean political unity except under irresistible pressure. But just as Canada and the other Dominions have worked out within the British Commonwealth a new relationship which harmonizes the fullest independence with a completely free association, so Canada and the United States may yet discover a harmony between their distinct national identity and their wide and growing range of common interests.

That is a development which would be aided by a more mature

independence on the part of Canada toward the United States and Britain, coupled with a full recognition of the value of her position in its relation to both these powers. It is somewhat indicative of the present balance of attraction that Canada should hold aloof from the Pacific Council set up in London but should accept a seat on the body which shortly afterward was established in Washington. For while her connection with Britain will not necessarily be weakened after the war, their relationship will inevitably be changed. The statement of the Balfour report of 1926 that equality of status within the Commonwealth does not universally extend to function, while not yet invalidated, will lose some of its original significance. The exhaustion of Britain after the war will make it difficult for the Dominions any longer to assume her readiness and ability to undertake her former world-wide obligations on their behalf. The negative policy toward relations with the mother country, which Canada in particular tended to pursue before the war, will have to be replaced by a more definite readiness to formulate and implement policies if the imperial connection is to retain any reality. Canada has insisted on full national status within the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is most likely to survive if the full responsibilities of nationhood are recognized and accepted.

The same is true of her new relationship with the United States. The evolution of the modern Commonwealth, involving as it did the transformation of the old imperial structure, presented a study in legal relationships and in political experimentation whose novelty, quite apart from its bearing on imperial unity, attracted widespread attention. No such features enter into the new integration of Canada and the United States. Yet it is not impossible that the King-Roosevelt policies, if their implications are followed out in future developments, may be one of the salient landmarks in the evolution of the American continent. With little ostentation they have traced the salient lines of a process which holds the possibility of replacing the unquiet attitudes of the past with a mutual trust and co-operation, based on the realization that political separatism is not only no insuperable barrier, but may even be an asset, to the free partnership

of nations who are animated by common ideals and possessed of a common heritage.

That can only be achieved by common consent. A Canada which chooses a narrow and divergent path, a United States which returns to the self-sufficient aspirations of economic nationalism can stultify its possibilities. But broad vision and a comprehensive good will on both sides can foster the steady growth of a relationship whose effects will be felt far beyond the borders of the two nations directly concerned. A Canada which acts and is accepted as an adult in relation to both London and Washington can have a profound effect on both of them. Harmony between them is essential to her own well-being. It is no less desirable to Britain and the United States. Canada is traditionally in a position to encourage that relationship. But her success is likely to be greater if she is willing and is permitted to act not as a satellite of either, or even as an intermediary between them, but as a partner whose policies spring from her own initiative and are based on a clear and reasoned conviction of where her own interests lie. That is the ideal which Mackenzie King voiced in his speech describing the Ogdensburg agreement as an element in a new world order based on friendship and good will. "In the furtherance of this new world order," he said, "Canada, in liaison between the British Commonwealth and the United States, is fulfilling a manifest destiny." It is a concept which, far more than the older vision of destiny which no longer seems so manifest, holds an enduring hope for the welfare of the world.

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